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
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**THE**  
**INVASION OF THE CRIMEA.**







## EXPLANATION.

---

- A. *The Malakoff.*
- B. *The Redan.*
- C. *The Flagstaff Bastion.*
- D. *The Central Bastion.*
- E. *The (land) Quarantine Bastion.*

- G.G. *The English Camp.*
- H. *The Right of the French Camp.*
- R. *The spot from which Lord Raglan reconnoitred Sebastopol on the 25<sup>th</sup> Sept.*

- 1. *Fort Constantine & adjoining Batteries.*
- 2. *Telegraph Battery.*
- 3. *Fort Michael.*
- 4. *The Severnaya or Star Fort.*
- 5. *Batteries called Number Four.*
- 6. *West Lighthouse.*
- 7. *East Lighthouse.*
- 8. *Russian Ships.*
- 9. *Fort St Paul.*
- 10. *The Karabel Faubourg.*
- 11. *Basins and Docks.*
- 12. *Hospital.*

- 13. *Prisons.*
- 14. *Man of War Harbour.*
- 15. *Roadstead.*
- 16 & 17. *Fort St Nicholas.*
- 18. *Artillery Fort.*
- 19. *Fort Alexander.*
- 20. *Quarantine Sea-Fort.*
- 22. *Cemetery.*
- 23. *Port and Buildings of the Quarantine.*
- 24. *Buoys shewing the Reefs.*
- 25. *River Tchernaya.*
- 26. *Carriage Port.*

*The line of sunken Ships (which does not appear in the drawing) stretches across the entrance of the Roadstead from the Reef beneath Fort Constantine to the one beneath Fort Alexander. The Quins stretched from the Reef beneath Fort Michael to the one beneath Fort Nicholas.*

### NOTE

*It must not be understood that this drawing should be regarded as a strictly accurate representation; but it may aid the endeavours of those who desire to have a general conception of the appearance which Sebastopol might present under a "Birds eye View" from the West; It is based upon a Print published in Paris which purported to reproduce a drawing prepared for the Emperor Nicholas; but the representation of the Malakoff shows marks of a non Russian origin because the work is made to look like what the Allies supposed it to be i.e. a round tower, whereas it was in part of a horse shoe form.*

THE  
INVASION OF THE CRIMEA:  
ITS ORIGIN,  
AND  
AN ACCOUNT OF ITS PROGRESS  
DOWN TO THE DEATH OF  
LORD RAGLAN.

By ALEXANDER WILLIAM KINGLAKE.

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# INVASION OF THE CRIMEA.

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## CHAPTER I.

WHEN the fighting on the banks of the Alma had ceased along the whole line, more than one of the English generals prayed hard that their troops might be suffered to come down and bivouac near the bank of the stream, for the labour already undergone by the men had been so great, that it was painful to have them distressed by the toil of going a long way for water, and fetching it up to the heights. But not choosing to loose his hold of ground carried at no small cost of life, Lord Raglan was steadfast in his resistance to all these entreaties, and ordered that his troops should bivouac upon the heights they had won.

CHAP.  
I.

Disposition of the Allied armies after the battle of the Alma.

With the sanction of his chief, General Airey placed our infantry for the night in a line of columns on the heights, with the artillery in rear of each column; and the disposition of these two arms had been so contrived that, although the artillery was covered, yet at any moment, and without there being any need of moving the infantry, the guns could be rapidly



**C H A P.** brought to the front, and placed in battery between  
**I** the columns. In this order, and having a portion of the cavalry covering the rear, with the rest of our horsemen on its left flank, the English army bivouacked for the night.

When General Martimprey learnt that this plan had been adopted by the English, he was so well pleased with it that he resolved to advise a like disposition of the French army.

During the battle, the waggons which followed the English army had, of course, been kept far enough in the rear to be, for the most part, out of fire ; but when the fighting had ceased, they were brought down towards the bridge, and soon became so crowded as to breed much confusion. For hours, and even, I think, all night, men were eagerly seeking after others whom none could help them to find.

Continued  
prevalence  
of the  
cholera  
during the  
night.

On the night which followed the battle, men were sickening and dying of cholera in numbers as great as before.

State of  
the field  
after the  
battle.

That which lay in the sight of the troops when the fight on the Alma had ceased was new to the bulk of the soldiery, and, in one feature, new to all. In general, the warring armies of Europe have been followed by a hateful swarm, who make it their livelihood to hover upon the march of the regiments, alighting at last upon a field of battle, that they may rifle the dead and the wounded. And there comes, too, that other and yet fouler swarm which strips the dead of their clothing and accoutrements with so strange a swiftness, that a field which was speckled and glittering,

at the close of the battle, with the uniforms of CHAP.  
prostrate soldiers, is changed of a sudden to a ghastly I.  
shamble, with little except maimed or dead horses,  
and the buff, naked corpses of men, to show where the  
battle has raged.

But the breadth of the lands and the seas which divided this simple Crim Tartary from the great seats of European vice, had hitherto defeated the baneful energy of those who come out to prey upon armies by selling strong drinks, and robbing the dead and the wounded. Armed and clothed as he stood when, receiving his death-wound he heard the last of the din of battle, so now the soldier lay. Many had been struck in such a manner that their limbs were suddenly stiffened, and this so fixedly, that, although their bodies fell to the ground, their hands and arms remained held in the very posture they chanced to be in at the moment of death.\* This was observed, for the most part, in instances of soldiers who had been on the point of firing at the moment when they were struck dead ; for, where this had happened, the man's hands being thrown forward and fixed in the attitude required for levelling a firelock, they of course stretched upwards towards the heavens when the body fell back upon the ground. These upstretched arms of dead men were ghastly in the eyes of some : others thought they could envy the soldier released at last from

\* Medical men knew, as might be expected, that this catalepsy-like stiffness might now and then result from a gunshot wound ; but I believe they were somewhat surprised at the large proportion of instances in which it occurred.

**CHAP.** his toil, and encountering no moment of interval  
**L** between hard fighting and death.

The bearing of the wounded men.

In general, the undisturbed clothing of the stricken soldiers hid their wounds from a common observer; and it was only here and there—as where a man's head had been partly shot away, or where the skull had been entered by a cannon-ball—that the ugliness of the havoc was obtruded upon the sight. For the most part, the wounded men lay silent. Now and then a man would gently ask for water, or would seek to know when it was likely that he would be moved and cared for; but, in general, the wounded were so little inclined to be craving after help or sympathy, that for dignity and composure they were almost the equals of the dead.

Effect of the scene upon the mind of the soldiers.

The evil of keeping the soldiers on the site of the battle.

Still, although there was nothing in the field of the battle which could mar the dignity of war, the sight was of a kind to press hurtfully upon the imagination of young soldiers. For such troops it was an ill thing to be kept a long time together in the contemplation of a field strewn with dead and wounded; and this the more because the sight went to make a man question the cause of the slaughter in his own corps. None can wonder if the survivors of the Light Division men who had stormed the redoubt were inclined to let their thoughts dwell upon the nature of the trial to which they had been exposed, and even, in some regiments, to comment, and say, 'We 'were sacrificed.'\* In such questionings there is danger.

Feeling disclosed by soldiers of the Light Division.

\* I myself, in passing, heard this the day after the battle. The sen-

That priceless confidence which sustains the accom- CHAP.  
plished soldier, and gives him the mastery in battle, I.  
is, after all, a sentiment of a tender and delicate kind,  
which may be easily weakened or destroyed, if he  
comes to believe that his regiment has been mis-  
handled in a bloody encounter; and it could not but  
happen that regiments which had suffered great losses  
would be encouraged in the indulgence of a sinister  
criticism by keeping them long on the ground where  
their comrades lay maimed and slaughtered.\*

On the day after the battle, the hundreds of Russians The  
who lay wounded on the English part of the field had wounded  
been brought to a sheltered spot of ground near the Russians.  
river.† There, they were laid down in even, parallel  
ranks, and in such manner that the surface they covered  
with their prostrate bodies was a large symmetrical  
oblong. The ground where they lay was at some  
short distance from the Headquarters camp, and but  
little exposed to view. From this, and from other The ne-  
circumstances, it happened that not only the wound- glect to  
ed Russians, but also the English soldiers mounting which, for  
guard at the spot, were forgotten, and left without a time,  
food for many hours. But happily there was a man they were  
subjected.

tence was uttered in a group of private soldiers belonging to one of the regiments of the Light Division.

\* Many will recognise the high authority which is my warrant for venturing this remark, and for insisting on the danger to which the *morale* of the Light Division was exposed by its experience on the day of the Alma. Over, and over, and over again, Lord Clyde used to say that no troops in the world could be subjected to such a trial without undergoing a ruinous loss of soldierly confidence.

† The number, I believe, was about 500; but it was estimated, and on some authority, at 750.

C H A P. at Headquarters whose sense of honour and duty  
I. was supported by a strong will, by resistless energy,  
and a soundness of judgment and command of temper rarely united with great activity. Romaine came to know that these poor wounded Russians were lying untended, and he judged that, unless they were cared for, there would be a lasting blot upon the honour of the English name. An officer of the common stamp who had got to be possessed with such a feeling would have cheaply discharged his conscience by making a communication to Lord Raglan, or some other 'proper authority.' It was not so that the task was passed on, and got rid of. Knowing the weight of the cares pressing upon the chief, Romaine did not appeal to Lord Raglan, but began to act himself, giving no repose to any whose aid he needed, but disturbing nobody else. Under the power of his generous indignation and strong will all lethargy slowly gave way; and, having obtained four hundred pounds of biscuit, and the number of hands that were needed to aid him in the undertaking, he toiled at his good work until there was no one in all those prostrate ranks of wounded men who had not been tended with the offer of food and water. It was from seven in the evening until half-past eleven at night that he thus laboured. At the time, his exceeding zeal made him seem to be acting for the honour of some great cause much more than from tender pity; but what he felt he has owned and recorded: 'It was the most painful act,' he says, 'I ever had to perform. Some of the faces were terrible and ghastly from wounds, and hardly had

Mr Romaine's exertions for their relief.

‘ mouths to eat or drink with. They were faces to  
 ‘ haunt one in sleep.’ One young man in the centre  
 of a rank of prostrate soldiers sat up, and succeeded in  
 causing himself to be distinguished as an officer; and  
 although there were few or none amongst the other  
 sufferers who could speak any tongue but their own,  
 there was a plaintive melody in the sound of the words  
 they uttered which served to convey to a stranger an  
 idea of their gentleness and gratitude. There were  
 some who, in cheerful tones, declined to prolong life  
 by eating, and asked instead for a light. Sankey, of  
 the Quartermaster-General’s department, entered into  
 Romaine’s feeling with great warmth, and not only  
 shared with him in the bodily labour of tending the  
 sufferers, but helped to overcome the difficulty that  
 there is in wringing new kinds of exertion from people  
 who are over-much regulated. Of course, the English  
 sentries, who had been left for a time without food,  
 were at once supplied with biscuit; but it did not at  
 all delight them to have the mere staff of life without  
 any of what they regarded as the more cheering part  
 of their rations.

C H A P.  
 I.

Aid ren-  
 dered also  
 by Major  
 Sankey.

There was no enemy’s force at hand to whom the  
 care of these wounded Russians could be given up;  
 and, within the period of the halt on the Alma, it was  
 not practicable for the English to do more than get  
 their own wounded men on board ship. So when, on  
 the morning of the 23d, the Allies resumed their ad-  
 vance, the wounded Russians were left where they  
 lay on the banks of the Alma, in charge of a medical  
 officer. As soon as might be, they were to be got on

These  
 wounded  
 Russians  
 left on the  
 Alma.

C H A P. board ship and sent to some Russian port under a flag  
 of truce.

Painful  
 task im-  
 posed  
 upon Dr  
 Thompson  
 and his  
 servant  
 M'Grath.

It fell to the lot of Dr Thompson, assistant-surgeon of the 44th Regiment, to be left with the charge of these sufferers in a country abandoned to the enemy.\* He kept with him his servant, a soldier named John M'Grath, but no other was left to take part with him in the performance of the forlorn duty that he had to fulfil.† In the event of a Russian force coming upon this surgeon and his attendant whilst left alone with their charge, the best fate they could hope for was that of being prisoners of war; but unless their idea of the modern 'Cossacks' was other than that which commonly obtained in the Allied armies, they must have believed themselves to be in more or less danger of barbarous treatment.‡

\* I have always understood that Dr Thompson was *ordered* upon this painful duty, but the language of Captain Lushington rather leads to the inference that Dr Thompson had *volunteered* the service. See the next note.

† Captain Lushington to Admiral Dundas, 27th September 1854. Captain Lushington speaks of Dr Thompson, with his servant M'Grath, as having 'remained alone in an enemy's country, without tent or 'accommodation of any sort, for the sole purpose of alleviating the 'sufferings of 500 of his fellow-creatures.' And Dundas, in reporting the matter to Lord Raglan, speaks of Dr Thompson and his servant as having 'remained by themselves in an open country, without food or 'shelter.'—Dundas to Lord Raglan, official despatch, 30th September 1854. What they needed, however, was the help of their fellow-men, not shelter; and with regard to Dundas's idea of their having been without food, Lord Raglan, I see, with his own hand, has written on the margin opposite to that passage the following words: '*They had food.* R'

‡ It was observed, I think, in a former volume, that the modern Cossacks were obedient regiments of regular cavalry, with nothing of the wild, lawless character which belonged to the Cossacks of 1812; but the fact that this change had occurred was not generally known in the Allied armies.

The arrangement imposing such a service must have been made in the full assurance that there would be no cruel delay in the arrival of succour from the fleet ; but (from causes to me unknown) it did actually happen that, between the time when the army marched off, and the time when succour came, there was an interval of three days and three nights.\* Of the five hundred ghastly and prostrate forms which were left to this one surgeon and his one attendant for their only companions, all were so stricken as to be unable to help to lift a body ; very many were shattered in limb ; very many, still tortured by strong remains of life, were lying on their faces, with their vitals ploughed open by round-shot ; but some were dying more quickly, and others already lay dead.† From time to time during those three days, and to the utmost of their bodily strength, Dr Thompson and his servant laboured to part the dead from the living, to heave the corpses away, and get them more or less underground ; but when, at last, succour came, our seamen had to lift out as many as thirty-nine bodies—some, in part, decomposed—before they could get at the living.‡

When at length, on the morning of the 26th, Captain Lushington of the Albion came up from the shore, and discovered his two fellow-countrymen at their dismal post of duty, he was filled with admira-

Succour brought by Captain Lushington after an interval of three days.

\* From the morning of the 23d to the morning of the 26th. Lushington reached the anchorage late at night on the 25th, and the next morning early went up to the ground where the wounded Russians were lying.—Lushington to Dundas, 27th September 1854.

† Ibid.

‡ Ibid.



C H A P. I. tion of their fortitude, and with sympathy for what they had endured.\*

The wounded Russians, except about fifty of them, got on board ship and sent to Odessa.

All that day, and for five or six hours more on the following morning, the seamen of the Albion and the Vesuvius, being well provided with stretchers, laboured hard, and with cheerful alacrity, at the business of carrying the sufferers on board ship ; and there only remained about fifty of the wounded still lying on the ground, when the appearance of a Russian infantry force, which was judged to be three thousand strong, obliged Captain Lushington to give up the rest of his task.†

The state in which they arrived.

The wounded men carried on board ship were sent to Odessa under a flag of truce ;‡ and the number of those who lived to be thus delivered up to their fellow-countrymen was 342 ;§ but so utter a weakness had prostrated this suffering mass of human beings, that the Governor of Odessa declared it impossible, for the time, to make out by question and answer how many of them were non-commissioned officers and how many private soldiers. ||

\* Ibid. Captain Lushington was despatched on this duty in his ship, the Albion, towed by the Vesuvius, and having the Avon transport in company.

† Ibid. The arrangements made by Captain Lushington for covering the working parties who carried the wounded, and for effecting the orderly retreat of his marines and small-arms men, seem to have been very able and neatly timed.

‡ Dundas to Lord Raglan, private letter, 30th September 1854.

§ Acknowledgment dated 4th September 1854, signed by General Annenkoff, the Governor of Odessa.

|| The Governor says, he does not distinguish the non-commissioned

In his letter to the Governor of Odessa, Dundas had spoken of the surrender of these wounded men as an act dictated by feelings of humanity.\* The answer of the Governor was so stern and cold as to make Dundas remark that it 'might have been more gracious;' † but remembering what was the aspect of those wounded men on the morrow of the battle, and inferring the state they were in at the time of their reaching the port, I can excuse the Governor of Odessa if he angered a little at the sight of the word 'humanity,' and almost thought himself mocked when he was asked to agree that these poor remains of what once had been soldiers, might be considered as 'non-combatants' until they should be exchanged. If Dundas had boarded the *Avon*, and looked on those ruins of human forms with which she was laden, his kindly heart would rather have inclined him to utter his sorrow for the havoc inflicted by war, than to speak as though he were indulging in any act of humanity. ‡

C H A P.

I

The tone taken by the Russian Governor in acknowledging the arrival of the wounded.

officers from the privates, 'par l'impossibilité d'en questionner la plupart dans l'état d'affaiblissement où ils se trouvent.'

\* Dundas to the Governor of Odessa: 'I trust your Excellency will, in the same feeling of humanity, receive and consider them as non-combatants until regularly exchanged.'

† Dundas to Lord Raglan, 30th September 1854. The answer of the Governor to Dundas, 11 September, refers coldly to the acknowledgment—the one above quoted—which he, the Governor, had given; and adds, that he will communicate to the Emperor the arrival of the wounded, and the condition which Dundas annexed to the surrender of them.

‡ To make the act an act of 'humanity,' I suppose something like sacrifice was needed, but there was none. The poor wounded men were simply an encumbrance, which it was convenient to shift off upon the Russians.

CHAP. With only, perhaps, too much truth he might have  
I. palliated any seeming neglect of those poor Russian  
prisoners by alleging the hardships and privations  
which he could not find means to avert from our own  
sick and wounded men.

## CHAPTER II.

WE saw that, at the close of the fight on the Alma, an unwillingness to lengthen the distance between the French and their knapsacks, then lying in the valley below, was the reason avowed by St Arnaud for withstanding Lord Raglan's desire to advance at once in pursuit; but, unless there were some other and heavier shackle which still held back the Allies, there could hardly be room for question that, on the morrow of the battle at latest, it would be well for them to push forward and follow up their victory. Yet they lingered on the ground they had won for the whole of two clear days. The reason why they thus remained halted must not be kept in concealment.\*

CHAP.  
II.

Importance of a prompt advance after the victory won by the Allies.

It had hitherto been taken for granted that the Allies were to march upon the Severnaya, or north

Inquiry into the cause of

\* Both in his official and private correspondence with the Home Government, Lord Raglan is silent as to the causes of the halt on the Alma, and neither records his endeavours to bring Marshal St Arnaud to march upon the position of the Star Fort, nor the Marshal's refusal to do so. As to the cause of this reserve I shall hazard my surmise in a future chapter (see chap. xi.) It is fortunate that the silence of the English Commander has been in some measure compensated by other testimony.

## CHAP.

## II.

the protracted halt on the Alma. (See the Map.)

Lord Raglan's opinion in favour of an immediate advance.

The reasoning of Lord Raglan and of Sir Edmund Lyons.

Steps taken by Lord Raglan for giving effect to his opinion.

side of Sebastopol ; and—not at first harbouring the thought that Marshal St Arnaud would swerve from the purpose with which the Allies had come out—Lord Raglan deemed it to be of great moment to press on, and at once attack the northern forts, without giving the enemy time to recover from the blow which had felled him. As expressed—not in language originating with Lord Raglan himself, but by his declared concurrence in the statement of opinion submitted to him by Sir Edmund Lyons,—Lord Raglan conceived ‘ that the character of the whole expedition was that ‘ of a surprise, that it was undertaken without accurate knowledge of the strength of the enemy or their ‘ resources, and that in great measure they [the Allies] ‘ still remained ignorant on these points ; that all they ‘ knew positively was, that the victory at Alma had ‘ been a heavy blow to them, and that the best chance ‘ of continued success was to follow it up rapidly, and ‘ try and take the Northern Forts by a *coup-de-main*.’\*

In order to give effect to his desire for an advance on the morrow, and to concert the movement with the naval chiefs, the English Commander had, on the day which followed the battle, sent a note to Sir Ed-

\* MS. Memorandum of a conversation held with Sir Edmund Lyons on the 10th of February 1856, by Mr George Loch. The memorandum was placed in Sir Edmund's hands on the same day, and after he had read it over, he returned it with a statement that it was correct, and, a note stating that approval having been forthwith made, the paper became, upon the death of Sir Edmund Lyons, a valuable and authentic record. Its value was increased by the corroboration which was given to it in writing by the late Duke of Newcastle.—See Appendix, where will be found all that portion of the memorandum which relates to affairs touched in this and the next volume.

mund Lyons, requesting him to come up to the English Headquarters at eight o'clock the next morning ;\* but the peremptory orders of Admiral Dundas prevented Sir Edmund's compliance with the request until after mid-day ;† and before Lord Raglan and Lyons were destined to have their interview, counsels opposite to those they judged right had not only prevented that immediate resumption of the forward march which they both deemed to be of great moment, but had brought into question and seeming jeopardy the whole plan and fate of the expedition.

Marshal St Arnaud and Lord Raglan had met ; and the purport of what passed between them, as conveyed by Lord Raglan to Sir Edmund Lyons, was this : Convinced of the policy of an immediate advance, and an attack of the Northern Forts, Lord Raglan pressed his opinion upon the French Marshal, and ' proposed to him at once to advance on the Belbec, ' cross that river, and then assault the forts.'‡

In answer to this proposal for an immediate advance and attack upon the Northern Forts, Marshal St Arnaud said that ' his troops were tired, and that ' it could not be done.'§

\* Lyons's recollection seems to have placed these circumstances at a time one day earlier than that which I assign to them ; but his notes to Lord Raglan, now lying before me, show that he must have been mistaken.

† These were orders founded on the report—a false report—that seven Russian men-of-war had slipped out of Sebastopol and sailed (apparently) for Odessa. Lyons with the steam squadron was ordered to pursue.

‡ The MS. memorandum mentioned in note, *ante*, p. 14.

§ Ibid.

C H A P.  
II.

Meeting between Marshal St Arnaud and Lord Raglan. Lord Raglan presses his opinion upon the French Marshal, and proposes an immediate advance on the Belbec, with a view to attack the North Forts. Marshal St Arnaud refuses.

## CHAP.

## II.

Lord Raglan's vexation.

Lord Raglan, as may be supposed, 'was disappointed by this answer,' and 'could not,' he said, 'understand it; for he knew that the troops could not be tired, and that there must be some other reason for the Marshal's answer.'\*

Lord Raglan has a second interview with St Arnaud, and again presses for an advance across the Belbec.

St Arnaud's refusal.

After this, Lord Raglan had another interview with Marshal St Arnaud, at which he exerted his power of persuasion in 'again urging the French General to advance across the Belbec;' but in reply the Marshal now said: 'He had ascertained that the Russians had thrown up strong earthworks on the banks of the river; and though he did not doubt that the Allies could force them, as they had the works on the Alma, they could not afford the loss that would be entailed.'†

Lord Raglan's dejection of spirits.

In his power of warding off or concealing every access of despondency which might be hurtful to the public service, Lord Raglan stood above other men; but even he could not hide—not, at least, from his friend Sir Edmund Lyons—the dejection of spirits which was brought upon him by Marshal St Arnaud's refusal to go on with the campaign as hitherto planned.‡ And, indeed, the conjuncture was a painful one. I have never learnt that the Marshal proposed any alternative plan; and for a while the pause of the Allies was not a mere halt. The enterprise stopped.

\* The MS. memorandum mentioned in note, *ante*, p. 14. My surmise as to what the other reason was will be given in chap. iv.

† Ibid.

‡ Sir Edmund says he 'found him (Lord Raglan) in low spirits. On asking him the cause, he (Lord Raglan) said' [then follows the account of Lord Raglan's second interview with St Arnaud as above given].





\_\_\_\_\_

It might seem that now once more—and this, too, CHAP.  
II.  
on the morrow of a victory—the expedition was in danger of coming to an end; but if Lord Raglan had undertaken a venturesome campaign in loyal obedience to the desire of the Queen's Government rather than to his own judgment, for that very reason perhaps he was the more steadfast in his resolve to overcome or elude all obstacles: and the moment he found himself encountered by this sudden recusancy at the French Headquarters, he sought and perceived a way by which his continued persistence in the enterprise against Sebastopol could be made to consist with St Arnaud's refusal to go on and attack the North Forts. Lord Raglan, indeed, had not yet abandoned the hope that this refusal might be withdrawn; but, for the time, he had to deal with it as a decision which was only too likely to be adhered to: and accordingly, but only on the supposition that St Arnaud might really persist in refusing to attack the North Forts, Lord Raglan proposed for consideration a plan of campaign which would relieve the Allies from the duty of having to march against the northern defences, by transferring the theatre of war from the western to the southern coast. Of the counsels which ended in a resolve to adopt this new plan of campaign I shall have to speak by-and-by,\* and it is only in the process of accounting for the halt on the Alma that I stay to glance at them here.

His determination to push on the enterprise.

As an alternative to which the Allies were reduced by St Arnaud's refusal to attack the North Forts, Lord Raglan proposes to march to the south coast.

Upon the question thus raised there was no need for the Allies to come to their final and absolute deci-

The Allies, whilst still on the Alma,

\* *Post*, chap. iv. See the Map.

C H A P.  
II.

were re-  
solved to  
prepare for  
the event-  
uality of  
their ulti-  
mately  
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Cause of  
the halt  
on the  
Alma.

The way  
in which  
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tended to  
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the halt.

sion until they should be in the neighbourhood of the Belbec ; but whilst they were still on the Alma they apparently determined that nothing but a return to the old plan of attacking the North Forts should prevent them from adopting Lord Raglan's conditional proposal : and this determination carried them so far towards an actual adoption of the measure, that already their merely inchoate approval of it began to govern their movements.

The way in which these changes of plan detained the Allies on the Alma will now be perceived. So far as concerns the earlier period of the halt, it resulted of necessity from Marshal St Arnaud's refusal to go on and attack the North Forts ; for between the time of the refusal and the conditional acceptance of Lord Raglan's alternative proposal, the Allies were without any purpose sufficing to guide their steps ; and when at length, by persisting in his refusal, the Marshal constrained the Allies to entertain a measure involving the abandonment of the western coast, he drove them to an alternative which still further lengthened the halt.

It is easy to see how the idea of abandoning the western coast carried with it a prolongation of the halt on the Alma. The number of the wounded was so great, that the labour of getting them on board could not but fill a good deal of time, and it was of necessity that this operation should be covered by the presence of a sufficient force. Now, if the Allies had been firmly persisting in their determination to march against the Severnaya or north side

of Sebastopol, the western coast would have necessarily continued to be the theatre of operations, and in that case it would have been easy for them to go on with their advance the very day after the battle, leaving only a detachment on the Alma to cover the embarkation of the wounded. If, on the other hand, the Allies should determine to abandon the western coast, they could not well venture to leave there an isolated detachment; and the business of embarking the wounded must either go on without the presence of any land forces to cover the operation, or else the whole Allied army would have to be detained for the purpose; and since the abandonment of the wounded by the land forces was an alternative too painful in its possible consequences to be held worthy of adoption,\* it followed that to harbour the idea of giving up the intended attack on the North Side, and quitting the western coast of the peninsula, was to bring upon the whole Allied army the necessity of a halt on the Alma, and a halt, too, for such a time as would suffice for getting the wounded on board ship.

So, although it is true that the cause of the delay on the Alma was the unwillingness of the French Marshal to go on with the advance against the north side of Sebastopol, still, the halt having once been resolved upon, its duration was made to depend on

C H A P.  
II.

Although the Marshal's unwillingness to attack the Severnaya was the cause of

\* With our present knowledge we may entertain no doubt that the seamen and marines of the Allied navies might have been well able to secure the safe embarkation of the wounded without requiring the support of the land forces; but, at the time, there was not information enough in the Allied camp to warrant such an assumption.

CHAP. the time it would take to have the sick and the  
 II. wounded put on board ship. The French would

the halt,  
 its dura-  
 tion de-  
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 the time  
 needed for  
 embarking  
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 wounded.

Time  
 required  
 by the  
 French.

Time  
 required  
 by the  
 English.

the time it would take to have the sick and the wounded put on board ship. The French would have been able to get their sick and wounded on board in one full day. On the other hand, the number of the wounded English being, as Lord Raglan computed, just three times greater than that of the French, and the ground whence they had to be moved being very much farther from the shore, it soon became certain that at least two days of ceaseless labour would have to be gone through before the English would be able to bury their dead, and to get all their sick and wounded on board.

The zeal  
 and devo-  
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 and men  
 of the  
 navy in  
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The part  
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 our sea-  
 men in  
 removing  
 the sick  
 and  
 wounded,  
 and get-  
 ting them  
 on board  
 ship.

Even within the two full days, the work could not have been done without bringing to bear upon it surpassing exertions. Nothing short of the energy and the tenderness of the sailors would have sufficed. Admiral Dundas devoted all his medical officers to the care of the sick and wounded who lay on the field; and in the duty of removing these sufferers, and bringing them on board ship, as well as in that of landing stores, he employed all his boats, and no less than a thousand of his seamen.\* Every soldier prostrate with wounds or sickness was a difficult load, which had to be carried by the strength of men for a distance of three or four miles; but the sailors toiled, and toiled with a generous, exuberant zeal which left them no rest till the work was achieved. Deep, indeed, as Lord Raglan declared, was his 'feeling of 'gratitude' to the sailors for these kindly services, and he owned that he had been singularly

\* Admiral Dundas to Admiralty, 27th C

observing the devotion with which naval officers took part in the bodily labour of lifting and carrying the wounded soldiers.\*

CHAP.  
II

Of the whole number of wounded English, amounting, as we saw, in number to more than sixteen hundred, a large proportion were so stricken as to be helpless; but besides, there were the sufferers who lay upon the ground cast down and disabled by mortal sickness, and of these there were very many; for—baffling the hopes which medical science had tried, one may say, to harbour—the cholera had proved to be a pestilence which was not to be warded off by the stir and glory of battle.†

The numbers of men stricken with cholera.

Thus, then, the battle having ended before five o'clock on the afternoon of the 20th of September, the Allied armies remained halted on the Alma until the morning of the 23d; and when it is asked why, instead of thus tarrying, they did not resume their advance on the morrow of the battle, the answer, we see, must be like to that which showed why they did not press the enemy's retreat on the afternoon of the fight. The hinderer was Marshal St Arnaud. But the halt having once been resolved upon, it lasted two whole days instead of one, because, though the French could embark all their wounded men in one

The halt on the Alma lasted till the morning of the 23d.

Recapitulation of the circumstances which occasioned it.

\* Lord Raglan to Duke of Newcastle.

† Captain Dacres, the commander of the Sanspareil, and his captain of the forecastle, were but two out of the number of those seamen who generously busied themselves in the kindly duties which they felt imposed upon them by the painful scenes of the battle-field; who had died of cholera during

October 1863.

C H A P.

## II.

Although Marshal St Arnaud's refusal to attack the North Forts had occasioned the halt, he could still say with truth on the 22d that he was kept waiting by the English. Accordingly, he suffered himself so to write.

The Fort which stood between the Allies and the North Side.

day, the number of those who lay stricken on the English part of the field was too great to allow of their being dealt with in the lesser time.\* So, notwithstanding that the measure of halting on the Alma was chargeable upon Marshal St Arnaud, still, on the 22d of September (having by that time got his own wounded on board), he could say, and could say with literal truth, that the French army was able to advance when the English army was not. Accordingly, on the 22d, whilst the English were still toiling hard at the painful task of getting their wounded on board, the Marshal suffered himself to write: 'The English are not yet ready, and I am kept back, just as at Baltochick, just as at Old Fort. It is true they have more wounded than I have, and that they are farther from the sea.† What slowness in our movements! War can hardly be carried on in this way. The weather is admirable, and I am not profiting by it. I rage.‡

It being now seen that St Arnaud's refusal to advance on the position of the Northern Forts was the cause of the halt on the Alma, there remains the task of determining how far this refusal was warranted. Of the strength of the works which were thus arresting the Allies on the morrow of their victory we shall have to speak more fully by-and-by. For the present, it is enough to say that the main obstacle was the Star

\* By some it has been thought that commissariat difficulties prevented the earlier advance of the Allies: but after considering the grounds on which that belief rested, I have not accepted it.

† Letter to his brother, 22d September.

‡ Private journal under same date.

CHAP.  
II.

Fort, an octagon earthwork, surrounded by a ditch and glacis, looking down upon the open sea towards the west and the Sebastopol bay on the south; that the Fort was not a work designed against invaders coming from the Belbec, being commanded and looked into from the ground by which the Allies might approach it;\* that the fire of the French and English ships could be easily brought to bear upon it;† that, whatever accession of strength might be given to the adjacent ground by the hasty labours of the enemy, there were only twelve out of all the guns then arming the Fort itself which could be brought to bear upon the approaches by which the Allies might advance; that the new, and as yet unarmed, work which threatened the mouth of the Belbec was assailable from the ships as well as by the land forces;‡ and that, finally, in the judgment both of Lord Raglan and Sir Edmund Lyons, the Fort, with all its new adjuncts, was not an obstacle which ought to baffle a victorious army of from 50,000 to 60,000 men advancing along the coast, with the active and available support of the attendant fleets. §

Opinion of Lord Raglan and Sir Edmund Lyons as to the expediency of immediately attacking it.

Time, at last, has apparently proved that the inferences of Lord Raglan and Sir Edmund Lyons were sound. More than that, it has shown that, at a

Soundness of their inferences.

\* Sir John Burgoyne questions this, but he had not an opportunity of effecting any sufficing reconnaissance of the ground; and upon such a matter I can hardly refuse to treat General de Todleben's statements as a safe guide.—'Defense de Sebastopol,' p. 131, 230.

† Ibid. p. 222.

‡ Ibid.

§ Mr Loch's MS. memorandum, quoted *ante*, p. 14.



CHAP. II. period when the Allies might have been marching upon the Star Fort,\* Prince Mentschikoff had not only withdrawn to the south of Sebastopol, but had deliberately renounced the idea of venturing his army in any encounter on the north of the roadstead.† Therefore, if St Arnaud had followed the counsels of Lord Raglan and Sir Edmund Lyons, the Allies would have occupied the north side of Sebastopol without encountering resistance, and having done this, they could have proceeded at once to execute the main purpose of the invasion by destroying the Black Sea fleet and the naval establishments of Sebastopol.‡ Nor was even this all; for there is reason to believe that, by adding to their operations the mere occupation of a point on the road to Baktchi Seräi, the Allies

\* Viz., the 22d or 23d of September. After the departure of Prince Mentschikoff in the night of the 24th, the Allies, though not liable to be encountered at the Star Fort by any 'army,' would still have had to deal, as we shall afterwards see, with Korniloff and his sailors; but on the 22d or the 23d, or even, as I consider, on the 24th, the invaders might have marched upon the position of the Star Fort without being met by either the army or the seamen.

† After giving his reasons for regarding the position of the Star Fort as untenable by the Prince's army against the Allies, General Todleben says: 'Having thus convinced himself that there was not, 'on this ground, any position where our troops could await the enemy 'with some hope of success, and without being exposed to find themselves in a most critical situation in case of failure, Prince Mentschikoff 'saw himself obliged to renounce encountering the Allies on the north 'of the roadstead. Recognising, at the same time, the necessity of re-organising his troops, of completing his supplies of ammunition and 'food, of reinforcing the garrison of Sebastopol, and determining the 'measures necessary for its defence, Prince Mentschikoff took the resolve of transporting himself to the south of Sebastopol.'—'Defense de Sebastopol,' p. 215.

‡ The authority for this conclusion will be given *post*, chap. iv.

would have secured the surrender of the south of Sebastopol, and have brought the campaign to an end.\* C H A P.  
II.

I said that the victory of the 20th of September gave Sebastopol to the Allies on condition that they would lay instant hands on the prize.† That condition Marshal St Arnaud rejected, by refusing to go on against the northern defences of the place. We shall have to make a reckoning of the lost occasions which followed the battle of the Alma. This one stands as the first.

This the  
first of the  
lost occasions.

\* So also as to this.

† Vol. II. last page.

## CHAPTER III.

CHAP. ON the morning of the 23d of September the Allies  
 III. once more marched forward ; and moving all the way  
 Advance along ground thickly strewn with arms and accoutre-  
 on the ments—the signs of the enemy’s haste to retreat—  
 Katcha. they descended at length into the valley of the  
 Katcha. The English were quartered amid the gar-  
 The vil- dens and vineyards of a village all smiling with signs  
 lage on its of plenty ; for although, in broken furniture and emp-  
 banks. tied chests, there were traces of Cossack spoilers, and  
 although, in their terror, the villagers had fled, still  
 the happy-looking cottages, with their trellised and  
 welcoming porches, the cherished fruit-trees and espe-  
 cially the abounding clusters of the vine, all seemed  
 to speak of content and rewarded industry.

The peo- Though the villagers had fled they had not gone  
 ple of the far. A knot of Englishmen inclined to ramble into  
 village. the country had chosen the road leading eastward as  
 the one most likely to withdraw them from the famil-  
 iar scenes of the camp. When they had gone some  
 way in this direction, they saw that, at a distance of  
 some hundred of yards in front of them, there was a  
 crowd. At sight of the strangers the crowd began to

fly, but after a while some of the people turned round, and, little by little, were brought to attend to the beckoning and the encouraging signs with which they were met. After a while, the fugitive villagers—for these were the people who formed the crowd—began to grow somewhat less fearful; and at length, though often halting in doubt, they came nearer, and then again nearer; but even when they had evidently made up their minds to accept the proffered intercourse, they yet stopped from time to time that they might make prostrations and gestures in token of submission.

These poor people were lurking about the neighbourhood of the village in order to see or make out what was going to befall their homes. The Englishmen saw the importance of reassuring the villagers, and an interpreter was fetched. When the people came to understand that no harm would be done to them or their property they became very grateful, and some of them ventured back into their village. From them the English first came to hear of the panic which had seized the Russian army in the midnight after the battle; and it was here, too (as told in a former page), that the simple natives excused their content by saying that for three generations they had lived in peace under the Czars.

The English at this time received a small accession to the strength of their cavalry from the landing of the Scots Greys.

The landing of the Scots Greys.

But whilst the whole of the French, and the main body of the English army, were establishing their

Lord Raglan had already

C H A P.  
III.

pushed  
forward  
his cavalry  
to the  
Belbec.

quarters in the valley of the Katcha, Lord Raglan—in the person of the General commanding his cavalry—was already in sight of Sebastopol, and descending unmolested to the Belbec. He had ordered Lord Lucan with the bulk of the cavalry and his troop of horse-artillery to push forward, and take possession of the village of Duvanköi, a village lying close to the Belbec, but so far up the stream as to be upon the high road which connected Sebastopol with Baktchi Seräi. Lord Lucan had to approach the village by passing through a long defile which might have been easily defended against cavalry; but, although watched by Cossacks, he was not opposed. The village, when reached, was found to be in a nook shut in between the bank of the river on one side, and precipitous heights on the other. Finding the place unoccupied, Lord Lucan not only took possession of it—that might have been done by means of a picket—but kept his troops down in the nook for some hours. As far as was possible in such a situation, he strove to prepare against the event of an attack by placing three guns at each entrance to the village, and some scouts on the commanding hills; but he did not conceal from himself that his cavalry thus cooped down must be powerless, and exposed to destruction if attacked by infantry or artillery.\* The enemy did not seize the occasion, and at dusk Lord Lucan withdrew his troops to the high

\* Lord Lucan seems to have thought that the order to 'take possession of' Duvanköi made it his duty to place his main body in the village, and to keep it there during some 'few hours;' for he speaks of the occupation of the village which he had effected and continued till dusk as an act which had 'sufficiently carried out his instructions.'

open ground above;\* but certainly during some hours, our cavalry had been in peril. CHAP.  
III.

Lord Lucan had been apprised that the Russians had had 2000 horse in the village of Duvanköi just before its occupation by our cavalry; and when he rose from his bivouac on the morning of the 24th, he saw bodies of Russian troops both in the direction of Sebastopol and near Mackenzie's Farm; but he was recalled into the general line of march before the enemy's movements were yet so developed as to enable him to make out their scope and bearing. If his orders had suffered him to remain in the neighbourhood of Duvanköi, he might have found that the Russians in force were converging upon the very ground where he stood, and that in a village close by Prince Mentschikoff was to establish his Headquarters.†

Excepting the cavalry, which Lord Raglan had thus pushed on a day's march in advance, the whole of the Allied army bivouacked, as we saw, on the Katcha.

On the morning of Sunday the 24th of September, the Allies made ready to begin the march which was to bring them to the Belbec, and place them in presence of the defences which guarded Sebastopol on its northern side. Sunday  
the 24th.

They were checked. The reported existence of a fresh covered battery commanding the mouth of the Belbec had been already put forward by the French Commander as an obstacle which might force the Allies Avowed  
cause of  
the anxiety  
which  
was creating  
hesitation at the

\* This last measure, as might well be expected, was fully approved by Lord Raglan.

† The village of Otarköi. It was early on the following morning that Prince Mentschikoff in person reached the village.

CHAP. to swerve from their purpose;\* and now that the  
 III. advancing armies were at last on the banks of the  
 French Katcha, the Marshal's avowed anxiety on the subject  
 Head- of this new field-work still hung in the way of the  
 quarters. enterprise. The French, as we know, were on the  
 right; or, in other words, next to the sea. Theirs was  
 the part of the Allied army which (if the advance  
 should be continued in the direction hitherto followed)  
 would be brought opposite to the newly-formed bat-  
 tery; and, not unnaturally, they deemed it to be  
 within their peculiar and separate province to judge  
 of the importance of an obstacle which lay, as they  
 thought, in their path. Moreover, it had now be-  
 come known at the French Headquarters that the  
 enemy had sunk men-of-war across the mouth of the  
 Sebastopol roadstead.

The ad-  
 vance of  
 the Allies  
 delayed at  
 the request  
 of the  
 French  
 Com-  
 mander.

At seven in the morning, Lord Raglan received  
 a message from the French Marshal requesting  
 that the march might be postponed till ten o'clock,  
 not only for the purpose of considering the aspect of  
 affairs as altered by the sinking of the enemy's ships,  
 but also in order to give time for a further reconnais-  
 sance of the field-work at the mouth of the Belbec.

The request was conveyed by Colonel Trochu, who  
 brought a note signed by himself, which he left in  
 the hands of Lord Raglan. In English, the note  
 runs thus: 'Last night news reached the French  
 ' camp that the Russians had yesterday destroyed the  
 ' entrance of the port of Sebastopol by sinking five  
 ' ships and two frigates. Thence there results a new

\* See *ante*, p. 16, and *post*, chap. iv.

‘ situation, on the subject of which the Marshal sends  
 ‘ me to confer with his lordship Lord Raglan. Be-  
 ‘ sides, the Russians have constructed in advance of  
 ‘ Fort Constantine\* a battery which directly com-  
 ‘ mands the mouth of the Belbec, where the siege  
 ‘ materials and the supplies have to be disembarked,  
 ‘ and where the line of march is which the French army  
 ‘ would have to take. Pending the expression of  
 ‘ opinion on this subject by his lordship Lord Rag-  
 ‘ lan, the Marshal has adjourned the departure for  
 ‘ some hours.’

C H A P.  
 III.

Lord Raglan, of course, could do no otherwise than yield to the request, more especially on the last ground assigned; for the field-work to which it referred stood opposite—not to the English, but—to the Marshal’s, line of advance, and (unless it were shunned altogether) would have to be dealt with by the French.

It seems to have been ultimately agreed that the Allies should continue their march upon the Belbec, though without committing themselves to an attack of the Severnaya, or encountering the new field-work; and accordingly, at about ten o’clock, the advance was resumed. Soon, crowning the ridge of the hills which divide the Katcha from the Belbec, and then, gazing eagerly southwards, the two armies looked down on Sebastopol.

The ad-  
 vance at  
 length re-  
 sumed, but  
 without  
 any deter-  
 mination  
 to attack  
 the Sever-  
 naya, or to  
 encounter  
 the new  
 field-  
 work.  
 Sebastopol  
 in sight.

On this summit the Allies for a while remained

\* Colonel Trochu meant the ‘Star Fort.’ It was common at the time in the Allied camps to call the ‘Star Fort’ ‘Fort Constantine.’ The real Fort Constantine, however, was a sea-fort at the mouth of the Sebastopol bay.



C H A P. halted. Marshal St Arnaud quitted his saddle and  
 III. lay upon the ground. According to the accounts  
 Marshal of the French historians, he was within a few hours  
 St Arnaud. of the period when the physicians pronounced him  
 His state. to be suffering from cholera; and although, at this  
 time, his appearance and manner spoke more of  
 downcast spirits than of mortal disease, it may well  
 be imagined that nothing other than bodily illness  
 had made him joyless at this the moment of his first  
 looking down on Sebastopol. He was unspeakably  
 sad. Contrasting the hard enterprise before him with  
 the work of happier days in the country of the Arabs  
 and the Kabyles, he sighed as men sigh when they  
 have to endure without hope.

The direc-  
 tion of  
 march now  
 began to  
 disclose  
 the bend  
 that there  
 was in the  
 resolve of  
 the Allies.

Again the Allies marched forward; but by the time  
 that their line of march was developed, an observer  
 who knew the ground might have inferred, from the  
 direction they took, that already they were swerving  
 from their purpose. Shunning the imagined strength  
 of the new field-work at the mouth of the Belbec,  
 they began to bend away from the shore.

Signs of  
 the ruined  
 condition  
 in which  
 the Rus-  
 sian army  
 had re-  
 entered  
 Sebasto-  
 pol.

The ground at this time traversed by the invading  
 armies was so thickly strewn with the marks of the  
 enemy's hasty flight and confusion, as to show that  
 defeat had been lapsing into ruin, and that that which  
 had entered Sebastopol was a hurried and fugitive  
 crowd. Amongst the things abandoned there was even  
 that cargo of kitchen implements which had supplied  
 the table of the Russian Headquarters. The Allies  
 failed to read these signs, or rather they failed to read  
 them with that kind of understanding which leads to

C H A P.  
III.

clear inference and to accordant action. Indeed, it would seem that they had hardly at all treasured up and applied the narrative of that Russian panic on the Katcha which the villagers had been giving them on the foregoing night. Strange to say, that stand, or that mere semblance of a stand, which Kiriakoff had made at the close of the battle on the Alma, had raised up a veil so effectual, that it still served to screen the Russians from the eyes of their invaders. No fragments of the wreck, no accounts of eyewitnesses, were enough to countervail the effect which Kiriakoff had wrought upon the counsels of the Allies, by showing them a front for some minutes, and causing them to believe that the retreat which he was covering must be a retreat in good order.\*

Cause which hindered the Allies from apprehending the condition of the Russian army after the Alma.

The invading armies now descended into the beautiful valley of the Belbec. There was little that could yet be seen of the Russian troops. Lord Cardigan, with a couple of squadrons, reconnoitred a pass towards Sebastopol in the direct front of the English lines, and reported it impracticable, there being, he said, a marsh in front, then a causeway, and then a battery of heavy guns supported by a strong force of infantry and some cavalry.

The invaders descend into the valley of the Belbec. Reconnaissance by Lord Cardigan.

\* The reason why the few minutes' stand made by Kiriakoff imposed so effectually upon the Allies was this: it happened that his line of retreat was so far diagonal, that when he took up his second position, some two miles in rear of the Alma heights, he was no longer opposite to the French line of battle (as he had been during the action), but to the English; and the consequence was, that his presence in order of battle, much aided by the nature of the ground, masked the confusion of that part of the Russian army which was retreating from its conflict with the English.

C H A P.  
III.

The serious nature of a resolve to abandon the old plan of the invasion.

To go hardily on with the old plan of the invasion, undertaking to carry at once whatever the enemy might have prepared by way of defence for his Star Fort,—this, however difficult, or however easy, was, at all events, an enterprise deliberately contemplated beforehand, and of such a kind as to be strictly consisting with the character of the expedition ; for the attack was one in which (by aiding in the capture of the works at the mouth of the Belbec, and the entrenchments connecting them with the Star Fort) the naval forces of the Allies could take a great part. Besides, the condition of things was such that, if the Allies should determine to shun this encounter, their caution would be far from restoring them to the approved and recognised paths of scientific warfare. On the contrary, a tardy wariness in that direction could hardly now fail to be imprudent. The expedition had gone too far to leave open a choice between risk and safety. The choice was between two or more kinds of grave danger. This night, though the soldiery were gladdened by the beauty of the vale, and the wealth of the gardens and the villas, it could not but happen that the chiefs would be busied with anxious counsels.

## CHAPTER IV.

AT the time when the deliberations of the Allies in Bulgaria resulted in their determining that the western, and not the southern, coast of the Crimea should be looked to for the place of their landing, it was not so much settled in words, but rather taken for granted, that this resolve carried with it the ulterior design of moving on southward along the same western coast, and operating against the northern defences of Sebastopol. The assumption was a natural one; for, because of the Sebastopol bay, it was only from the north that an invader remaining established on the western coast could attempt an attack.

CHAP.  
IV.

The design of operating against the defences of Sebastopol from the north. See the Map.

Long before, and prior indeed to the actual commencement of the war, Captain Drummond of the Retribution had ventured to give firm counsel upon this subject; and the knowledge which he had acquired by lying at anchor in the roadstead of Sebastopol enabled him to speak with great weight.\* Both Cap-

Report of Captain Drummond of the Retribution, made so early as January 1854, in favour of

\* Since the now published statements and comments of General Todleben tend very strongly to show that the 'North Side' was the true point to attack, it cannot but be interesting to the friends of Captain Drummond to see the words in which he thinks that, on carrying the position of

C H A P.  
IV.

the attack  
on the  
North  
Side; and  
of Captain  
Willis.

The land-  
ing and  
the bat-  
tle of  
the Alma  
brought  
great ac-  
cession of  
weight to  
the rea-  
sons for  
attacking  
the North  
Side.

The time  
had now  
come for  
a final  
decision.

tain Drummond and Captain Willis (who was acting with him at the time of the survey) conceived themselves able to report decisively in favour of an attack upon the Star Fort as a means of achieving the great object of the Allies;\* but if, even before the invasion, they were warranted in fixing upon the Severnaya or 'North Side' as the true point of attack, much more was it now to be concluded in favour of such a choice, since the Allies, by their successful landing, followed up by the result of the battle on the Alma, had fastened already upon that very part of the coast from which they could conveniently assail the Star Fort; and moreover, it was fairly to be reckoned, that if the Allies should go straight to their end, without at all turning aside, or interposing fresh marches between themselves and their prey, the momentum they had gathered from their victory might carry them through the defences without being put to a siege.


Bivouacking now on the Belbec, the Allies were at last within gunshot of the fortress they had come over sea to confront; and, the period in which it had been possible to keep the question open being close to its end, they were called upon to determine whether they would at once prepare to deliver the attack, or give up their old plan of campaign.

'the "E" Fort [the Star Fort is marked "E" in Captain Drummond's 'plan] the place would fall immediately.'—Captain Drummond's Report, 9th January 1854.

\* Captain Willis says, in his Report: 'I think it is quite possible to destroy the arsenal with time and 20,000 soldiers, artillery, &c. The attack on the South Side should be a feint.'

# SEBASTOPOL.

25<sup>th</sup> Sept<sup>r</sup> 1854





It is now therefore time to see what there was in front of the Allies which might be calculated to turn them from the execution of their original design. C H A P.  
IV.

On the northern side of the Sebastopol bay, and facing the sea-forts which cover the town and harbour, there were not only other sea-forts of great size and power, but also some barracks, some magazines, and a factory worked by the Government. This aggregate of buildings, or the quarter in which they stood, was known amongst Russians by the name of the Severnaya; and the English have been accustomed to call it the 'North side of Sebastopol,' or, in language more short, the 'North Side.' If once the Allies could make themselves masters there, they would be able to deal so heavily with the town and arsenal of Sebastopol, and would have it so completely in their power to burn every ship in the harbour, that thenceforth the main object of the invasion might be regarded as an object attained.\* The Severnaya or north side of Sebastopol.  
  
Its value to the Allies.

But even these were not all the advantages which might be expected to flow from a resolve to attack the Star Fort. By reason of the proximity of that field of action to the roads which converge near Mackenzie's Farm, the plan of operating against the north side of Sebastopol was compatible with measures for seizing the enemy's lines of communication.† And this was a priceless advantage; for although, in regard

\* I rest this assertion upon the authority of General de Todleben.—'Defense de Sebastopol,' vol. i. p. 239. The General states his conclusion upon this point in decisive, unhesitating terms.

† Not only with the north, but with the south-east of the Crimea, where there were 10,000 men under Khomatoff.



CHAP. to material supplies, Sebastopol for the time might be  
IV. sufficing to the needs of the Russian army, Prince Mentschikoff was wholly dependent upon his lines of communication for the reinforcements which he believed to be of absolute necessity to him. General de Todleben has good means of knowing the degree of stress which must have been put upon the Russians by the loss of their lines of communication ; and it is his judgment that, at this time, the establishment of an Allied force on the road to Baktchi Seräi must have brought the campaign to an end.\*

The plateau over-  
 hanging  
 the North  
 Side.

The forts, barracks, storehouses, and factory, which thus came to be of great worth in the eyes of the striving nations, were at the foot of a high plateau surrounded on three sides by water. Along the northern boundary of the plateau there flowed the stream of the Belbec ; on the west its base met the Black Sea ; and on the south, where the buildings were placed, it fronted the great bay of Sebastopol. The sea-forts were not so constructed as to be the means of defence against an invader coming down upon them by land from the north ; but on the high ground above, though still at a distance of only a few hundred yards from the bay, there was a work—ill-con- trived and dilapidated—which the English have called the Star Fort. The work had been constructed in the year 1818, with a view to secure Fort Constantine, and the other great sea-forts which lined the north of the roadstead, from being taken in reverse by marines or

The Star  
 Fort.

\* Expressed in his book, and—very positively indeed—in conversa- tion with me.

other forces landing on the west coast; but it stood in the path of any invader approaching Sebastopol from the Belbec, and could therefore be brought into use as a means of defence against him. It was an octagon, having sides of which each was from 190 to 230 yards long; and, of its eight angles, every other one was supplied with a little bastion or caponiere, having an earthen parapet, whilst three out of the four remaining angles of the octagon were furnished with small bonnettes and barbettes, each taking three pieces. At the flanks of the bastions, the lines of what would otherwise have been the curtain were so interrupted as to provide means of obtaining a flanking fire from some small guns placed in casemates. The profiles of the bastions gave 14 feet of height with 10 of thickness, and the other parts of the fort had a height of from 4 to 7 feet, with a thickness of from 3 to 7 feet. The bastion which looked towards the roadstead was retrenched at its gorge by a work called a cavalier. The fort was surrounded by a ditch 12 feet deep and 18 feet broad, with revetment in masonry and a glacis. It was covered on its south and south-eastern sides by two lunettes, but both of these faced the water, and were of no important use against an enemy advancing from the Belbec. Of the 47 guns which armed the work, only 12 could be of service in the expected attack from the north. The fort was commanded, and even looked into, from the heights towards the north.\*

\* It may be right to say that in the above account of the Star Fort I have not implicitly followed the description contained in the text of

CHAP.  
IV.

Endeavours of the Russians after the 14th Sept. to strengthen the fort and the plateau.

In and near this work, from the day of the landing, on the 14th of September, down to the evening of the 24th, the time of which we are speaking, the Russians had toiled night and day, and with a force of, at one time, some 1500 workmen. Their object was, not only to repair and strengthen the Star Fort itself, but also to provide generally for the defence of the plateau against an enemy advancing from the Belbec. By those who know that these hurried works went on under the direction of Lieutenant-Colonel de Todleben, it will be easily inferred that they were planned with a consummate skill; but what even he found means to achieve in ten days could not but fall very short of what was needed.

However, he threw up works on each flank of the fort in order to strengthen and extend the line of defence, taking care that all the approaches (some of which had before been quite out of harm's way from the fort) should now be liable to be swept by fire. Besides this, he erected two batteries on the crests towards the north-west, with the design of keeping off the enemy's ships; and two, if not three, out of the nine guns which ultimately armed these batteries were

General de Todleben's work; but my words, I believe, will be found to agree with the plans which accompany his book. Those plans agree very well with the description contained in the admirable work which I have followed, the work of Gendre ('*Matériaux pour servir,*' &c.), but not with the words of General de Todleben's book. General de Todleben's book purports not to have been written, but edited by him; and I imagine he would be much more likely to allow mistakes to occur in the words of the narrative compiled under his auspices than to suffer any grave faults to appear in the elaborate maps and plans of fortifications which form so valuable a portion of the work.

so placed as to command that part of the coast which lay towards the mouth of the Belbec. The earthwork prepared for the reception of those two guns was the apparition described to Lord Raglan in the morning by Colonel Trochu, and threatening, as we have already seen, to scare the Allies from their purpose. It does not appear that Todleben foresaw the effect which these two guns would have upon the counsels of the Allies. His general object was to take care that no ships should come within range without incurring fire; and he did not, it would seem, entertain any notion that, by refusing to the Allies the absolutely peaceful possession of the mouth of the Belbec, he might drive them to abandon their plan of campaign. He connected both of these north-western batteries with the Star Fort by means of trenches, which were to be lined by men using their musketry. In order to prevent the Star Fort from being looked into by the enemy, a great effort was made to increase the height of the parapet; but under the weight of the earth laid for this purpose upon one of the old parapets the revetment of the scarp gave way, and a breach was thus made by the defenders themselves. One of Todleben's objects was to throw up works which might prevent the enemy from turning the Star Fort on the eastern flank, but for the execution of this part of his plan there was no time.

By the morning of the 25th there were altogether twenty-nine guns in battery and available for the defence against the expected attack from the north. Amongst these were the nine pieces which now armed

C H A P.  
IV.

The guns  
available  
for the  
defence.

C H A P. the two new north-western batteries, including the two  
 IV. 24-pounder carronades which commanded the coast  
 towards the mouth of the Belbec. These two batteries,  
 however, were liable to be destroyed by the guns of the  
 Anglo-French fleet;\* and the trench connecting one  
 of them with the fort could be enfiladed and taken  
 in rear by fire from the same quarter.† Indeed, the  
 position of the ground and of the Russian works was  
 such that in every stage of an attack undertaken against  
 the Star Fort, the seamen and the ships of the Allies  
 would have been able to take a great part.‡

The works  
 might be  
 attacked  
 by the  
 guns of  
 the fleet.

The im-  
 portant  
 part which  
 might  
 have been  
 taken by  
 the fleets  
 in attack  
 on Star  
 Fort.

In order to cover the retreat of the Russians, some  
 of their ships were placed in such positions as to be  
 able to sweep with their broadsides the slopes on the  
 north of the roadstead.

The form of the ravines descending from the Star  
 Fort was such that upon two, if not three, of the  
 approaches from the side of the Belbec, the assailants  
 might come up to the ditch without first incurring a  
 cannonade of any great might or duration.§

Forces  
 available  
 for the  
 defence.

With regard to the forces available for the defence,  
 it may be said that if the Allies had advanced against  
 the Star Fort on the morning of the 25th they would  
 have encountered there and on the ground adjoining  
 a battalion of militiamen,|| a company of sappers, and  
 so large a body of sailors—withdrawn, for that pur-

\* Todleben, 'Defense de Sebastopol,' vol. i. p. 233.

† Ibid.

‡ Ibid.

§ In the 'Defense de Sebastopol,' General de Todleben undertakes to  
 show elaborately, and in full detail, the power and duration of the fire to  
 which the assailants would be exposed.

|| I continue to use the term 'militia' as a word for distinguishing  
 what the Russians call their 'reserve' battalions.

pose, from the ships and from the defence of the South Side—as would bring up the whole number of combatants to 11,000.\* The sailors were, for the most part, ill armed, some of them having old flint-and-steel muskets, and others, it seems, only pikes or cutlasses. This was the force which, extended along a front of a mile, was to defend the fort and the plateau against a victorious army of from 50,000 to 60,000 men, supported and actively aided by their fleets. The defenders, however, were commanded by one whose name will be long illustrious in the annals of Russia. For the present, it suffices to say of Admiral Korniloff, that he was a chivalrous, resolute, and devoted seaman, who, with hardly a hope of any better success than that of an honourable death, had determined to defend the plateau and the fort to the last extremity

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IV.

The force  
defending  
the posi-  
tion on the  
24th and  
25th Sept.

Admiral  
Korniloff.

Of the reception so prepared for the Allies, I am content to say only this much, because, after all, it so happened that the Star Fort was never assailed; and although there is use in inquiring what would have been the probable result of an attack upon 'the North Side' from the direction of the Belbec, it chances that this very question has already received an answer which comes with so much authority, and is, at the same time, so well supported by detailed statement and laborious demonstration, that it is well to give the conclusion without reproducing, in this place, the voluminous materials of proof on which it is rested.†

Reasons  
for avoid-  
ing a more  
detailed  
account of  
the prepara-  
tions for  
the de-  
fence of  
the North  
Side.

\* 11,350.—Totleben, vol. i. p. 227.

† The passages in which General de Totleben maintains his conclu-

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Opinion of  
Todleben  
on the  
question  
whether  
the Star  
Fort and  
the North  
Side could  
have been  
successful-  
ly defend-  
ed against  
an attack  
by the  
Allies.

We saw that the officer who planned and directed the works of defence was Colonel de Todleben. He it is who has now pronounced that the plateau and the fort could not have been successfully defended against the attack which the Allies had the means of making.\* The situation of the defenders, he says, notwithstanding all they had done, and notwithstanding their heroic resolves, was nothing less than desperate;† and he declares that the complete success of the expected attack by the Allies would have been inevitable.‡ He adds—and there were reasons which gave great importance to that part of the question—that their success must have been speedy.§ These conclusions he of course founds on his own complete knowledge of the defences as seen from within; and it would not of necessity follow that the weakness of which he was cognisant would be visible to the Allies. But, then, General de Todleben goes further. Supposing the Allies to have made full use of even those restricted means of observation they had, he says they must needs have learnt that the attack was feasible.||

The opin-  
ion which  
General de  
Todleben  
says the  
Allies  
ought to  
have been  
able to

And, lest it be said that this, after all was only the conclusion of an Engineer officer standing on the sea-cliff, and thence undertaking to say how far the defences could be judged of from the ships, it must be repeated that the conclusion to which Gen-  
sion will be found in p. 230-33, 238 and 239 of his work; but I do not reproduce them, because they fail to deal with the really disputed question—*i. e.*, the question whether the position could have been advantageously defended by *an army*. The argument in favour of that last view (*i. e.*, Sir John Burgoyne's) will be found in the Appendix.

\* Todleben, 'Defense de Sebastopol,' vol. i. p. 230-33.

† Ibid. p. 30. ‡ Ibid. p. 233. § Ibid. p. 232. || Ibid. p. 239.

eral de Todleben says the Allies ought to have come was the very same as that to which Lord Raglan and Sir Edmund Lyons did come in fact. Sir Edmund, as commanding the in-shore squadron, would have been called upon to take a great part in any attack carried on along the coast, and therefore his judgment was that of a man preparing to act upon it. He, no less than Lord Raglan, was convinced, as we saw, that after the Alma the true policy of the Allies required an immediate attack upon the Star Fort.

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form was  
come to  
in fact by  
Lord Rag-  
lan and  
Sir E.  
Lyons.

The Allies were not ignorant that the possession of the North Side would at once enable them to cannonade the enemy's shipping.\* Nor again did they fall into the error of supposing the Star Fort to be of itself a formidable work.† Indeed it may be said that the hindrances which stood in the way of the enterprise were all of such a kind that they must have been as clearly apparent to the minds of general officers whilst planning at Varna as now they were to the eyes of men scanning the work with their field-glasses. It is true, as we saw, that towards the north-west of the Star Fort a field-work had lately appeared, which bent round the shoulder of the hill, and in such a direction that two if not three of its guns, at a range of two miles, might bring their fire to bear upon the

The ob-  
jections  
which  
were urged  
against  
going on  
with the  
plan of  
attacking  
the North  
Side.

\* See chap. iv. p. 42. It is difficult for an Englishman to help thinking wistfully of the course things might have been likely to take if, the French claim to precedence being out of the way, the English had been on the right. In that case, Lord Raglan and Sir Edmund Lyons would have been operating, as it were, side by side, and the enterprise against the Star Fort would have given a good occasion for showing what can be done by the closely combined action of land and sea forces.

† See Sir John Burgoyne's Memorandum, *post*, p. 67.



CHAP. IV. waters at the mouth of the Belbec ; but the use of the spade and the pickaxe has been so long known in the world, and the crust of the earth has been so frequently used by man as a means of sheltering him in his efforts to harm his assailants, that if the Allies were to turn aside from a well-weighed plan of campaign at the sight of a newly-made battery, they would not only disclose a flexibility scarce consistent with the pretensions of aggressive States, but would be conceding to the power of the Defence, as compared with the power of the Attack, an ascendant which does not belong to it. Certainly, it was possible that by a gun in the new battery, discharged at a range of two miles, a vessel might be struck whilst engaged in bringing stores into the mouth of the Belbec ; but it was not with a notion of being baffled by a contingency of this kind that the venturesome enterprise of the invasion had been planned or begun ; and the work which thus threatened the entrance of the Belbec was not only open to attack by the land forces of the Allies, but was also so placed that the naval forces of the French and English ships could have taken their part in its capture.

Again, it was said that the position which the Russians would have to defend on the North Side was only a mile in extent, and that therefore their main strength might be concentrated with powerful effect upon a comparatively small space of ground.\* It was also argued that, from the moment of the landing, the Russians must have inferred that the invaders intended to attack the Severnaya or North Side, and that, therefore, there was no hope of surprising the

\* Sir John Burgoyne's Memorandum, *post*, p. 67.

enemy by an attack at that point.\* So far as they went, these two arguments were sound, but, taken alone, they had not sufficient cogency to warrant the abandonment of a well-matured plan of campaign. CHAP.  
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Yet again, it was argued that the capture of the Severnaya or North Side alone, though involving the means of cannonading the Russian ships and their dockyards, would not of necessity carry with it the entire possession of Sebastopol.† To this objection the answer is twofold : for, first, it is clear that the capture of the Severnaya or North Side alone would have enabled the Allies to attain at once the main object of the invasion ; but, secondly, as we have already seen, the operations against the Severnaya might have been easily accompanied or followed by a measure which (unless General de Todleben errs) must have instantly given the Allies the whole of the prize they were seeking.‡

By far the gravest of the obstacles to the plan of assailing the North Side was the want of a safe harbour on that part of the neighbouring coast which was north of the Sebastopol bay. It was said that the attack might take time, and that, pending the operations, the fleets might be so driven from the coast by stress of weather as to put the Allies in peril for their supplies. Of course, this fear was one which applied to the idea of attempting any landing at all on the western shores of the Crimea ; and, since it had been so far set at nought that, in despite of it, the Allies had both landed and established themselves in the country, it was hardly perhaps opportune to revive the objec-

\* Sir John Burgoyne's Memorandum, *post*, p. 67.

† Ibid.

‡ See *ante*, p. 38.

CHAP. tion at a time when the invaders had made good their  
 IV. footing in the peninsula by a decisive victory. The Allies did well to regard the want of a harbour as a grave evil; but apparently their most prudent mode of allowing this care to weigh upon their counsels would have been by treating it as a motive for shortening to the utmost the anxious interval, and determining—ay, even, if need be, at a painful cost of life—to carry the works of the Severnaya with a peremptory despatch, whilst yet by title of victory they seemed to have might on their side. So inextricably were the Allies engaged in the expedition, and so deeply were they committed in the face of Europe to the duty of achieving their end, that, whatever may have been their wisdom originally in resolving to touch the Crimea, the driest prudence now seemed to command that they should follow up the victory with swiftness, and always in that venturesome temper which was the only one fitted to their enterprise. For refuge as well as for glory they needed the port of Sebastopol.

The  
 grounds  
 of Sir  
 John Bur-  
 goyne's  
 conclu-  
 sion.

I do not understand that Sir John Burgoyne would venture a negative answer to this question;\* and if, when this is acknowledged, it be asked once again why he counselled the Allies to avoid the Star Fort, the explanation is this:—Instead of regarding the Fort as a work which (along with its adjuncts) would be only defended by its mere garrison, he looked

\* Although he has strongly argued that it would have been injudicious to attack the position of the Star Fort, he has done this on the expressed ground—ground now known to have been unfounded—that the position was defended by an '*army*.'—'Military Opinions,' p. 238. It is Sir John Burgoyne himself who puts the word in italics.

upon it as a part only of an extended line of defence. C H A P.  
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He looked upon it as marking the dominant feature of an entrenched position which, in his judgment, might be advantageously defended by an army; but having formed that opinion, he went on to infer that a like opinion would govern the decisions of the enemy, and that by a whole army accordingly the position would be defended. There, he erred. There was no intention on the part of the Russians to attempt to defend the position by means of an army; and it must be added that the mistake of believing the contrary was one that might have been cleared away by a careful reconnaissance.

But if the relinquishment of the North Side was not to be justified upon military grounds, there was still this to say for the measure:—it was a way out of trouble. We have seen that when, the day after the battle, Lord Raglan proposed to St Arnaud ‘at once ‘to advance to the Belbec, cross that river, and then ‘assault the forts,’ the Marshal answered that ‘his ‘troops were tired, and that it could not be done.’\* We also learnt that on the following day, the 22d, Lord Raglan was ‘again urging on the French ‘General to advance across the Belbec,’ and, for once in his life, was cast into a state of ‘low spirits,’ by hearing the Marshal reply, ‘that he had ascertained ‘that the Russians had thrown up strong earthworks ‘on the banks of the river; and though he (the Marshal) did not doubt that the Allies could force them, ‘as they had the works on the Alma, they could not

Recapitulated statement of the objection to attack the Severnaya which was evinced by the French Headquarters on the 21st and the 22d of September.

\* Statement of Sir E. Lyons, *ante*, chap. ii.

CHAP. 'afford the loss that would be entailed ;' \* and, finally,  
 IV. we were enabled to perceive the way in which this refusal of the French to go on with the campaign as originally planned, was the cause which induced the Allies to halt—to halt with the whole of their forces—for two clear days on the Alma.†

Recon-  
naissance  
by Sir  
Edmund  
Lyons.

Failure of  
his endeav-  
our to  
persuade  
St Arnaud  
to resume  
the plan of  
attacking  
the Star  
Fort.

Lord Rag-  
lan's great  
power of  
lessening  
the evils  
arising  
from a  
divided  
command.

It must now be added, that the further efforts of Sir Edmund Lyons to induce the Marshal to agree to an attack on the position of the Star Fort were attended with no success. Upon hearing from Lord Raglan that the Marshal had alleged the new earthworks overlooking the Belbec as an obstacle not to be faced, Sir Edmund put himself on board a small steamer, and ran in so close as to be able to reconnoitre effectually. He then ascertained that the newly-appearing works were of the kind represented by the Marshal, but that they had not yet been armed. Sir Edmund hastened to report the result of his survey to the French Commander, but could not persuade him to resume the idea of marching against the Star Fort.

At first—and this was the cause of Lord Raglan's dejection—the whole enterprise seemed to be threatened with ruin by the refusal of Marshal St Arnaud to go on in the execution of the plan of campaign with which the Allies had set sail. But the English General was by nature so constituted that no man could be better qualified than he was to lessen to the very utmost the acknowledged evil of a divided

\* Statement of Sir E. Lyons, *ante*, chap. ii.

† Instead of leaving merely a division to cover the embarkation of the wounded, an expedient which would have consisted perfectly with the plan of advancing at once to the attack of the Star Fort. See *ante*, chap. ii.

command ; for, besides that his devotion to the public service was so entire as to exclude all thought of self, he was free from the vanity (if vanity it be) which makes a man desire that a great event should be traceable to his own conception : and he was not accustomed to ponder over warlike devices in such a way as to be likely to conceive a violent predilection for one plan, or a violent dislike of another. He plainly believed that, for an army endued with the strength which a victory always gives, an inferior or even rash plan, carried through with good will by each of the commanders, would serve the cause better than any other plan (however good in itself) which failed to win the cordial approval of both the chiefs. He was, therefore, well qualified to deal with the emergency in which the Allies would find themselves placed if the French should persist in their unwillingness to assail the Star Fort.

The evil was occasioned by the fact that, at a moment when (from causes which will be afterwards spoken of\*) the French army was temporarily disqualified for enterprise, that same army chanced to be the one which (by reason of its position on the right of the Allied forces, and therefore opposite to the Star Fort and its outworks) was called upon to perform an arduous duty. This accident, if so one may call it, being the true root of the evil which threatened the fate of the invasion, it followed that a way of escape from it might be found, if the hitherto adopted plan of campaign could be replaced by one which, for the

Nature of  
the di-  
lemma  
in which  
the Allies  
were  
placed.

\* At the close of this chapter.

CHAP. moment, would present the labouring oar to the  
 IV. English instead of the French. Blending a technical phrase with words of common parlance, a man might say that the condition of the Allied army was this:— If, as first intended, it were called upon to operate ‘by its right,’ it would still be under the palsy which affected the French Headquarters. If, on the other hand, the Allied army were to operate against the enemy ‘by its left,’ it would instantly shake off all numbness deriving from Marshal St Arnaud, and would practically come under the leadership of the English General.

Account of the information obtained respecting the land defences of Sebastopol.

It was possible to imagine a plan of campaign which would work this change. Though custom and foreseeing prudence have made it the practice of the great European Powers to obtain in peace-time full accounts and plans of the fortresses belonging to rival States, this (in common with many other of the warlike duties attaching upon her in peace-time) England had neglected; and it happened that, in the case of Sebastopol, there had been a like neglect on the part of the French War Office. Neither France nor England were authoritatively informed of the state of the land defences of Sebastopol.

Information supplied by Colonel (now General) Macintosh.

In the year 1835, Colonel Macintosh had given to the world an account of the then state of the land defences of the place; and he had brought to bear upon this task not only a sufficing care and labour, but also so much sagacity, and so sound a knowledge of the military art, that to this hour it is curious to see how the nature of the struggle which was one day to gather about the Malakoff is foreshadowed in

a book almost twenty years old.\* When the war began to impend, General Macintosh imparted further expositions of the subject to the authorities at the Horse Guards; and it is now certain that the body of information and suggestive comment which he supplied would have been a wholesome study for the Allies; for although it would have been necessary for them to make wide allowance for the changes which the hand of man might have wrought in a period of twenty years, the great features of the ground must needs be the same, and the plan of the defences which (according to the showing of General Macintosh) the Russian engineers had traced out on paper was one so cogently dictated by the nature of the ground, that it might well be regarded as a useful indication of what the defences would be even after a lapse of years. It was natural, however, that, being impatient of their strange want of knowledge concerning the actual state of the land defences, and yearning after fresher information, the Allies should have given too little care to the result of old surveys and inquiries.

\* On the 16th of December 1834, General (then Colonel) Macintosh, in a memorandum addressed to our Ambassador at Constantinople, wrote: 'It appears that the works intended to enclose the town on this side (it is now quite open) are meant to consist in a strong enceinte of revetted bastions. They are now laid out, and quarries opened to carry them on. . . . The new works are to extend as nearly as possible in the direction *e, e, e*, and will completely cover the town and harbour. At present the inner harbour is commanded from the height *d*.' By looking at the accompanying copy of the sketch which Colonel Macintosh sent with his memorandum of 1834, it will be seen that the ground there designated as 'the height *d*' is the site of the Malakoff.



CHAP. Our army is not constituted upon a plan which  
IV. entices its officers to the pursuit of warlike studies or warlike inquiries having only a contingent usefulness ; and the power which England may be able to exert in appealing to arms depends a good deal upon the readiness with which she may be able to break down mere professional barriers, and bring to bear upon the great business of war the abounding zeal, energy, and skill of her whole people.

Mr Oli-  
phant.

It was from the book of a young Scottish traveller that the Allies derived what knowledge they had of the state of the land defences at Sebastopol.

Mr Oliphant had been gifted with an almost instinctive power, which showed him from afar where fields of action were opening ; and he was so prone to decide and dart forward whilst others were only pondering, that, however many there might have been with wishes and plans like his, yet commonly of late years he has been the first to alight upon the scene of coming events. So it happened that, before the home statesmen of the day had begun to take the alarm, this restless, sagacious traveller had half divined the war, and already was pacing those ridges and knolls and ravines upon which, a little while later, his country was to rivet her thoughts. For some time, it had been the policy of the Czar to withdraw Sebastopol from the eyes of Europe ; and, in general, no traveller was suffered to enter the place. But an obstacle of this kind was sure to be overcome by the spirit of enterprise ; and Mr Oliphant not only found means to enter Sebastopol, but succeeded in informing him-



**SEBASTOPOL.**

*Fac simile of a Sketch  
from a Russian Survey which accompanied  
and then Col. Machinsk's memorandum  
addressed to the British Ambassador  
at Constantinople,  
on the 16<sup>th</sup> of Dec<sup>r</sup> 1854.*



self of the then state of the land defences on the south side of the harbour. Returning to England, he quickly made known the result of his observations, and caused to be published these words :—

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‘But of one fact there is no doubt, that however well fortified may be the approaches to Sebastopol by sea, there is nothing whatever to prevent any number of troops landing a few miles south of the town in one of the six convenient bays with which the coast as far as Cape Kherson is indented, and, marching down the main street (provided they were strong enough to defeat any military force that might be opposed to them in the open field), sack the town, and burn the fleet.’\*

His report  
of the  
state of  
the land  
defences  
of Sebastopol.

This report not only did much to evoke the desire for an enterprise against Sebastopol, but also caused men to see that, at all events, up to the period when the question of the Holy Shrines began to assume a grave aspect, little had been done to the land defences ; and that whatever obstacles might have to be encountered by an army attacking the place from the south, those obstacles, at the time of Mr Oliphant’s visit, were not of a kind to make a formal siege needful. Moreover, as there was no proof that works on a great scale had been going on during the last eighteen months, there seemed to be fair ground for hoping

The effect  
it pro-  
duced.

\* Oliphant’s ‘Russian Shores of the Black Sea,’ p. 260. Mr Oliphant’s report was accurate. With the exception of throwing up a work near the water’s edge, which was more properly an adjunct to one of the sea-forts than a part of the land defences, nothing had been done at the time of his visit towards fortifying the main town of Sebastopol on its south side. Mr Oliphant’s book was published on the 15th of November 1853.

**C H A P.** that, so far as concerned the existence of regular fortifications in masonry, the land approaches to Sebastopol might be nearly in the state they were in when Mr Oliphant saw them.

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Before he left England, Lord Raglan did not fail to give himself the advantage of a personal interview with Mr Oliphant, and afterwards with Oliphant's fellow-traveller, Mr Oswald Smith. The result was, that the impression created by the passage in Mr Oliphant's book was strengthened. Thenceforth the probability of finding Sebastopol weakly fortified on the land side never ceased to be kept in remembrance; and it was only the supposed want of a convenient landing-ground on the southern coast of the Crimea which afterwards caused the Allies to discard for a time the plan of attacking the place from that side.

Lord Raglan's leaning in favour of the plan of an attack on the south side.

The idea (though it had been laid aside when the west coast was chosen for the landing) now recurred to his mind.

Idea of a campaign by which the measure of attacking

At the time of the earliest deliberations on the subject, Lord Raglan had been disposed to think that Sebastopol ought to be attacked on the south side; and although he had ceased to dwell on the idea from the time when the west coast was chosen for the place of landing, it recurred to him, as we saw, on the morrow of the battle, when he found himself encountered at the French Headquarters by a refusal to attack the Star Fort. He then conceived that if the French should persist to the last in their refusal, he at least might avert that utter cessation and collapse of the whole enterprise which their determination threatened to produce by persuading them (as a substitute for the old plan which they were thus abandoning) to join with him in marching across the country to the south

coast, and there establishing a new base of operations, from which to attack Sebastopol on its south side.

The hazardous character of such an undertaking as this has been masked, as we shall hereafter see, by a strange coincidence, and by the singularly happy immunity which that coincidence brought with it; but the plan now proposed was nothing less than that, in the presence of a Russian army understood to be concentrated in Sebastopol, the Allies should break into a slender column, with a depth of many miles, and in that state defile for two whole days or more (through a forest unknown save by maps) round the eastern side of Sebastopol. It would seem at first sight that an army undertaking such a task would lay itself open to the danger of being cut into two or more pieces at the pleasure of the Russian Commander.

Some reckoned, indeed, that the defeat which the enemy had suffered might be expected to render him so tolerant that he would suffer the flank march to go on under his eyes without daring to undertake the seemingly easy task of bringing it to ruin; but to hope this was to found a great deal upon the moral effect of a victory; for the condition of troops and waggon-trains defiling through forest and mountain roads is exactly such as to give to a defeated army on their flank an occasion to recover its boldness and self-respect by effecting successful though petty attacks upon the more helpless portions of the long, trailing column. Besides, it is obvious that if the enemy's prostration was so complete as to make him capable of suffering the Allies to defile by their left and march

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the south side of Sebastopol might be reconciled with the fact that the plan of operations hitherto followed had placed the Allies on the west coast of the Crimea. The hazardous character of a proposal to defile round the east of Sebastopol.

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Its effect  
in wasting  
the moral  
strength  
which the  
Allies had  
gained by  
their vic-  
tory on  
the Alma.

Its effect in  
debaring  
the Allies  
from un-  
dertaking  
offensive  
operations  
in the  
open field.

round him, it was still more likely that, in the event of a prompt attack upon the Star Fort, that same prostration of spirit would bring about the fall of the work. Indeed, one strong reason for discarding the plan was, that if the Allied army should once turn aside to make a circuitous march, instead of going on straight with its purpose against the Star Fort, it would lose a great deal of that priceless momentum which the victory of the Alma had given it.

Again, the configuration of the ground in the neighbourhood of the Mackenzie Heights was of such a kind that if, as was proposed, the Allies should march round to Balaclava and the Chersonese with the whole of their forces, they would so forfeit their freedom of action that (except by undertaking a second invasion) it would become impracticable for them, however strong they might be, to press upon the enemy by offensive operations in the field.\* Shut back in a narrow district, they would be liable to undergo the attacks of the Russian Commander whenever he might find it convenient to assume the offensive, and yet would be debarred from exercising a corresponding power themselves. The invaders had no acquaintance with the country into which they were going, except what they got from their map;† and although, so far as it went, this guide was not an unfaithful one, the

\* This, as we shall hereafter see, was effectually proved in the spring of 1855, when, in the hope of finding an escape from the almost intolerable predicament in which the Allies had placed themselves, the French Government was about to undertake a fresh invasion of the Crimea.

† A reprint, under the auspices of Major Jervis, of the map prepared by the Russian Government.

language of the engraver, who represented with lines and shading the southward declivities of the Mackenzie range, did not have the effect of warning the Allies that there was there an impregnable position, and that, if they should leave it to the enemy, they would concede to him irrevocably an advantage of the greatest worth, by giving up their power to attack him in the open field, and compelling themselves to assail him, if ever they should assail him at all, in his lines of defence at Sebastopol.

And last, it must be observed, that for the Allies to avoid the attack of the Star Fort, which stood within gunshot before them, and to move away to the south coast, was to fly from a task measured out, understood, well defined, and go off to confront things unknown. The weakness of the Fort itself as an aid to defence had been perceived by the Allies ; \* and although they did not know that it had been abandoned by the Russian army to the care of the seamen, they were aware that it would be defended, if defended at all, by a force suffering under the depression of a lost battle, and having to attempt a stand with an arm of the sea in its immediate rear. Yet to the task of seizing this fort, and so at once gaining the north side of Sebastopol, and the means of destroying the enemy's fleet and dockyards, they were going to prefer the unexplored forest and the mountain roads, with the necessity of having to debouch into a plain where the presence of a Russian army might be expected, and of afterwards being forced to conquer for themselves new

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It involved the abandonment of a definite, practicable task, for one of unknown magnitude.

\* See Sir John Burgoyne's Memorandum, *post*, p. 67.



CHAP. means of communication with the sea. On that, of  
IV. course, their very existence was to depend ; and then, again, in the distance there would still lie before them the prospect of having to force the immensely strong position of the Sapounè ridge ; and not until that should be carried would they be able to begin attacking the southern defences of Sebastopol—defences of which, at this time, they knew very little. They had learnt, indeed, that on its land side, some two years before, the place was open ; but in knowledge of what might since have been done for its defence their minds were almost blank.

Little  
 freedom  
 of choice  
 remained  
 to Lord  
 Raglan.

The dangers and evils thus attaching to the plan of the 'flank march' were of the gravest kind ; but the truth is, that the unwillingness of the French Commander to persist in the plan of attacking the north side of the place had brought the affairs of the Allies to such a state that, supposing his reluctance to continue, very little freedom of choice could or would remain to Lord Raglan. He could not, of course, insult the French army by marching across its front to attack a work which was straight opposite to their lines, and away from those of the English. And, although Lord Raglan judged it to be his duty to uphold, to the last, the expediency of going on with the old plan of campaign, and attacking the North Fort, he also felt that there was a limit to the urgency which could be appropriately exerted in that direction ; for it was evident that to be beyond measure persistent in pressing and pressing the French Marshal to undertake an attack against

his declared will and judgment was not only a course which held out small promise of good, but one which, if too far pursued, could hardly be otherwise than unbecoming, offensive, and impolitic. The thought of abandoning the expedition was not to be borne; and although it may be judged that the most politic mode of conquering the enemy's stronghold was by means of field operations carried on upon his lines of communication, yet the impatience of the English at home was so great, was so closely pointed to one object, and was, moreover, so hotly shared by their Government, that a resort to any plan of campaign, however wisely conceived, which avoided a direct attack upon Sebastopol, would have been almost looked upon as an abandonment of duty.

Well, but if, for this reason field operations could not well be proposed as a substitute for a direct attack upon Sebastopol, then what choice was left? The truth is, that the unwillingness of the French to attack the north side of Sebastopol had brought the Allies into straits so hard that, with all its rashness, the plan of defiling round the east of Sebastopol might be regarded as the least of the evils from which a choice could be made. Rightly looked at, 'the flank march'—for so the movement is called—was a perilous, a desperate expedient, by which—that he might avert a collapse of the whole undertaking—Lord Raglan sought to find an alternative for the enterprise declined by the French. From causes which will be spoken of presently, the French army, without any fault of its own, was, for the moment, paralysed; and

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Reasons  
tending to  
justify  
the resort  
to the  
flank  
march.

CHAP. the English army, on the other hand, being ready for  
IV. action, and under a General resolved to force on the enterprise, there was great temptation to clutch at a plan which would relieve the French army from all immediate demand on its energies, and cast the load on the English. The plan of the flank march fulfilled these conditions; for it spared the French from the task which had seemed to await them on their right front, and invested the English General with the leadership and the virtual control of the proposed operation.

Light in which Lord Raglan regarded the alternative of the flank march.

But although it was as an escape from a dilemma that the flank march is best to be justified, I do not represent that Lord Raglan himself thought ill of the measure. Without ever wavering in his opinion that the victory on the Alma should be followed up by pursuing the old plan and attacking the Severnaya or North Fort, he yet thought that he saw such good features in the alternative plan as to be able to fall back upon it with a cheerful contentment. Apparently he was not much impressed with the hazardous character of the flank march; and, on the other hand, he certainly thought that, if once the Allies should be established on the south coast, they would there be on the best ground for attacking Sebastopol.\*

\* 'I have always been disposed to consider that Sebastopol should be attacked on the south side, and Sir John Burgoyne leant strongly to the same opinion.'—Private letter from Lord Raglan to the Duke of Newcastle, 28th September 1854. This must not be understood as implying—for that would be contrary to the fact—that Lord Raglan, *when once landed on the western coast of the Crimea*, did not anxiously desire and prefer that there should be an attack on the north side.

For the purpose of informing himself upon any question of military engineering, Lord Raglan had at his side an accomplished and gifted adviser. Sir John Burgoyne was a general of engineers now serving on the Staff of the army which Lord Raglan commanded. His experience of war went back to the great days. It began with the first year of this century at Malta. In 1806 he was serving in Sicily. He was commanding engineer with General Fraser's expedition to Egypt, and was at the assault on the lines of Alexandria, and the siege of Rosetta. He was with Sir John Moore at Messina and in Sweden in 1808, and was with him the same year in the Peninsula. He was at Corunna. He blew up the bridge of Benevente in the presence of the enemy. He was with Sir Arthur Wellesley in 1809, and attached to the 3d (Picton's) Division. He was at the passage of the Douro. He served in the lines of Torres Vedras. He blew up Fort Concepcion in presence of the enemy. He was at Busaco, at the first siege of Badajoz, at Elboden, at Aldea del Ponte, and at the siege and capture of Ciudad Rodrigo, where he was present at the assault. He was at the second siege and capture of Badajoz, and was present at the assault and escalade of the castle. He was commanding engineer at the siege and capture of the forts of Salamanca, and at the battle. He was commanding engineer at the capture of Madrid, and the Retiro, and also at the siege of Burgos, where he was wounded. At Vittoria he had a horse shot under him. He was wounded at the assault of St Sebastian.

CHAP.  
IV.

Sir John  
Burgoyne.

**CHAP.** He conducted the siege of the castle of St Sebastian  
**IV.** as commanding engineer. He was at the passage of the Bidassoa, the Nivelle, at the Nive, at the passage of the Adour, the blockade of Bayonne, and the repulse of the sortie. He was at New Orleans, and was with the force despatched to Portugal in 1827.\* He had, therefore, a vast experience, connecting his name with a glorious period of England's history; and the value of this advantage was not, as so often happens, in the least counteracted by failure of energy. On the contrary, Sir John Burgoyne was gifted with a vigour of mind which made him in that respect the equal of those who were young. Furrowed by years, and the sheer labour of great wars, he still showed what mettle there was in the generation of men with which England began the century; for neither Egypt, nor the retreat to Corunna, nor the cares of Torres Vedras, nor the business of all the great sieges—Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz, Burgos, St Sebastian—nor yet the discomfiture of New Orleans, had been able to imprint upon his features the marks of painful anxiety. To high intellectual power he added the firmness of a reasoner who holds that there can be no sect in mathematics, and that opinions carefully formed must not be dominated by mere results. As might be expected, he was master of the science of the military engineer; but his mind, ranging freely beyond his own branch of the service, had become stored with the many kinds of knowledge which concern the whole business of war. He wrote with clearness, with grace, and so

\* Hart's Army List.

persuasively that, having a pen in his hand, he was liable perhaps to be drawn into error by the cogency of his own arguments. He was daring and resolute; and since his mind had been formed at a time when England was not only in a robust and warlike condition, but also in some degree careless of the lives of common soldiers and workmen, it is probable that he could have easily brought himself to make a great sacrifice of life for a great purpose; and the power to do this, where a strong place has to be taken, is one of no little worth. Moreover, it is believed that Sir John Burgoyne was not without that wholesome ambition which, if the command of an army had chanced to fall to his lot,\* might have impelled him to great achievements. It is possible that because he was the commanding engineer with Fraser's expedition to Egypt, and at the siege of Burgos, and because he was at New Orleans, and because he was advising in the business of trying to take Sebastopol at a time when the place did not fall, therefore some, in estimating his quality as a general, might condemn him, after the manner of the Athenians, for not being fortunate; and supposing it to be insisted upon (as it would be by the more accurate Moderns) that a mere charge of lucklessness is no honest answer to a question concerning the capacity of a general, the objector, when thus driven home, might venture perhaps a surmise that Sir John Burgoyne's sureness of judgment was liable to be endangered by his too indiscriminate

\* He was at one time the senior general officer serving under Lord Raglan, and, under possible circumstances, might have succeeded to the command.

CHAP. reliance upon the processes of close reasoning ; for a  
IV. method like that is most apt to lead man into fallacies, whenever he applies it to questions of such a kind that they need to be solved by the instinctive, the divining power, or even by coarse sagacity.

Still, the tenor of counsels, appearing at first sight to result from a too studious method of solving warlike problems, might be traceable, after all, to the nature of Sir John Burgoyne's position at the English Headquarters, rather than to the original bent of his mind ; for he who, without holding a command, was called upon to give advice likely to be accepted at the French Headquarters, as well as by his own chief, was obliged to make proposals of such a kind that he could support them in argument ; and that very necessity would be enough to prevent him from striking upon one of those daring yet happy conceptions which can be originated and pushed to great issues by a sole commander, although they are wanting in those smooth, placid features which would best recommend them to a council of war.

Of course, it was in the nature of things that the judgment of a man deeply versed in the business of sieges should be more or less warped by his science ; and that, advising on the conduct of an enterprise much dependent on swiftness of action and on prompt use of the blessing of victory, the skilled engineer might be too ready to enter upon a war of entrenchments ; but Sir John Burgoyne had so much breadth of view, and so general a knowledge of the warlike art, that he was as little likely, perhaps, to err in this

direction as any other officer of the same calling in the French or the English camp. CHAP.  
IV.

Now, Sir John Burgoyne not only held that the project of an attack upon the south side of Sebastopol had many and great advantages over that of assailing the Star Fort, but even brought himself to believe that, for the sake of being able to exchange the one plan for the other, it would be wise to front all the hazard of marching the Allied armies to the east of the Sebastopol roadstead, and thence round to the south of the place. His opinion was known to his chief; and when Lord Raglan perceived that the reluctance of the French to attack the Star Fort was strong, and firmly rooted, he hastened to obtain for the alternative plan which had occurred to him the sanction and persuasive support of Sir John Burgoyne. Accordingly, on the morrow of the battle on the Alma, he requested Sir John to put his opinion in writing; and, in the course of the same day, the English Commander was furnished with this memorandum:—

His  
opinion.

He is re-  
quested to  
put it in  
writing.

*Memorandum.*

‘CAMP ON THE ALMA, 21st Sept. 1854.

‘I would submit that, unless some impeding circumstances occur which cannot now be foreseen, the combined armies should at once move round to the south side of Sebastopol, instead of attacking Fort Constantine;\* by which the following advantages may be anticipated:—

Sir John  
Bur-  
goyne's  
Memoran-  
dum.

‘1. That instead of attacking a position naturally strong and of limited extent, to which a powerful support will be given by Fort Constantine,\* which is a permanent fortification, though by no

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\* By Fort Constantine Sir John Burgoyne means the Star Fort. Fort Constantine was one of the sea-forts, but at this period of the invasion the name was often applied by mistake to the Star Fort.



CHAP. IV. ' means formidable, if insulated, the enemy would have to defend a  
 ' very extensive line, divided by valleys, and, from every informa-  
 ' tion, very imperfectly, if at all, entrenched, and which would pro-  
 ' bably be forced rapidly.

' 2. As the advance is from the north, our attack will rather be  
 ' expected on that side, and not on the south.

' 3. Even supposing the Fort Constantine\* to be taken, although  
 ' it will open the shipping, dockyard, &c., to cannonading, it does  
 ' not insure entire possession of the important establishments until  
 ' after a second operation, which may still require to move round  
 ' to the south, while the enemy will retain to the last free and open  
 ' communication to the place.†

' 4. There is every reason to believe, from the appearance of the  
 ' maps, and what may be expected to be the formation of the ground,  
 ' that there is a very strong position between the sea at Balaclava  
 ' and along the valley of the Tchernaya, that would most efficiently  
 ' cover the Allied armies during the operation, but is too extensive  
 ' to be taken up by the garrison.

' 5. That the communication with the fleet, which is, in fact, our  
 ' base of operations, would be far more secure and commodious by  
 ' the small harbour of Balaclava and the bays near Chersonese,  
 ' than on the open coast to the north, and with the advantage of a  
 ' good road from Balaclava to the attacks, and a very flat country  
 ' to pass to them from the bays near Chersonese.

' 6. Under ordinary circumstances such a movement would have  
 ' the effect of exposing the communication of the army to be cut off;  
 ' but in this case the idea is, to abandon the communication from  
 ' the north altogether, and establish a new one to the shipping in  
 ' the south, which would be moved round for that purpose.

' J. F. BURGOYNE, *Lieut.-General*.'

Sir John  
 Burgoyne,  
 by Lord

Having completed this memorandum, Sir John  
 Burgoyne was requested by Lord Raglan to go to the

\* See preceding note.

† Possibly some words may have been here left out or miswritten, for, as actually worded, this last suggestion seems to be not only an error, but an inversion of the real state of the case. The attack of the North Side was the one which would have been compatible with plans for seizing the enemy's lines of communication, whilst the flank march was on the contrary a final abdication of all power to operate in that way.

French Headquarters, and there propound the plan of the flank march. He obeyed. His interview with Marshal St Arnaud took place in the presence of the Marshal's Chief of the Staff and of General Bizot, the officers in command of the Engineers. Some other Staff officers were in the tent. When Sir John Burgoyne had explained the proposal recorded by his memorandum, and had answered the few questionings which were addressed to him, the Marshal at once, and without at all seeking counsel from the officers about him, declared, as Sir John understood, that he approved the plan, and was willing to join with Lord Raglan in the determination to carry it into effect ;\* but it must not be understood that these words carried with them an unconditional decision. The Marshal apparently understood the proposal exactly in the same sense as that in which Lord Raglan had meant it to be submitted to him ; and what his answer really imported was, that if he should persist in his objection to attack the North Fort, then, and in that event, he would consent to resort to the flank march. At all events, it is certain that the question of adopting the plan of the flank march remained open until a later period.†

Yet, even as early as the time when the Allies still lay on the Alma, the plan had won so much favour,

C H A P.  
IV.

Raglan's direction, propounds the flank march to Marshal St Arnaud.

Extent to which the idea of the flank march was entertained at the period of the halt on the Alma.

\* Letter from Sir John Burgoyne.

† See Marshal St Arnaud's journal, under date of the 23d and 24th September. Lord Raglan fixes the evening of the 24th, on the Belbec, as the time when the measure was adopted.—Despatch to Secretary of War, Sept. 28. See also, *post*, an extract from a private letter to the Duke of Newcastle, written on the night of the 24th.

CHAP. that already, as we saw, it acted upon the arrange-  
 IV. ments of the Commanders, preventing them from leav-  
 ing a detachment to cover the embarkation of the  
 wounded, and, in that way, prolonging the halt.

And now, in the evening of the 24th of September, whilst the troops were establishing their quarters among the gardens and the villas on the Belbec, the Allies took their final resolve.

Lord Raglan's conference with Marshal St Arnaud on the evening of the 24th.

Lord Raglan, with some of his Staff, went to the camp of the French Headquarters. The interview was not a long one. Lord Raglan, in few words, and for the last time, submitted that the Allies should go on with their original plan of campaign, and assault the works on the north of Sebastopol. Marshal St Arnaud once more declined to agree to this. He said that the defences of the Star Fort had revetments in masonry, and that he would not undertake to attack such a work without laying formal siege to it.\* This answer was treated as negating all further idea of attacking Sebastopol from the north.† As regards the course which, in these circumstances, was to be resorted to, Lord Raglan, as we saw, had himself proposed the alternative plan; and Marshal St Arnaud,

\* Information from an officer present. In a private letter to the Duke of Newcastle, written just after this conference, and dated, 'On the Belbec, 24th Sept., night,' Lord Raglan says: 'We crossed to the Belbec this afternoon, and moved to the heights above it. I was anxious to have gone farther, but the French thought otherwise.'

† The mouth of the Belbec being commanded by the new battery thrown up near the Star Fort, it was conceived that no base of operations could be constituted in that region without first carrying the Star Fort, and that, consequently, any attacks on the Fort must be of a summary kind.

it seems, though not without some hesitation, had already made up his mind to accept it.\* On this subject, therefore, neither one nor the other of the two Commanders had need to use words of persuasion. They agreed to attempt the flank march.†

CHAP.  
IV.

Determin-  
ation to  
attempt  
the flank  
march.

During the conversation, Marshal St Arnaud sat rigidly up in an armed chair, and to some who observed it his bearing conveyed an impression that

State of  
Marshal  
St Arnaud.

\* On the 24th the Marshal wrote in his private journal: 'We start at eleven o'clock. We shall turn the positions and the batteries by the left.' Lord Raglan's view seems to have been that the Marshal's assent to the flank march did not so much result from positive approval of the measure as from reluctance to go on with the original plan of attacking the Star Fort after hearing of the new works which commanded the mouth of the Belbec. In his private letter of the 28th of September to the Duke of Newcastle, Lord Raglan, after speaking of Sir John Burgoyne's memorandum respecting the flank march, says: 'The Marshal did not very readily adopt the idea in the first instance; but when he found that the mouth of the Belbec was commanded, and that strong works were erecting in front of Fort Constantine [meaning the Star Fort] which would impede the use of the river, he assented to the proposition without hesitation.' I imagine that the hesitation which Lord Raglan here ascribes to St Arnaud must have shown itself *after* Burgoyne's interview with the Marshal, and *before* the discovery of the new field-work overlooking the mouth of the Belbec.

† Statement by an officer present. Writing that same night of the deliberations between the French and the English Headquarters, Lord Raglan says: 'We shall move again to-morrow morning, and we have nearly determined to attempt the attack of Sebastopol from the south side, abandoning our communication with the Katcha.'—Private letter to Duke of Newcastle, dated, 'On the Belbec, 24th Sept. 1854, night.' In qualifying his language by the word 'nearly,' Lord Raglan, as I understand him, was adapting his statement to the fact that the execution of the plan was to be subject to the result of the reconnaissance he was going to undertake on the morrow. He did not, in any other sense, mean that the resolve was otherwise than final; and as the intended reconnaissance was to be in the course of the flank march, and, so to speak, a part of it, I can make, without qualification, the statement in the text to which this note is appended.

**C H A P.** he wished to give to the interview an appearance of  
IV. formality ; but Lord Raglan perceived the truth. He had no sooner left the French camp than he said to one of his Staff, ‘ Did you observe St Arnaud ?—he is ‘ dying.’

This was the last time that the two chiefs conferred upon the business of the campaign. When Lord Raglan visited the French Headquarters on the following morning, he found that the Marshal was no longer in a condition to be able to take part in affairs.

The deci-  
sion to  
which the  
chiefs  
came.

The decision the chiefs had come to was this :—that unless the reconnaissance which Lord Raglan was to make on the morrow should disclose good reasons for changing the plan, the English army first (to be followed in due time by the French) should endeavour to push round the head of the Sebastopol roadstead by gaining the Mackenzie Heights, with intention to descend thence into the valley of the Tchernaya, and recover communication with the sea by seizing the harbour of Balaclava.

Difficulty  
at the  
time of  
account-  
ing for the  
Marshal's  
unwilling-  
ness to  
attack the  
Star Fort.

At the time, it was hard to account for the Marshal's unwillingness to go on with the task of assailing the Star Fort, as well as for his ready acceptance of an alternative plan which, for the moment, would throw the leadership of the Allied army into the hands of his English colleague ; and Lord Raglan acknowledged to Sir Edmund Lyons that he could not understand the Marshal's recusancy. But time has since thrown some light on what was then obscure ; and to me it seems that the theory which best explains the counsels of the French Headquarters

Lord Rag-  
lan's feel-  
ing of un-  
certainty  
as to St  
Arnaud's  
motives.

at this time is the obvious, the simple, the shallow one—the one which traces them to the bodily condition of Marshal St Arnaud.\* Without any accurate knowledge of the successive maladies from which the Marshal was suffering, or of their singular intermissions, it is easy to see that, in the interval between the battle of the Alma and his final determination to consent to the flank march, he was grievously ill in health, and was, from time to time, prostrated by his sufferings. But just as, in his African campaigns, he had more than once bravely resolved to drag his suffering body out of hospital that he might be acting with his regiment in some approaching engagement, so now, exerting himself to hold on in spite of his bodily state, he persisted in keeping his command. In the condition in which he was it was physically impossible for him to perform the laborious duties of a general who has to provide for the attack of such a place as the Star Fort. If it be said that he might have resigned his command, the answer is, that that was exactly the end which he was striving to avoid. With his old spirit of resistance to bodily weakness, he clung to his command, and apparently with the more tenacity from the time when he suspected that measures had been secretly taken to provide for the event of his becoming unable to remain at the head of the army.

CHAP.  
IV.

Probable origin of the counsels which governed the French Headquarters.

St Arnaud's bodily state.

\* This was the solution which Sir Edmund Lyons afterwards adopted ; but he also intimated that, at the time of the Marshal's refusal to go on against the North Forts, the state of his bodily health was not so far known to him (Sir Edmund) or to Lord Raglan as to enable them to see that that was the cause of the evil.

CHAP. So when, as a substitute for the attack of the Star  
IV. Fort, there came the proposal to resort to the flank march, he could see that the measure was one which averted the immediate necessity of his resigning the command, by shifting the stress of duty in the Allied army from its right to its left, and thereby enabling him to do now again what he had so happily done once before when he lay struck down by illness \*—that is, to leave the virtual leadership of the whole expedition for the time in the hands of the English Commander.

This way of explaining what passed is the more to be welcomed since it tends to disperse the seeming cloud that was thrown upon the French army by the counsels of its chief, and recognises that singular power of fighting against bodily sickness which was one of the most interesting features in the character of Marshal St Arnaud.†

The avoidance of the Star Fort was the second of the lost occasions.

If this final determination to turn aside from the Star Fort was in one sense a mere continuance of St Arnaud's former refusal to march on and attack the work, still it took place under different conditions, and in circumstances which gave it the character of a distinct resolve. Thus regarded, it has to be ranged as the second of the lost occasions which followed the battle of the Alma.

\* During the voyage. See *ante*, vol. II. chap. ix.

† Since I wrote the above, I have had an opportunity of seeing that General de Todleben ascribes the avoidance of the Star Fort to the same cause—the maladies of the French Marshal.

## CHAPTER V.

THE night they lay on the Belbec, the Allies were still in blank ignorance of the enemy's plans ; and although they supposed that the Russian army must be almost, as it were, in their presence, they did not know where it was posted. Of course, this still undispersed darkness in regard to the enemy's counsels and movements was of itself a source of grave danger ; and unless they were largely reckoning upon the despondency or the unskilfulness of the enemy, the Allies might well believe that the circumstances in which they stood were critical even to jeopardy. Hitherto, each day's march had ended by relinking the (temporarily) abandoned communication between the land and the sea forces of the Allies ; but now that the invaders had made up their minds to leave the mouth of the river on which they were bivouacked to the undisturbed control of the enemy, it resulted that, except by a retrograde march to the Katcha, or by an adventure across the country to the southern coast of the peninsula, they could no longer gain access to their shipping. On their right, there was the sea-shore, controlled by the enemy, and not approached by the succouring fleets.

C H A P.  
V.

The Allies still in ignorance of the enemy's plans and movements.

The critical position of the Allies.



CHAP. Before them, they had that Severnaya or north side of  
 V. Sebastopol, which, since they had determined not to attack it, was as hampering to them as if it had been really impregnable. On their left, the Allies had a wooded and broken country, to them quite strange, though of course well known to the enemy; and the condition of things was such that it was competent to the Russian Commander, without hazard (and even without being seen till the work should be nearly done), to move his army at pleasure to any part of the Belbec which was far enough above the English lines to be clear of their outlying picket.\*

If it could have been taken for granted that the troops which retreated from the Alma were still a coherent army, there would have been no reason why the morrow's dawn should not show Prince Mentschikoff coming down in force upon the left flank of the Allies, and threatening to roll up their line. In that case the Allies—first the English and then the French—would have had to change their front, and to range themselves as best they could, with the north side of Sebastopol on their right, and, at their backs, a sea and sea-shore no longer friendly to them, but controlled by the enemy's guns. The cause of their being in this plight was Marshal St Arnaud's refusal to attack the work at the mouth of the Belbec; for if that had been taken or silenced, the attendant fleets would have ap-

The cause which brought the Allies into an imperilled state.

\* The soundness of this observation is proved by the movement which was actually made by the Russian army in the night of the 24th and the morning of the 25th. See *post*, chap. vii.

proached, and the Allies, as before, would have been in communication with the shipping. This not being done, the fate with which the principles of the art of war seemed to threaten the Allies was—not mere discomfiture, but ruin. If two strategists for pastime, or for love of their art, were to wage a mimic war upon a map with pins and counters, the one who might find himself brought to the condition in which the Allies now lay would have to confess himself vanquished, and this notwithstanding that his counters might show him to be much the grosser in numbers. It was with better fortune that the Allies were destined to rise from their bivouac on the Belbec; for they had strength of a kind which the pins and the counters of the strategist could hardly symbolise; they were still under the shelter of their Wednesday's victory, and were favoured beyond common measure by the unskilfulness of the Russian Commander.

CHAP.  
V.

The circumstances to which they owed their immunity.

About two hours after midnight, there was a good deal of musketry firing in a part of the Allied line; and when this came to be followed by the sustained roar of field-artillery, it was hard for young soldiers to avoid believing that a somewhat hot combat must be going on. Lord Raglan was not awakened. It was said that the false alarm which brought about all this firing arose in the Turkish lines.

False alarm in the night.

When morning dawned upon the invaders there was no sign that the enemy was hovering upon their left flank; and although, as was afterwards known, the army of the Allies and the Russian field army

At dawn there was no sign that the enemy was on the left flank of the Allies.

CHAP. were drinking that morning of the same stream, there  
V. was between them a distance not hitherto pierced by  
the reports of scouts or deserters, and great enough to  
prevent their being seen the one by the other.

Virulence  
of the cho-  
lera on  
the night  
of the  
24th.  
Demean-  
our of the  
sufferers.

During the hours of this bivouac on the Belbec, the cholera raged. In the morning, great numbers of the soldiers thus torn from the strength of the English regiments were laid in ranks parallel with the road. The sufferers all lay strangely silent.

## CHAPTER VI.

## L

BEFORE he moved forward on the morning of the 25th, Lord Raglan saw Marshal St Arnaud, but found him in a state of bodily suffering too acute to allow of his taking part in business.

The resolve of the foregoing night was to be executed in the following way:—Leaving General Cathcart with the 4th Division and the 4th Light Dragoons on the Belbec, in order that, for a while, he might there maintain the communication with the Katcha, and be able to send the sick thither, Lord Raglan determined that the rest of his army, avoiding the marsh in front which Lord Cardigan had reconnoitred, and bending at once to its left, should move straight up to the ground overhanging the head of the Sebastopol bay, and try to keep such a direction as to be able to strike the highroad between Sebastopol and Baktchi Seräi at a spot described in the maps by the name of ‘Mac-kenzie’s Farm.’ In that direction, accordingly, Lord Lucan was to proceed on reconnaissance with the cavalry division; and, the ground being woodland, he was to be supported by a battalion of the Rifles, under

C H A P.  
VI.

Lord Raglan's visit to Marshal St. Arnaud. The Marshal's state of suffering.

Lord Raglan's dispositions for the flank march.

CHAP. Colonel Lawrence. Upon reaching Mackenzie's Farm,  
VI. Lord Lucan was to abstain from moving troops into the great road; but his instructions enjoined him to watch it both ways—that is, in the direction of Sebastopol on one side, and Baktchi Seräi on the other. He was to report to Lord Raglan the result of his observations.\*

According to an indication given by the maps, there was a narrow lane or woodland road which led to Mackenzie's Farm; and in order to leave that route clear for the cavalry and artillery, our infantry were to make their way through the forest by following, as ships do at sea, the guidance of the mariner's compass. The direction in which they were to move was south-south-east from the point where the compass would first be needed.

Lord Raglan in person proposed to move forward in the general line of march until he should find himself on the commanding heights which overhang the head of the Sebastopol roadstead; but then, taking with him his escort—a troop of light-horse—he intended to reconnoitre the ground, and to determine with his own eyes whether there was anything in the nature of the country, or in the visible preparations of the enemy, which might make it expedient to withdraw from the undertaking of the flank march, or to alter the way of effecting it. If he should judge that there was nothing which ought to hinder his enterprise, the advance of his whole army to Mackenzie's Farm, and thence to the Tchernaya and the south

\* See the written instruction in the Appendix.

coast, was to go on. In that case, and as soon as the English cavalry, artillery, and waggon-trains should have so far defiled through the forest as to leave the road clear for other troops, the French army was to follow in the same direction. Accordingly, it may be said that, during the first hours of the march, the advance was a 'reconnaissance in force,' but a reconnaissance so arranged that Lord Raglan, by a word, could convert it into a definitive movement of the whole Allied army, which would be carried on to the top of the Mackenzie Heights, thence down to the Tractir bridge on the Tchernaya, and at last to the port of Balaclava.\*

CHAP.  
VI.

At about half-past eight on the morning of the 25th of September, the flank march began. From the first, Lord Lucan's reconnoitring column was but little in advance of the main body of the English army for which it had to feel the way.† Lord Lucan's order of march was this: at the head of his column there moved a troop of hussars with which he was present in person. Half the companies of the Rifle battalion were placed in advance, and the other half in the rear of the main body of the cavalry, each regiment of which was covered by flankers of its own.

Com-  
mence-  
ment of  
the march.

After marching some miles in the right direction, this reconnoitring column of Lord Lucan's (though

The caval-  
ry did not  
(as had

\* See the Map, and the Plan of the country near Mackenzie's Farm.

† Lord Lucan (whose squadrons had bivouacked on the left of the English line) marched at about the same time as Headquarters—i. e., at about half-past eight. It seems that in the earlier part of the morning the Rifle battalion had not reached the ground from which Lord Lucan was to move, and that, from that cause, the march of the reconnoitring column began at a later hour than would have been otherwise chosen.

C H A P. VI. its route had been chosen for it by an officer of the

been intended) take the woodland road;

but marched, as the infantry did, by compass.

March of the infantry.

Quartermaster-General's department, who rode with the force for the purpose) was led into a path which turned out to be a byroad diverging from the true line of march—a byroad degenerating, after a time, to a mere track, and at last disappearing altogether.\*

The troops were able, however, to make some way through the forest in the manner that had been prescribed to the infantry, by taking the compass for their guide, and moving, as nearly as they could, in a south-south-easterly course. Since Lord Lucan had a battalion of Rifles joined to his cavalry, and understood that he ought to keep his whole force together, he was unable, of course, to allow to himself and his horsemen a greater degree of speed than the foot-soldiers with him could reach. Upon the whole, it resulted that, after a while, the reconnoitring column was not (as Lord Raglan had of course supposed it would be) at the head of the advancing army.

By aid of the compass, and with great toil, our infantry divisions made their difficult way through the forest. The underwood was in some places so thick as to leave but a very narrow choice of path, and in general it was found impracticable for the troops to preserve any kind of formation. The men of each battalion broke through as best they could, passing sometimes over ground where several could be working their way

\* The officer charged with this duty was Major Wetherall, a man so able that no one ever thought of blaming him for choosing what turned out to be the wrong path. See, in the Appendix, Sir Edward Wetherall's statement.

abreast of one another, but at other times compelled to break into Indian file. Still, the plan of marching by compass was successful; and, so far as I have learnt, no body of men fell out of the prescribed line of march in such a way as to become long divided from the rest of the army.

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It was a laborious task for troops which were not at the time in the enjoyment of great bodily strength to have to tear their way through steep forest ground without a road or a path; and at one of the halts which took place with a portion of the Foot regiments already near the summit of the heights, some impatience broke out; for, there being no water, the men felt the torment of thirst. There arose a low, grave, momentous sound—the murmur of angered soldiery. Each man, whilst he sat or lay on the ground, hoarsely groaned out the same intense word. The one utterance heard travelling along the lines was, ‘Water! water! water!’\*

Suffering  
of some  
of the in-  
fantry  
from  
thirst.

Their mur-  
murs.

When Lord Raglan had gained the high ground on the east of Sebastopol, he diverged from the line of march which his army was taking; and having with him his escort, rode on along the shoulder of the hill which there bulges out towards the west. When he stopped, he was at no great distance from the easternmost of those two lighthouses which stand at the head of the bay.†

Lord Rag-  
lan in per-  
son effects  
a recon-  
naissance  
in the di-  
rection of  
the head  
of the  
bay.

Then the prize, for the winning of which the Allies had come over the seas, lay spread out before him. Of such defences as there might be on the land side

\* This was not in the hearing of Lord Raglan.

† See Plan.



CHAP. of the place he indeed could discern very little; but  
VI. the day being bright, and the ground so commanding as to give him full scope for his survey, he looked all the way down the great roadstead from the east to the west, and even could mark where the waves were lapping the booms at its entrance. He saw part of the fleet and the docks, the approaches of the man-of-war harbour, and the long-nurtured malice of the casemated batteries couched down at the water's edge. On the upland above the Severnaya or North side, he saw the Star Fort now left behind and avoided, and on the south the Karabel faubourg, with, beyond, the steep shining streets and the olive-green domes of Sebastopol. So glittered before him that 'priceless jewel'—for so the Russians declared it—now becoming the gage of a conflict not destined to end in his time.\*

None foresaw, I believe, at the time, that the ground where Lord Raglan was standing would ere long acquire a strange worth in the eyes of the invading nations; yet before the next spring should warm into summer, the dominion of those barren uplands at the head of the Sebastopol bay was about to be accounted so precious that, in order by sheer might to win it, the great Powers of the West would be contemplating another armada, another descent on the coast, another and a greater invasion.† But at this time, all was

\* See the bird's-eye Plan. In a letter to his sovereign which will be spoken of hereafter, Prince Mentschikoff gives to Sebastopol the appellation of 'priceless jewel.'

† This is an allusion to the plan which, as we shall see hereafter,

quietness. The Russians showed no troops; and not only was there no sign of their undertaking to obstruct the flank march, but it even seemed as if hitherto they must either have been blind to the movement, or else so alive to its nature as to be willing to let it proceed, and determined to abide their time.

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The survey thus effected by Lord Raglan in person had disclosed nothing that could deter him from converting the reconnoissance into a definitive movement, but no report of the condition of things on the great road had yet come in from the cavalry. He turned his horse's head, and made for the line of march which his troops were pursuing, but with the intention of striking it at a point some way in advance.

Led by that instinctive knowledge of country which was one of his natural gifts, and neither having a guide, nor needing any fresh glance at the map, he at once chose his course like a rider who had been familiar with the ground all his days, and soon struck into the lane or woodland road which bends up towards Mackenzie's Farm. The cavalry, as we saw, was moving through another part of the forest; but Maude's troop of horse-artillery, though in general commanded by Lord Lucan, did not now form a part of the reconnoitring column; and having avoided the mistake which led the cavalry into a bypath, it was now upon its assigned route, moving steadily along the woodland road. The road was just broad enough to allow the passage of a piece of artillery, with also one horseman

Lord Raglan strikes into the lane leading up through the forest to Mackenzie's Farm.

There he finds Maude's troop of horse-artillery.

was propounded with great eagerness by the French Emperor in the spring of 1855.

CHAP. alongside it ; and at the time of the interruption which  
 VI. will be presently recorded, Lord Raglan, followed by  
 his Staff in single file, was riding abreast of the fore-  
 most gun, or perhaps a few paces ahead of it.

Lord Raglan supposed that the reconnoitring column of cavalry and riflemen was in front of him, and from moment to moment, no doubt, he was expecting Lord Lucan's report.

Cause of  
the un-  
guarded  
way in  
which  
Lord Rag-  
lan and  
the artil-  
lery-train  
moved on  
along the  
lane.


If the cavalry had been leading the march through this lane, it would have been moving, of course, with the usual precautions, and an advanced-guard preceding the column by a sufficing distance, and perceiving a hostile force in its front, would have been quick to carry back warning to the main body. It chanced, however, as we saw, that our cavalry had missed the lane, and this is why it was that Lord Raglan came to be riding with none of his troops in front of him.

Lord Rag-  
lan's prox-  
imity to  
the point  
where the  
lane joins  
the great  
road.



At length Lord Raglan reached a point in the lane where the light some way on could be seen breaking through—breaking through in such way as to show that, a few yards in front, there must be an opening in the forest.\* Observing this, General Airey asked permission to ride on a little way in advance, in order to see whether the ground was clear : and he moved accordingly ; but in a few seconds he stopped ; and without speaking held up his hand in a way which instantly showed not only that Lord Raglan and the whole column should instantly halt, but that there was need to be very quiet. Airey had, all at once, come in sight of the great road at the point where

General  
Airey  
moves for-  
ward,  
and sud-  
denly finds  
himself  
close to  
a Russian  
waggon-  
train and  
a body of  
Russian  
infantry.

\* See Plan of the country near Mackenzie's Farm.



J. Jobbins

Russian Infantry ..... thus .....   
 Guns in March along a Road ..... thus ..... 



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it crosses the lane almost close to Mackenzie's Farm. There, and only a few paces off, there was a Russian waggon-train and a body of Russian infantry. The force, as we now know, was a battalion of foot-Cossacks escorting the waggon-train, but constituting also the rear-guard of Prince Mentschikoff's field army.\* The men were halted—but not because they yet stood on the alert; they had halted as troops halt for rest in the midst of a toilsome march, and some of them were strolling along the road. Almost at the moment when they first caught sight of General Airey surveying them from his saddle, they must have heard the rumble of Maude's horse-artillery, and learnt that an enemy's force was close upon them.

If two hostile forces thus came, as it were, by an accident to strike, one against the other in marching, the result was owing to two causes—to mere negligence on the part of the Russians, and, on the part of the English, to that mistake, already explained, which had led our reconnoitring column into the wrong path. To each of the bodies thus brought almost into contact the sudden presence of the other was a surprise; but the gravity of the danger they respectively incurred was far from being the same. A train of artillery marching up through a woodland lane, and the string of horsemen forming the Headquarters Staff, must needs have been almost helpless under the fire of a few foot-soldiers moving briskly into the wood.

The surprise was mutual, but the gravity of the danger not the same to each.

The kind of attack to which the English might have been subjected.

\* A battalion of the Black Sea Cossacks escorting an ammunition-train of the artillery, and the baggage of the 'Saxe Weimar' hussar regiment.

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Lord Raglan's presence of mind.

His way of dealing with the emergency.

The interval before the coming of the cavalry.

But between the Russian battalion and the head of the English column thus by strange chance coming together, there was the difference that the Russian battalion, at the time, was apparently without the guidance of an officer having presence of mind, whilst the English Commander-in-Chief, who happened, as we have seen, to be present in person with this part of his army, was one whom Nature had gifted with the power to do at the moment just that which the moment requires. In a tranquil, low voice, Lord Raglan gave orders to bring up some of his cavalry;\* and the officers whom he charged with this mission glided swiftly away; but he himself and the rest of his Staff slowly moved down the lane a few paces, then halted, and remained very still.†

Before the orders for bringing up the cavalry could produce their effect, some minutes must needs pass, and during this little interval the English Commander and his Staff, as well as Maude's artillery, could not but be much at the mercy of the enemy. Yet those of the Russians who were so placed as to be able to descry Lord Raglan through the foliage would never have been able to infer from

\* He despatched, I think, two officers, of whom one, I suppose, may have been ordered to fetch the troop under Captain Chetwode which were on duty as Lord Raglan's escort, whilst the other was probably directed to endeavour to find Lord Lucan and the main body of the cavalry. According to the impression I formed at the time—and I believe I heard his words—he sent for any cavalry that could be found.

† I have seen it somewhere stated that Lord Raglan and his Staff came galloping back in haste. If they had done so, they would probably have brought destruction upon themselves. Neither Lord Raglan nor any of his Staff (except the officers sent to fetch the cavalry) moved out of a walk.

the sight that he or his Staff were people who supposed themselves to be placed in any kind of jeopardy. Rather they would have been led to imagine, from what they saw, that the English General had just effected a surprise designed beforehand, and was inspecting the progress of an attack now about to be made on themselves.

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Deceived by the tranquillity of the scene thus presented to them by Lord Raglan, or simply, perhaps, bewildered by the suddenness of the adventure, the Russians did not stretch out a hand to seize the gift which fortune was proffering. Minutes passed without bringing signs that the enemy's soldiery were moving into the wood; and at length Chetwode's troop of hussars came galloping up the lane in single file, the officers of the Staff making room for them by moving into the copse. Nor was this the only cavalry force now at hand. It chanced that Lord Lucan, who had been marching through the forest a little lower down on the right, had sent Captain Wetherall to explore, and Wetherall coming back to him quickly with tidings of the emergency which had occurred, Lord Lucan hastened to bring his cavalry division into the lane, and some of his squadrons were there almost as soon as the escort. Lawrence's Rifles, too, were up, and swiftly pushing forward. None of the horsemen stopped at all in the lane, but all as they came, and in single file, galloped on into the place where the enemy had been seen.

The Russians lose their opportunity.

The English cavalry comes up.

Lord Lucan in person was with the horsemen coming up. Naturally, Lord Raglan had been



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faction addressed by Lord Raglan to Lord Lucan.

Retreat of the Russian battalion.

by finding that the cavalry was not in advance upon the main line of march; and when he saw the divisional General passing, he said to him, 'Lord Lucan, 'you are late!' Lord Lucan galloped on without answering.\*

But already the Russian soldiery who had undergone this surprise were in flight along the great road, and in a direction which took them away from Sebastopol, and towards the town of Baktchi Seräi. Our cavalry continued to come up, and by this time Maude's troop of horse-artillery had not only got out of the forest, but had unlimbered some of their guns on the great road, and brought them to bear on a part of the enemy's waggon-train in a way which stopped its retreat.

The Greys dismounted and ordered to take possession of the wood by the roadside.

In order to cover his flank, Lord Raglan dismounted some of the Greys, and caused them to take possession of the wood by the road's side.

Our cavalry pressed forward, and at length came up with a small rear-guard consisting of some twenty of the enemy's infantrymen. These faced about boldly, and delivered a volley at the faces of Lord Lucan and Lord Cardigan and their Staff, then riding in front of our horsemen; but the Russians fired too high, and were presently, of course, overpowered, some running aside into the forest, others standing their ground so long that they failed to escape the edge of the sabre.

\* The foregoing account shows the grounds which would have been available to Lord Lucan if he had afterwards thought fit to tender an explanation of the way in which the reconnoitring column lost its place.

When our cavalry had reached the crest from which the road goes steep down into the plain beyond, Lord Raglan stopped the pursuit.

In the result, there were taken a few prisoners, including an officer of artillery, and numbers of ammunition-waggons. But besides these captures, there was found in the baggage-train of the Weimar hussars so great a quantity of things worth the trouble of carrying, that almost every soldier coming up at this time was made happy with some piece of booty. The baggage of the Russian hussar regiment included the possessions of the officers, and thence it was that our soldiers got trophies of a kind which would serve for memorials and for presents. Without some knowledge of the soldier, and the simplicity of his nature, it would be hard to understand the full measure of the animation and delight which the troops were able to derive from this little capture of booty.

When Lord Cardigan had returned from the pursuit, he presented himself to the Commander-in-Chief. Lord Raglan was still in anger at the thought of the disaster which might have been occasioned by the want of any cavalry force advancing in front of his army; and after mentioning the way in which the Headquarters Staff and Maude's artillery had been suffered to come, as it were, into contact with a hostile force, he said, 'The cavalry were out of their proper place. You took them much too low down.' It may be believed that Lord Cardigan bore with much fortitude the blame which he felt could be immediately transferred from his shoulders to those of Lord

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The pursuit stopped.

A few prisoners and some booty taken.

Lord Raglan's expression of dissatisfaction addressed to Lord Cardigan.

C H A P. Lucan, and he readily answered, 'My lord, I am no  
 VI. 'longer in command of the cavalry.'\*

**Mackenzie's Farm.** Almost close to the point in the road where the Russians had thus been surprised, there was the building marked in the maps as Mackenzie's Farm. It seemed to have been used as a temporary barrack, or resting-place for troops in march. In its precincts there were two wells, which yielded a grateful, though too scanty, supply of water.

**Heavy bodies of Russian troops perceived to be marching on Baktchi Seräi.** From the crest just reached by our cavalry when they had to obey the recall, the eye commanded a far-reaching view of the plain beneath. Through this plain there passed the post-road which led to Baktchi Seräi and Simpheropol, and thence north to the mainland of Russia. Retreating along it, there could be seen a division of infantry, some cavalry, and a battery of field-artillery; but beyond, and beyond again, there were thick clouds of dust, which indicated the track of more distant battalions and of squadrons on the same line of march.

**Nature of the coincidence which brought about the mutual surprise.** This 'incident of war'—so Lord Raglan called it at the time to one who rode near him—this 'incident of war' was the result of a singular chance which brought into contact of time and place two movements, each of them cardinal—the one the flank march undertaken by the Allies, the other a flank march also, in which the Russians were busied.

\* The words 'no longer' may seem hardly intelligible; but Lord Cardigan had cherished the idea that his authority over the cavalry which landed with the army—i. e., over the Light Brigade—was to be a separate command. See *post*, chap. iv. vol. IV.

Of the extent and purpose of this Russian flank march we shall have to speak by-and-by ; but, for the present, we are only observing so much of the then dim truth as was visible, at the time, to the English Headquarters.

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It might be thought that, from the sight of the enemy's retiring columns, from the nature of the captured baggage, and from the answers of the few prisoners taken (of whom one was an officer), a clue would be easily seized, from which to infer with some certainty the scope and extent of the operation going on under the eyes of our people. It was not so.

The scope and extent of the Russian movement did not disclose itself to the English.

The officer who had been taken prisoner proved to be a captain of artillery. He was brought forward that he might be questioned, but it instantly appeared that he was in a condition which, for the moment, was of advantage to his country, for it baffled all endeavours to draw knowledge from him. He had brought himself to that stage and that kind of drunkenness which causes the patient to reel in curves from side to side, declaring his good-will to his fellow-creatures, and incessantly proffering his friendship. Yet the time was mid-day, and the sun was shining. Lord Raglan's anxious regard for the personal dignity of the officer and the gentleman had nothing of the narrowness which would confine its scope to those of his own nation, and it seemed that the feeling with which he looked upon the reeling captain was hardly short of distress. At all events, he was so revolted that, yielding to impulse, he broke away from the sight, abandoning all endeavour to draw from the prisoner tl

The officer taken prisoner.

Lord Raglan pained and revolted.

C H A P. knowledge he might happen to have. If other at-  
 VI. tempts were made to get at the truth, they were fol-

The na-  
 ture of the  
 enemy's  
 movement  
 remained  
 unknown  
 to the  
 English  
 Headquar-  
 ters.

lowed by little result; for it is certain that, even long afterwards, the magnitude and the purpose of the movement which brought the Russian force to Mackenzie's Farm remained unknown at the English Headquarters.

Para-  
 mount  
 anxiety in  
 regard to  
 the recov-  
 ery of the  
 sea com-  
 munica-  
 tion.

But whoever has formed any conception of the perilous character of this flank march will easily believe that, at this time, almost the whole stress of the English General's attention must have been brought to bear upon the object of recovering his communications with the sea.

The march  
 resumed.

The army again moved forward, and, in a little while, it had reached the southern crest of those Mackenzie Heights upon which, during many long months, the Great Powers of the West were destined to be gazing with the eyes of baffled desire. Moving down from the summit of these heights to their base by a steep mountain-road, the English army descended into the valley of the Tchernaya. Still pushing forward, but by a painful effort (for this day's was a long and forced march), the bulk of the army at last descended upon the Tchernaya, at the point where its waters were crossed by the Tractir bridge; but darkness had long set in before the bulk of the troops gained their bivouac on the banks of the stream, and some did not reach it that night. Lord Raglan's quarters were established in the little post-house which stood near the bridge.

The Mac-  
 kenzie  
 Heights.

The army  
 reaches  
 the Tcher-  
 naya.

Whilst the main body of the English army thus lay

on the Tchernaya, the road by which they had come was still crowded, miles back, by their trains ; and the obstruction thus caused prevented the French from pushing their march for that night beyond Mackenzie's Farm ; indeed, their rear-guard was not able to reach its bivouac there until three o'clock in the morning. The scanty supply of water remaining in the wells was exhausted by the first comers, and the troops suffered thirst.

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March  
of the  
French.

Cathcart, meanwhile, with his Division, was still on the Belbec, where he had been entrusted with the duty of covering the march, and sending back the sick to the Katcha. His position would have been one of some peril if there had been in the field an enemy watchful and enterprising. From the Belbec to the Katcha, where lay the fleets, there was a tract of hill country unoccupied by the Allies, and the trains sent thither with the sick were at the mercy of the enemy. One of the trains came upon a strong Russian picket, and Surgeon Inlong—himself a sick man—was only able to save the convoy by causing the strongest of the patients to get out of the waggons and feign the appearance of a baggage escort.

Cathcart's  
duties on  
the Bel-  
bec.

Communi-  
cations  
with the  
Katcha  
now at the  
mercy of  
the ene-  
my.

Divided thus by what might almost be reckoned as a two-days' march from Cathcart's Division, and divided, too, from his shipping by a yet farther tract of country now left in the hands of the enemy, Lord Raglan, from his bivouac at the Tractir bridge, was anxious, as may well be supposed, to make known to our Admirals the success of his march on the Tchernaya, and his now unconditional resolve to

Lord Rag-  
lan on the  
Tcher-  
naya.

Import-  
ance of be-  
ing able  
to send a  
message  
to the  
Admirals.

**CHAP.** seize the port of Balaclava. This object was effected twice over in the course of the night. Captain Hugh Smith was ordered by Cathcart to endeavour to carry a despatch to Headquarters; and although the Captain passed a Russian battery, which opened upon him and killed one of his orderlies, he was able to reach the Tchernaya, and thence bring back from Lord Raglan a message which Cathcart was to send on to the Katcha. Colonel Windham, entrusted by Cathcart with the duty of carrying on the message, succeeded in reaching the Katcha, and delivered it safely to the Admiral. Also, Lieutenant Maxse, despatched from the Agamemnon, was able to find our Headquarters on the Tchernaya, and to bring back, during the night, Lord Raglan's message for Lyons. Lord Raglan did not choose to risk a despatch, lest it should fall into the hands of the Russians; but the message, repeated in duplicate, which he had thus been enabled to send, informed the Admirals of the progress of his march, and of his now final determination to move to the south coast, conveying, at the same time, his hope that a naval force would come round to Balaclava, and be there to meet him.

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The object effected in the night.

Purport of Lord Raglan's communications from the Tchernaya to the Admirals.

Rightly looked at, the need that there was for resorting to ventures like these will help perhaps to disclose the hazardous character of the Flank March, and the weakness of the posture in which the Allied army lay on the night of the 25th of September.\*

The march resumed on the 26th.

On the morning of the next day, Lord Raglan resumed his march, and crossing, after a time, the now

\* See the Plan.

famous Woronzoff Road, was at length upon ground where, unless the maps were deceiving him, he must needs be very near to Balacclava. But the country which lay before him seemed closed up at every point by towering hills, and there was not the least sign of an opening in which to look for a seaport. Soon he came upon a village, but a smiling, and apparently inland village, having the porches of its cottages richly laden with clustering grapes, and disclosing no sign of its being a place near the sea. This was Kadiköi. The villagers were questioned a little, and they said that Balacclava was undefended. They seemed to speak like people who had nothing they cared to withhold.

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Lord Raglan before  
Balacclava.

The Rifles were already ascending the hills which lay towards the south, but, upon the road by which he was moving, Lord Raglan, at this time, had no advanced-guard before him. As at the Alma, when he gained the knoll looking down upon the enemy's reserves, and as yesterday at Mackenzie's Farm, when he all but struck in upon the rear-guard of a Russian army, so to-day, and for the third time in this singular campaign, it once again happened that of the whole Allied army he himself was the foremost explorer. A bend in the road brought him to the edge of what seemed to be only a small inland pool with a rivulet trickling into it; for the rest of the sheet of water to which he had come lay hidden behind the fold of the hill. Beyond the pool, but still very close at hand, there rose a barrier of steep, lofty hills; and one of



CHAP. VI. them was crowned, as it seemed, with an antique castle in ruins.\*

Fire opened from one of the old castles.

All at once, from a mortar in the ancient castle, fire was opened, and, in the next moment, a shell dropped plumping into the pool. This shot was followed by more, and one of the shells which came down sank into the earth — without bursting — at a spot very near the chief. Lord Raglan looked angry, imagining, I believe, for a moment, that the villagers of Kadiköi had meant to deceive him when they said that Balaclava was undefended. He ordered that the two flanking heights should be occupied by the Light Division, and by a part of Brandling's troop of horse-artillery. The ground at a few paces distant afforded more or less shelter from the fire of the castle; but pending the operation entrusted to the Light Division, Lord Raglan had to await its result, and in the mean time submit to remain shut out from the haven on which he had marched.

Lord Raglan's measures.

To an army engaged in the hazardous operation of marching across the enemy's country in order to find and conquer for itself a new base of operations, any unlooked-for hindrance, even though it may seem likely to be of short duration, can hardly fail to be a subject of anxiety.

Presently, and sounding as from beneath the old castle on its southern side, there roared out the

\* The castle was on the left of the two flanking heights; but from the way in which the hills interfolded, the contrary seemed to be the case. Codrington with his brigade ascended the hill on our right and encountered no opposition, but had the happiness of reassuring some gentlewomen who had fled thither in terror from Balaclava.

thunder that peals from a gun of majestic calibre. Then again ; then again. The whole landscape, being closed in abruptly towards the south by the form of the hills, bore a thoroughly inland aspect ; but men knew, as it were, by his voice, the tried friend whom they could not yet see. They said, 'There is Lyons !' The Admiral was keeping his tryst.

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Ships'  
guns  
heard.

The officer in charge of the castle which had opened fire on our Headquarters Staff was Colonel Monto. He had no force under his orders except a few Greeks of Balaclava, who had been formed into a kind of local militia ; and before our light infantry had time to crown the two hills, he found means to show that he surrendered. When afterwards asked by Lord Raglan why he had taken upon himself to open fire without having means to attempt a real defence, Colonel Monto answered that he had never been summoned. He said that if he had been summoned he would have surrendered at once ; but he thought that, until he should be either attacked or summoned, it was his duty to offer resistance.\*

Surrender  
of Bala-  
clava.

The com-  
mandant's  
reason for  
not sur-  
rendering  
at once.

Upon learning the surrender of the castle, Lord Raglan once more rode forward, and presently entered the little street which formed the main part of Balaclava.

Entrance  
of Lord  
Raglan  
into Bala-  
clava.

The people of the place were alarmed when they thought of the consequences which might be brought

Demean-  
our of the  
inhabi-  
tants.

\* The Russians ascribe to Colonel Monto one of those heroic speeches which people are accustomed to invent in time of war ; but I am sure that the above is the real purport of the Colonel's answer, for Lord Raglan so represented it to me just after having received it. Lord Raglan, I remember, said there is often a good deal of practical difficulty in summoning.

CHAP. upon them by Colonel Monto's show of resistance.

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Their notion of what should be done may have been formed on the exigency of the moment, or else may have come down to them with their Greek or Asiatic traditions of conquering armies and suppliant towns. At all events, these poor people found a mute, touching way of declaring their submission and praying for mercy. Leaving clear a lane in the centre for Lord Raglan and the horsemen who followed him, and the troops coming after, they went down upon their knees, and so remained, holding up, all the time, loaves of bread in their outstretched hands. They seemed to take heart when they lifted their faces and scanned the gracious looks of the English Commander; but still he was what their imaginations represented as terrible—the capturer of a place which had greeted him with fire—and they could see—because of his arm—he was one who had known other wars.

Lord Raglan rides towards the water's edge;

Riding forward to where, on his right, the way opened down to the water, Lord Raglan approached the pool or basin which lies parallel with the little street; but, shut in, as it was, by steep, lofty hills towards the south, the water still looked like a tarn or small mountain lake; and whilst some who had studied the maps were only now at length convincing themselves that what they saw must be indeed the port of Balaclava, there occurred a conjuncture of the kind which a dramatist makes free to create, but one too signal and too aptly timed to be commonly met with in the confusions of the actual

world.\* Lord Raglan had scarce stopped his horse, and was glancing across the small sheet of water before him, when from between the enfolding hills a vessel came gliding in, and she carried the English flag. Once more, after a hazardous time of separation, the land and the sea forces met.

CHAP.  
VI.

and at  
the same  
moment  
an English  
vessel of  
war comes  
in.

The words which Lord Raglan spoke at this moment disclosed that quality of his nature which made him ever thoughtful of others. It was in concert with Lyons that against every kind of obstacle he had forced on this bold invasion in obedience to the Government of the Queen; and now when, after the temporary severance occasioned by the flank march, he again touched the helping hand which the navy afforded, his first utterance was the expression of a wish that Lyons were enjoying the happiness of being there to greet him. 'If Lyons were here,' he said, 'this would be perfect.' The greeting soon followed, for Lyons, in the *Agamemnon*, was close outside.

Lord Raglan's first words on recovering the sea communication.

From on board the vessel which had run in, soundings were quickly taken, and, small as it was, the pool proved deep enough to float a ship of the line. In a little while, the harbour was crowded with shipping, and the town with English soldiery.

Smallness and depth of the harbour.

Harbour and town quickly filled.

\* To an observer standing at Balaclava or approaching it from the north, the port seems to be much more closely land-locked than could be easily supposed possible by one deriving his impression from maps and charts. And although it may be true that mensuration does not err, no one seemed to be prepared to find the port looking so exceedingly diminutive as it did. Its length is stated to be as much as 1400, and its breadth 230 yards.

C H A P.  
VI.

## II.

Remon-  
strance on  
the part  
of the  
French.

Its justice.

Impracti-  
cability of  
dividing  
the place  
between  
the French  
and the  
English.

Claim of  
the French  
to Bala-  
clava on  
the ground  
of their  
having  
hitherto  
taken the  
right-hand  
side.

Forbear-  
ance of the  
French.

The next day, when one of the French Divisions came up, there was an inclination to remonstrate, and not without reason, against the occupation of the whole of Balaclava by the English. The French said that, according to the understanding with which the flank march was agreed to, Balaclava was to be for the Allies, and not for one of them only. However accurate the maps and charts may have been, they had failed to convey to men's minds beforehand the exceeding smallness of the place; but now when the basin was thick crowded with masts, when the landing-place swarmed with busied men, and the little street overflowed with the red-coated soldiery, it was evident that Balaclava was too diminutive to bear being divided between the French and the English. If the place was to be assigned to one of the two armies in exclusion of the other, the French were entitled to say, that in the Allied line they had hitherto taken the right, and that unless the precedence so conceded were to be withdrawn from them, Balaclava must needs be theirs, because it was the easternmost of all the possible landing-places on this part of the coast, and the Allies, when arrayed against Sebastopol, would have to face towards the north.

The French acted, however, with great forbearance; and nothing, indeed, could be fairer than the course which Canrobert took.\* He justly represented that the

\* General Canrobert, as will be afterwards stated, had at this time acceded to the command of the French army.

French had hitherto had the right side on the Allied line, and that, of necessity (on account of the position of the place), the army which was to be on the right must have Balaclava as the port of supply which would be in its immediate rear; but seeing the English already installed in the port and the town, and inferring that to call upon them to move out and make way for the French would be likely to create ill blood, he generously and wisely proposed to give Lord Raglan his choice. Either Lord Raglan might continue, as before, to take the left place in the Allied line, with an understanding that, in that case, he would have to give up Balaclava to the French, or else he might keep Balaclava, but, as the consequence of doing so, must take his place on the right of the Allied line. To take the right was to add to the toils of the siege the duty of withstanding any enterprises which might be undertaken by the enemy's field army; to take the left was to be sheltered from molestation on all sides except that of the town. But, on the other hand, the privilege of occupying Balaclava seemed, at the time, to be one of great value, because the fitness and the ample advantages of the bays of Kamiesh and Kazatch had not been then recognised.\*

C H A P.  
VI.  
The choice  
offered to  
Lord Rag-  
lan.

\* Yet it might have been. In the memorandum addressed to our Ambassador at Constantinople in 1834 (see note and plan, *ante*, p. 53), General, then Colonel, Macintosh wrote: 'Immediately after passing the lighthouse on the point, there is an extensive bay which branches out in several directions—an excellent landing-place, but it is above four miles from the town.' The inlets thus described are those of Kamiesh and Kazatch. In November 1853 General Macintosh called the attention of the Horse Guards to his memorandum of 1834, and

## CHAP.

## VI.

Before he made his choice Lord Raglan consulted Lyons, and Lyons urged with a great earnestness that Balacclava should be retained by the English. There, and there only, as he thought, could there be a sufficiently sure communication between the fleet and the land forces. As experience proved, he was wrong; but upon a naval question—and such this question was—his opinion, of course, had great weight. It prevailed. For the sake of retaining Balacclava, Lord Raglan elected to take the right in the Allied line, with all its burthens and perils.

Lord Raglan, after consulting Lyons, determined, for the sake of retaining Balacclava, to take the right in the Allied line.

It seems probable that, if Lord Raglan had chanced to prefer the other alternative, the subsequent course of events would have borne but little resemblance to that which in fact took place.

Change in the array, the English now taking the right, and the French the left.

Pursuant to the understanding between the two chiefs, the French marched on to the westward; and the forbearance they had shown was rewarded, for it proved that the bays of Kamiesh and Kazatch yielded excellent means of landing supplies for an army.

It was from their own choice, and not from any selfishness on the part of the French, that the English were in-

Thus the French gained the vast advantage of having ample, convenient ports, together with all the comparative ease and immunity of being on the left of the Allied line, whilst the English, with one diminutive harbour, were taking a post which seemed to involve them in the double duty of covering the siege and taking part in its labours; but this allotment resulted

wrote: 'The large bay, marked D in the sketch [see copy of it, *ante*, p. 53], at once suggests itself as the most suitable place to land a 'battering-train and siege stores, but it is very probable that it is now 'also fortified.'

from the free (though mistaken) choice of the English, and not from any endeavour to overreach them on the part of General Canrobert.

C H A P.  
VI.

duced to  
take the  
right.  
26th to  
29th Sept.  
The Allies  
began to  
take up  
their  
ground in  
front of  
Sebasto-  
pol.

The Allies, pushing forward, proceeded to establish their besieging troops upon a line passing from east to west across the centre of that district of high ground on the south of Sebastopol which goes by the name of the Chersonese; and the English, for the reason just given, accepted the east or right side, whilst the French, keeping more to the westward, consented to take the left.

Having, in the course of the 25th, sent back all the convoys of sick to the Katcha, and having sent forward what remained of the baggage-trains into the general line of march, Cathcart, on the following day, left the Belbec, moving up to Mackenzie's Farm, and descending thence to the Tchernaya. For some thirty hours or more Cathcart had been left so far isolated as to make it seem likely that he would have occasion for showing his quality as a commander, and he contemplated the eventuality of being attacked in a way which would oblige him to burn his baggage and cut his way through; but the enemy forbore, attempting nothing against him.

Cathcart's  
march.

After gaining the Tchernaya on the 26th, Cathcart did not, on the following day, pursue the track of the other divisions; but, pursuant to Lord Raglan's orders, moved up by the Khantor Pass to the top of the plateau, and so at once came into line with the rest of the Anglo-French army, then ranging in front of Sebastopol.



## CHAP.

## VI.

Success of  
the flank  
march.

Reason  
why the  
success of  
the meas-  
ure afford-  
ed no  
sufficing  
test of its  
prudence.

Thus ended a venturesome movement. Whether the measure was really, as some have imagined, a wise one, or whether it was of so perilous a nature as only to be rendered warrantable by the exceeding stress of the predicament which caused its adoption, the Allies had at least the fortune to reach the goal they had sought, and even to reach it unhurt; but it must not be thought that, in any other sense, the flank march bore the test of experience; for we shall see by-and-by that, though master of the country around him, and having some 3000 horse, Prince Mentschikoff suffered himself to remain unacquainted with the march of the Allied army then proceeding in open day close to where he had brought his own troops; and that, even when his rear-guard was touched by Lord Raglan, and attacked by our horse and artillery, he ascribed the collision to a French or English patrol, and still preserved his clean ignorance of all that was going on. From this, the blindfolded state of Prince Mentschikoff, it resulted that the flank march did not undergo the perilous trial which seemed to await it; and therefore the success of the movement does not make it at all an example of what may be wisely dared in the presence of an enemy accustomed to use common watchfulness, and able to seize an advantage.

Circum-  
stances  
under

But, even without the interposition of an enterprising foe, a march of this kind might have been brought to ruin by any faltering or mismanagement on the part of the Allies. As it was, the march prospered. When once it had been agreed on the Belbec that this venturesome movement should be attempted, and that

the English army should lead the way, it resulted from this arrangement, and from Marshal St Arnaud's increasing weakness, that Lord Raglan got for forty-eight hours the practical leadership of the whole Allied army; and the effect of the change soon showed itself in the speed and the firmness with which the flank march was executed. As at sea, after the 10th of September the illness of Marshal St Arnaud gave a great momentum to the invasion, by placing the virtual guidance of the armada in the hands of Lord Raglan during several critical days, so now, when, from similar causes, the virtual leadership of the Anglo-French army fell once more, for a time, to Lord Raglan, it instantly felt the advantage which results from undivided command.

C H A P.  
VI.

which the sole leadership of the Allies during the flank march devolved practically on Lord Raglan. The good effect resulting from this temporary concentration of power.

### III.

The night the French lay on the Tchernaya, Marshal St Arnaud ceased to hold his command. Naturally, the policy of the French Emperor had inclined him to put the army, as far as was possible, under officers concerned in the slaughter which placed him on his throne; and it must be acknowledged that in this respect General Canrobert was but too well qualified by the part which he had had the misfortune to take in the massacre of the Boulevard; but it is also true, as we have seen, that the brilliant reputation which the General had established in African warfare, gave him a more honourable, though not more cogent, title to be trusted with high com-

Cessation of Marshal St Arnaud's command. Night between 26th and 27th Sept. Policy of the French Emperor with respect to the command of the army. General Canrobert

## CHAP.

## VI.

The dormant commission entrusted to him. The existence of this was to be concealed from St Arnaud.

mand. To him the French Emperor had secretly confided a dormant commission which was to put him at the head of the French army, if any event arising out of sickness or war should prevent the Marshal from keeping the command. This dormant commission was to be kept hidden, it seems, from the Marshal.\* Monsieur St Arnaud seems to have had an instinctive suspicion that something of the kind had been planned, but he was not made acquainted with the truth until the 13th of September, the day next before the landing. The Marshal had sent for General Morris, the officer next in seniority, and General Canrobert then thought it was time to disclose the existence of the commission. St Arnaud had already requested the Government to appoint his successor as soon as Sebastopol should fall; but it would seem that his discovery of the dormant commission tended rather to increase than to lessen the singular tenacity with which—struggling always against mortal sickness—he still clung to the command. However, on the 26th—the night the French lay on the Tchernaya—he became so weak that the attending physician thought fit to make his patient's state known to

\* It will be observed that in speaking of this dormant commission, and of the illnesses, resignation, and death of Marshal St Arnaud, I avoid the language of positive statement; and I may say that for the means of making the statements I do on this particular subject I am mainly indebted to the work of M. Bazancourt. Through General Yusuf and M. Henry, who were constantly at the side of the Marshal in his last days, M. Bazancourt had peculiarly good means of knowing what passed, and his account bears internal evidence of being accurate. What I say, however, of Lord Raglan's last visit to the is drawn from Lord Raglan's private correspondence.

Colonel Trochu, the officer understood to be entrusted by the Emperor with the function of advising at the French Headquarters. The Colonel then conceived it his duty to act. Entering the Marshal's tent, he strove to break his purpose with all the tenderness and kindly feeling which words could express, but ended by telling the sick man that the time had come when, in order to obtain the repose which he needed, he must have his mind free from anxiety.

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VI.

Interposi-  
tion of  
Colonel  
Trochu.

For an instant the Marshal only fixed his eyes upon the Colonel; but then he said, 'Yes, I understand you; send for General Canrobert:' and in the next hour he resigned the command into the hands of his preordained successor.

The com-  
mand re-  
signed into  
the hands  
of General  
Canrobert.

It seems that on this night the Marshal had thrown off the cholera, but other ailments still caused him from time to time cruel suffering alternating with periods of prostration. From the moment when he resigned, he longed with great intensity to be away from the Crimea, but before he embarked Lord Raglan went to his bedside to bid him adieu. The Marshal, at that time, could only speak in a whisper, and his mind, as Lord Raglan thought, was wandering. 'I must say,' Lord Raglan wrote—'I must say I deeply regret him. Although he occasioned me many difficulties from time to time, he never varied in his determination to be upon good terms with me; and, personally, he was all kindness to and consideration for me.'\*

The Mar-  
shal's state  
at this  
time.

Lord Rag-  
lan's last  
visit to  
the Mar-  
shal.

Lord Rag-  
lan's feel-  
ing at the  
loss of  
Marshal  
St Ar-  
naud.

\* Private letter from Lord Raglan to the Duke of Newcastle, 8th October 1854.

## CHAP.

## VI.

It must be remembered, however, that when Lord Raglan thus wrote, he had not become acquainted with the contents of the despatch which Marshal St Arnaud had thought fit to address to the Emperor on the morrow of the Alma.\* After learning the contents of the despatch, Lord Raglan, in very warm terms, expressed his approval of the indignant remonstrance on this subject which our Ambassador, as we shall see by-and-by, had made to the French Government;† and it will therefore, of course, be inferred that his perusal of the Marshal's narrative must have more or less changed his opinion of the writer.

Nature of the troubles which Marshal St Arnaud had occasioned to Lord Raglan.

Among the troubles to which Lord Raglan referred as having been brought upon him by Marshal St Arnaud, there were some which had threatened to shake the Alliance, and others to mar the campaign; but, however much it might be owing to his own peculiar gifts that Lord Raglan, in the face of these dangers, was able to ward off all fatal disagreement from the camp of the Western Powers, and to prevent the invasion from collapsing, it was the generous quality of the Marshal's temper which made it possible for the English General to achieve these results without leaving bitterness in the heart of his colleague.

Whether the feeling with which St Arnaud was regarded by the French army sprang from the circum-

\* See *post*, vol. iv.

† He speaks of the communication narrating the remonstrance and the grounds for resorting to it as 'perfect;' and considering how choice Lord Raglan was accustomed to be in his language, this word coming from him was a strong one.—Private letter from Lord Raglan, 15th November 1854. And see *post*, vol. iv.

stance of his suffering himself to be interfered with by the Emperor, or whether it arose from the intrigues of rivals, or from honest distrust and reprobation, it is certain that the Marshal was without due ascendancy in his own camp. Under his command, the French army was never the powerful instrument which the numbers and the prowess of its components seemed able to make it; for although, after the battle of the Alma, he suffered himself to imagine that victory had won him at last the full confidence of the troops, his bodily health from that time was hardly in such a state as to enable him to try the strength of his authority.

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VI.

It was only in the early days on the Bosphorus and in Bulgaria that the troubles St Arnaud occasioned were of a kind resulting from his ambition or encroaching spirit. From the time when, during the voyage, the French officers sent in their protest against the intended descent on the Crimea, down to that when the whole Allied army was turned aside from its purpose by the bare apparition of an earthquake descried by the French on the Belbec, it was never, I think, mere ill-will or perverseness on the part of the Marshal, but always his want of authority, or else his failing health, which stood in the way of the enterprise.

Almost the last of the Marshal's acts whilst on shore gave proof of that freedom from vindictiveness which was spoken of in an earlier page as one of the features of his character. Before he embarked, he offered a present—his Russian carriage and horses—

Token of the Marshal's good-will towards one whom he regarded as an enemy.

CHAP. to General Bosquet, an officer, as we know, of great  
 VI. repute and station in the French army, who, even at  
 that parting moment, was regarded by the Marshal  
 as his enemy.

The Mar-  
 shal car-  
 ried on  
 board  
 the Ber-  
 thollet.  
 Is attend-  
 ed by a  
 priest, and  
 dies.

Covered by a tricolor flag, the Marshal, on the 29th of September, was carried on board ship by the seamen of the Berthollet, and placed in the cabin prepared for him. There, the Abbé Paratère, who had been summoned to do the part of the Church to a dying Catholic, was left alone with the sufferer ; but, 'After 'some instants'—so runs the account—'the Abbé 'came out, and said, "The Marshal is ready to die ' "a Christian."' This was in the morning. The Berthollet put to sea. Marshal St Arnaud no longer suffered from acute pain, but between noon and sunset he died. In earlier volumes I recounted some of his actions.

## CHAPTER VII.

## I.

WHEN two hostile armies are parted by only a few miles of ground, the plans adopted in the one camp must commonly have close relation to what is there known of the other ; and in such case, the narrative of operations conducted by either force must be more or less blended with accounts of what its adversary is doing or intending. But in this campaign it strangely happened that, even after their victory, the Allies could not scatter the mist which had shrouded the enemy's strength ; and, except from vague rumours, and the marks of a hastened retreat which they tracked all the way to the Belbec, they knew nothing of Prince Mentschikoff's army, till, by sheer chance, our Headquarters touched it on the road by Mackenzie's Farm. Even then, the sudden and incomplete knowledge thus flung upon the mind of Lord Raglan did not bring him to change his designs ; and therefore it is that we have been able to follow the march of the Allies from the Alma to the Belbec, and from the Belbec away to the south round the head of the Sebastopol bay, without being forced to break in upon

CHAP.  
VII.

Singular  
absence of  
all inter-  
depend-  
ence in  
the plans  
and move-  
ments of  
the hostile  
armies.

Effect of  
this upon  
the struc-  
ture of the  
narrative.



CHAP. that part of the story with accounts from Prince  
 VII. Mentschikoff's camp.

The un-  
 dertaking  
 to defend  
 Sebasto-  
 pol.

Yet during those seven days which were passed by the Allies in caring for their wounded, and in marching to the southern coast of the peninsula, men faithful to their Czar and their country, and so endued with courage as to be able to exert their whole power of mind and body under a weight of disasters which seemed hardly short of mere ruin, were entering upon a task of great moment, and destined to be famous in history. Expecting the attack of a victorious host, and abandoned by their own defeated army, an admiral with some thousands of sailors and workmen, all guided by the skilled engineer whose achievement has made him illustrious, were preparing the defence of Sebastopol.

The pre-  
 liminary  
 knowledge  
 required  
 for appre-  
 hending  
 the nature  
 of the  
 conflict.

The road-  
 stead of  
 Sebasto-  
 pol.

A fair apprehension of the nature of the conflict which those brave men undertook must be based upon some acquaintance with the features of the ground, and the resources available for defence.

Towards the south-western extremity of the Crimea there is an arm of the sea, with a breadth of from a thousand to fifteen hundred yards, which stretches in from the west to a distance of three miles and a half. This deep, narrow bay is the roadstead of Sebastopol.\*

On the north the roadstead is bounded by the slopes

\* The Allies were much in the custom of calling the bay or roadstead of Sebastopol 'the great harbour,' or sometimes only 'the harbour;' but I follow the more accurate language of the Russians, who called the great bay 'the roadstead,' and the man-of-war's creek 'the harbour' of Sebastopol.

and ledges on which stand the forts and buildings constituting the Severnaya or 'North Side of Sebastopol;' and it may be remembered that of the state of the land defences in that quarter we spoke in an earlier page. There was there shown ground for believing that, even so late as the 25th of September, though much had been done since the day of the landing, the Star Fort, the key of the North Side, could not have been successfully defended against a resolute attack by the Allies; and on the 14th—the day to which we are now going to revert—the Severnaya was still less capable of offering a formidable resistance.

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VII.

State of  
the land  
defences  
on the  
North  
Side.

On the south and south-west of the bay there is a high plateau or table-land, having much the shape of a heart or Saxon shield, with its top towards the east and its pointed end towards the west. This plateau is called the Chersonese.\* It is much higher towards the east than towards the west. Along its eastern or landward side, it is abruptly divided from the plain by an acclivity rising to a height of from five to about seven hundred feet, and so extending from north to south, for a distance (in a straight line) of about eight miles, as to form a continuous buttress to the plateau. This acclivity, as well as the easternmost crest of the table-land or plateau at its top, is called Mount Sapounè. The only great break in the steepness thus dividing the table-land of the Chersonese from the plain is at the point some three miles from the southern coast, which was called the 'Col de Balaclava.' Along a distance, in a straight line, of about four miles, beginning from

The pla-  
teau on  
the South  
Side, call-  
ed the  
Cherson-  
ese.

\* That is, according to General de Todleben's nomenclature.

**C H A P.** its north-easterly angle near the Inkerman bridge,  
**VII.** and going thence westerly, the plateau is washed, for the first half-mile, by the Tchernaya, and lower down, by the waters of the Sebastopol bay; but the rest of its water boundary is the open sea. The side of the Chersonese which lies towards the north is deeply jagged by creeks or bays throughout its whole length, from the Inkerman bridge on the east to Cape Chersonese on the west; but on the south and south-western side of the plateau its shore-line has a different character; for a seaman coasting along it from Cape Chersonese to the eastward would have on his larboard side a wall of rocks so unbroken, that although he might land a boat near the Monastery of St George he would look in vain for a sheltering bay like those which abound on the other side of the Chersonese, and it could be only after passing the plateau that he would be able to find an inlet. The port he would then find is Balaclava. The length of the plateau, from its easternmost side to Cape Chersonese, is about ten miles.

Throughout its extent the plateau is scarred by ravines. Some of these are deep and precipitous. They run, for the most part, in a direction from the south-east to the north-west, and several of them are prolongations of the openings which form the many creeks and bays indenting the north and north-west of the plateau.

The Man-  
 of-war  
 Harbour.

Of these creeks there is one which, stretching deep in from the roadstead in a direction from north to south, had become the port of Sebastopol, or, as the


# DIAGRAM

*Illustrative of descriptions  
contained in the text with reference  
to the positions of the Allies before  
SEBASTOPOL*

SEBASTOPOL

# PLAIN OF BALACLAVA

*(Held by the English Cavalry and by a  
chain of Turkish Redoubts.)*





English used to call it, the 'Man-of-war Harbour.' C H A P.  
VII.  
In this port mighty fleets could lie sheltered, and its waters were so deep even home to the shore, that the seamen of line-of-battle ships could pass from their decks to their barracks without taking to boat. It was in this harbour, and upon the ground on either side of it, that the Allies had to seek their prey.

Including that eastern suburb which is called the 'Karabel' faubourg, Sebastopol may be regarded as standing upon a semicircular tract of ground, subtended by the great bay or roadstead, and split into two segments by the Man-of-war Harbour, in such manner that the western segment included Sebastopol proper, with the Admiralty, the public buildings, the arsenal, and town; whilst the eastern segment—that is, the Karabel faubourg—contained, among other buildings, the docks, great Government storehouses, some barracks on a large scale, and a church. The separation of the town from its faubourg was rendered the more complete by the steepness and depth of the ravine which descended into the heart of the Man-of-war Harbour, for if a man, being in the town of Sebastopol, desired to go into the faubourg without passing over the water, he would not only have to go down, and go round by the Péressip at the head of the Man-of-war Harbour, but would be forced to ascend the eastern side of the ravine by a steep and difficult road. The configuration of land and water which thus split off the faubourg from the main town was a great source of embarrassment to the defenders, and was not the only obstacle in the way of their

Position  
of Sebas-  
topol.

C H A P. lateral communications, for there was another ravine  
 VII. which subdivided the town, and another again which cut the suburb in two. These ravines, as well as the ridges and knolls on which the place stood, sloped down with more or less abruptness to the water's edge. The long hill on which stood the main part of the town is 200 feet above the level of the sea, and it descends with some abruptness towards the man-of-war harbour on the east, and on the west towards the deep ravine which divides the main town from its outskirts on the west of the Artillery Bay.

The  
 streets.

Of the streets in the town two were spacious, and in these stood the principal buildings of the place. The rest of the streets were narrow and unpaved.

The Naval  
 Library.

The highest spot in the town was the one where stood the Naval Library. On the top of the building there was an observatory which (designed as it had been for recreation rather than for State purposes) men used to call the 'belvedere.'

This Naval Library was the place to which officers were accustomed to go when they sought to meet one another; and thence it was that one of the most momentous changes in the progress of the strife was destined to be first descried.

Popula-  
 tion of the  
 place.

In the times immediately preceding the invasion the numbers collected within the town and its suburbs had been in general about 42,000, but 35,000 of these belonged to the fleet or the army.

When Count Pozzo di Borgo, in 1828, warned his Government against the eventuality of an attack upon

Sebastopol by an English fleet,\* his words, it would seem, were not written in vain ; and during the years which followed, the works judged to be needed for the seaward defence of Sebastopol were carried on upon a vast scale. The result was, that at the time of the invasion, the portals, both north and south, of the great bay or roadstead, and both its shores within, to a distance of more than two miles, were studded with fortified works. Of these, some, indeed, were only great earthworks, but others, and those the chief ones, were huge casemated forts, having stone-work revetments. These sea-forts and batteries, were : on the north side, Fort Constantine and Fort Michael, both stone-works ; the work called 'Number Four,' the 'Twelve Apostles,'† and 'Paris ;' and, on the south side, the Quarantine Sea-fort,‡ Fort Alexander (a stone-work), the Artillery Fort,§ Fort Nicholas, and Fort Paul (both stone-works) ; and, lastly, the Sviatoslaw Battery. Three of these, the Twelve Apostles, the Paris, and the Sviatoslaw Battery, were constructed so late as the beginning of the year 1854. It was to cover Fort Constantine on its landward side, and to prevent the enemy's ships from approaching the shore, that, after the breaking out of the war, the Volokhoff Tower (surnamed by our people the 'Wasp'), and the 'Kartas-

C H A P.  
VII.

The sea  
defence.

\* See *ante*, vol. ii. p. 71 in 4th edition.

† Not to be confounded with the man-of-war of the same name. The earthwork was named after the ship.

‡ Called by the Russians the 'Number Ten.'

§ The Fort thus called by the Allies included that front towards the roadstead which the Russians called the 'Number Eight Battery' and also the Work for landward defence which the Russians called the 'Number Seven Bastion.'



C H A P. 'chewsky,' or 'Telegraph' Battery, were erected on the  
VII. high ground between the Star Fort and the open sea. In all these sea-forts and batteries, without including that Star Fort of which we heretofore spoke, there were mounted, at the time of the landing, 611 guns, for the most part of heavy calibre.\*

The fleet. The Black Sea fleet, which lay in the harbour or in the roadstead, consisted of 14 line-of-battle ships, 7 frigates, 1 corvette, 2 brigs, and 11 war-steamers, besides some smaller vessels. It carried 1908 guns, and was manned by 18,500 seamen. Of course, this naval force could be so placed as to be able to take part with the sea-forts and batteries in repelling from the first the incursion of a fleet, or else in preparing a reception for such of the enemy's ships as might break into the mouth of the roadstead despite all the power of the forts.

It was not the fate of the Black Sea fleet to prove its worth by engaging in any sea-fight with the ships of the Western Powers; but from the ceaseless pains which, since the last war, had been taken to make the fleet strong—from the love and reverence with which the seamen clung to the memory of the commander who had been foremost in labouring to this end†—from the sailor-like spirit and the evident love of the sea service which had been engendered—from the faith the sailors had in the power of their fleet—and, above all, from the courage with which Korniloff and his

\* 'Matériaux pour servir,' &c. Todleben, I think, gives 610 as the number. For the details of the armament, see table in the Appendix.

† Admiral Lazareff.

seamen, when forced to take to the land, stood fast to the defence of a place which Prince Mentschikoff and his army had abandoned,—there is ground to infer that, whatever may still have been wanting to fit the Black Sea fleet for great encounters at sea, it would not have been wanting to itself in the less complex duty of fighting to extremity in the roadstead.

C H A P.  
VII.

Across the roadstead, at some distance from its entrance, there was a boom. Before the day of the Alma (when alarm brought about the resort to a new and mournful expedient), it was believed by the Russians that these defences alone were fully enough to make the roadstead secure against an attack from the sea; and after the sinking of the ships at the mouth of the bay, the Allies acquiesced in this judgment, abstaining throughout the war from any attempt to break in with their fleets. So it resulted that both the north side of the place and the whole of Sebastopol itself, including the Karabel suburb, were safe from the attacks of the Allies in every part fronting the roadstead or the man-of-war harbour. Nor were even these all the advantages which the defenders of Sebastopol drew from their hold of the roadstead and its creeks; for, on its eastern side, the Karabel suburb was so bounded by the Careening Bay, and the deep ravine at its head, that, in that quarter also, the dominion of the water by the Russians was an obstacle to any attack. Thus relieved from apprehension of attack from the side of the water, the garrison would be enabled to bring almost their whole strength to bear upon the land defences.

The presumed efficacy of the sea-forts and the fleet for the defence of the roadstead.

The extent to which the safety of the roadstead tended to assure the safety of the town.

C H A P.  
VII.

Of such of those land defences as covered the north of Sebastopol from attack on the side of the Belbec we have already spoken ;\* and what we now have to observe is the strength of the ground which hemmed in on the landward side not only the town of Sebastopol but also its Karabel faubourg.

Nature of  
 the ground  
 on the  
 land side  
 of Sebas-  
 topol.

On the western side of the town of Sebastopol there was a wide and deep ravine, running parallel with the boundary of the place, which could not but be a grave obstacle to besiegers ; and, upon the whole, the configuration of the ground was of such a kind that works on a moderate scale might suffice to prevent an enemy from choosing, in that direction, his point of attack. It was towards the south and south-east that the defenders of the place were least helped by nature. Even in those quarters, however, the configuration of the ground was in some respects favourable to the defence : for the ravines descended into the place in a way which laid them open to the fire of the garrison, especially to fire from the ships ; and every one of the intervening ridges along which the assailants could best come to push their attacks was so formed by nature as to offer to the defenders of the place an advantageous position for the erection of a fortified Work.

On the other hand, the place was commanded by the ground which would be under the dominion of besiegers established on the Chersonese. Then also the length of the semicircular line which had to be defended throughout was as much as four miles ; and

\* *Ante*, chap. iv.

finally, it must be understood that of the defensive posts which might be most advantageously established along this extended line, there were three, at the least, so circumstanced that the loss of any one of them would be likely to carry with it the fall of the place.\*

C H A P.  
VIL

There existed other sources of embarrassment which however—though not in an equal degree—were common to the attack and the defence. Besieged and besiegers alike were sure to be put to great stress by the depth of the ravines, which would more or less split their strength by hampering all lateral movements; and, in the event of the conflict taking a form which should make it depend much on earthworks, both the garrison and their assailants would have to encounter the difficulty of trying to gain cover from ground which was simply hard rock, coated over, where coated at all, with a very thin layer of clay.

## II.

With the exception of an adjunct† to one of the sea-forts which faced in part along shore, the whole

Absence  
of land  
defences

\* The positions subsequently occupied by the Malakoff, the Redan, and the Flagstaff Bastion. Todleben even says that the loss of the 'Central,' or of the 'Land Quarantine' Bastion, called by the Russians 'Number Six,' would also have been fatal.

† This was an adjunct to the work which the Allies called the Artillery Fort, and for the Russian names of which see the last footnote, p. 119, *ante*. The adjunct seems to have been intended to secure the flank of the sea-fort called by the Russians 'Number Eight' with which it was connected; but as the work has been counted amongst the land fortifications, I have thought it right to speak of the adjunct mentioned in the text as an exception to the statement there made.

C H A P. line of landward defences traced out in the year  
 VII.

on the  
 South Side  
 in the  
 autumn  
 of 1853.

Works  
 commenc-  
 ed after  
 the rup-  
 ture fol-  
 lowing the  
 action of  
 Sinope.

State of  
 these  
 works on  
 the 3d of  
 February  
 1854.

State of  
 these de-  
 fences at  
 the time  
 of the  
 landing,  
 14th Sept.  
 1854.

1834 had been suffered to remain in the condition of a mere project down to the autumn of 1853, and certainly on its south side, at that time, the place lay quite open ; but after the rupture of friendly relations with the Western Powers, which followed upon the action of Sinope, some works were begun upon a part of the projected line of defence. At first, however, it was only against the eventuality of a sudden landing in one of the neighbouring bays, and an incursion thence into the town, that the engineers were apparently plying their task ; for an enterprise of that kind, undertaken as a measure merely auxiliary to an attack from the sea, was the utmost in the way of a land attack that Prince Mentschikoff, the Commander-in-Chief, had hitherto believed to be at all probable.\* So, although in the beginning of February 1854 the works planned for the defence of the west side of the town had been begun, the whole of the Karabel suburb, and even the approach from the south leading into the heart of the place, remained untouched by the spade.† After that period, however, some works sprang up ; and on the day when the Allies effected their landing, the state of the land defences was as follows : So much of the project of 1834 as had for its immediate object the defence of Sebastopol proper had been almost carried into effect ; for at intervals along a curved line beginning from the Artillery Fort and ending at the


\* Todleben, vol. i. p. 121.

† The approach which was afterwards barred by the Flagstaff Bastion.

# SEBASTOPOL.

24<sup>th</sup> April, 1853.

*As was substantially the state of the  
places at the period of M<sup>r</sup> Cliphant's visit  
to Sebastopol.*



*N. B. In this Plan, the Roads though  
existing at the time to which it  
relates are not delineated.*



ground overhanging the head of the man-of-war harbour, there now stood this chain of works : the Artillery Fort, the Land Quarantine Bastion,\* the Central Bastion, the Schwartz Redoubt, and the Flagstaff Bastion. With the exception of the Central Bastion, which was still in course of construction, these works had reached their completion, and were connected with one another by a naked, loopholed wall, which passed with but little interruption along the whole of the curved line from the Artillery Fort to the head of the man-of-war harbour. Besides these works, the isolated sea-fort near Quarantine Bay, which we call the Quarantine Sea-fort, and also the Artillery Fort, had been so closed at their gorges by earthworks as to be turned into redoubts, now defended on the land side as well as on the side of the water.

In the Karabel suburb, less had been done ; but there also, along a curved line extending from the head of the man-of-war harbour to the mouth of the Careening Bay, there were already the Redan, the Malakoff Tower, the Little Redan, and, finally, a single-faced battery for four guns in connection with the stone building, in the form of a cross, which stood near the mouth of the Careening Bay, and was made to serve as a cazern or defensible barrack. The works thus defending the Karabel faubourg were not as yet connected by any intermediate en-

\* The same work as that which the Russians called the 'Number Six' Bastion. I call the work the *Land Quarantine Bastion* from a fear that there might be a tendency to confound it with the sea-fort near Quarantine Bay, which we have always been accustomed to call the *Quarantine Fort*.



**C H A P.** trenchment ; and the Malakoff, afterwards so formidable, was only at this time a naked, horseshoe-shaped tower, having five guns on the top, but without the glacis and the outworks which were soon to rise folding around it. It seems that the tower was built at the expense of the Sebastopol traders. At this time, the number of guns in battery for the defence of the south side of Sebastopol on its land side amounted to 151. Of these, 128 pieces were applied to the defence of Sebastopol proper, and only 23 to that of the Karabel suburb.

**VII.**

The armament of the works.

III.

Strength and disposition of the Russian forces in the Crimea at the time of the landing.

Supposing General de Todleben's history to be free on this point from all error, the strength of the Czar in the Crimea, on the day when the great armada of the Allies was seen to be approaching the coast, may be taken to stand as follows : The land forces then occupying the peninsula were 54,000 strong.\* Of this force, some small portions, consisting, it would seem, of about 1000 men, were local troops ; and another portion, to the number of 2700, was a body of artillerymen permanently stationed at the batteries of the coast defences ; but the rest, amounting in numbers

\* 54,208, thus made up :—


|  |        |
|--|--------|
| Strength of the army (Todleben, p. 140),                   | 51,500 |
| Artillery appropriated to the coast defences (ib. p. 110), | 2,708  |

54,208

I include the artillerymen appropriated to the coast defences, because, as a matter of fact, they were on the ground ; but as they remained, it seems, constantly at their batteries, it may be considered that they were kept in check by the naval forces of the Allies.

# ASTOPOL.

of Sept<sup>r</sup> 1854,  
(day of Landing.)





to more than 50,500, were troops belonging to what the Russians call their 'active army,' and were available for operations in the field wherever their services might be needed. Of these Prince Mentschikoff had under his immediate personal command a force of 38,500 men.\* These lay posted partly in Sebastopol and partly at other places, but all were so nearly in hand as to be capable of being assembled in time for the battle. The rest of the regular land forces in the Crimea amounted in number to about 12,000,† and were stationed under the command of General Khomoutoff in the south-eastern part of the peninsula; but even these most distant troops were not so far beyond reach as to make it impossible to call them in to headquarters before the critical moment.‡

Besides these bodies of men, which were all in strictness land forces, there were some bodies of marines, which at this time had been stationed in a permanent way, partly at the several sections into which the land defences had been divided, and partly in furnishing guards for the Admiralty and the hospital. These stationed marines were not men withdrawn from any of the ships in the roadstead. They amounted in number to 2600.§ There were, besides, four 'landing battalions,' amounting in number to 1800 men, which were posted along the lines of defence. These 'landing battalions' were marines withdrawn from the

\* 38,597.—Todleben, p. 140.

† Ibid.

‡ This was proved by the forced march of the Moscow Regiment, which, having been ordered up soon after the appearance of the Allies on the coast, was on the field of the Alma on the morning of the battle.

§ 2666.—Todleben, p. 141-43.

**CHAP.** fleet, and efficiently organised for land service. In-  
**VII.** cluding these, it may be said that, independently of  
 the army and of the local companies, and indepen-  
 dently, also, of the men appropriated to the coast  
 defences, and without counting any of the naval forces  
 remaining on board ship, there was a body of upwards  
 of 4000 men\* specially charged with the duty of hold-  
 ing the land defences, and guarding the Admiralty  
 and the hospital.

Prince  
Mentschi-  
koff's  
double  
command.

Causes of  
the facil-  
ity with  
which  
the crews  
of the  
ships were  
brought  
into use  
for land  
service.

The seamen of the Black Sea fleet lying in the  
 roadstead or in the harbour numbered, as we have  
 seen, 18,500 men. Prince Mentschikoff, as High Ad-  
 miral, was in command of the fleet as well as the  
 army; and this, his double authority, may help to  
 account for the exceeding ease and readiness with  
 which, in the progress of the siege, the crews of the  
 ships, one after another, were turned into good battal-  
 ions; but it is also evident that some of the arrange-  
 ments peculiar to the Russian navy were conducing  
 in the same direction. The Russian seaman (whose  
 home is partly on shore and in barracks) has always  
 been subjected to a good deal of the discipline and  
 instruction received by the land forces.

The Admi-  
rals left in  
command  
at Sebas-  
topol in  
the ab-  
sence of  
Prince  
Mentschi-  
koff.

In the absence of the Prince, Vice-Admiral Korniloff, the chief of the staff of the Black Sea fleet, was the  
 first in authority over the naval forces in the road-  
 stead and the harbour of Sebastopol. The fleet was  
 divided into two squadrons, of which one was com-  
 manded by Korniloff, and the other by Vice-Admiral

\* 4466 including the gunners, or 4048 without them.—Totleben,  
 p. 143.

Nachimoff, the officer whose squadron had destroyed the Turkish ships at Sinope. C H A P.  
VII.

From the time when Sebastopol was chosen as a military harbour, great works, such as docks and forts, had been almost constantly in course of construction ; and it seems that the numbers of workmen whose services could be obtained for the defence of the place amounted to 5000. Including these (and as they were obedient to military discipline, and were even of more worth than soldiers for the works which would have to be raised, it seems fitting to do so), the force which Prince Mentschikoff had in the Crimea at the time of the landing was 76,000 men.\*

The numbers of workmen available for the defences.

Force which Prince Mentschikoff had in the Crimea at the time of the landing.

Sebastopol, as might be expected, was rich in warlike stores. Thousands of guns of heavy calibre were contained in the arsenal ; but it is stated that, either because of the age and make of some of this ordnance, or else for want of the corresponding ammunition, a chief portion of these pieces were useless ; and there is no need to push inquiry on the subject, because, in the event which happened, the whole resources of the fleet became available for the land defences ; and not only all the ships' guns—some 1900 in number—not only the ammunition, the iron, the timbers, the cordage, the spars, the tanks, the canvas

Abundance of warlike stores.

Vast amount of materials and mechanical

\* 76,375, thus made up :—

|  |        |
|--|--------|
| The army, . . . . .  | 51,500 |
| Local companies, . . . . .                                 | 1,000  |
| Stationed marines, . . . . .                               | 2,666  |
| Seamen of the Black Sea fleet, . . . . .                   | 18,501 |
| Artillerymen appropriated to the coast defences, . . . . . | 2,708  |
|  | <hr/>  |
|  | 76,375 |

C H A P.  
VII.

appliances  
which be-  
came  
available  
for the  
defence.

—all, in short, that a great fleet could need, with vast quantities of stone already detached from the neighbouring rocks,—but also the cranes, the gins, the engines of all kinds by which man enforces his dominion over things of huge bulk and weight, and all the machinery, implements, and materials which had been in use either for the ordinary business of the dock-yards, or for quarrying and carrying on great works in the way of excavation, embankments, and masonry ; —all these things were not only at the disposal of the defenders, but close by, and most apt to the hands of the men,—some 26,000 in number,\*—who had long been accustomed to wield them.

Ammuni-  
tion.

In the midst of all these vast resources, which General de Todleben speaks of as almost inexhaustible, there was a comparative scantiness in the supply of engineering tools ; but it does not appear that this want existed to a degree which prevented it from being effectually met by the measures which were taken for the purpose, or that, for want of the requisite implements, any work was even delayed. Indeed, the order to the Government factories for fresh and abundant supplies shows, in passing, the variety and the greatness of the mechanic resources to which the defenders could look.

For all the early necessities of the defence there was

|                    |   |   |   |   |        |
|--------------------|---|---|---|---|--------|
| * Seamen,          | . | . | . | . | 18,501 |
| Stationed marines, | . | . | . | . | 2,666  |
| Workmen,           | . | . | . | . | 5,000  |
|                    |   |   |   |   | <hr/>  |
|                    |   |   |   |   | 26,167 |

a vast abundance of ammunition ; \* and it being impossible for the Allies to invest the place, fresh supplies could be always poured in. We may therefore evade that task of inquiring as to the quantity of ammunition in store which might be necessary for understanding the condition of a city which was really beleaguered, and the same reason dispenses with the necessity of any detailed statement with respect to the supply of food in Sebastopol ; but it may be worth while to say that, in the matter of bread, the fleet was provisioned for seven months, and the army for four and a half.

CHAP.  
VII.

Store of  
provisions.

Between nine and ten o'clock on the morning of the 13th of September, men using their glasses at Sebastopol were able to see on the horizon two line-of-battle ships, and, behind them, a darkness of such a kind that it could hardly be anything else than the smoke of a great fleet of steamers. About noon, the telegraph from Loukoul announced that a fleet visible to the N.W. was drawn up in three columns, and was standing E.N.E. By intelligence sent from the neighbourhood of Cape Tarkan, Prince Mentschikoff also learnt that seventy vessels had there been seen, and it now appeared sure that the Allies had troops on board, and had come with intent to land.

13th Sept.  
The armada seen  
from Sebastopol.

Prince Mentschikoff lost no time in giving the

\* The almost reckless way in which the Russians used to squander their ammunition at the early period of the siege, is proof that at that time they could have had no apprehension of the possibility of finding it run short. In Todleben there will be found minute and ample details on the subject.



CHAP.

VII.

Measures  
thereupon  
taken.

orders which were to assemble his army on the heights of the Alma. He stopped all the works at the port of Sebastopol which were unconnected with the strengthening of the place, giving orders that the men should be employed at the defences. He directed that the men should be mustered at the batteries, that they should be practised at the guns, and that all should be held ready for action.

It was ordered that the fleet should prepare to make sail ; but on this day it blew from N. to N.E. in the bay, and apparently N.W. in the offing, and these winds were adverse to any project for sailing out to attack the armada.

From time to time the increasing numbers of the approaching ships were announced ; and at half-past eight in the evening the telegraph said, and said truly, 'The enemy's fleet is casting anchor.'

14th Sept.  
Sebastopol  
knew that  
the land-  
ing was  
going on.

The next day was calm ; and Sebastopol knew that, without encountering hindrance, the Allies were landing their troops. The Russians were men so constituted as to be able to derive a faint pleasure from the mere date of the event, and even, it would seem, to found upon the coincidence a happy augury ; for they ever had thought with pride of the war which they are accustomed to call 'the war of the twenty nations,' and the 14th of September was the anniversary of Napoleon's entry into Moscow. In the roadstead of Sebastopol, and at the mouth of the Man-of-war Harbour, the two squadrons of the Black Sea were ranged in the order deemed best for sailing to meet the enemy.

Coincid-  
ence of  
date ob-  
served by  
the Rus-  
sians.

The adverse winds had been followed by calm ; but it does not appear that there was any continuance of that yearning to venture a naval attack which seems to have been felt the day before. The Russian fleet was so much weaker than that of the Allies in many respects, but especially in point of steam-power, that, unless it should chance to succeed, any attempt of the kind would be liable to be condemned for its rashness. It is probable that upon this subject the orders of Prince Mentschikoff were peremptory. At all events, there was no thought, it would seem, on this day, of undertaking to disturb the busy scene in Kalamita Bay by breaking into the midst of the flotilla whilst the French and the English were landing.

CHAP.  
VII.

Abandonment of any intention of attacking the armada.

There was now withdrawn from some of the ships a number of men sufficing to add four more battalions to the strength of the mariners already turned into soldiers ; and a day or two later, heavy guns, to the number of thirty, were taken out of the men-of-war, and brought into use for the land defences.

Further withdrawal of men from the fleet for land service.

All this time, the five thousand workmen at the command of Prince Mentschikoff were busily employed, and the works on the North Side especially were pushed on with ceaseless energy ; but it was not until after a week from the landing that these approached their completion. On the South Side, the defenders were busied with a field-work connecting the Flagstaff and the Central Bastions, but regard to the progress thus making at a

Progress of the works for the land defences.

The state of these works on the 20th Sept.

CHAP. VII. single point, the land defences continued to be, for some time, in the state already described.

Distribution of authority at Sebastopol after the 18th Sept.

When Prince Mentschikoff had established himself on the Alma, he entrusted the defence of the North Side to Rear-Admiral Istomin, and the defence of the South Side to Rear-Admiral Panfiloff, at the same time enjoining these seamen to apply to Lieutenant-General Möller, the Commander-in-Chief of the land forces at Sebastopol, for special instructions. Prince Mentschikoff also directed that, in the absence of Vice-Admiral Korniloff, the command of the fleet, and any troops on board it, should be assumed by Vice-Admiral Nachimoff, the senior officer in the roadstead.

Perfecting of the means of telegraphic communication between Sebastopol and the army on the Alma. Strength of the forces left at Sebastopol when Mentschikoff had completed the withdrawal of all the troops ordered to join him on the Alma.

Means were taken for perfecting the telegraphic communication between Sebastopol and the covering army.

When Prince Mentschikoff's orders for assembling his troops on the Alma had been carried into effect, the only portion of the 'active' Russian army then left at Sebastopol was a body of four militia battalions. The rest of the combatants who helped to form the garrison were the gunners attached to the batteries of the coast defences, the local companies belonging to Sebastopol, the 2600 stationed marines, and the 18,500 seamen. If, to all these forces, there be added the 5000 workmen, it would result that when Prince Mentschikoff had advanced to the heights on the Alma with the whole of the forces which there afterwards encountered the enemy, the number of men still forming the garrison of Sebastopol or aiding it

in its labours, amounted to some 32,000.\* Of these, C H A P.  
VII.  
however, there were none, except the gunners at the coast defences and the 3000 militiamen, who could be said to form part of the army.

\* Without reckoning the local companies belonging to Sebastopol, and which, appearing to be nine in number (see Todleben, p. 139), were probably 1000 strong, the exact number would be 31,875—thus made up:—

|                                     |        |
|-------------------------------------|--------|
| Four militia battalions, . . .      | 3,000  |
| Gunners at the coast batteries, . . | 2,708  |
| Stationed marines, . . .            | 2,666  |
| Seamen of the fleet, . . .          | 18,501 |
| Workmen, . . . . .                  | 5,000  |
|                                     | <hr/>  |
|                                     | 31,875 |

## CHAPTER VIII.

## I.

CHAP. SUCH was the condition of things at Sebastopol when,  
 VIII. on the 20th of September, the telegraph announced  
 Sebastopol on the day of the Alma. to the garrison that the Allies were advancing to  
 assault Prince Mentschikoff in his position on the  
 Alma heights. At half-past one, the cannonade  
 which marked the opening of the battle was heard in  
 the town, and at two there came from the telegraph  
 at Cape Loukoul a message, destined to be its last,—  
 ‘The army is engaged with the enemy.’ Already  
 Korniloff’s ride with Todleben towards the field of battle. Korniloff was on horseback, and riding, with Colonel  
 de Todleben, towards the sound of the guns.\* We shall  
 see by-and-by that, from a distance of 3000 miles, the  
 care and the sagacity of a news-dealing company on  
 the banks of the Thames had enabled it to point out  
 the day as well as the place of the expected encounter ;  
 and it might be thought that, since Korniloff was  
 within cannon-sound of the Allied camp, and in hourly

\* Without distinguishing from others those facts which I owe to personal communications from General de Todleben, I wish to acknowledge generally the immeasurable advantage which I have derived from the repeated, lengthened, and most interesting conversations with which the General honoured me.

communication with Prince Mentschikoff, he would hardly need prophecy to prepare him for the 20th of September. Yet, in speaking of the reasons which made him believe that this 20th of September would prove to be the fated day, he gives the first place to the predictions of an authority—in his eyes apparently a kind of periodical apocalypse—which he calls the ‘Athenian Calendar.’ Two days before, he had been at Prince Mentschikoff’s tent on the Kourganè Hill, had seen the great strength of the position, and had not only observed the army to be in excellent spirits, but had found the Prince easy in his mind and cheerful. Yet now, as he rode towards the scene of action, he could not but be agitated, he says, by the thought that the fate of Europe ‘was to be decided on Cape ‘Loukoul or on the Alma.’

By degrees, he was forced to apprehend, and then to see only too plainly the result of the encounter. ‘As I approached,’ he says, ‘the firing grew slacker, and I soon perceived that our army was retreating, but retreating in order.\* A sad picture it certainly was, but the will of the Lord is inscrutable to us.’

Amongst the troops which Korniloff and Todleben thus met retreating, there approached an officer on horseback, not marching on duty with any particular regiment, nor yet having with him the staff which would denote the presence of a general. He was

\* It was at a later period in the day that there occurred, along the road descending to the Katcha, the scene of confusion witnessed by Chodasiewicz, and described in a former volume of this work.

C H A P.  
VIII.

Their  
meeting  
with  
Prince  
Mentschi-  
koff.

bowed forward, as though very weary. This horse-  
man was Prince Mentschikoff, the Commander-in-  
Chief of the defeated army, and of all the military  
and naval forces in the Crimea. Since the time when  
he sat by his tent on the slope of the Kourganè Hill,  
indulging a happy belief in the strength of his ground  
on the Alma, some eight hours only were passed; but  
these had come heavy upon him. When Korniloff  
and Todleben had come up and spoken with him,  
they turned their horses' heads, and the three, in  
company, rode down to the Katcha. It seems that  
the torment of mind which might well be supposed  
to be assailing the Prince was at all events masked,  
and even perhaps superseded, by the extreme of bodily  
weariness which he was suffering.\*

Prince  
Mentschi-  
koff's  
orders to  
Korniloff  
for closing  
the en-  
trance of  
the road-  
stead.

But if the Prince was thus bowed down by fatigue,  
and unwilling or hardly able to speak many words,  
he had formed a momentous resolve, and could still  
wield that strength of will which was needed for  
giving effect to it. He enjoined Korniloff to close  
the mouth of the Sebastopol roadstead (where the  
Black Sea fleet lay at anchor); and it was understood,  
if it was not expressed in words, that this was to be  
done by sinking some of the ships. The import of  
this order was, that the Czar's famous navy of the

\* I do not know whether Prince Mentschikoff, in the course of the foregoing night, had imposed upon himself any labours which would account for this excessive fatigue. Including all his hapless untimely rides from the east to the west, and from the west to the east, of the battle-field, he had not traversed much ground in the course of the day. Mentschikoff was not a young man; but I imagine that, in part at least, his prostration of strength must be ascribed to the stress which care and grief can put upon the bodily frame.

Black Sea,—the result of patient energy continued from generation to generation, the long-cherished instrument of conquest, the terror of the Moslems, the hope of the Christians in the East,—was to abdicate its warlike mission upon the approach of danger, and shut itself in for ever—a fleet foregoing the sea. And the officer instructed to execute this ruthless order was the virtual commander of this same fleet, the man who had toiled during years and years to fit it for the business of war. The emotion with which Korniloff heard the words addressed to him may be inferred from their mere purport, as well as from the spirit of resistance which he made bold to show on the following day; but it seems that, at the time, he spoke little. He could not say he thought well of this measure of desperation, and he did not, he could not, reply that he would obey the command; but, on the other hand, he respected the anguish of a defeated commander, and indulged his chief's bodily weariness by refraining, for the time, from words of dispute and remonstrance.

C H A P.  
VIII.

Korniloff's  
reception  
of the  
order.

When first Prince Mentschikoff found himself in full retreat from the Alma, he conceived the idea of attempting a stand on the left bank of the Katcha; but although it would be an error to suppose that the spirit of the Russian soldiery was crushed by the defeat it had suffered, it is not the less certain that the loss of officers killed and wounded in the battle was greater than could be well borne, and that, from this and other causes, the army was for the moment in a disorganised and helpless state.

Prince  
Mentschi-  
koff's idea  
of at-  
tempting  
a stand  
on the  
Katcha.  
The state  
of the  
Russian  
army was  
not com-  
patible  
with the  
execution  
of that  
plan.



C H A P.  
VIII.

Prince  
Mentschikoff's plan  
of taking  
up a flank-  
ing posi-  
tion in the  
country  
of the  
Belbec.

Prince Mentschikoff therefore dismissed the idea of making a stand on the Katcha, and imagined a plan which (supposing that the ground should prove fit for the purpose) was well adapted to the object of enabling the army, though defeated and inferior in numbers, to try to cover Sebastopol. The Russian Commander proposed to take up such a position in the country of the Belbec as would enable him to menace the left flank of the Allied army whilst engaged (as he assumed that it presently would be) in attacking the Star Fort, and at the same time allow him to communicate freely by his rear with the great road through Baktchi Serai to the interior of Russia. With this view, he now entrusted to Colonel de Todleben the task of surveying the country on the morrow, and trying to find a ground upon which it would be prudent for the army to take up a position.

The in-  
struction was  
given  
with that  
object to  
Colonel de  
Todleben.

The  
muzzle of  
the bat-  
tle at  
Sebastopol  
and the  
noise  
which  
arose.

Hearing  
of the in-  
habitants  
during the  
period of  
suspense.

At ten o'clock at night, Korniloff was once more in Sebastopol. As there heard, the sound of the firing at half-past one had come from the left of the position on the Alma, had gradually rolled to the eastward, at half-past four had slackened, and then ceased altogether. From that time until night, the hours were blank, bringing nothing for men to learn; but it does not appear that the booming of the guns or the still suspense which came after raised any of that kind of stir or emotion which signs of such import might be likely to create in a city devoted to the arts of peace. The people in the place were soldiers or sailors for the most part, and the rest of them were virtually amenable to military rule. Things went on in their accus-

tomed way, but preparations were made for transporting wounded men from the North Side to the South, and for carrying them thence in litters to the hospital. To aid the work, the road up the hill along which the wounded would have to be carried was strongly lighted up. Prince Mentschikoff, it would seem, reached Sebastopol at about eleven o'clock at night, but already the rumours of the defeat had begun to creep into the town. At a later hour, boats coming across from the North Side began to discharge their freight of wounded men; and afterwards, all the night long, the dark shadows seen moving up by the illuminated road to the hospital bore dismal witness of what must have been done in those three hours when the firing was heard at Sebastopol.

C H A P.  
VIII.

Preparations for the reception of the wounded.

Prince Mentschikoff's return to Sebastopol.

Tidings of the defeat.

Wounded soldiery brought in during the night.

It would seem that when Prince Mentschikoff and his naval vicegerent had reached Sebastopol, bodily fatigue put off to the morrow nearly all further action and counsel; for, except the despatch of an aide-de-camp to St Petersburg,\* nothing more is chronicled as having been done or resolved on that night.

Despatch of an aide-de-camp to St Petersburg.

## II.

The next morning, Korniloff assembled a council of admirals and captains to determine what should be done in the straits to which things were brought by the loss of the battle. Prince Mentschikoff himself was not of the number assembled, but there is ground

21st Sept. Council of admirals and naval captains.

\* Major Greig, despatched to St Petersburg that night by Korniloff, in obedience to orders from the Prince given him on the Katcha.

C H A P. for inferring that to some of those who were there he had  
 VIII. imparted at least his opinion, if not his final resolve.\*

Korniloff's  
 address.

Korniloff addressed the assembled admirals and captains. 'Our army,' he said, 'is falling back on 'Sebastopol, and therefore the enemy will easily occupy 'the heights on the south of the Belbec. He will ex- 'tend his forces as far as Inkerman† and "Holland"‡ ' (where the intended tower has not yet been com- 'pleted), and, commanding from those heights the 'ships of Nachimoff's squadron, he will force the fleet 'to leave its present position. By thus altering our 'order of battle for the fleet, he will make it feas- 'ible to force the entrance of the roadstead; and 'if, at the same time, his land forces should take 'the Star Fort, no resistance on our part, however 'heroic, will save the Black Sea fleet from ruin and 'disgraceful capture. I therefore propose to put to 'sea and attack the enemy, crowded as he is off Cape 'Loukoul. I think that, fortune favouring us, we 'might disperse the enemy's armada, and thus deprive 'the Allied armies of supplies and reinforcements. In

His pro-  
 posal to  
 put to sea  
 and attack  
 the Allied  
 fleets.

\* For much of the information on which I base my statements respecting Admiral Korniloff and the Russian navy, I am indebted to a most admirable collection of materials by Captain Gendre, an officer who was upon the Staff of Admiral Korniloff. I, in general, refer to the work by the description of 'Matériaux pour servir.' It is in Russian, but the great kindness of Admiral Likhatcheff, who was himself on Korniloff's Staff, and also of Mr Michel of the Admiralty, has overcome for me this obstacle.

† In Russian nomenclature the 'Inkerman heights' do not mean the ground where the battle of Inkerman was fought, but the eastern heights overhanging the head of the roadstead.

‡ The ground thus designated was between the Star Fort and the head of the roadstead.

‘ the event of failure, we shall be able to avoid a dis-  
‘ graceful capture; for, supposing that we do not suc-  
‘ ceed in boarding the enemy’s ships, we can at all  
‘ events blow them up when close alongside, together  
‘ with our own. C H A P.  
VIII.

‘ While thus saving the honour of the Russian flag,  
‘ the seamen will be defending their port; for the  
‘ Allied fleets, even if victorious, would be so weakened  
‘ by the loss of many ships, that they would not dare  
‘ to attack the strong sea-batteries of Sebastopol;  
‘ and, without the co-operation of the fleet, the Allied  
‘ armies could not capture the town, if fortified and  
‘ defended by our troops, until the arrival of a fresh  
‘ army from Russia, and then, with united exertions  
‘ we might crush the enemy.

‘ The absence of all order in the disposition of the  
‘ enemy’s fleet during the landing and off Cape Lou-  
‘ koul—the carelessness of their cruisers, which have  
‘ not yet captured even one of our steamers on the  
‘ Black Sea during the whole summer—the careless-  
‘ ness of the Allied admirals, who have allowed our  
‘ squadrons to cruise freely in sight of Sebastopol, and  
‘ missed an opportunity of attacking the Three Holy  
‘ Fathers, which lay aground on the 9th of June for  
‘ above twenty-four hours out of reach of our batteries  
‘ —who have even allowed the steamer Taman to leave  
‘ Sebastopol and to cruise, caring little for the count-  
‘ less steamers of the enemy, on the lines by which  
‘ the Allies communicate with the Turkish ports,—  
‘ all this plainly proves that against such an enemy  
‘ success is not impossible.’

## CHAP.

## VIII.

Tenor of  
the latter  
part of  
Korniloff's  
address.

From the tenor of what the speaker next said, it is to be inferred that he was interrupted at this point by an expressed or anticipated suggestion, importing that the time for a bold irruption into the midst of the enemy's great armada was surely on the morning of the 14th, when the ships were still encumbered with troops, and the crews engaged in the business of the landing; for the rest of Korniloff's address seems meant to answer an objection of that kind; but the speaker, as I judge from his words, became confused by his endeavour to go on recommending a desperate enterprise, when he found himself forced to acknowledge that the right time for a venture of the kind had been suffered to pass.

Recep-  
tion by  
the coun-  
cil of Kor-  
niloff's  
proposal.

The meas-  
ure which,  
before  
being  
actually  
proposed,  
seemed to  
be engag-  
ing the  
attention  
of the  
council.

Question  
whether  
Korniloff's  
measure  
was one  
which he  
could  
usefully  
propose in  
the coun-  
cil.

The assembled admirals and captains received the proposal of Korniloff in blank silence; and it presently appeared that, although there were some few who assented to the proposal, the rest disapproved it, and were already bending their thoughts to a measure of a very different kind. All probably knew beforehand that this other measure was to be proposed, and that it had the sanction of Prince Mentschikoff, the Commander-in-Chief.

The period of Korniloff's great ascendancy was close at hand, but it had not yet come; and great as we shall see him to be in the days which were approaching, it may be acknowledged that, whatever good there might be in his desperate plan of attack, if peremptorily ordered and fiercely pushed through to the end by a resolute commander, it was hardly one which could be usefully submitted to a numerous assembly of admirals and

captains who knew that it was disapproved by the Commander-in-Chief. And the reasonings by which Korniloff tried to support his proposal were surely weak. Because the Allied fleets kept no formal array, they were not therefore in confusion. There was always, at the least, one vessel of war standing sentry over the prisoned fleet of the Russians ; and the ships of the Allies, though somewhat dispersed, were well enough linked by signals and by their great steam-power. Even before the landing, when an irruption into the midst of the crowded and busy armada could have been best attempted, the seamen of Dundas's off-shore squadron were not only ready for such an encounter as the very one for which their services were specially reserved, but were even partly cleared for action. And again, it was wild to build the hope of surprising the whole Allied fleet upon the furtive success with which a small single Russian steamer had now and then cheated the watchfulness of the Anglo-French cruisers.

CHAP.  
VIII.

The value  
of the  
reasons by  
which he  
supported  
it.

The rejection of Korniloff's measure was followed by the open proposal of that other and very different plan of action which was already engaging the thoughts of the council. It was Captain Zorin who submitted this counter-proposal to the assembled admirals and captains ; and it will be observed that, although submitted in this way as the advice of one of the captains, the plan was the one which Prince Mentschikoff, on the evening before, had ordered Korniloff to execute. That which Captain Zorin proposed was this . . . of the oldest of the ships

Captain  
Zorin's  
counter-  
proposal.

**C H A P.** across the mouth of the roadstead, and employ the  
**VIII.** crews of the sunken ships, as well as those of the rest  
 of the fleet, in reinforcing the garrison.

The grief  
 with  
 which the  
 counter-  
 proposal  
 was heard.  
 Loud  
 speaking.

Captain  
 Gendre's  
 expression  
 of the feel-  
 ings with  
 which the  
 officers  
 and men  
 of the fleet  
 regarded  
 the meas-  
 ure.

When this proposal was made, many, knowing ap-  
 parently that it had the sanction of the Commander-  
 in-Chief, and would therefore be adopted, began to  
 shed tears. And now there was loud speaking. He  
 who records what passed does not undertake to give  
 the words, or even the tenor of what was then said,  
 but in his own language—he was himself an officer of  
 the Black Sea fleet—he utters the grief of the officers  
 to whom the appeal was addressed : ‘How to decide  
 ‘on such a cruel measure? To bar the port, and shut  
 ‘ourselves up, is it not tantamount to a solemn con-  
 ‘fession of our inability to fight at sea? Is it not  
 ‘tantamount to our abdicating the very name of sea-  
 ‘men, so dear to the men of the Black Sea fleet? By  
 ‘the love we have borne to our profession, by our  
 ‘unanimous co-operation in the noble efforts of our  
 ‘ever-memorable chiefs, we have brought our ships to  
 ‘a high state of perfection in manœuvring, in gunnery,  
 ‘and general management; and now, when we might  
 ‘justly boast of our creation—when the fleet has grown  
 ‘strong and formidable—we are to sacrifice these fine  
 ‘ships, and sink them with our own hands in the  
 ‘waves of their native port! Such a proceeding is  
 ‘next to suicide. The question is not to offer upon  
 ‘the altar of our country our wealth, our material  
 ‘interests. No; the sacrifice is of a higher kind.  
 ‘We are to crush with a merciless hand everything  
 ‘upon which we have concentrated our moral efforts,

‘ in which we have been accustomed to see our calling  
‘ and our future.’

C H A P.  
VIII.

Korniloff expressed his dissent from the counter-proposal, but perceiving that the majority of the officers present approved it, and still holding to his own opinion, he dismissed the council, and with these words: ‘ Prepare for putting to sea. A signal will be given pointing out what every one has to do.’ But he spoke, the narrator says, with a heavy heart, for he had little hope that the Commander-in-Chief would change the resolve he had imparted to him the evening before.

Korniloff dismisses the council with directions to prepare for putting to sea.

Korniloff, however, went to Prince Mentschikoff, and declared his intention of putting to sea. To this the Prince peremptorily objected, and he reiterated the order he had given Korniloff the evening before on his ride from the Alma—the order to close the entrance of the roadstead by sinking some of the ships. Korniloff answered that he would do no such thing. Prince Mentschikoff replied, ‘ Well, then, you may return to your post at Nicolayeff,\* and send for Admiral Stanncovitch in order to give him the necessary instructions.’ Then Korniloff said: ‘ Stop a moment. It is suicide what you are compelling me to; but now—to leave Sebastopol surrounded by the enemy is impossible. I am ready to obey you.’†

Korniloff's interview with Prince Mentschikoff.

The Prince's orders to close the harbour by sinking ships.

Korniloff's refusal to obey it.

Prince Mentschikoff's rejoinder.

Korniloff's withdrawal of his refusal to execute the order.

\* Under ordinary circumstances, Nicolayeff was the place where Korniloff, as chief of the staff of the Black Sea fleet, would be stationed.

† ‘ This conversation has been reported by Prince Mentschikoff himself.’—Note appended to the account of the conversation in the ‘ *Matériaux pour servir.*’



C H A P.  
VIII.

The orders  
issued in  
obedience  
to Prince  
Mentschi-  
koff's re-  
solve.

21st Sept.  
Removal  
of stores  
from the  
North  
Side.

And Korniloff obeyed. The order he issued pointed out the places to be taken by all the ships of the fleet, including the five line-of-battle ships and the two frigates, which were to be brought to the mouth of the roadstead and held in readiness for sinking. It directed that when the ships should be sunk their crews should be formed into battalions. It ordered that, with a view to the event of its becoming necessary to give up the town, the rest of the fleet should be held in readiness to be sunk. In the mean time, however, they were to be ranged in an order which would enable them to pour their fire upon the slopes descending from the North Side. The order directed that, upon the mere appearance of the enemy on the heights to the south of the Belbec, two of the roadstead batteries on the north, the Paris and the Twelve Apostles, should be destroyed. A separate order directed that vast quantities of the ammunition and other stores should be transported from the North to the South Side. All day, the numbers of vessels employed in obeying this order were crossing and recrossing the roadstead. The timely removal of these stores tends to show that the defence of the North Side against the Allied armies was regarded at the time as an almost desperate undertaking.

Colonel de  
Todleben's  
report of  
his survey.

It was not until the afternoon of this day that Colonel de Todleben had completed the survey entrusted to him the evening before by Prince Mentschikoff. For eight hours he was riding over the ground, and studying it, as may well be supposed, with anxious care. Upon his report the whole tenor of the rest of

the campaign was depending. At length he formed his opinion, and with a confidence which freed him from all misgiving. In order apparently to receive Colonel de Todleben's report, Prince Mentschikoff had come back to the North Side, for there—in the Lodge that he had close adjoining the Number Four Battery—Colonel de Todleben waited upon him, and reported the conclusion to which he had come. Todleben's conclusion was, that in the country he had been ordered to examine, there was not to be found any line upon which it would be wise for the Russian army to take up a position. There was no ground—otherwise suitable—which offered good means of retreat.

C H A P.  
VIII.

He communicates  
it to  
Prince  
Mentschikoff.

Prince Mentschikoff listened to this report in the way that might be expected from one who had ready an alternative plan; but that other plan, whatever it might be, he withheld from Colonel de Todleben. The Prince did not say much. Presently he got into a small boat and crossed over to Sebastopol, leaving Todleben without instructions in regard to the next duty, if any, which he was to undertake. After reflecting a little, Colonel de Todleben determined that he would return to the task from which he had been summoned, and go on with his endeavours to strengthen the works on the North Side. This he did.

The  
Prince's  
reception  
of the  
Report.

Prince Mentschikoff, at this time, was very secret in regard to his ulterior plan for the disposition of his army; but, for the present, he allowed his troops to continue the movement which divided them from the field of the Alma, and retreat fairly into Sebastopol.

The army,  
continuing  
its retreat,  
passed  
over into  
Sebastopol.

In a weakened and tired condition of body, but

C H A P.  
VIII.

Arrival of  
the defeat-  
ed troops,  
and their  
passage  
across the  
roadstead.

Their  
bivouac on  
ground  
adjoining  
the town.

The ships  
moved  
into their  
prescribed  
places.

not, it is said, in a state of dejection, the troops in the course of the day were all brought over the water, and into the town. Thence they were moved to a ground outside, which was called the Koolikoff field. There they bivouacked.

At four o'clock in the afternoon, the ships of the fleet, including those which were doomed, began to move into their places, and at half-past ten at night all were there.

### III.

22d Sept.  
Impres-  
sion cre-  
ated on  
board the  
French  
fleet by  
the ap-  
pearance  
of the  
doomed  
ships at  
the mouth  
of the  
roadstead.

Early in the morning of the next day (the 22d), the top-gallant masts of the condemned ships were struck, and their sails unbent. Descrying five ships and two frigates ranged across the entrance of the roadstead, and either not seeing that the sails were unbent, or failing to observe the change in the way that leads to inference, the French were led to imagine that the enemy was coming out to give battle, and, accordingly, there was a joyous expectation that day on board their fleet. All that day, the condemned ships remained in their places across the mouth of the roadstead.

Farther  
effort of  
Korniloff  
to save  
the ships,  
and its  
failure.

The way  
in which  
Prince  
Mentschi-  
koff's de-

Korniloff had not yet absolutely despaired of saving the ships, and he again pressed Prince Mentschikoff to spare them. The Prince, however, had by this time made up his mind to that flank march of which we shall presently speak, and he conceived that the sinking of the ships was an essential part of the plan to which he meant to resort. According to that p<sup>l</sup>

he was to remove the army from Sebastopol, abandoning to the seamen the charge of the land defences; and he rightly enough judged that, as long as there should be the prospect of an irruption of the Allied fleets into the roadstead, it would be impossible to withdraw to the shore the whole energy of the crews.

The Naval Library, as we saw, was the place where officers used to gather. Thither Korniloff came at six o'clock in the evening. He was in a state of deep sadness. It had been arranged that, when the measure of sinking the ships should be irrevocably determined upon, the national flag should be hoisted as a signal to all that the sacrifice was to be accomplished. The dooming flag was run up. Korniloff went on board one of the ships, and when afterwards he returned to his house, he found awaiting him there some naval officers, men zealously devoted to the service. They had come to entreat that he would avert the blow which was aimed, as they said, at their calling; and they probably sought to make him know, that if he should undertake to resist the destroying orders, he might not be without support. They urged their prayer. Korniloff answered, 'We must submit to necessity.'

In his address to the seamen, Korniloff explained a part of the grounds for resorting to the measure, but omitted all mention of the intended withdrawal of the army, and even spoke of the land forces as having come back to Sebastopol in order to defend it to extremity. He then said: 'It is no doubt painful to 'destroy our own work! We have used many efforts

C H A P.  
VIII.

termination to sink the ships was connected with his plan of a flank march.

6 P.M. Signal announcing the final determination to close the roadstead by sinking ships.

Naval officers awaiting Korniloff at his house. Their endeavour to stay the act of sinking the ships.

Korniloff's answer to them.

His address to the seamen.

C H A P. ' to put these doomed ships in a state to excite the envy  
 VIII. ' of the world. But we must submit to stern neces-  
 ' sity. Moscow was burned, but Russia was not ruined  
 ' by it. On the contrary, she only grew the stronger.  
 ' God is merciful. No doubt He is even now prepar-  
 ' ing a similar destiny for His faithful Russian people.  
 ' Let us, then, offer up our prayers to the Lord, and  
 ' not suffer a mighty enemy to conquer us !'

In the night between the 22d and 23d, the doomed ships were scuttled.

Morning of the 23d Sept.

State of the doomed ships.

Tenacity with which the Three Holy Fathers resisted the endeavours to sink her.

Feeling excited by the spectacle.

In the night, the orders for the scuttling of the ships were obeyed, and at dawn on the morning of the 23d there were only to be seen some bare masts in the places where the Sizopol, the Varna, and the Silistria, had been lying the day before. Soon afterwards, the Ouryl and the Selaftroil went down ; and at eight o'clock the waves passed over the Flora, but the Three Holy Fathers, a 130-gun ship, was still erect. The water rushed in through the openings which had been made in her sides, near the water-line, but, despite the unnatural wounds, she did not yet sink. Her steadfastness caused men to think how faithfully she would have served in honest fight with the enemy. In the minds of the seamen of the fleet, the sight of the grand old ship thus clinging to life added horror to grief. Amongst such of the officers as were free from superstitions, the pain, it would seem, was akin to that which men feel when they force themselves to see the blow given to one of the brute creation who is an old and faithful servant, condemned to have his days ended ; and the commander of the steam-frigate the Thunder-bearer was commanded to fire into her sides, in order—as the naval recount

the scene expresses it—in order to ‘shorten her agony.’ But this last spectacle was more harrowing than all that had gone before. In the idea of the seamen, and many, perhaps, of the officers, the sacred name of the ship, and the notion that some holy emblem or relic must still be remaining on board her, aroused a belief or surmise that what the heathenish Thunder-bearer was doing might be a deed unspeakably impious. At a quarter before one, the sacred man-of-war reeled. For a moment—so pious men thought—the waves fell away recoiling, then closed, and bore the ship down.

The destruction of the ships already condemned was only a part of the sacrifice; for it could not but be that the policy which had sunk seven ships and closed the entrance of the roadstead, was bringing to an end the career of the whole Black Sea fleet, and turning its crews into soldiers. The seamen knew that to change thus was to fall.

In the capital of many a state there sits an industrious clerk—a sovereign he may be or a minister—working hard at the task of giving a base uniformity to bodies of armed men, and never remitting his toil till at last he is taught by disaster that the mind and the soul he has laboured so hard to keep down are amongst the main needs of an army in time of war. If he sees a body of troops having some distinctive accoutrement which helps to sustain its individuality in the midst of an army, and connects itself, in the minds of the men, with the pride they take in their regiment, he hastens to tear off the mark which makes the corps differ from others; and when

C H A P.  
VIII.

The policy which closed the roadstead was ending the career of the whole Black Sea fleet.

The fall to which the seamen would be made liable by becoming transferred to the land service.

The too mechanic state to which the Russian army had been brought.

CHAP.  
VIII. there is a regiment which glories in its ancient name, connecting it vaguely with great traditions, and founding upon the cherished syllables that consciousness of power which is a main condition of ascendancy in war, then the army clerk suffers such pain from the want of that sequence which he has long observed in an orderly series of numerals running on like 'one,' 'two,' and 'three,' that he takes from the regiment its proud historic name, and orders that for the future it shall be called by a number in the way that is used with convicts.\* But of all the clerks who thus laboured at the business of making armies by extinguishing men, none had been more ruthless than the one who toiled at St Petersburg; for, devoting himself to the merely military as distinguished from warlike pursuits, and being little short of a madman in his love of things uniform, the Emperor Nicholas for years had been lowering and lowering the Russian soldiery in the scale of humanity, with the intent of bringing his army to a base mechanic perfection; and this policy

\* This particular illustration of the silly and noxious lengths to which an army administration may be carried by its love of uniformity was not fetched from St Petersburg, but from our own Horse Guards, though not, I believe I may say, from the Horse Guards as at present administered. The Russian regiments are officially called by names or descriptions not founded on numerals; but many a one has been subjected to the practice of taking away the old name of the regiment, in order to designate it as the possession of some mere prince. Thus, for instance, the 'Borodino' regiment had a name which the Russians have ever held to be one of great glory to their nation; but it got instead a wordy, cumbrous designation, describing the regiment as the property of one of the Emperor's sons, and sounding more like a tiresome extract from a court almanac than the honest name of a regiment.

had been carried to such baneful extremes that the most illustrious of Russia's living generals has assigned it as one of the causes which exposed the Czar's troops to defeat.\* But in the fleets of the empire the perverse energy of Nicholas had failed to complete the mischief it tended to work; and although more or less he tormented his seamen with drill, and marched them, and wheeled them, and put them in barracks, and divided them into bodies of the size of battalions, with a number belonging to each,† he could not altogether extirpate from the sailors the true sailor's spirit. There was a strength in the nature of things which withstood him; for happily—and this is a main source of the glory attaching to the sea service—the ever-changeful exigencies which the winds and the waves create must be met by the individual energies of the very men who encounter them, and not by mere codes of regulation sent down from an office. The sailor of the Black Sea fleet could not but feel that his calling ennobled him. He could not but know that if he were to be withdrawn from his ship for land service, he would be in danger of falling to a lower estate.

It is true, as we shall very soon see, that although put to fight on shore, the seaman did not fail to display his ever-ready resource, his careless, his merry

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VIII.

Comparative freedom of the naval forces from this evil.

The seaman ennobled by his calling would have reason to deprecate his transfer to the land service.

\* Todleben, vol. i. p. 204. I have reason to know that the unsoundness of the policy in this respect of the Emperor Nicholas is fully recognised by the present Government of Russia.

† These bodies were numbered and called 'crews,'—a somewhat misleading term, because the numbered crew, though composed of men belonging to the ships' companies, was not a body identical with that which formed the crew of any particular ship. The numbered crew consisted of about a thousand men belonging to different ships.



C H A P.  
VIII.

love of danger, his agile and flexible energy, his devotion to warlike duty, and, above all, that valour which could be proof against the sense of being abandoned and sacrificed; but some, at least, of the qualities thus brought to light on shore, were qualities derived from the sea, and the more the sailor was gifted with these, the greater would be his fall and his loss of self-respect, if—not merely for the one struggle then going on, but for all the rest of his time—he were to become a land-service man, reduced step by step to the mechanised state of the Russian soldier, with nothing but memory, and perhaps some small, cherished relic, to remind him of his good old ship, and the nobler life he had lived in the days of the Black Sea fleet.

Therefore more than one train of thought was con-  
ducing, it seems, to the grief with which the men saw the ships sunk.

The policy  
of sinking  
the ships.

But it must be acknowledged that this sinking of the ships was a wise measure. It fulfilled two great purposes. It closed the entrance of the roadstead against the Allies; but also, by putting a sure and visible end to the career of the fleet at sea, it brought to bear upon the land defences that strength of 18,000 fit men, and those almost boundless resources in the way of things material which the navy was able to furnish.

And it seems to be plain that, such as it is, the whole merit of designing the expedient, and forcing it into effect, belongs of right to Prince Mentschikoff. Except by adducing this instance of firm and opportune action, it would be hard to show a fit ground for

ascribing to the Prince any share of that kind of capacity which is needed for the business of war ; and mankind will be loath to agree that the martial renown of a commander, when devoid of all other foundation, can be rested upon the single act, however timely and fortunate, of closing an arm of the sea. But still this Prince Mentschikoff's idea of at once shutting out the invading fleets and turning his own navy into a town garrison by the short expedient of sinking some ships, was a conception so boldly, so ruthlessly formed—it was so simple—it was so well adapted to its twofold end—it was carried through with so strong a will, and, withal, was so signally justified by receiving the crown of success, that, if it had been imagined and executed by a great commander, the measure might have been honestly cited as one bearing marks of his genius.

## CHAPTER IX.

CHAP.  
IX.

The power  
the Allies  
had of  
seizing the  
enemy's  
line of  
communi-  
cation  
with the  
interior of  
Russia.  
Prince  
Mentschi-  
koff's  
grounds  
for dread-  
ing this.

The Allies  
not using  
their  
power,  
the Prince  
saw a way  
of recover-  
ing his  
communi-  
cations.

His plan.

SINCE the troops, overthrown on the Alma, had retreated all into Sebastopol, leaving no other body to dispute with the invaders for the dominion of the country outside, it followed that the Allies, by inclining to their left with the whole or a part of their forces, were enabled, if so they should choose, to lay hold of the enemy's line of communication with the interior of the empire; and this, it would seem, was a measure which Prince Mentschikoff had good reason to dread; for his pressing need of reinforcements made it vital for him to be able to keep the command of the great homeward road through Baktchi Seräi and Simpheropol, as well as the means of communication with Khomoutoff's force in the south-east of the Crimea. Therefore, when he observed that, instead of seizing this road, the invaders were keeping their whole strength together, and slowly advancing upon Sebastopol along the sea-shore, he conceived that he might escape from the predicament of being cut off from his succours by darting upon the precious ground which the policy of the Allies had left open to him. With this view, he resolved that he would withdraw his army from Se-

bastopol at night, move it by a south-easterly march to the valley of the Tchernaya, cross the valley, turn northward, ascending the Mackenzie Heights, and place himself upon the highroad which leads thence by Baktchi Seräi to the interior of Russia. Once there, he hoped to be able to keep open the way to the interior of Russia, and give the hand to his expected reinforcements from Odessa, as well as to those coming up from the neighbourhood of Kertch: but this was only a part of the plan which he professed to have formed; for by way of justification for the withdrawal of his army from Sebastopol, he engaged to hang upon the flank of the Allies, and to do this so formidably that his attitude would be sure to hinder them from undertaking any resolute attack against the north side of the fortress. Except in so far as he might be aiding the cause in this collateral way, the Prince was to leave the main defence of Sebastopol to the sailors; for, save only 5000 militiamen and one battalion of sappers, he proposed to withdraw from the place the whole of his army.

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IX.

Its advantages.

His justification for the abandonment of the garrison.

So far as concerned the defence from within, the charge was to be mainly left to the sailors.

When Korniloff was apprised of this resolve by Prince Mentschikoff, he protested and said, 'That it would be impossible to hold Sebastopol if the troops were to leave it; that a handful of seamen would not be able to resist the onset of the numerous army of the Allies on the northern fortifications, and, these being carried, they would not be able to hold out long in the town itself.'

Korniloff's remonstrance against the plan.

Prince Mentschikoff replied, 'The enemy cannot undertake an energetic attack upon the northern for-

Prince Mentschikoff de-

C H A P. ' tifications, having our army on the flank and rear.'\*

IX.

fends it, insisting upon the effect he would produce by placing his field army on the flank and rear of the enemy.

His final resolve and orders to form the ships' crews into battalions.

The consideration which justified the plan as proposed.

23d to 25th Sept. The operation entrusted to Kiriakoff.

Persisting in his resolve, he ordered Korniloff to form battalions out of the ships' crews for the defence of the place.

There was much that seems politic in this plan of operations ; but the thought of abandoning Sebastopol at such a time, and leaving to the sailors the main defence of the place, was only to be justified by keeping it always coupled with that other part of the plan, which provided that the army thus stealing out of the fortress should operate formidably upon the flank and rear of the invading armies ; and it will be seen that, although this last duty was in terms undertaken by Prince Mentschikoff, he did not make haste to perform it.

With a view to the execution of the intended flank march, Kiriakoff was entrusted with the delicate and important task of observing the enemy at a very critical time ; and accordingly, on the 23d, the day before the march of the main army, he was sent towards the Belbec, taking with him, it seems, 12 battalions, 20 guns, and 400 Cossacks.

There is some obscurity in regard to the instructions with which General Kiriakoff was furnished ;† but at half-past four in the afternoon his troops were so near to the Belbec as to be able to see the English cavalry on the other side of the river ; and in the evening he learnt that Lord Lucan's force had occupied the vil-

\* ' This conversation was related by Korniloff on the evening of the 11th [23d] of September.'

† See Todleben, vol. i. p. 242 *et seq.*, comparing the note and the text.

lage of Duvanköi. Thereupon, and the same night, Kiriakoff fell back upon the Inkerman bridge, crossed the river, ascended the Sapounè Heights, moved southward along the road on their crest, descended once more into the valley of Tchernaya, recrossed the stream by a ford, ascended the Mackenzie Heights, and was thenceforth on the same line of march as the rest of the evading army. One of his battalions, however, in consequence of some mistake, fell out and returned to Sebastopol.\* In the night of the 24th the main army moved out of Sebastopol, crossed the valley of the Tchernaya, and ascended the Mackenzie Heights. At the moment when, on the forenoon of the 25th, Lord Raglan came suddenly upon a Russian battalion and waggon-train, all the rest of the army then marching under Prince Mentschikoff, including Kiriakoff's force, had already passed to the eastward of Mackenzie's Farm.

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IX.

Night of the 24th. The main army marches out of Sebastopol. Progress of the march up to the time of the encounter at Mackenzie's Farm.

After first providing for the way in which the command of the forces left at Sebastopol should be distributed during his absence, Prince Mentschikoff in person departed from the place; and at eight o'clock on the morning of the 25th he reached Otarköi, a village on the Belbec, lying only about six miles above that part of the stream on which the English were then bivouacked.† From that village of Otarköi, a half-hour's ride of the Prince's cavalry scouts along

Prince Mentschikoff at Otarköi on the 25th.

\* The 3d Taroutine battalion.

† I say *then* bivouacked, because the time spoken of is eight A.M., and the foremost column of the English army did not march till half an hour later.

**C H A P.** the road through Duvanköi would have brought them  
IX. in full sight of the English army. At the village of Otarköi Prince Mentschikoff remained a great part of the day; and at about eleven o'clock in the morning, both he and his army were so placed, that those commanders who pass much of their life in sighing after the great occasion which comes but too rarely, would be likely to regard him, in that forenoon of the 25th of September, as a man to be keenly envied.

The opportunity which offered itself to him that morning.

His whole army, with all its train, except a few waggons and a small rear-guard, was already on that part of the road which is to the eastward of Mackenzie's Farm; but, at the same time, no part of it was distant enough to be out of his reach; so that, if he should see reason to stop the march of his more advanced columns, and assemble his army in the neighbourhood of Mackenzie's Farm, he would be able to do this by an early hour in the afternoon. His troops carried bread; and his trains, reduced, for the purpose of the march, to a moderate scale, were moving with the rest of the force.

Now, the English army, it will be remembered began the flank march this same day, at half-past eight in the morning; and supposing that Prince Mentschikoff—who was master of the intervening country, and of ample cavalry forces—had been taking only those common means for ascertaining his adversary's movements which, even in days not regarded as specially critical, the customs of warfare prescribe he would have learnt, by the time we are speaking of

that Lord Raglan was moving in force towards Mackenzie's Farm ; and only a little later, if not indeed some time before, he must have come to know that the whole Allied army was following the flank movement of the English General. The orders which the Prince might have issued, after making this discovery, would have enabled him to stay the march of his army towards Baktchi Seräi, to face it about, and to dispose it in such way as he might think fit in the woodland and broken ground lying east of the paths by which the Allies had to cross the mountain. He then would have had at his back the country traversed by the great road to Baktchi Seräi, and opening to him his communications with the interior of Russia ; whilst, before him, he would have seen the Allies moving painfully across his front in all the helplessness of an army broken up into a trailing column, with a depth so great as to make it a day's march from the rear to the van, and a front so narrow as to consist of one gun and one horseman—and all this defiling through forest or steep mountain-paths. Some of these roads, too, and especially the mountain-road descending from the Mackenzie Heights to the valley of the Tchernaya, there would have been time to break up or obstruct. To add to his advantages, the Russian army would have had abundant water in its immediate rear, whilst the Allies, after draining the last turbid cupful from Mackenzie's Farm, would have been condemned to bear the torment of thirst, with a liability to have their sufferings aggravated in the detention, and the labour which the



CHAP. necessity of having to combat, or prepare for combat,  
IX. could not fail to occasion.

Nor can it be rightly said that any inferiority in point of numbers, or any depression occasioned by late defeat, unfitted Prince Mentschikoff's army for operations against the uncovered flank of a lengthened string of soldiery and waggons pursuing its difficult way through woodland or mountain-roads; for during at least some hours, the bare numbers of an army thus caught in the process of journeying, with a day's march between van and rear, would have no more served to repress an enemy assailing its uncovered flank, than the length, the mere length, of a far-stretching thread can avail it against a knife; and the enterprises to which the occasion invited were exactly of the kind which may be usefully undertaken with a brave though discomfited army, because they could be carried through by the personal boldness of a few men, and without exposing great masses to have their coherence tested. The conjuncture was such that, by reason of their effect in challenging and delaying a force to which long delay would be fatal, the smallest successes of the assailants might be fraught with great results; and it is to be observed, too, that there was a collateral advantage deriving from attacks of this sort, to which the Prince might have looked: for experience has taught that a series of even the pettiest triumphs, down even to those which may be won over stragglers and drivers of waggons, is of great worth as a means of restoring self-respect and confidence to troops which have suffered disaster.

Although the Allies encountered no sort of resistance, it cost them, as we saw, a painful march from morning to midnight, and again another march the next day, to traverse the ridge which divided the Belbec from the Tchernaya ; but if Prince Mentschikoff, perceiving and using the power which fortune offered him, had so wielded his army as, from time to time, to constrain the invaders to prepare a front, and gather their means of resistance, the duration of their perilous march must have been proportionately lengthened ; and they were forces to which despatch was life, for they abandoned, as we know, their old base of operations, and were travelling by map and compass in hope of finding another. It would seem that even slight ventures undertaken that day by the Russians must have put the Allies in grave danger.

Such was the occasion which fortune stood prof-  
 offering to Prince Mentschikoff from the morning of  
 the 25th of September to the forenoon of the follow-  
 ing day. But in vain ; for on the 25th he had not  
 only suffered himself to remain in sheer ignorance of  
 the movements of an army of between 50,000 and  
 60,000 men, which had bivouacked at a distance of  
 half an hour's ride from his quarters, but was even so  
 content with his state in this respect that he avowedly  
 postponed to the morrow the business of seeking this  
 precious knowledge.\* His sloth was the more extra-

C H A P.  
IX.

Prince  
Mentschi-  
koff's want  
of ac-  
quaintance  
with the  
move-  
ments of  
the Allies.

\* I am informed, on very high authority, that the cause of Prince Mentschikoff's ignorance of the enemy's movements was his reliance on Kiriakoff, and the failure of the operation to him entrusted ; but the language of Prince Mentschikoff's letters seems to me inconsistent with

C H A P. ordinary, since it is evident that (either from deserters  
IX. or from some other source) he had gathered reason for  
 surmising that the Allies might march to the south ; \*  
 yet, even with such added motives for desiring information,  
 his mind on this subject remained so blank, and his desire of  
 knowledge so languid, that, at a time when the English were  
 marching at a distance of but three or four miles from his  
 desk, he was able to write thus to Korniloff: 'Bivouac near the  
 Otark village, on the Belbec, 13th [25th] September 1854.  
 ' We arrived here at eight o'clock in the morning,  
 ' and sent some Cossacks in advance. Our further  
 ' movements will depend upon the position of the  
 ' enemy, and it would be therefore desirable to get,  
 ' from time to time, some information from Sebastopol  
 ' as to the position of our adversaries. We neither  
 ' see nor hear anything of the enemy here.' So that,  
 being himself within half an hour's ride of the English  
 bivouac, he sent back all the way to Sebastopol, and asked  
 of the sailors there left to their fate some news of the enemy's  
 movements. Here again, it

that supposition ; and there are many reasons which tend, as I think,  
 to make the explanation invalid.

\* This we know because, almost immediately after quitting Sebastopol,  
 Prince Mentschikoff sent back to the garrison urging precautions  
 which could only be needed on the supposition that the Allies would  
 march to the south. These injunctions, however, disclosed a surmise  
 that the Allies, if they should march to the south, would take the  
 lower road by the mouth of the Tchernaya ; for the Prince directed  
 that the passage by that route should be obstructed and fortified. He  
 also sent back recommending that efforts should be made to strengthen  
 the Malakoff Hill and the ground between that and the Careening Bay,  
 and his anxiety could not have been ranging in that direction unless he  
 had apprehended that the Allies would march to the south coast.

would seem, there was proof that a too-laboured military system has a tendency to unfit men for warfare; because, after owning thus that he knew not where the invading armies were, nor what they might be doing, the Prince went on to speak of a military process for acquiring the needed information, which was to be commenced with all form and ceremony—not then, but—on the following day. ‘I hope,’ he writes, ‘the advanced posts will meet to-morrow for ‘ the first reconnaissance.’

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At a later hour, Prince Mentschikoff learnt how the rear of his army had been suddenly attacked by English horsemen at Mackenzie's Farm; but even when he knew this had happened, he still kept himself blind to the truth which the incident seemed fitted to teach him; for he ascribed the collision to ‘a patrol,’ and remained unacquainted with the fact that, all day, the whole Allied army had been defiling, and was still continuing to defile, at a distance of but three or four miles from his quarters.\*

\* He ascribes the capture effected by the English at Mackenzie's Farm to ‘a mounted patrol and two guns.’—Second note from the Prince to Korniloff, dated ‘13th [25th] September.’ Lest it should seem, for even a moment, that Prince Mentschikoff's ignorance concerning the Allies was paralleled by their ignorance of his operations, it may be right to say that, whilst there was nothing to prevent Prince Mentschikoff from gathering all requisite knowledge of the movements of the Allies, his own flank movement carried on from behind Sebastopol to the mid-valley of the Tchernaya, and thence northward to the Mackenzie Heights, was far out of the reach of any degree of reconnoitring zeal which the Allies could exert on the 24th from the region of the Lower Belbec; and with respect to the condition of things on the morning of the 25th, when our army was marching, the circumstances which on that day prevented the English cavalry from effectively reconnoitring

**CHAP.** If Prince Mentschikoff had been surrounded by a  
IX. force like the Cossacks of 1812, it would have been hardly possible for him to have remained unacquainted with the movements of a hostile army which bivouacked on ground six miles from his quarters, and had since been marching towards him ; but although there were abundance of horsemen still called by the name of Cossacks, the spirit of military organisation had changed all these into bodies having no more spontaneous energy than the rest of the Russian cavalry.

Comple-  
tion of  
Prince  
Mentschi-  
koff's  
flank  
march,  
and his  
retreat to  
the Kat-  
cha.

The state  
of seclu-  
sion in  
which the  
Prince and  
his army  
remained.

In the course of the 25th, Prince Mentschikoff, with the whole of his force, took up a position in the neighbourhood of Otarköi ; and the next day, after leaving a detachment\* in the country of the Upper Belbec, he yet further withdrew the main army, and completed his retreat to the Katcha. There, day after day, as we shall see by-and-by more minutely, he remained with his army in a state of seclusion, concerting no measures with the people he had left in Sebastopol for the defence or relief of the place—nay, suffering the garrison to live on for a time in sheer ignorance of the region where he and his troops were reposing ; and all this while the Prince was so far from threatening, or even observing, the invaders, that not only did he not know on which coast of the Crimea (the west or the south) they were operating,

in front of the advancing column, in accordance with Lord Raglan's desire, have been already stated.

\* A force of cavalry and infantry under Jabrokritaky, ~~an~~ altogether to 13,000 men.

but when at last he once more put himself in communication with the garrison, it was to them that he looked for his tidings, requesting them to send him back word, and tell him where the enemy was.\*

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\* It will be observed that, in a summary form, this sentence contains a whole cluster of assertions, all having a bearing upon the question of Prince Mentschikoff's competence for the command of an army in the field. The proofs of these assertions will be given in the next chapter; and there also, there will be found an exposition of the way in which Prince Mentschikoff's flank march has been justified.

## CHAPTER X.

## I.

**C H A P. X.** UPON withdrawing his army from the scene of the threatened attack, Prince Mentschikoff had distributed amongst three commanders the authority which was to be exercised at Sebastopol during the period of his absence.

Prince Mentschikoff's distribution of the command to be exercised at Sebastopol during his absence.

The command of the few land forces left in the place.

General Müller.

To General Möller he had left the command of the small body of land forces which was suffered to remain in the place, that is, of the one imperfect battalion of sappers, and the 5000 militiamen.

Of the officer thus placed at the head of the town garrison, it cannot be said that he had disclosed the qualities needed for any momentous charge ; but, at all events, he was so constituted as to be able to show his devotion to the public service, by a generous abandonment of every pretension and right which might clash with the general good.

The command of the seamen landed for duty on the South Side.

The Prince ordered that all the seamen who had been withdrawn from the fleet for the defence of the south side of the town should be under the orders of Vice-Admiral Nachimoff.

This commander, though fully as willing as soldier

or sailor should be to part with his ease, and encounter all dangers for the sake of his sovereign and his country, was of too desponding a nature, and too distrustful of himself, to be equal to the stress of a high command at a time when the emergencies requiring to be dealt with were not only momentous, but also of a kind quite novel. He had made it the rule of his life to try to avoid engaging in any undertaking unless he could make himself sure beforehand that he was qualified to go through it well; and imagining that he was hardly competent to command forces acting on shore, he waited on Prince Mentschikoff, before the Prince's departure, and told him that 'he was ready to die for the good of his country, that he was willing to place himself under the orders of a junior, and that, in that way, he would be happy to lend his co-operation, but that he could not be himself a good general of land forces.' Prince Mentschikoff answered that he did not consider this speech as a refusal, and made no change in his arrangements. Besides having the charge thus forced upon him, Nachimoff remained in command of one of the two squadrons into which the Black Sea fleet had been divided.

Vice-Admiral Korniloff continued to be the 'Chief of the Staff' of the Black Sea fleet, and remained in command of his naval squadron; but, independently of these functions, the Prince, upon quitting Sebastopol, entrusted to Korniloff the command of all the forces, both naval and military, which were to operate on the North Side.

This North Side was the ground where the whole

C H A P.

X.

Admiral  
Nachimoff.

The command of the forces on the North Side.



C H A P. weight of the victorious invaders was expected to  
X  
 fall; and any attempt to defend it was regarded by  
 Admiral Korniloff as a merely forlorn undertaking; but, for  
 that very reason the more, he was swift to accept  
 the command; and those who knew him the best  
 ascribe his joy at the time to a heroic exaltation of  
 spirit which hardly needed the prop of any hope this  
 side the grave.

Without holding supreme command, but acting as  
 chief of the staff, Vice-Admiral Korniloff, for a period  
 of some five years, had had the main direction of  
 affairs in the Black Sea fleet; and it was during that  
 time that he had been able to engender the zeal, the  
 trustful affection, which now, in the hour of a great  
 disaster, brought round him a band of undaunted sea-  
 men resolved to stand by his side in the void which  
 the army had left. He was destined to be cut off  
 when the period of his sway over events had lasted  
 scarce twenty-six days; but this space included a  
 time when the failing of the organised forces which  
 people had hitherto trusted made room once more  
 in the world—nay, made room in so straitened a  
 place as a Russian garrison town—for a man hav-  
 ing strength of his own.

The wars undertaken by Russia having always been  
 waged against nations of other creeds or other churches,  
 the religion and the patriotism of the people had been  
 blended, as we saw, into one sentiment, giving force  
 and steadfastness to the nation;\* but there were few,

\* *Ante*, vol. I. chap. iv. p. 55, 4th edition, and the reference there to  
 Dean Stanley's work on the Greek Church.

I imagine, who lived more absolutely under the gov- C H A P.  
ernance of this kind of religious patriotism than did X  
this brave Admiral. Indeed, it would seem that a main  
source of his strength was his faith in that Divine  
Power which he humbly believed to be taking part  
with 'Holy Russia' in her struggle for a cause which  
seemed to him to be a righteous one. 'May the Lord,'  
he writes—'May the Lord bless our cause! To the  
'best of our understanding it is a just one.' 'Of  
'course, all depends on God. God will not forsake  
'those who are righteous. Therefore await the issue  
'calmly and patiently.'

So, against all the cares which were worldly, and  
therefore subject to limits, he ever could bring that  
strong faith, which—having its source in the Infinite  
—was not an exhaustible power; and as often as the  
trials he was facing grew heavier and heavier, he  
only clung so much the more to the aid of Heaven.  
Thus, although he was too loyal to suffer himself,  
even, perhaps, in thought, to cast doubt upon the  
capacity which directed affairs at Headquarters, it  
still can be seen that, whenever he strove to look  
cheerfully upon the prospect of what might be  
achieved under Mentschikoff's personal direction, he  
was careful to base his structure of hope upon  
strictly religious grounds.

From the traces we have of this chief it can hardly  
be shown that he was gifted with original genius, still  
less with a piercing intellect; and the soundness of  
his judgment in the business of war may well be  
denied, or, at all events, brought into question; but

CHAP. <sup>X.</sup> it is not from the mere tenor of his words, nor even, indeed, altogether from his acts, -that the quality of his soul is to be gathered, but rather from the visible effect of its impact upon the souls of other men. As one man to whom many look may be passing through a distant assemblage unseen and unheard himself by those who gaze from afar, and yet his course can be tracked by the movement and the cries of devotion which his presence arouses, so, in part, our knowledge of Korniloff must rest upon the perception of what people did when they felt the impulsion he gave. At a time when there seemed to be no room but for despair and confusion, he took that ascendant which enabled him to bring the whole people in the place—inhabitants, soldiers, sailors—to his own heroic resolve. In a garrison town of the empire which had carried the mania of military organisation to the most preposterous lengths, all those straitened notions of rank and seniority, and, in short, the whole network of the formalisms which might have been expected to hinder his command, flew away like chaff at the winnowing. By the fire of his spirit there was roused so great an energy on the part of thousands of men as has hardly been known in these times; and he so put his people in heart that not only the depression created by defeat, but the sense of being abandoned and left for sacrifice by the evading army, was succeeded by a quick growth of warlike pride, by a wholesome ardour for the fight, by an orderly, joyful activity. And, even when he was dead, there continued to be still growing

proofs of the power he had had over the minds and affections of those around him ; for men whose pride it was that they had served under his immediate orders in the last—in the glorious—month of his life, were content to engage in great toil for the sake of making known to their country the worth of the chief they had lost.\*

If this were all, it might be said that Korniloff's nature was of the kind which people call 'enthusiastic,' that the effects he wrought upon other men's minds were exactly those which 'enthusiasm' is used to produce, and that, therefore, that single word would suffice to disclose what is meant. Yet this would be hardly strict truth, and at all events might mislead. The 'enthusiast,' in general, is a man very prone to hopefulness, and the flame he is able to impart to others is that which burns in his own bosom. With Korniloff it was not thus. The hope, the assurance of victory, with which he could inflame other men, he did not at all share himself ; for though he was very sure that in the ultimate designs of Providence the triumph of 'Holy Russia' must needs be secure, he believed that bloody disaster must first come ; and he seemed to have made up his mind that—for himself, at all events—there was no issue out of the trouble except an honourable death. In truth, it may be gathered that, although to others his presence brought joyful

\* This is in allusion to the great (Russian) work of Captain Gendre, one of the most attached and most valued of Korniloff's Staff. I may here express my lively sense of the service which has been rendered me by Admiral Likhatcheff, who most kindly translated for my use the portions of the work which relate to the earlier period of the siege.

**C H A P.** X promise of success—of success to be had in this world —yet in his privacy he was more the resolute martyr than the confident and half-careless seaman. But, whatever was the true source of his power over the warlike temper of other men, the power was there. He had soul.

Vice-Admiral Korniloff was an able administrator, and excellently versed in the duties pertaining to a naval commander; but the faculty of designing apt plans for the conduct of war was not in the number of those with which he was known to be gifted; and, in this respect, no guiding help was to be got from General Möller, nor yet, it would seem, from any of the officers on duty whom Prince Mentschikoff had left in the place.

Colonel  
de Todle-  
ben.

But if the army was wanting in this the time of trial, and the seamen were without the skill needed for planning defences on shore, there had come, as a guest, to Sebastopol, a man so gifted by nature as to be able to fill the void, and able, moreover, to make people bend to his judgment, confessing that his was the guidance which best would meet the emergency. The officer who planned the defence of Sebastopol has already been spoken of as one whose authority in his engineering art is of almost resistless weight; but, until some four or five weeks before the time we are dealing with, the name of Lieutenant-Colonel de Todleben had scarcely been heard of at Sebastopol.

Colonel de Todleben was born in one of the Baltic provinces lying within the dominions of Russia, and to Russia accordingly he has ever devoted himself;

but by race, and name, and feature, and warlike quality, he is the fellow-countryman of Count Bismark and of some of the most formidable of the troops which conquered at Sadowa. Whilst the empire he serves is the Empire of the Czars, the power he represents and almost seems to embody is the power of North Germany.

The honour of placing this gifted man upon the scene in which he was destined to achieve his renown must be given to Prince Michael Gortschakoff. The keen and piercing intellect of the Prince had enabled him, in his quarters with the army of the Danube, to distinguish between true and false rumours, and to read the signs which foreshadowed an approaching invasion of the Crimea. Therefore, when he came to learn that the General and High Admiral commanding in the Crimea was refusing to believe in the likelihood of a descent, Prince Gortschakoff resolved to make an effort to awaken the sleeper from his dream of security. But this was only a part of what his foresight enabled him to do; for, having discovered the capacity of Colonel de Todleben, and knowing how likely it was that the issue of the conflict which he perceived to be impending might be governed by a skilful application of the engineer's resources, Prince Gortschakoff determined that he would not only entrust to the Colonel the duty of conveying his warnings to the Headquarters in the Crimea, but would introduce him to Prince Mentschikoff, as an officer capable of being of great use to him in the business of fortification. This the Prince might well do; for Colonel de

**C H A P.** <sup>X</sup> Todleben was master of the art of military engineering. His devotion to the study of his profession had been unstinted ; and indeed there was a period when his practice of the business of mining had kept him mainly underground during a third part of each year ; but although his craft had been learnt at all this vast cost of toil, he was saved from the mistake of over-valuing it by his strong common-sense, but also, perhaps, by his wholesome experience of the trenches before Silistria, and the rough tasks of war in the Caucasus. Therefore, whenever his art was not really applicable, it did not seem so in his eyes. How and when to apply it to the business of war he exactly knew. He was about thirty-seven years old.

On the 22d of August, Colonel de Todleben reached Sebastopol, and presented to Mentschikoff the letter with which he came charged. He afterwards, it seems, said all that he appropriately could in support of the warnings contained in the letter ; but Prince Mentschikoff would not see the coming invasion. From the first, he had withheld his belief in the rumour which foreshadowed the armada, and the lateness of the season was added now to the grounds on which he rested his disbelief. It was too late, he said, for an invasion that year, and before the next summer, there would be peace. Prince Mentschikoff, it is true, gave heed to that part of the letter which spoke of De Todleben's merits ; and the Lieutenant-Colonel was not only received with all courtesy and kindness at Headquarters, but was armed, it appears, with full power to examine the defensive

resources of Sebastopol. Prince Mentschikoff, however, had been habitually a rigid economist of the public treasure, and he was still unwilling to incur expense in providing against a danger which he believed to be chimerical. Colonel de Todleben's inquiries elicited the want that there was of engineering tools ; but although there were Government factories from which it would have been easy to get the required supply, the Prince did not yet see the need of obtaining them in the ample quantity which prudence seemed to demand.

Nor was this all. As though to protect his repose from farther assaults, Prince Mentschikoff took a step which, if he had had his way, would have produced consequences beyond the reach of his imagination. He recommended Colonel de Todleben to quit the Crimea. Coming from the Commander-in-Chief, this recommendation was almost a mandate ; but, for a time at least, compliance might be evaded. Todleben contrived to avoid or defer the necessity of departing for some days, and then, the armada appearing, he remained and defended Sebastopol.

It is certain, however, that even during the three weeks which elapsed between the arrival of Prince Mentschikoff's visitor, and the appearance of the armada on the coast, Colonel de Todleben was not only making himself minutely acquainted with the field of the approaching conflict, but also beginning to earn that rare confidence which afterwards enabled him to guide into a right direction the valour and strength of the garrison. The momentous charge entrusted



CHAP. X. to him on the evening which followed the battle of the Alma shows that even at that early time his genius had obtained great ascendant.\*

Towards the creation of all this confidence, both his manner and his expression of feature were conducting. For although, as might be expected from his race and his Courland birthplace, he had that Northern, that North German conformation of head and countenance which denote a man fitted for violent bodily conflict lasting out to the death, and although he even seemed to be one to whom the very labours of fighting, and of exterminating the weaker breeds of men, must be an easy and delightful exertion of natural strength, he had joyous, kind-looking eyes, almost ready to melt with good-humour, and a bearing and speech so frank and genial, that people were instantly inclined to like, and, very soon after, to trust in him. From his looks and demeanour it could not at all be inferred that he was a man who had devoted his mind to a science; and, for this very reason perhaps, he had the less difficulty in making people yield to his judgment. No one who had so much as seen him could imagine that his power of doing the right thing at the right time had been at all warped by long study of the engineering art. No one who had once conversed with him could doubt that, body and soul, he was a man of action; nothing more, nothing less. A race, corrupted by luxury and the arts of peace, knows instinctively that it must succumb to a nature of this kind. I imagine that few men of great intellect have

\* The task so entrusted to him is stated *ante*, chap. viii.

ever attained so closely as he did to that which the English describe when they speak of a man as being ‘practical.’

CHAP.  
X.

It was supposed at one time in Europe that Todleben had made discoveries which altered and expanded the old science of fortification. This is hardly true. It was in applying his science—in applying it to novel and changeful circumstances—that his excellence lay. He had the power of instantly recognising, and at once understanding, all the material conditions upon which from time to time he had to found his resolves. If these conditions were new and startling, he did not the less hasten to accept them. If they were of such a kind that they threatened to dislocate his plans, and turn to naught his past labours, he did not for that reason fail to give them, and give them at once, their just place in his reckonings. That which most tries the powers of a commander is not the mere solution of any problem laid clearly before him. His harder task is to learn in good time that he has a problem to solve, and then to see what it is. For the questions which he ought to be deciding are very many; they are, some of them, strange and startling, and they spring up—often suddenly—from day to day, from hour to hour—nay, in battle, from minute to minute. It avails him but little to be able to see any truth unless he can marshal and place it in due relation with the existing conjuncture. He needs the swift judgment, and the firm, encompassing grasp which enable a man to lay out of his sight the conditions no longer material, and to gather clean into one

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**X.**  
 problem the terms which really belong to it. There are few who, in war, can thus steadfastly look upon the present, discarding those things in the past which have only just lost their import. And often the most industrious man is the one least able to exert this power; for when change of circumstance comes, it finds him carrying on with a great momentum in a direction which has ceased to be the right one, and he can hardly at once change his course. It was not so with Colonel de Todleben; for although he had been gifted, as we shall see, with rare energy, his mind was at the same time so nimble that the force with which he had been acting in one direction did not hinder him from acting in another, the moment a change of action was called for by a change of conditions.

The way in which Colonel de Todleben applied himself to his very first undertaking, is perhaps a too simple illustration of the accuracy and completeness with which he read problems in war; but although, for that reason, it will necessarily fail to indicate the scope of his power, it may still convey some idea of the nature of the quality in which he excelled. Before the time of Todleben's arrival, the Star Fort had been examined by engineers, and it was soon ascertained to be so faulty in construction as to be likely to be of comparatively little use. Seeing what the faults of the work were, and seeing what ought to be done in order to make it a good fort, the engineers at once went on to commence the works which were needed for the purpose. But one of the conditions in which th

were called upon to act, they failed to bring into their reckoning. They left out the condition of time. To bring to an effective state the works which they thus undertook, would necessarily cost a labour of several months ; but on the other hand, the attack of this Star Fort, if it should take place at all, might be expected in a few days. Therefore the labour going on was labour in vain. When Colonel de Todleben attained to his sway, he at once stopped the works in hand, and brought the energies of the defenders to bear upon the construction of other works of easier construction, which, however imperfect they might be, should at all events have the merit of being in time. If it be said that the necessity for taking time into account must have been obvious to all, the answer is, that, for days and days together, that necessity remained unperceived by the military authorities who had the ordering of the works. A simple truth of this kind lies often unseen or scarce heeded until it comes under the light which genius is able to shed ; and thenceforth the wonder is that any one ever was blind to it.

What was said of a lusty English statesman, may be said once more in the same words, and applied to this Colonel of Sappers : All that was fanciful, or for any reason unpractical—all that was the least bit too high for him, or the least bit too deep for him—all that lay, though only by a little, beyond the immediate future with which he was dealing—he utterly drove from out of his mind, and his energies, condensed for the time upon some object to which they could be applied with effect, were brought to bear upon it with all their

**C H A P.** full volume and power.\* It was certain that he would  
X. strive to do the very utmost of what could be compassed by mortals ; and nothing more. Under guidance so firm and sure there could be no waste of energy, no waste of bodily labour.

But besides that he was able to withhold his own mind from the pursuit of things not to the purpose, Colonel de Todleben, after a time, grew strong enough to be able to repress in others any inclination to wander from the true path. It was at Korniloff's table that he achieved this. There was mention there, one day, of a fanciful method which some projector had imagined for the defence of the place ; and Korniloff seemed to be interested by the suggestion. Colonel de Todleben interposed. ' There ought,' he spoke to this purport—' there ought to be no listening to suggestions ' of this kind. The way of doing what is possible towards defending the place lies clear before us. We ' must not make waste of our time, and disperse our ' energies by thinking of other plans. All the minutes ' we have we want.' And all the commanders and officers on duty had been made so wise by the discipline of imminent peril, that they bowed to the words of the great volunteer thus laying his weight on their counsels. Thenceforth his strong sense did more than prevail. It prevailed without question. He had made it supreme.

When the Russian field army undertook its flank march, Colonel de Todleben remained at Sebastopol. Admiral Korniloff and he had come to be as one man.

\* *Ante*, vol. i. p. (in 4th edition) 455.

They lived in the same room. What Todleben judged to be right, the Admiral impelled men to do. If Korniloff was the soul of the cause, the great Engineer was its mind. Whilst the sentiment which Korniloff inspired was one so exalted that men might call it holy, the robust sanguine nature of Todleben, and the immense vital forces he had at command, brought joyousness, nay, even brought mirth, to help the toil of the defenders. The enthusiasm kindled by the Admiral might more or less cause men to look for heavenly aid; but the very presence of Todleben was enough to assure them that even in this world there was something at least to hope for, and plainly a great deal to do.

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X.

The perfect accord between Korniloff and Todleben.

The force exerted by their conjoint powers.

The character in which Colonel de Todleben acted, and (till long afterwards) continued to act was that of a volunteer.\*

## II.

On the 24th of September—the day the Allies were marching on the Belbec with the then apparent intention of attacking the Star Fort—Korniloff assumed the command of the North Side, and Colonel de Todleben, whilst still continuing to direct the works there going on, was now also charged to post the troops in the way he deemed to be the best for resisting the expected assault. In the course of the day some additional battalions of sailors were moved from the South to the North Side; and we have already seen that, on the morning of the 25th, the time when

Korniloff assumes the command of the North Side.

Duties undertaken by Todleben.

Additional forces moved to the North Side.

\* This General de Todleben himself told me.

## CHAP.

## X.

The strength there on the morning of the 25th Sept.

Korniloff's despair of being able to defend the North Side.

The spirit in which he prepared for the expected conflict.

the Allies might be expected to begin their attack, Korniloff had on the North Side two militia battalions, and so great a number of seamen as to bring up his whole force to eleven thousand.\*

Korniloff did not seriously imagine that, with this force, or with any fresh numbers of seamen which he might draw from the ships, he could offer a successful resistance to a resolute attack directed against the Star Fort by a victorious army with a strength of between fifty and sixty thousand. Colonel de Todleben did not deceive him, and he did not deceive himself. It is true he had accepted the command with eagerness, and even with a kind of joy. But his joy was the joy of one who looks beyond the grave. He apparently put but a measured trust in Prince Mentschikoff's promises of help from without; and it did not occur to him to look to the enemy—to look to the probable effects of a divided command—for the means of encouragement which his own camp failed to supply. 'From the North Side,' Korniloff said to Captain Gendre—'from the North Side there is no retreat. All of us who are there will also find our graves. Death does not terrify me. Only one thing makes me uneasy. If wounded, one cannot defend one's self, and to be taken prisoner!' He was anxious that his flag-officers should be spared the fate of perishing with him in what he regarded as a hopeless undertaking; and although Captain Gendre (who was

\* See *ante*, chap. iv.; where will be found an account of the state of the defences at this time on the North Side, and references to General de Todleben's views as to the possibility of defending the North Side against a resolute attack.

one of them) represented that they would all be bitterly mortified at the notion of being parted from their chief in the hour of danger, the Admiral clung to his desire. 'I should not like,' he said, 'to see all fall 'with me;' and he then proceeded to assign to his Staff some duties which would detain them, all except one, on the South Side.

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X.

The morning of the 25th brought with it no signs of the expected advance of the Allies against the Star Fort; but, as though to add to the helplessness of the people abandoned in Sebastopol, Prince Mentschikoff had left them without the cavalry required for reconnoitring the enemy: and it seems that the garrison remained unacquainted with the momentous operation in which the Allies were, that day, engaging, until it was almost noon. And then, strange to say, they learnt the truth without seeking it. They learnt it as a man learns some incident with which he has no concern, by chancing to look out of window.

The morning of the 25th. The garrison had been left without a cavalry force with which to reconnoitre.

From that Naval Library of which we have heard as standing upon a high knoll in the town of Sebastopol and commanding a far-reaching view, some officers extended their gaze towards a quarter not hitherto thought of as the probable scene of any English or French operations. They looked towards the heights overhanging the head of the roadstead. There, scarlet and glittering under a bright noontide sun, they saw regiments and regiments of the English soldiery moving up along the skirts of the forest to the Mackenzie Heights, and afterwards descending southward into

The sight accidentally observed from the Naval Library.



**C H A P.** the valley of the Tchernaya. All day, the march was  
X.  
 seen going on ; and before evening, the heights where the English had first been descried were observed to be alive with dark-coated troops moving on in the same line of march which the scarlet battalions had taken.

Evident import of the operation undertaken by the Allies.  
 The shifting of the danger from the North Side to the South.

The import of this movement could hardly be doubtful. It must mean that the Allies were abandoning the valley of the Belbec with design to attack Sebastopol on its south side. It followed that the Severnaya, which before had been regarded as doomed, was now safe, and that the danger had, all at once, shifted from the north to the south of the place.

### III.

Scantiness of the forces which Nachimoff had at his command for the defence of the South Side.

His anxiety to make sure of being able to destroy all his ships in time to prevent the enemy from taking them.

We saw that on the south, the now threatened side, the seamen were commanded by Admiral Nachimoff. Of these, for the moment, there were but few ; for out of the battalions already withdrawn from the ships no less than eleven were on the North Side, and of land forces there were none except the militia battalions. Nachimoff was a brave, devoted man ; but the courage he now evinced was of that forlorn sort which consists with blank despair. By cutting apertures in the ships' sides—to be filled up until the last moment by stoppers—he strove to insure to himself the power of sending his whole squadron to the bottom with little delay ; but he had become so passionately intent upon this idea of destroying his ships, that after making ready to scuttle them, he could not think he had done enough. He therefore placed about

them tarred hoops and such like combustible materials, in order to be able to fire them at the chosen moment; and he arranged a dismal code of signals for insuring despatch in the transmission of his dooming orders. One signal was to mean 'Sink your ship,' another was to mean 'Fire your ship.' For himself and his seamen he hardly seemed to wish more than that he and they might die fighting. It was in this spirit that he issued his address to the seamen: 'The enemy is approaching the town, in which there is but a very small garrison. I therefore find myself under the necessity of sinking the vessels of the squadron entrusted to me, and of reinforcing the garrison with men armed with boarding-pikes and cutlasses. I have the fullest confidence in the captains, officers, and crews, and am certain that every one of them will fight like a hero. In all we are about three thousand.\* The rallying-point will be the Theatre Square. I herewith make it known to the squadron.'

CHAP.  
X.

His hopelessness.

His address to the seamen.

#### IV.

The despair of Nachimoff was founded in part upon the assumption that Korniloff, being entrusted with the charge of the North Side, would not only there remain, but would continue to keep gathered around him the whole or great part of the force which

Nachimoff's despair was founded in part upon the assumption that Korniloff,

\* In giving so low a number as this, Nachimoff must be understood to refer only to the seamen who had been withdrawn from the ships for the defence of the South Side, and not to include either the 'militia' battalions, as I call them, or the 'stationed marines.'

C H A P.

X.

obeying  
his orders,  
would  
concern  
himself  
only with  
the North  
Side.

This a re-  
sult which  
Prince  
Mentschi-  
koff's way  
of split-  
ting the  
command  
was calcu-  
lated to  
produce.

he had assembled for the defence of the Star Fort. And such, indeed, was the course of action which might have been expected to follow from Prince Mentschikoff's determination to go away from the Sebastopol region himself, and leave the command of things there perversely split into two.\* The measure was fitted to neutralise one of the greatest of all the advantages which Nature had given to the defenders of Sebastopol. Russian troops could be ferried across from the North Side to the South, or from the South to the North, in half an hour; whilst the assailants, if they should be minded to change the place of attack from the North to the South, or from the South to the North, could only do this at the cost and peril of a difficult two days' march round the head of the roadstead. But by appointing one man to command the North Side and two others the South, with no one in authority over them, and retreating himself to so great a distance from Sebastopol as to be without the means of exchanging quick communications with the garrison, Prince Mentschikoff did what man could to counterwork the advantage which Nature had offered to the defenders, and prevent them from bringing the united resources of the North Side and the South to the seat of danger.

\* Viz., Korniloff on the North, and on the South, Nachimoff and Möller. The command was really split into *three*, because Möller had an independent command of the land forces on the South Side; and if the text speaks of the command as being split into only *two*, it is because the South Side is there treated as a unit. In that aspect, the separate commands of Nachimoff and Möller resulted from a *sub*-division of authority.

In a country where men's minds had been weakened by habits of overweening respect for official superiors, and where, also, the bondage of a vast, yet straitened military system perversely kept up in peace-time had done much to benumb the warlike prowess of the nation, it was hardly to be imagined beforehand that the error of the chief would be neutralised by the devotion, the patriotism, and the wise disobedience of a subordinate. Entrusted with the command of the North Side at a moment when that was the ground believed to be in peril, Korniloff now saw the Allies so plainly committing themselves to the enterprise of attacking the South Side, that the North, for the time, was clearly safe. So far as concerned the charge committed to him, he could breathe freely; and if he thought only of obedience to orders, he might henceforth stand at his ease until such time as his absent chief might cast upon him some new duty. That, as matter of course the commander of the North Side would so act, Nachimoff did not doubt.

But Korniloff was of that noble calling which seems to defend those who follow it from the stunting power of a military despotism continuing through long years of peace; and, moreover, he had so much greatness of mind, and was of so generous a nature, that despite the straitening effect of the formalism then predominant in Russia, he was able to understand the occasion. The army, and the commander of all the forces both military and naval, had abandoned the place to its fate. The navy was prisoned. The peril which beset Sebastopol was great, was im-

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X.

But Korniloff was great enough to be able to understand the occasion.

CHAP. <sup>X.</sup> minent. On the other hand, Korniloff's orders, if only they were to be obeyed, would prevent him from acting upon the scene of the approaching conflict, and rivet him fast to that North Side which was no longer threatened. Far from accepting the repose thus enjoined by his instructions, Korniloff at once turned away from the quarter whence the danger had passed, and went straight to where the danger was coming. Giving up the command of the North Side to Captain Bartenoff, and leaving orders for the transport of his eleven sailor battalions from the North to the South, he went on board the Twelve Apostles, in order to consult with Admiral Nachimoff for the defence of the main town and arsenal, now all at once threatened; and for the same purpose Korniloff afterwards assembled at his lodgings Admiral Nachimoff, General Möller, and Colonel de Todleben.

He at once gives up the command of the North Side to a subordinate, and withdraws 11 battalions of seamen to the South Side; and goes to consult with Nachimoff for the defence of the South Side.

Meeting of four officers at Korniloff's lodgings. Arrangements then made for disposition of the forces.

Korniloff requested to take charge of the arrangements for the defence of the place.

He accepts the command thus offered to him.

There, arrangements were made for distributing what forces they had along the lines of defence on the South Side. But this was not all that the assembled chiefs did. They came to a great resolve.

Forgetting their mere rank in the army and the navy, and remembering only the welfare of their common country, General Möller and Admiral Nachimoff requested Admiral Korniloff 'to undertake the general arrangements for the defence of the town.' And Korniloff did not shrink from accepting the command thus proffered him by the judgment of his comrades. He observed, it is true, that the land forces would not be under an obligation to obey his orders; but General Möller met this objection by appointing Korniloff

the Chief of the Staff of the Sebastopol garrison, and by publishing an instruction which enjoined obedience to all the orders which Korniloff might give the land forces.

C H A P.  
X.  
Arrangement for insuring the obedience of the land forces to Korniloff's orders.

The Russians take a just pride in tracing the glory of their defence of Sebastopol to the political courage and the generous self-denial which thus secured unity of command in the gravest hour of danger.

## V.

No sooner was Korniloff thus invested with command than he proceeded to exert, and even to stretch, his power, without at all shrinking from the duty of having to overrule one of those very chiefs who had just placed him over their heads. When Nachimoff joined in ceding to Korniloff the whole charge of defending the town, he did not intend to abdicate his authority as an admiral commanding one of the two squadrons into which the fleet was divided; so, having already taken the measures we spoke of for the eventual destruction of his squadron, and being still in the despairing mood, he now issued the final orders for sinking his ships.

Korniloff proceeds to use, and even extend, his power.

Korniloff was suddenly informed, not only that the final order had been issued by Nachimoff, but that, in obedience to it (this was not yet true) one of the ships had been actually sunk, or was sinking. Korniloff instantly called Captain Gendre, one of his flag-officers, and said to him, 'Go to all the ships' captains, and tell them that if one single under-mark stopper

Nachimoff, still despairing, issues the final orders for the destruction of his ships.

Korniloff, informed of this, interposes, and peremptorily forbids the destruction of the ships.

CHAP. ' be opened without my orders, I will declare the cap-  
X ' tain of that ship a traitor to the country, and send  
 ' him in chains to the Emperor.' Gendre went on  
 board all the ships except the Twelve Apostles (where  
 Nachimoff's flag was flying), and delivered Korniloff's  
 message. He added that no signal for the sinking or  
 burning of the ships was to be attended to unless it  
 came from Korniloff's flag-ship. No vessel was sunk.

## VI.

Korniloff  
 and Todle-  
 ben de-  
 vote them-  
 selves to  
 the busi-  
 ness of at-  
 tempting to  
 defend  
 the South  
 Side.

The move-  
 ment of  
 the Allies  
 to the  
 south coast  
 had been a  
 surprise  
 upon the  
 garrison.

The slight  
 changes  
 in the  
 works on  
 the South  
 Side which  
 had been  
 effected  
 since the  
 landing.

The destruction of the ships having thus been averted, Korniloff, with Todleben at his side, devoted his whole energy to the all but desperate purpose of attempting to defend the South Side. The march of the Allies to the south coast was a surprise upon a garrison which had assumed, since the day of the Alma, that the attack would be delivered against the Severnaya, and their energies having been directed in the main to that quarter, they had not found time to do much on the South Side. There, the principal change which had been effected since the landing was the completion of the Central Bastion; and although the lines along the Karabel suburb were fully equal in their military value to those which took in the main town, they had received but little accession of strength since the day of the landing. The Battery of the Point had indeed been begun, and preparations had been made for strengthening the position of the Malakoff Tower; but little had been hitherto done in this quarter, and the Malakoff, on the 25th of Septem-

ber, was a mere naked tower, without a glacis, exposed from head to foot, unsupported by the powerful batteries which were destined to flank it, and uncovered as yet by the works which afterwards closed up round its base. There were no intermediate entrenchments along the lines of the Karabel suburb which connected with one another the four works there begun or established. Those four works afforded but a weak defence to the great intervals of ground by which they were divided. Upon the whole, it may be said that along all the arc of four miles which encompassed the place on the land side, the part which reached from the Artillery Bay to the Central Bastion was the only one which could be regarded as tolerably secure. All the rest of the line of defence, including that occupied by the Flagstaff Bastion, and all the works of the Karabel faubourg, were weak, and could be easily forced. They afforded hardly any cover for infantry, not even for the reserves; and the gunners at the batteries, having for the most part mere barricades to shelter them, or having to serve guns which fired over the parapets, would have been ruinously exposed, at that time, to the eye and the ball of the rifleman.\*

C H A P.

X.

Weak  
state of  
the de-  
fences.

To defend this weak line Korniloff had indeed as many artillerymen as he needed; but it seems that the whole number of other combatants which he could employ in the defence of Sebastopol was only 16,000.†

Numbers  
of foot  
available  
for the de-  
fence of  
the lines.

\* Todleben, vol. i. p. 256, 257.

† Including the Taroutine battalion mentioned in the next note. Todleben speaks of this body of 16,000 as representing the whole force



CHAP. In this force there was an imperfect battalion of sappers, and a body of 5000 militiamen.\* The rest consisted of seamen withdrawn from the ships, and had been formed into sixteen battalions, of which four, and four only, were well trained and well armed. The remaining battalions, it seems, were but slightly instructed in the duties of the land service, and portions of the force were ill armed, some carrying old flint muskets, and some having no better weapons than pikes or cutlasses.

X.  
Composition of the force.

Hopelessness of the endeavour to defend the lines with this force against a determined attack.

With sixteen thousand combatants of this description, it was hopeless to try to defend a line of four miles against such an attack as might be made by the victorious army of the Allies ; and this the more, since the garrison, split into two by the Man-of-war Harbour, and the deep ravine at its head, would be unable to concentrate upon any one endangered quarter the little strength that it had. In the opinion of Todleben, it was impossible that the attack of the Allies could be repelled by even the most valiant

of 'combatants' available for the South Side ; but an examination of his details, and a comparison of them with a former chapter, will show that he must mean to include in the 16,000 those only who were serving as infantry, and not the gunners. Korniloff (forgetting to reckon the Taroutine battalion) calls the force only 15,000. It must not be supposed that the small body of 16,000 soldiers and sailors represented the whole military and naval strength of the place. The strength was about the same as it was on the 20th of September (see *ante*, chap. vii.), except that there were now about 2000 more militiamen, and also some companies of sappers, which were not in the place on the 20th.

\* In the night the third Taroutine battalion, which had lost its way, and was supposed to be cut off, came back into Sebastopol, and there remained. It was only as the consequence of a misadventure that this solitary battalion of regular infantry came to be in Sebastopol during the last days of September.

defence. The 26th, it is true, passed away without showing that the Allies (who had this day seized Balaclava) were preparing an attack for the morrow ; but, on the other hand, it brought no tidings of the evading army. ‘Of the Prince,’ writes Korniloff on this day, ‘nothing is to be heard.’

CHAP.

X.

No signs on the 26th that the Allies would attack the next day.

On the other hand, no tidings of Prince Mentschikoff and the army.

Morning of the 27th, the garrison still without tidings of the army.

Totleben's view of the desperate position in which the garrison were placed.

Solemnity enacted on the morning of the 27th Sept. at the lines of defence.

## VII.

On the morning of the 27th, the garrison was still without tidings of Prince Mentschikoff and his army. ‘Thus,’ so Todleben writes, ‘the defenders of Sebastopol had no help that they could reckon on. It has been seen that it was absolutely impossible for them to repel the enemy with only the force the garrison consisted of. So there remained to them no alternative but that of seeking to die gloriously at the post committed to their bravery.’

Supposing it useful and fitting for a people, in the time of their peril, to strive to approach the Almighty by help of bishops and priests, the solemnity enacted by the Church on the 27th of September was indeed opportune. It was not upon the issue of a battle, nor indeed upon things material, that the fate of Sebastopol was hanging that day. It was hanging upon the resolve of three or four men in the enemy's camp, who would be trying to govern events by dint of thought and hard reason. Therefore, even amongst those Russians who could hardly make bold to expect the corporeal intervention of Heaven in the conflicts of mortals, there well might be some who trusted that

**C H A P.** at the prayer of the Orthodox Church, the Lord would  
X.  
 so far vouchsafe to chastise a schismatic, an impious enemy, as to cloud his mind with surmises and reasonings, give him cleverness instead of wisdom, incline his heart to delay, and in short make him weak of counsel. It was along the lines of defence that the ceremony had been ordained to take place.

27th Sept. At an early hour, the troops stood ranged in order of battle, some battalions being in extended order, and forming a chain along the line of the ramparts, whilst other battalions were drawn up in columns of companies, and others again in columns of attack. Then the priests, with images,\* gonfalons, and crosses, walked in procession along the lines, and performed divine service at each of the bastions, and the troops were sprinkled with holy water. 'Let the troops first 'be reminded of the Word of God,' said Korniloff, 'and 'then I will impart to them the word of the Czar.'

Impres-  
sion pro-  
duced,  
especially  
upon pious  
minds, by  
the way in  
which  
Korniloff  
had been  
raised up  
to meet  
the occa-  
sion.

Enthusias-  
tic devo-  
tion to  
him.

To pious, obedient Muscovites, the way in which Heaven had raised up a man to meet the occasion was of the nature of miracle. Without having lawful authority, Korniloff had suddenly come to be the unquestioned ruler whom all rejoiced to obey—whom all, wherever he rode, were pursuing with blessings and cheers. By the seamen of the fleet, as we saw, Korniloff had long been known, had long been beloved and trusted; but at this time there was glowing, in the hearts of the whole people, a sentiment of enthusiastic

\* It is a Russian writer and a Russian translator who gives me the word 'images;' but he must refer only to the flat, or basso-relievo, representations of sacred beings which are used by the Greek Church.

devotion to the elected chief. None caught this feeling more warmly than that small body of land-service men which Prince Mentschikoff had left in the place. Abandoned by the Prince and his evading army, these men, it would seem, had come to be proud of the fate which left them to fight under an admiral, and alongside of mariners, in a cause thought too desperate to allow of its being upheld by the strength of Prince Mentschikoff's army.

C H A P.  
X.

Devotion  
to him on  
the part of  
the men of  
the land  
service.

Of a certainty, the fire and the thorough devotedness of Korniloff's nature were the main sources of the power which he was thus exerting over the minds of men never bred to the sea. But, also, it was given him to seem what he was. Unless the portraits deceive, his face was of classic mould ; for although, near the eyes, there were signs of a blood deriving from the North, the rest of his features had that kind of beauty which belonged to the great Bonaparte in the time of his first Italian campaign, whilst yet his face remained lean. According to those who knew Korniloff, it was not only in his features that the wearing, consuming energy of the man was expressed, but also in an eager bend forward, which his ardour had rendered habitual. It chanced that he had an accomplishment which delighted the soldiery. Like the Bedouins seen in the ranges of the Atlas, he was accustomed to gallop at speed either up or down heights so steep, and over ground so rugged, as to make the feat seem a wonder ; and it charmed the people and the garrison, but, most, the men of the land service, to see the chief flitting thus from one post of

Causes of  
the enthusiasm  
which his  
presence  
created.

CHAP. defence to another.\* But, above all, he had elo-  
 X. quence of that peculiar kind which touches the heart  
 of the soldier.

At the  
 close of  
 the religi-  
 ous cere-  
 mony,  
 Korniloff  
 rode along  
 the lines,  
 and har-  
 angued  
 the troops.

When the religious ceremony had ended, Korniloff, arrayed in the brilliant uniform of an Adjutant-General,† and followed by a numerous Staff, rode along the lines ; and to every separate body of men he addressed some words of harangue. As might be expected, the words of these brief speeches were from time to time varied, but each of them, it is said, had words to this effect : ‘ The Czar hopes that we shall not give up ‘ Sebastopol. Besides, we have nowhere to retreat to. ‘ We have the sea behind, the enemy in front. Prince ‘ Mentschikoff has deceived our enemies, and got ‘ round them ; and when they attack us, our army ‘ will fall upon their rear. Remember then—believe ‘ in no retreat. Let the bands forget to play the ‘ retreat ! Let him be a traitor who sounds the re- ‘ treat ! And if I myself give the order for retreating, ‘ kill me with the bayonet !’ In his addresses to the men of the land service, he added words to this effect : ‘ Your business will be at first to receive the enemy ‘ with a well-directed fire of musketry ; and if they ‘ should try to mount the batteries, receive them in ‘ the Russian style. You well know the work—at ‘ the point of the bayonet !’

\* To one who has never seen such feats before, it is extremely interesting and surprising to see what a horseman can do in a rugged, mountainous country. Certainly I had not the least conception of what was possible in that way until I saw what the Bedouins could do in the ranges of the Atlas.

† As is well known, it is customary in Russia to give army rank to men of distinction who are not by profession soldiers.

To the battalion of Captain Vinck, which contained many sailors who had served under him when he was Captain of the Twelve Apostles, Korniloff said that he had long known them as gallant fellows, and that to such there was no need of much talk. Indeed, he in general spoke less to the sailors than to the men of the land service. He was more sure, it seems, of the steadiness of the sailors.

C H A P.  
X.

The harangues which seem to touch soldiers do not often embody a new and lofty conception ; \* but they utter some thought which all can partake ; and by merging each man's love of self in the aggregate feeling of the regiment, the brigade, or the army, they make opinion set in with all the volume and weight which can be given to it by a multitude of human souls when they bend their whole forces one way. Therefore, speeches to soldiers are not to be wholly judged of by weighing the thoughts they contain, but rather by watching to see how they work on the hearts of the men.

Tried simply by this latter test, the harangues of Korniloff must be held to have had a great worth ; for witnesses of different callings, and observing what passed from different points of view, are not only agreed in speaking of the enthusiasm which flew from battalion to battalion along the whole line of the works, but also in connecting this outburst of

Effect produced by Korniloff's harangues.

\* The grand apostrophe of Bonaparte at the foot of the Pyramids, when he said to his soldiery, ' Forty centuries look down upon you ! ' was addressed to a body of troops—all children as it were of the great Revolution—who, in point of intellectual and imaginative power, were not at all of the same quality as the ordinary armies of Europe.

**C H A P.** national sentiment with the eloquence they ascribe to  
X  
 the chief. His zeal spread like flame. The minds of men were exalted ; and although it is certain enough that the garrison had been grieved, if not angered, by the untimely evasion of the army,\* the sense of abandonment, the sense of being men offered up, and left, as it were, for a sacrifice, was so far from making them sullen with their cause, that rather it gave them just pride—not unlike the pride of the martyr—and filled them with admiring love of the chief whom Providence, as it seemed, had given them for their ruler. There was rapture, the hearers declare, in the sound of the bursting ‘Hurrahs!’ which tracked his career through the lines. And this rapture, it seems, was scarce short of worship. In the minds of a religious and unlettered people, the ascendant of a mortal exerting his power for purposes judged to be good is more commonly traced to the special interference of Deity than to the original of the Divine scheme ; and it would seem that the emotion with which the garrison looked up to their chief was much of the kind which first led people to say that the king set up to rule over them was king ‘by the grace ‘of God.’ Amongst those entitled to boast that they were with Korniloff at this time there are able and gifted men who know and respect the true import of words : yet, speaking and writing now in cold blood, these witnesses say that every one at the time

The emotion with which Korniloff was regarded.

\* My Russian accounts do not tell me, in terms, of any such grief ; but they enable me to infer it by recording the joy with which, at a later time, the reappearance of the army was hailed.

looked up to the chief as to a man 'inspired.' Nay, they still hand it down, and declare that in those last days of September—the glorious days of his life—he was not as other men.

CHAP.  
X.

## VIII.

Colonel de Todleben was too deeply versed in things material, too familiar with the rigid calculations of his engineering science, to be liable to the error of ascribing undue force to all this exaltation of spirit. He did not believe that any efforts of the garrison, however heroic, could, at this time, make good the defence against a determined attack.\* Nor, again, was he caught by the hope that anything he could do within a brief compass of time would enable the sailors and landsmen then left in the place to resist a determined attack without the aid of the army; but, on the other hand, he was of a strong sanguine nature; and there was room for the hope that those same works which were needed for the merely desperate purpose of enabling the garrison to sell their lives dear, might also do a more wholesome service, by shaking the enemy's counsels. In either aspect, the course to be taken was the same; and Todleben saw plain as day what had to be done.

Todleben did not believe that any efforts of the garrison could defend the place against a determined attack.

But there was room for the hope that the sight of preparations for a desperate defence might shake the enemy's counsels.

Todleben saw plain what had to be done. He kept steadfastly before

As before in providing for the defence of the Star Fort, so also in this emergency, he looked steadfastly

\* 'Yet neither the exaltation of the troops, nor their resolve to fight to the last extremity, could have saved Sebastopol, if the enemy had attacked it immediately after his passage of the Tchernaya.'—Todleben, vol. i. p. 257.



CHAP. to the condition of time; and, conceiving that the  
 X. Allies might make their attack at once, he took care  
 him the condition of time. that his endeavours to push forward the works towards that ulterior degree of perfection at which he was aiming should be always subordinated to the object of preparing them for the event of an assault taking place on the very morrow. Thus, for instance, he said it was better to be ready in time with the guns of a battery ill covered, or even not covered at all, than to have, at the moment of the assault, a work designed for great things, but marked by the fatal defect of not as yet being armed.

The other condition with which he had to deal.

The emergency had placed at his and Korniloff's command all the resources of the fleet.

In this necessity of looking to the question of time there was nothing novel; but another of the conditions with which the garrison had to deal, was one which may be called unexampled, and of so startling a kind that no common man would have been likely even to perceive it, still less to found upon it a course of action. Korniloff and Todleben were not only able to see and understand this condition, but to accept it with all its consequences. They comprehended that, the fleet being prisoned in the roadstead, and Sebastopol—the sole hope and shelter of that same fleet—being in the extreme of danger on the land side, there had come an emergency in which, without lawful authority, but for the good of their country, and even for the good of the fleet itself, they—an Admiral absent from his assigned station without leave, and a volunteer Colonel of Sappers—could take upon themselves to break up and dismantle the whole Black Sea fleet, and apply

its vast warlike treasures to the purpose of the land defences. As soon as they came to see this—they did not take in the whole truth quite at once, but they did by rapid degrees—they had upon them the full burthen of men to whom much is given. They had grace to see that because they could, therefore they must. Todleben judged that especially he ought to labour towards making the greatest and most rapid use of this mighty resource; that he ought not to suffer the land defences to want for any one thing which could be supplied by stripping the fleet; and that, in particular, he must be sure to use to the utmost the great guns of the ships. Governed, as he says, by his perception of these two conditions—stress of time on the one hand, and, on the other, the command that he had of all the ship's guns and munitions—he went on to frame his plan for strengthening the lines of defence, and, with that view, resolved 'to choose a position as little extended and 'as near to the town as the nature of the ground 'would allow, and to arm its principal points with a 'formidable artillery; to connect these points one with 'the other by trenches to be defended by musketry; 'to establish there separate batteries, each armed with 'some pieces of cannon, and in this way to concentrate upon all the approaches of the town a powerful front and flank fire of artillery and musketry, 'endeavouring to sweep with as much fire as possible 'all the bendings of the broken ground by which the 'enemy might approach.'\*

C H A P.  
X.

Todleben's  
plan for  
strengthening  
the defences.

\*eben, vol. i. p. 259.

## CHAP.

## X.

The object  
which  
Totleben  
kept in  
view.

The way  
in which  
his works  
were  
meant to  
produce  
their  
result.

The one  
word  
which,  
Totleben  
used to  
say, ex-  
pressed  
his whole  
purpose.

The object of the works to be undertaken on this general plan was to provide against the event of an assault at whatever part of the line it might be attempted;\* but the way in which they were to produce their result was to be by enabling the garrison to meet every column of assault with a slaughtering fire. Whilst some thought much of the obstacles to assailants which the engineers' art can contrive, and others, remembering Suwarroff, spoke rather in praise of the bayonet, Todleben was always steadfast in declaring that against an assault of the Allies the garrison had but one defence. According to him, that one defence lay in the volume of shot which the garrison might be able to pour into bodies of troops coming on within grape-shot range; and one single word, he used to say, at the time, was enough to describe his main purpose—'Mitrail!'+ The round-shot, the shell, the bayonet, and the rifleman's far-ranging bullet had each, he acknowledged, its use; and now too, if ever in war, the spade and the pick-axe were needed; but still, in his mind, these things were chiefly of worth, because they either tended

\* Todleben, vol. i. p. 264.

† Originally, it seems, 'mitrail,' or, as the French spell it, 'mitraille,' meant 'canister' shot specially; and even now, perhaps, in strictness, it describes only grape and canister; but in common parlance—and it was so that Todleben used it—the expression includes all the components of that hail which drives through the air when rifle or musket balls are flying along with grape and canister. It must be acknowledged that the word thus chosen by Todleben, as sufficing to denote his main purpose, is one which (in French) has great power; for, besides that its mere sound helps somewhat to make it expressive of destructiveness, this word has the quality of indicating that the shot of which it speaks is in considerable volume, and is—not in the mere inert state of ammunition, but—cutting through the air, or actually striking.

to avert the assault, or else, more or less, were auxiliary and conducing to his one cherished purpose —to his one cherished purpose of meeting the assaulting column, whatever the time, whatever the point of attack, with a pelting blast of mitrail.

C H A P.  
X.

This was one of the aspects of the conflict in which the garrison were engaging ; but, consistently with full adherence to Colonel de Todleben's plan of defence, and even, indeed, resulting from it, there was open to the defenders of Sebastopol another and a more hopeful view of the future. That which can kill may also deter ; and it was possible, as has been part said already, that the very sight of preparations for resistance might not only bring the enemy to adopt counter-measures for neutralising those same preparations, but might even perhaps for that purpose incline him to delay his attack. In other words, it was hoped that the enemy might be induced to refrain from taking Sebastopol, with a view to besiege it instead. The problem, as stated by one who toiled at Korniloff's side,\* was, to maintain a line of four miles against powerful armies with only a small body of sailors and militiamen ; whilst the way to attempt its solution was by making the defences so formidable as to induce the enemy to forsake the idea of an immediate assault, and proceed to a regular siege.

The other aspect of the conflict.

Probability that the sight of the preparations for resistance might incline the enemy to delay the attack.

But whether men looked to the very end, and the actual crash of mitrail, or whether they rather drew hope from the pressure which might be put upon the mind of an English or a French engineer by their visible means of slaughter, the work to be done was

In either aspect, the work to be done was the same.

\* Gendre, 'Matériaux pour servir,' chap. iii.

CHAP. the same. Besides the task of connecting the still  
 X. isolated works by intermediate entrenchments, it was  
 Nature of necessary to deepen the ditches, to thicken and raise  
 the work the parapets, to erect traverses, and to strengthen the  
 to be done. ground by a great number of new batteries. But also,

as we saw—if only the enemy should give enough time  
 —the armament of the works along the whole line of  
 defence was to be changed, and the lighter artillery  
 replaced by heavy guns brought from the ships. The  
 preparations for effecting this change of armament  
 could be carried on up to almost the last moment  
 without being perceptible to the enemy; and, in the  
 mean time—though it does not, I think, appear that  
 such a result was designed—the modest calibre of the  
 guns which the garrison showed for the moment,  
 was a snare which might cheat the Allies; for perhaps  
 they would argue and say, ‘If we were to storm the  
 ‘place to-day or to-morrow, our columns would be  
 ‘exposed to heavy loss from the fire of artillery; and  
 ‘yet that same artillery is so light that we should be  
 ‘able to silence it easily with the very much heavier  
 ‘metal which we have close at hand on board ship;  
 ‘we will therefore land our siege-trains.’

The small  
 calibre of  
 the guns  
 which  
 were left  
 for the  
 time in the  
 batteries  
 was likely  
 to mislead  
 the Allies.

Totleben's  
 way of  
 adjusting  
 the labour.  
 His way  
 of adjust-  
 ing it to  
 proximate  
 as well as  
 to more  
 remote  
 objects.

Colonel de Todleben determined that the works  
 should go on simultaneously along all the weak parts  
 of the line; and each day's toil was to be so adjusted  
 (a difficult problem this seems) that it would not only  
 effect a due approach towards the perfecting, after a  
 time, of the work which had to be executed, but would  
 also bring the pending improvements to such a state  
 every night, that, in the event of an attack the next

morning, they would still subserve the defence; so that, if the enemy should grant a long respite, or if, on the other hand, he should assault in three days, or in two, or on the very morrow, the works—whether grown to full strength, or assailed whilst yet frail and weak—might in each case do all the good which the limit of time would allow.

CHAP.

X.

## IX.

And now, by the ardour and consuming energy of Korniloff and Todleben, all things and all people within the place or the roadstead were turned to the business of the defences. Even in this time of extremity, the men of the desk were surely astonished by the boldness with which Korniloff laid open to the orders of Colonel de Todleben all the engines, stores, and materials to be found in the arsenal and the dockyards. Waggon, carts, phaetons, and carriages of all kinds, belonging to private citizens, were employed in drawing up loads to the batteries. In terms which would seem at first sight to be meant for our own English sailors, eye-witnesses speak of the merry, the ceaseless energy with which (in ways strange to landsmen) the crews of the ships dragged up great guns to the front. Of the citizens, some formed themselves into volunteer corps, undertaking to do duty as guards and patrols in relief of the soldiers. Others toiled at the works. The women, the children helped. Men just let loose from prison—they had been loosed, as I gather, on account of the desperate nature of the emergency—

All resources in men and things brought to bear upon the business of the defences.

CHAP.

X.

The exceeding  
alacrity with  
which the  
work was  
carried on.

came and entreated that they might be suffered to take part in the common labour. The people toiled cheerily, and indeed, as it seems, with a most joyful animation, each labourer working intent, as though he saw plainly the object which all were seeking in common, and also understood, without doubting, what he himself had to do. There was no ceasing. The people worked by relays. From dawn to sunset, between five and six thousand men were busy along the lines of defence. By help of torches, other men, in less numbers, carried on the work through the night.

The people  
now knew  
what it  
was to  
come of  
their own  
free will  
to the de-  
fence of  
their  
country.

Before this, of course, the people of the place and the garrison had shared with their fellow-countrymen the beliefs and the affections which are the foundation of patriotism; and they had, most of them, obeyed some orders connected with the service of the State; but now, for the first time, they knew the sacred emotion which kindles in the bosoms of men when, coming to toil or to fight for the land of their birth, they come of their free accord.\* Long held in subjection to a military system which had never ceased to be fiercely and cruelly obtruded upon them until there came this time of danger, they now had to face by themselves a task thought too hard for the army. Therefore, if they could not claim the birthright belonging to men

\* Of course, the soldiers and sailors composing the garrison (and practically also, I imagine, the dockyard labourers) were acting under orders; but the accounts make it evident that, taking the whole movement together—the movement of soldiers, sailors working on shore, other labourers, private citizens, women, and children—it was, in a sense, spontaneous; and that the hand of authority, though used to give direction to the energies of the people, was not needed for the purpose of compulsion.

in free States, at least they had now cast upon them the first and the proudest of the burthens which freedom imposes, for they stood defending their country against foreign invasion. They were worthy of their charge. He who guided their energies at the time, and afterwards recorded in history the things they had done, breaks loose from his engagement to adhere to dry soldierly language, and declares that their devotion to their country's cause was sublime in its strength. Yet this zeal, all the time, was under wise rule, and taking its direction, like some governed force in mechanics, from the will and the mind of one man.

C H A P.

X.

Their devotion to the cause.

Colonel de Todleben, it would seem, was instinctively conscious that the power he was wielding depended very much upon his actual presence. He never wrote. He did not even read the communications which poured in upon him; for, believing that he saw his way clear without the help of others, and being, it would seem, accustomed as an engineer to let his thoughts take the form of estimates and reckonings, he made, as it were, a computation, by which he assured himself that the probability of there being superlatively important matters in the papers before him was not great enough to compensate the distraction and the expenditure of most precious time which must be occasioned by reading them, and that, therefore, if he were to leave them unheeded, he would avoid a waste of power.\* It was with his own eyes, with his own

Todleben's habit of bringing his personal presence to bear upon the transaction of business.

\* When the conflict was over, the mass of unopened letters and papers which had accumulated was examined. It then appeared that there were three or four papers which, at the time they were sent, might have



CHAP. voice, that he defended Sebastopol. At a later period,  
 X. when the besiegers could rest their field-glasses on the gabions which covered their batteries, they grew to be familiar with the aspect of an officer on a black charger, who was constantly seen in the Russian lines of defence; and they more than once pointed their ordnance with design to extinguish that untiring activity of one man, which (even from across the space which divided besieged and besiegers) they could perceive to be of value to the garrison. In that ceaselessly diligent horseman, as we now know, they saw the great volunteer whose brain was defending Sebastopol.\*

## X.

Korniloff did not share the hopefulness which he had imparted to others.

On the 27th, as on the day

Although the spirit which Korniloff roused in others was one which forbade dismal fears, he himself, it would seem, in secret was living almost without hope. The encouragement he had given the garrison, by speaking of aid from the army, was not warranted by any tidings which had reached him. The whole of the previous day, the 26th, had passed away, as we saw, without bringing him a word of account concerning Prince Mentschikoff; and on the 27th it was the same. 'Of the Prince,' he wrote on that night, 'no-

been read with advantage, but that the perusal of the rest would have done no good.

\* It was during General de Todleben's visit to England in 1864, and in the course of conversation which passed between him and some of his former adversaries, that he was ascertained to be the officer on the black charger, whose movements had often been watched from the trenches. One of the shots specially directed against him struck the ear of his horse.

‘ thing is still to be heard.’ What rumour had told him before, and told him only too truly, was, that the Russian field army had retreated to Baktchi Seräi, and the distance thus interposed was too great to allow of his believing that any assault on Sebastopol, which the Allies might at once undertake, would be checked or embarrassed by a flank attack from Prince Mentschikoff. In his privacy Korniloff wrote: ‘ The troops are longing for adventurous deeds, but all this can only increase the carnage without preventing the enemy from gaining access.’\* And again: ‘ We strengthen our position as much as possible. What, however, but defeat can be expected when we have only a handful of troops, scattered on an immense extent; and what are fortifications which we have thrown up in the course of a fortnight? If I had foreseen this, I would never have consented to sink the ships, but would rather have stood out to sea and fought the enemy, though they were double our numbers. . . . The catastrophe may be enacted to-morrow. Even fighting to the last man will hardly advance our cause. The ships and all the vessels are ready for sinking. Let the enemy have their wrecks. The evening passed in gloomy thoughts about the future of Russia.’† Still, however, the Allies were giving respite. In the course of the day they were seen on the Chersonese, but they undertook no attack.

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X.

before, there were no tidings of Prince Mentschikoff or his army.

Korniloff's secret reflections upon the position in which the garrison was placed.

The day, however, the 27th, passed without any attack on the part of the Allies.

\* Private Journal, 14th (26th) September.

† Private Journal, 15th (27th) September, written at the close of the day when the religious ceremony and the harangues to the troops took place.

CHAP.  
X.

## XI.

On the 28th, there was still no attack by the Allies;

When the morning of the 28th had dawned, it still appeared that the Allies were undertaking no instant attack. They were afterwards seen reconnoitring the defences of Sebastopol; \* but for that day at least—had the prayers of the Church then been heard?—the place was to be spared from assault.

and there was a communication at last from Prince Mentschikoff.

Imagining the Allies to be still in the mountainous region east of Sebastopol, Mentschikoff had sent his messenger on foot and by night.

And, on this 28th of September, the deserted garrison of Sebastopol got tidings at last from the army. Prince Mentschikoff had suffered himself to remain so strangely unacquainted with the movements of the Allies, that he supposed them to be still in that mountain region to the east of Sebastopol through which they had made their flank march, and the officer instructed to carry his messages to the garrison made his way from Headquarters at night, and on foot; thus passing, as if by stealth, through a country which had long been quite free from the invaders.

Lieutenant Stetzenko was the officer intrusted with this mission; and (meeting, of course, no obstruction from the Allies, who lay far away from the scene of his night journey) he reached his destination the following

\* General de Todleben remarks that, in his judgment, this reconnaissance of the Allies was not carried close enough to enable them to come to sound conclusions; but the General is mistaken in supposing, as he apparently does, that the reconnaissance of the 28th was the one which led the Allies to delay their attack. The reconnaissance on which the Allies founded their decision had taken place the day before, the 27th, but it seems to have been completed without exciting the observation of the garrison. Of course, it was incumbent on the Allies to be every day striving to improve their knowledge of the Sebastopol defences: but the reconnaissances which they effected after the 27th were the ones which supplied them with the basis of their mistakes.

morning. He had been ordered to 'inquire about the 'state of Sebastopol; '\* but he also brought news that Prince Mentschikoff had been reinforced by the arrival of 10,000 men under Khomoutoff,† and was hourly expecting from the north fresh accessions of strength.

C H A P.  
X.

The tid-  
ings  
brought  
by Lieu-  
tenant  
Stetzenko  
the mes-  
senger.

The messenger also imparted to Korniloff the way in which Prince Mentschikoff intended to employ the army thus augmented in numbers. That last—the chilling part of the communication—Korniloff kept secret; but the fact that he was once more in communication with the army, and that the army was heavily reinforced, he did not fail to make known; and, to do this the more impressively, he took Lieutenant Stetzenko with him along the lines, presenting him to his people as the messenger who had come with the glad tidings from the army, and even, it seems, giving out (though this, as will be presently seen, was the opposite of what had been really determined upon by the Commander-in-Chief) that, according to the intelligence thus brought from Headquarters, the Prince would immediately attack the Allies.

Korniloff  
conceals  
part of the  
intelli-  
gence  
brought  
by Lieu-  
tenant  
Stetzenko;  
but makes  
known to  
the troops  
the fact of  
his being  
once more  
in com-  
munica-  
tion with  
the army,  
and the  
fact that  
the army  
had been  
reinforced.

Korniloff knew that this could not be the present intention of the Prince; for he had learnt from Lieutenant Stetzenko that what Prince Mentschikoff had resolved to do was to take up a position on the Belbec; and this was a resolve which, so long as it should last, would establish a state of mere peace between the Russian field army and the invaders of the Crimea;

He also  
gives out  
(though  
this was  
contrary  
to the in-  
telligence  
he had  
received)  
that the  
Prince  
would  
forthwith  
attack  
the Allies.

\* 'Matériaux pour servir,' chap. iii.

† The force which was in the south-east of the Crimea at the time of  
ante, chap. vii.) with the exception of the Moscow regi-  
hed to the Alma in time for the battle.

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## X.

Prince Mentschikoff's real determination, as communicated by Lieutenant Stetzenko, was to take up a position on the Belbec. So long as this resolve should last, Prince Mentschikoff would be excluding himself and his field army from all interference in the strife. Korniloff understood this. His private reflections.

for those invaders were now cut off by long, difficult marches from the country of the Belbec; and, consistently with the detention of the Russian field army in so distant a region, it would not be possible for Prince Mentschikoff to take any part in the impending strife at Sebastopol.

All this Korniloff understood but too well; and seemed to him that, since the Russian army was to establish itself in the now peaceful region of the Belbec, it was fitting for the deserted garrison to turn for succour to Heaven. On the evening of the very day when he had cheered the troops by presenting Stetzenko, and holding out promise of a diversion from Prince Mentschikoff, he set down in the gloomy account which he kept in secret, that the Prince 'was to take up his position along the heights of the Belbec between Otarkia and Schooli;' and then, as though writing in mournful irony, he immediately adds: 'Meanwhile, the enemy is advancing on Sebastopol. . . . There are three or four ways by which a passage may be easily effected; for there are but few defenders—10,000 sailors and 5000 reserve soldiers.\* May the Lord bless and fortify us!'

## XII.

On the 29th, the Allies were still refraining from an attack.

The next day, the 29th, the Allies were seen to be again reconnoitring, but again refraining from an attack; and the people of Sebastopol as well as the

\* It may be remembered that the troops described by the Russians as 'reserve' soldiers are those which I have called 'militia.'

garrison were now beginning to draw encouragement from a new and a wholesome source. They were cheered by the mere sight of the wonders which had been wrought by the work of their own hands. For a time, of course, there had been a great deal of the labour—as, for instance, the making of platforms—which went on in workyards, in factories, on board ships, in numbers of places, not reached by the public gaze; but the immense contributions towards the general scheme, which had thus been going on separately, and, as it were, out of sight, were now fast added, and added to the lines of defence; and, upon the whole, the result was so vast as to be astonishing to most people, and, in the eyes of some, almost magical; for, except the engineers, who could reckon these things by arithmetic, there were few who imagined beforehand the greatness of the works which might be done in three days by several thousands of men working always by day and by night, and under guidance so skilful that no man's toil was in vain.

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X.

Encouragement derived by the garrison and people of the town from the spectacle of the works they had achieved.

Of the changes which were wrought in the defences during the interval between the evening of the 25th and the evening of the 29th September, a rapid indication is all I am willing to give. Along the line between the Artillery Bay and the Central Bastion nothing was done; but from the Central Bastion to the Flagstaff Battery, and thence down to the bottom of the great ravine, and thence up to the Redan, and from the Redan to the Malakoff, and from the Malakoff to the Little Redan, and thence home to the Bat-

Changes wrought in the defences between the evening of the 25th and that of the 29th Sept.

**CHAP.** tery of the Point, the defences received great accre-  
X. sions of strength. The works already constructe  
 were extended and improved ; those remaining un-  
 finished were completed ; the long and hitherto empty  
 spaces which divided them one from the other were  
 studded, in some places, with powerful batteries, in  
 others, were seamed with entrenchments intended  
 for covering infantry ; and already, the armament  
 of almost the whole line of defence was beginning  
 to undergo change ; for the lighter artillery, which  
 had been lying as a snare for the Allies (by making  
 them imagine themselves the stronger in cannonading  
 power), was now giving place to great guns brought  
 up from the ships.

It was at the Malakoff, and the ground which  
 flanked it on either side, that the greatest wonder  
 were wrought. Admiral Istomin, who there com-  
 manded, knew that the post was vital ; but also he  
 had been frankly told by Korniloff that it was weak.  
 He had toiled with a ceaseless care, looking close into  
 things of detail with his own eyes, and guiding the  
 labours of the multitude which had swarmed night  
 and day round the work.

That simple white tower, the Malakoff, now famous  
 in history, was fast losing its height from the ground  
 for already the summit of the knoll where it stood  
 had been so changed in shape by the industry of the  
 last three days, that it now closed high up round the  
 centre or waist of the building, and had not only be-  
 gun to take the form of a glacis annexed to the ori-  
 ginal work, but was also the site of a new semicircular

battery, which covered the front of the tower. This last battery was connected by entrenchments with the other new works thrown up on both flanks of the Malakoff. CHAP.  
X.

Nor was it only along the line of the works that Korniloff and Todleben were expending their care. Ships of war were so placed in the creeks that their fire could search the ravines which descended into Sebastopol. To ease the passage between the town and the Karabel suburb a floating bridge was constructed. Between all the chief posts along the line of defence there was arranged a perfected system of communicating by signal. Provision was made for the care of men wounded. So far as can be gathered from the narratives of those who took part in these labours, nothing was forgotten, nothing neglected. Hardly four days had passed since the sight of the English on the Mackenzie Heights disclosed to men gazing from the windows of the Naval Library the peril then suddenly coming upon the south side of Sebastopol; but, as far as was possible in so scant a time, the garrison had now been put in a condition for using to the very utmost their means of slaughter; and, on the night of this 29th of September, the great Engineer, who had yearned to be in readiness along the whole line with his pitiless storm of mitrail, might almost lie down to his rest with the contentment of one who has made his purpose sure.

The general result which had been attained.



CHAP.  
X.

## XIII.

Totleben's exertions had, after all, only provided that in the event of an assault, the garrison would be able to sell their lives dear.

He had covered Sebastopol by an entrenched position.

To defend such an entrenched position there must be an army.

This condition was wanting.

But, so far as concerned the power of the small garrison then occupying Sebastopol to withstand a determined assault, Colonel Totleben's exertions had after all, only provided that the defenders should be enabled to sell their lives dear. The hasty labour bestowed on the lines of defence had not, of course changed an open town into a 'fortified place.' What had been achieved was this: there had been formed 'an entrenched position'—an entrenched position, extending four miles along the arc of a half-circle, and covering Sebastopol on its land side.

Now, although it is true that a fortified place may be defended for a time by a garrison vastly inferior in numbers to the besieging force, a merely entrenched position, and especially an entrenched position four miles in extent, has no such attribute, and if it is resolutely attacked by a powerful army nothing less than another army can defend it. Deriving support from its entrenchments, the defending force need not, of course, be equal in numbers to its assailants, but it must be really an army, and an army so strong as to be able to sustain a pitched battle with forces attacking it on its prepared ground. To the garrison of Sebastopol, at the time I am speaking of, this, the main condition of a hopeful defence, was wanting; for their body of 16,000 foot, composed for the most part of sailors unused to the land service, could hardly in any sense be called an army, much less an army competent to join battle with the in-

vaders upon a line four miles in extent. It is true that, within a day's march, there was a Russian army, and one, too, which in point of numbers could hardly be thought too weak for the exigency ; but, nine days before, this army had undergone a defeat, and its commander was persistently withholding it from the scene of the expected conflict.

CHAP.  
X.

In this point of view, the very success with which the garrison had busied itself was calculated to become an embarrassment to Prince Mentschikoff when apprised of what had been done ; for now that Sebastopol was covered by an entrenched position, it might seem hardly tolerable that the troops required to defend it should be refused by a general who was lying a few miles off with a disposable army of between 30,000 and 40,000 men. The growing strength of the works made it less and less easy to urge that the task of concurring with the garrison in defending the place was one too desperate to be undertaken by the field army. Be that as it may, the Prince still clung to his design of withholding from Sebastopol the succours required for defending it.

Yet the Prince still clung to his design of withholding succour.

On this 29th of September, nothing was heard of the army until the evening. Then there came a despatch from Headquarters to Korniloff, announcing that the advanced-guard of the field army, under the command of General Jabrokritsky, would be on the North Side the next morning ; but the rest of the note went to show that Prince Mentschikoff was persisting in his resolve to hold his army aloof from the defence of Sebastopol ; for it directed that the heavy baggage

This day, 29th Sept., nothing was heard of the army till the evening.

Purport of the communication then received by Korniloff.

**C H A P.** of the army (which had been left in the town when  
X. Prince Mentschikoff undertook his flank march) should  
 now be transported to the North Side. The measure  
 was one which could only be accounted for by sup-  
 posing—a painful hypothesis for the garrison to have  
 to adopt—that the separation of the field army from  
 Sebastopol was now meant to be lasting.

The infer-  
 ence to be  
 drawn  
 from it.

#### XIV.

Morning of  
 the 30th.  
 The Allies  
 still ab-  
 staining  
 from the  
 attack.

When morning broke on the 30th of September, it showed that the Allies were still abstaining from any attack. This was the sixth of the days which had passed since Prince Mentschikoff's army had been withdrawn from Sebastopol.

The ad-  
 vanced-  
 guard of  
 the Rus-  
 sian army  
 appearing  
 on the  
 North  
 Side,  
 spread  
 great joy  
 in Sebas-  
 topol.

But, at  
 the time,  
 this joy  
 was ill  
 founded.

In the course of the day the advanced-guard of the Russian army, commanded by General Jabrokritsky, appeared on the North Side; and the sight of his troopers imparted great joy to the garrison and inhabitants of Sebastopol, by causing them to imagine that the field army was returning at last to share in the perils and the glory of striving to defend the place. But this joy, at the time, was ill founded; for although some of Mentschikoff's troops had thus come once more within sight of Sebastopol, and could freely communicate with the town by crossing the ferry, their presence on the north of the roadstead was still far from really meaning that Prince Mentschikoff had resumed active warfare. Unless these newly-seen troops should be suffered to cross the water—and the prospect of such a movement seemed to be shut out by

the order for transferring the army's heavy baggage from the South to the North Side—there would still be long, difficult marches to divide them from the enemy. CHAP.  
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In the course of the day, Prince Mentschikoff in person came down from the Upper Belbec to the Severnaya, or North Side, but did not pass over the water. Supposing him still determined to withhold all succour from Sebastopol, it was natural for him to avoid the pain and embarrassment of going into the midst of a garrison which he meant to leave to its fate. He rested in the Severnaya at that North Side Lodge which he had adjoining the 'Number Four' Battery. There, he received the devoted Admiral who, since the two men last saw each other, had been forced by his love of country to usurp the command of Sebastopol.

Prince Mentschikoff in person came down to the North Side, but did not cross over to Sebastopol.

His interview with Korniloff.

Impliedly, if not in positive or generous terms, Prince Mentschikoff gave assent to the arrangements which had created, in his absence, a kind of dictatorship; for he treated it as quite natural that Korniloff should have been raised to the supreme authority.

His way of treating the arrangements which had raised Korniloff to the supreme command.

With respect to the question of succouring Sebastopol by means of the field army, Prince Mentschikoff disclosed the intentions he had formed. After complaining of the weakness of his army, and declaring his belief that the enemy was in great strength, he intimated that he was about to make another movement, and caused Korniloff to understand that he, the Prince, meant to leave Sebastopol to its own resources.\*

His intention of still keeping the army aloof, and leaving Sebastopol to its own resources.

\* 'The Prince complains very much of the weakness of his troops, 'and supposes the enemy to be very strong; he is about to make another movement, and to leave Sebastopol to its own resources.'—Kor-

C H A P. Korniloff remonstrated, and said: 'If that tak  
 X.  
 Korniloff's remon-  
 strance. ' place, then farewell to Sebastopol! If the Alli  
 ' decide on some daring action, they will cru  
 ' us.' \*

Prince  
 Mentschi-  
 koff un-  
 dertakes  
 to sum-  
 mon a  
 council of  
 war. Prince Mentschikoff then said that he would sur  
 mon a council of war.

## XV.

As propounded by Prince Mentschikoff himse  
 before he undertook it, his flank march was at lea  
 a well-promising measure; for he announced it as  
 expedient for enabling him to act with advanta  
 against the flank of the invaders; but the plan  
 professed to have formed bore little enough of resen  
 blance to the one which he really adopted; and th  
 proposition which has to be demonstrated by him w  
 would defend the Russian Commander is nothing le  
 than that the Prince was not only warranted in aban  
 doning Sebastopol, with all its brave garrison  
 sailors, but also in standing aloof from the war f  
 days and days together without disturbing, witho  
 threatening, nay, even without seeing, the invader  
 or learning where they were posted.

With apparently a friendly desire to give all th  
 shelter he could, General de Todleben has brought h  
 great name to the aid of the Russian Commander.

niloff's Private Journal, written on the evening of the day when t  
 interview with Mentschikoff took place.

\* He probably added (though this he does not expressly say) wor  
 equivalent to those which he inserted in his journal as words of priv  
 reflection: 'To hold Sebastopol with troops is very possible; nay, it

After speaking of the painful condition to which the army would be reduced by the loss of its communications with the interior of Russia, and showing that, even with the aid of the army, the endeavours to defend Sebastopol at this time against an attack by the Allies would be likely to fail, General de Todleben says: 'Having well weighed all these circumstances, 'Prince Mentschikoff, convinced that his army had 'not it in its power to save Sebastopol if the enemy 'should direct an attack against that town, judged 'that it was better to take the most effectual measures, and employ the most energetic efforts, for the 'defence of the peninsula of the Crimea.'\* But surely, for the purposes of the war, the whole worth of the Crimea lay centred in the fact that it included the mighty fortress which sheltered the Black Sea fleet; and, for the General to let Sebastopol fall that he might husband his means for the defence of the peninsula, would have been, as it were, to stand by acquiescing whilst the heart was torn out, with a view to keep the strength needed for defending the rest of the body.

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X.

Todleben's explanation of Prince Mentschikoff's course of action.

Inquiry as to its validity.

And again, when the all but hopelessness of an

'possible even to hold out long; but without troops—that alters the case!'—Korniloff's *Private Journal*.

\* Todleben, vol. i. p. 242. The passage in the text is immediately followed by this one: 'Nevertheless he still preserved the hope that, if 'the irresolution of the Allies and the desperate courage of our sailors 'should make it possible to keep the enemy in check before Sebastopol 'for some time, the army, after receiving reinforcements, might be 'able to stop the ulterior successes of the Allies.' General de Todleben's apology for Prince Mentschikoff's flank march will be found at length in the Appendix.

CHAP. X. endeavour to defend Sebastopol is assigned as the justification for the withdrawal of the troops, it is hard to see why some 20,000 brave seamen, withdrawn from their natural element to do the work of land forces, should have been left to meet their fate in a conflict which was thought to be one too desperate to allow of its being undertaken or even shared in by the army under Prince Mentschikoff.

Apparently, the soundest defence of Prince Mentschikoff's plan of a flank march was the one which he himself offered when he assured Korniloff that the adoption of it would enable him to operate formidably upon the flank and rear of the enemy; and the omission to execute that, the vital part of the undertaking, is the thing that has to be justified.

When there is no hope of being able to defend a place for such a time as may allow of the siege being raised by forces coming to its relief, the custom of even the most warlike nations permits and favours surrender; but for a general, with a field army 30,000 strong, to leave in the fortress some 25,000 brave men, who understand that they are to defend the place to extremity—to assure them that they will have the active support of the field army, which will be assailing the besiegers in flank and in rear—to go out by night from the south of the fortress when the enemy is approaching it by the north—to move away to a distance of some eighteen miles from the fortress and nearly as much from the enemy—to remain in that state of seclusion for days and days together, without even knowing or labouring to know where the enemy

might be, and in this way to break from the promise which engaged him to aid the defence by pressing upon the enemy in the open field,—this seems to be a course of action which, though it may be capable of explanation on grounds connected with the state of the army or its want of supplies,\* is not to be excused in all its stages by saying that, in the belief of the general who adopted it, the aid of the army which he thus kept aloof would have failed to make good the defence against a determined attack. Where some 25,000 men stand to defend a place to extremity, the desperate character of the service entrusted to them is, even at first sight, an astonishing reason to give for depriving them of the aid of a field army 30,000 strong, and withdrawing it from the scene of danger to a place of peaceful seclusion; but a closer look makes the reason seem still more unfitting. Far from being one of those places in which a few brave defenders can do as well as many, Sebastopol was a fortress with miles of ground to be guarded, and the very thing needed for a hopeful defence of the place was the army which Prince Mentschikoff withdrew. It is true that from without, even better, perhaps, than from within, he might have brought the power of that army to bear upon the defence, but down to this time, he gave no aid to the garrison in either one way or the other.

\* Todleben, in the place where he says that the main body of the army remained on the Katcha until the 28th, adds that it was there 'awaiting the supplies which were to reach it from Simpheropol' (vol. i. p. 245).



C H A P.  
X.

Surmise  
tending to  
account  
for Prince  
Mentschi-  
koff's con-  
duct.

It would be difficult to excuse Prince Mentschikoff's seclusion by alleging his want of supplies;\* but although I am without the knowledge which would warrant me in speaking with certainty, I can hazard a surmise which would account, in some measure, for the Prince's abstention.

From the first, the Russian army in the Crimea had been scantily provided with skilled officers in the higher grades;† and when it happened on the day of the Alma that out of the number who were competent a large proportion was killed or disabled, and that of the officers of rank not thus stricken down some at least were in great measure shorn of their due authority by the comments and the blame and the recriminations which too often follow defeat, it resulted that, for the time, the army was much out of gear‡—nay, was hardly, I think, in a state to be manœuvred in sight of the enemy, still less to be brought into action; and although the full stress of this want of officers was perhaps so imperfectly felt by Prince Mentschikoff, whilst still he remained in Sebastopol, that he thought he could safely promise to operate with effect upon the flank and rear of the Allies, yet what seems probable is, that the discovery of the

\* Because there was an accumulation of stores at Simpheropol as well as at Sebastopol (Totleben, p. 148); and there did not occur any incident of war or of weather which could have frustrated the arrangements necessary for supplying the army.

† Amongst the other wants of this kind there was that of a sufficing Headquarters Staff.

‡ It may be observed that up to this point in the sentence I speak with certainty. I do so on good authority.

weakness of his army in point of officers was afterwards so cogently forced upon the Prince by the incidents of the march (as, for instance, by the failure of the manœuvre entrusted to Kiriakoff, no less than by the sudden encounter with the English at Mackenzie's Farm) as to make him think it a duty to withhold his army, for a time, from the sight of the enemy's outposts. At all events, there is no sound reason for believing that the spirit of the soldiery drooped; and unless my surmise be ill based, it was nothing but the want of commanders which hampered, for a time, the mechanism of the army, and made the Prince shrink from the hazard of bringing it again into conflict before its defects were repaired.\*

C H A P.  
X.

## XVI.

It is time to be passing again to the camp of the French and the English; but I hardly could turn away yet from the lines of defence at Sebastopol unless I might trust that I have suffered full light to come in upon what was there ventured and done in the last six days of September. For although they all passed away without either the event of a battle,

The merit  
belonging  
to that

\* I have already intimated that this explanation of Prince Mentschikoff's conduct is not the one put forward in print by General Todleben (*ante*, p. 225); but it does not follow that the General would disapprove it, though reasons of a personal kind might naturally enough prevent him from assigning the want of competent officers as the cause of Prince Mentschikoff's inaction. General Todleben, however, does not, I think, say anything which would contravene the explanation above suggested.

## C H A P.

## X.

portion of  
the de-  
fence of  
Sebastopol  
which was  
comprised  
in the last  
six days  
of Sept.  
1854.

or any cannonade or assault on the part of the Allies, those, nevertheless, were the days when the heaviest stress was put upon the courage and the devotion of the defenders. From first to last, it is true, the place was defended with tenacity, with valour, and with a rare, pliant skill; but in the later period of the conflict, the strength of the garrison, for the most part, was proportioned, or more than proportioned, to its task. In the six days I speak of, it was otherwise. The army had stolen away in the night-time, and for days was not to be heard of. The fleet, so to speak, was aground. What remained attempting defence was a scant number of people—militiamen, sailors, and workmen—men unused, for the most part, to the duties of fighting on shore. But then all these men were parcel of one people, obeying one monarch, professing one faith, speaking all one tongue, and being all instinct with the life, the passion, the will, which belong to a mighty nation. Therefore it was that the default and retreat of the mere army at the moment of the enemy's approach did not cause, as a natural result, the instant fall of the place. That which remained at the post abandoned by the Commander-in-Chief and his army was a steadfast people. The showy façade had come down, but behind it, there stood walls of granite.

Korniloff could not tell his people with truth that there was either an army which would stand by them in the hour of danger, or a fleet which would be suffered to go to sea; but, with handfuls of men of various callings, yet having a com-  
mon

could and did say, There shall be 'a Russian defence.'\* CHAP.  
X.

Although the chiefs knew that a determined resistance to a determined assault must needs result in the slaughter of the garrison, they still prepared for a conflict which promised this dismal end with the spirit, the care, and the energy which men are accustomed to evince when they are abounding in strength and full of hope. The men of the garrison might well enough think they had been shamelessly abandoned by the evading army, but it seems they observed a brave silence in regard to the hardship of their fate, and only made themselves heard when they greeted their chosen Commander, or echoed his solemn engagement to hold out the place to the last. And that same love of country which filled the void left by the army was also sufficing to raise up a chief and ruler when the Czar's vicegerent was wanting. The emergency perhaps, in a sense, created the chief; but there was a generous, patriot spirit in that forbearance and suppression of selfish desires which inclined men high up in soldierly rank to submit themselves to Admiral Korniloff as their chosen dictator. Nor less was there wisdom and loyalty in bending to the counsels of a volunteer Colonel of Sappers, who owed the power he wielded to the sheer ascendant of genius.

\* It is in Korniloff's Private Journal that I find this expression; but I infer that he had been using it in speaking to the garrison and inhabitants.

## CHAPTER XI.

CHAP.  
XI.

The inquiry suggested by observing the condition in which Sebastopol was left at the end of September.

27th Sept. First reconnaissance by the Allies of the defences on the south side of Sebastopol.

WHOEVER has learnt the condition in which Sebastopol was left during those last days of September, will be ready to ask why it was that the invaders, now able to gaze at their ease on the domes of the coveted town, still did not move forward to seize it.

On the 27th of September—the day the French completed their flank march, and the second of the days during which the deserted garrison had been left without tidings of Prince Mentschikoff's army—both the French and the English pushed forward some troops towards Sebastopol, and effected their first reconnaissance of its defences from the southern side of the place.

They had little difficulty in finding spots of ground from which, in a general way, though not yet, of course, with minuteness, they could examine Sebastopol on its southern side; and the impression they were able to gather of the nature and strength of the defences was, upon the whole, a sound one.\* Indeed, it may

\* It may seem at first sight that this could not have been the case; for whereas the front of defence was in reality a semicircular arc of four miles, Sir John Burgoyne regarded the enemy's general line as 'virtu-

be said that when this day's reconnaissance was complete, the Allies, though unacquainted in detail with the condition and resources of the place, still knew the main facts which were needed as a basis for their next resolve. The evasion from the town of the force led out by Prince Mentschikoff they had seen with their own eyes; and although there was a surmise amongst the English that the column which our Headquarters had touched at Mackenzie's Farm was no more than 16,000 strong, the concurring testimony of the Russian prisoners, together with the known fact that Prince Mentschikoff was present in person with the evading force, went far to disclose the full truth. Upon this, it would seem, the French were in no state of doubt, for in their reasonings they justly assumed that the force which the Prince had with him on the road to Baktchi Seräi was nothing less than an army. The Allies had good means of computing approximately the strength which must remain for the defence of Sebastopol after the withdrawal of Prince Mentschikoff's army, and their estimates were not wide of the truth.\* Seeing the

C H A P.  
XI.

Upon the completion of this reconnaissance, the Allies had the knowledge on which to found their next resolve.

'ally a straight one,' and only 'about 2500 or 3000 yards in total 'extent' (Memorandum by Sir John Burgoyne of the 20th November 1854). But his apparent misapprehension can be explained. Sir John Burgoyne regarded both the flanks of the line of defence as virtually impregnable, and applied his words to that part of the line with which alone, in his judgment, the Allies could have any practical concern. He spoke, in short, only of that part of the arc which fronted towards the south and the south-east.

\* The error of those who supposed that no more than 16,000 men had been withdrawn from Sebastopol was counterbalanced by that of underrating the numbers of the sailors; so that, upon the whole, the Allies did not exaggerate the number of armed men, including sailors,

CHAPTER. entrance of the roadstead blocked up, they were not  
 XL without means of inferring that the resources of the  
 Black Sea fleet, both in men and material, must become, in a measure, available for the land defences; and they were themselves sure witnesses of the energy and haste which the garrison thought it needful to exert in trying to strengthen their lines; for upon the spots where their field-glasses had been pointing there were thousands of men and women at work. Of the motive, indeed, with which Prince Mentschikoff had withdrawn his army, and of the policy which was guiding the labours of the garrison, the Allies, as might be expected, could only judge by inference; but, upon the whole, it may be said that what they knew of the truth was enough to have served them as the basis of a right conclusion; so that, if they determined aright, it is to their own discernment that the merit seems due, and if they went wrong, their error was not that of men who have to move in the dark, but one which resulted from the default of their collective judgment.

The question which really needed solution.

Whether the Allies should now follow up their hitherto victorious march, and endeavour to carry Sebastopol by a prompt and determined attack, or whether they should consent to give the enemy a breathing-time, and begin upon a slow plan of warfare resembling what men call a siege—this, in reality, was the cardinal question which had to be solved; but it did not present itself to the attention of the

who were defending Sebastopol. Sir John Burgoyne did not reckon that number at more than from 25,000 to 30,000.—‘Military Opinions,’ p. 197, 201, 240, in which last page the estimate is only 20,000 to 25,000.

Allies as one they must needs determine at their first reconnoissance ; and although the deliberators all looked on Sebastopol with a concurring desire to attack the place sooner or later, there were few who so probed their own meaning as to know to what length they were willing to go in the perilous expenditure of time.

But before the day closed, bold counsel was tendered ; and it seemed, at first sight, to originate with the vehement sailor whose words had always found welcome at the English Headquarters. Few, however, will believe that, upon the vital question of an immediate assault, the mind of Lord Raglan could have been a blank awaiting the impress which the first adviser might give it ; or that Lyons would have urged his own opinion upon others, without first assuring himself that Lord Raglan approved it. On the other hand, it was of great moment that proposals liable to be overruled by the French should not be too closely identified with the name of the English General. There is, therefore, some ground for surmising that the germ of what Lyons proposed may have sprung from his intimate conversations with the Commander of our land forces, and that when he submitted this counsel he was echoing the thought and fulfilling the wish of Lord Raglan. Be this as it may, the recorded fact is that, having made himself acquainted in a general way with the state of the defences which covered the land front of Sebastopol, and concluding them to be imperfect and weak, Lyons urged at the English Headquarters the expediency of

CHAP.  
XI.

It did not present itself in this light at the time of the first reconnoissance.

The chiefs hardly probed their own intentions in regard to expenditure of time.

The counsel of Sir Edmund Lyons.



CHAP. an immediate assault.\* Lord Raglan was of the same  
XI. mind; but he found himself met by the counter-  
 opinion of Sir John Burgoyne, who remonstrated  
 against the notion of an assault without first getting  
 down the fire of the place by means of heavy artil-  
 lery.† It is the lot of mankind to be blind to the  
 future; and, unless Lyons errs, Burgoyne supported  
 his opinion by arguing that an immediate assault  
 would cost the Allies a loss of 500 men.‡ Another  
 of the arguments used was founded upon a sugges-  
 tion that the assaulting forces would be exposed to  
 slaughter from the fire of the enemy's men-of-war  
 lying moored in the harbour beneath. To that Lyons  
 replied by proposing to seize the position of the Mala-  
 koff—the knoll was then like an ant-hill, all creeping  
 with busy labour—and there establishing a battery  
 which must soon drive off all the ships.§

\* The MS. authenticated as described *ante*, chap. ii. The time as-  
 signed in the MS. as that at which this counsel was given by Lyons to  
 the military authorities is, 'immediately after their arrival at Bala-  
 'clava'—and this coincides very satisfactorily with the words, 'the day  
 'after our arrival here,' which are quoted in a note, *post*, p. 237, from  
 a different source, both records tending to show that the 27th of Sep-  
 tember was the day. I am disposed, however, to assign the afternoon or  
 evening as the time of the conversation; because Lyons's advice proceeds  
 upon a knowledge of the state of the defences, which he could hardly, I  
 think, have acquired until after the reconnaissance effected on that day.

† Ibid. It must not be necessarily understood that the discussion  
 was carried on between Lyons and Burgoyne personally. What I  
 rather imagine is, that, in eliciting Burgoyne's opinion, Lord Raglan  
 did not say what he himself and Sir Edmund Lyons thought of the  
 question. See Memorandum by Burgoyne, 20th November 1854, and  
 his 'Military Opinions,' p. 199, 202.

‡ Ibid.

§ Ibid. The proposal was to seize the position of 'The White  
 'Tower,' the then name of the Malakoff amongst the Allies.

Lord Raglan agreed with Lyons in approving the plan of an immediate assault; and, notwithstanding the objections of Sir John Burgoyne, he submitted it for consideration to the French.\* General Canrobert, however, refused to adopt the measure. He said that his men could not be restrained or kept together, and that from that cause alone, in the event of there occurring a check or reverse, the safety of the whole army would be imperilled.†

C H A P.  
XI.

27th Sept.  
Lord Rag-  
lan's first  
proposal  
for an  
assault.  
Its rejection  
by the  
French.

So now the Allies took a measure, not in itself decisive, but tending to govern their fate, by withdrawing their minds from the all-vital question of time, and placing them, as it were, upon a path—smooth and easy enough at first sight—which yet might lead into trouble. They requested the naval commanders to land the siege-trains. Their purpose

27th Sept.  
Determi-  
nation to  
land the  
siege-  
trains.

\* In allusion, as it would seem, to this proposal, the narrative of one of the French Generals of division says:—‘On était si loin d'attendre aux difficultés que l'on allait rencontrer, qu'il fut question de ne pas débarquer ce matériel, et qu'on parut disposé à tenter une attaque de vive force contre Sébastopol.’

† An officer who was present assures me (October 19, 1865) of the accuracy of this statement; but, as the impressions of all men are liable to be varied by lapse of time, it is satisfactory to know how his words were noted in writing at a time much more near to the deliberations of which he speaks. Writing in the Crimea on the 31st of August 1855, Romaine, after naming the same officer, says: ‘He told me that the French refused to make an attempt upon Sebastopol the day after our arrival here. They said that their men could not be restrained, and if any check or reverse followed they could not be got together, and the safety of the whole army would be compromised. This was whilst St Arnaud was alive.’ The 27th of September 1854 would be the day designated by the words ‘the day after our arrival here,’ the English having occupied Balaclava on the 26th.

CHAP.  
XI.

The purpose for which the siege-trains were to be landed.

28th Sept. The landing of the siege-trains commenced.

Opportunity of considering the decision towards which the Allies were driving.

September (apparently the 28th). Sir George Cathcart's suggestion for stealing into the place.

was to open the way for an assault by first getting down the enemy's fire.\*

The next day, the 28th, the seamen were busily engaged in landing the siege-trains, but the process was not a short one ; and the men who gave counsel in the Allied camps had leisure to weigh the soundness of the conclusion to which they had been driving.

It was at this time that Sir George Cathcart began to urge—and that with some eagerness—that the attack upon Sebastopol should be one of a summary kind. Upon completing the flank march he had been ordered, as we saw, to move his division straight up from the Tchernaya to the heights on the south of Sebastopol, without going down to Balaclava in the track of the main English army ; and he established himself upon ground confronting the Great Redan, from which he looked down upon the head of the Man-of-war Harbour, seeing no small part of the town and yet more of the Karabel faubourg. Judging that he had discovered a way by which it would be feasible for the Allies to steal at once into the place, he addressed to Lord Raglan a note, dated ' 1½, Height, mile from the head of the Man-of-war Harbour,' in which he says : ' I am in the strongest and most perfect position I ever saw. Twenty thousand Russians could not disturb me in it with my division ; and if you and Sir John Burgoyne would pay me a visit, you can see everything in the way of defences, which is not much. They are working at two or three redoubts, but the place is

\* See Burgoyne's ' Military Opinions,' p. 181.

‘ only enclosed by a thing like a low park wall, not in  
 ‘ good repair. I am sure I could walk into it, with  
 ‘ scarcely the loss of a man, at night, or an hour be-  
 ‘ fore daybreak, if all the rest of the force was up  
 ‘ between the sea and the hill I am upon. We could  
 ‘ leave our packs, and run into it even in open day,  
 ‘ only risking a few shots whilst we passed the re-  
 ‘ doubt. We see the people walking about the streets  
 ‘ in great consternation. I send this by Lieutenant  
 ‘ Ravenshill, who will explain everything.’\* C H A P.  
X I.

The impression under which Sir George Cathcart thus wrote, was created by the survey he had been able to make from ground in front of his camp; but when, as presently happened, his division was moved further east to the ground we now call ‘ Cathcart’s Hill,’ he had means of examining the defences from a fresh point of view, and thenceforth, unless I mistake, he ceased to insist that the Allies could slip through the defences in the easy and costless way which he at first supposed to be possible; but, in lieu of his plan for ‘stealing into’ Sebastopol, he now, it seems, counselled Lord Raglan to undertake a determined assault.† He gave it as his judgment that the

\* The note is not dated (except in a way showing the place and the hour), but I think that the 28th of September is the day on which it was most probably written. I have hit upon no trace of what was done in consequence. Sir John Burgoyne was not invited by Lord Raglan to go up and test the supposed opportunity of ‘walking into’ the place. It may be that Sir George Cathcart’s change of opinion took place in time to enable him to countermand his request for a visit. I ought to say that I do not find the original note amongst Lord Raglan’s papers, but take the words from a draft in Sir George Cathcart’s writing.

† I know of no written record of this second suggestion of Cathcart’s;

CHAP. place might best be wrested from the enemy's grasp  
 {  
 XI. by pouring in battalion after battalion, until the end  
 }  
 Sir George should be accomplished.\*  
 Cathcart's

subse-  
 quent sug-  
 gestion—  
 probably  
 on the  
 29th Sept.  
 —for  
 storming  
 the place.

And at this time once more Sir Edmund Lyons gave counsel.† He did not disguise from himself that the loss resulting from an assault must now be much greater than that which might have been expected to follow from such an enterprise if ventured some two

but the memory of the officer who heard it made is fortified—diplomats are the people who best know the value of a clue of that kind—by the quaint and homely simile with which his proposal was met. The simile, however, is not one worth repeating.

\* With a view to disprove the fact of Cathcart's having advised an assault, or to show that, at all events, any such advice, if ever given, could not have been adhered to, the following extract of a letter from Cathcart has been printed ('Official Journal of the Royal Engineers,' p. 18), date assigned being the 8th of October: 'To attempt an assault without mounting our heavy guns, would not be certain of success, but liable to a great loss of men.' It seems to me, however, that in that letter, Cathcart's disapprobation of an immediate assault belongs to the time when he was writing—i.e., to the 8th of October—and does not at all prove that he may not have approved an assault at an earlier day. My view of his meaning is supported by a letter which he wrote to Lady Georgiana Cathcart six days before—i.e., on the 2d of October; for there, after describing the part he had taken in the flank march, he proceeds to say: 'I then came on and secured an important post within fire of Sebastopol, and have held it for three days, with my division quite unsupported. If they had all been up we might have taken the place. Now, we have given them time to prepare and land their ship-guns, and we must have a long regular siege.' It seems that Cathcart's proposals, whether for 'stealing into' the place or assaulting it, were never made known to Sir John Burgoyne.—'Military Opinions,' p. 199, 202.

† The day when Sir Edmund Lyons tendered this advice for the second time, was on or before the 29th of September. It is stated by him to have been given 'a day or two after' the time when he, Sir Edmund, first proposed the assault of the South Side.—MS. described *ante*, chap. ii. Those words would seem to point to the 29th as the day; and a note from Sir Edmund, which will be afterwards quoted, fixes the 29th as the day on which Lord Raglan was to submit the proposal to Canrobert.

days earlier ; for in the interval, both by day and by night, the garrison and the people of Sebastopol had been incessantly busied at the works ; but, notwithstanding his perception of the now increased peril of the undertaking, he submitted to Lord Raglan the expediency of an assault. Lord Raglan was willing ; and asked Lyons how he would proceed. Lyons answered to this effect : ‘ The Russians must think by this time that we are going to lay regular siege to the place. Let them be encouraged in this belief. Send numbers of men to the front with pickaxes, or something that will look like pickaxes, and make a feint of turning up the ground, and then when the enemy, deceived by the sight, shall be least expecting an attack, rush in.’

CHAP.  
XI.

Sir Edmund Lyons again gave counsel.

Lord Raglan agreed with Lyons in desiring to proceed to an assault.

Whether Lord Raglan approved the stratagem of feigning the commencement of siege-works, I am unable to say. What has been recorded is, that he shared with Lyons in his desire to proceed by assault.\*

In the course of the conversation which elicited this agreement of opinion between Lord Raglan and Sir Edmund Lyons, Sir Edmund had expressed his conviction that, unless the place were at once assaulted, it would not be taken at all except after grievous loss, and that the men then composing the army ‘ would not live to do it.’ In later days, when the strength of the English army had dwindled, and still was

\* The testimony of Sir Edmund Lyons in regard to Lord Raglan’s desire for an immediate assault, has been fully confirmed to me by one who enjoyed the close confidence of his chief—I speak of General Airey. See in the Appendix extracts from letters of Lord Raglan, from which, as I there submit, an inference to the same effect may be drawn.

C H A P. XI. dwindling, and in yet later days when great reinforcements had more than supplied all the losses, Lord Raglan, in conversation with Lyons, used often to revert to that saying.

Unanim-  
ity of  
opinion  
amongst  
the  
French.  
Their  
opinion  
shared by  
Burgoyne.

What the  
general  
opinion  
was.

The argu-  
ment  
against  
assaulting  
without  
first get-  
ting down  
the ene-  
my's fire  
by means  
of the  
siege-  
trains.

But it seems that the opportunity for further deliberation failed to elicit any change of opinion in the camp of the French. Apparently they were all of one mind; and the opinion they entertained was not only shared at the time by Sir John Burgoyne, but has ever since had the support which his authority gives. This opinion was, that it would be rash, that it would be wanton, nay even, as one chief said, that it would be criminal, to attempt to carry the place without first endeavouring to get down the enemy's fire by the use of the siege-guns; and the following, as I gather, is the tenor of the reasonings on which the conclusion stands based: 'The works which cover the place, though not at all strong in themselves, are nevertheless well placed and powerfully armed. The line of these defences is unassailable at both flanks. The ravines descending into the town and the suburb are all of them open to a raking fire, either from the land batteries, or from the broadsides of the ships for that purpose moored in the creeks; and it is along one or more of the intervening ridges that the assailant would have to advance. Of the ridges available for such an attempt there are three; but each of them is powerfully defended—the first by the Flagstaff Bastion, the second by the Redan, and the third by the White Tower.\* Our troops, in approaching either of those three works, would have to m

\* Afterwards called the Malakoff.

‘ under the fire of the enemy’s batteries for a space of some 2000 yards. They would have to traverse ground quite unknown to them. Any attack upon the enemy’s defences must be made from an extended, diverging circumference ; and besides, our assailing forces would be so split by these deep, intersecting ravines, as to become divided into isolated bodies of men incapable of giving one another any mutual help.\*

C H A P.  
X I.

‘ Including the sailors now acting as a land force, the garrison is probably from 25,000 to 30,000 strong ; † and, within a day’s march of us, Prince Mentschikoff is in the field with an army which might act formidably upon our flank and rear—which might attack us whilst in the act of assaulting the place.‡ To storm an entrenched position thus held by a force 25,000 strong, and to provide at the same time against any enterprise on our flank or rear which Prince Mentschikoff might undertake, we have only some 50,000 men. In case of failing, we should find ourselves in danger of being driven into the sea.§ If we were to storm at once, we should have to do this with nothing but field-pieces at our command, and our troops would be exposed,

\* The above arguments were in substance urged by Sir John Burgoyne.

† See ‘Military Opinions’ of Sir John Burgoyne, p. 197, 201, 240, in which last page, however, the estimate is from 20,000 to 25,000 ; and also the Narrative of a French Divisional General, given in the Appendix.

‡ This seems to have been the argument which most pressed upon the minds of the French ; and its effect in bending their counsels should certainly be remembered by those who undertake to criticise Prince Mentschikoff’s flank march.

§ Narrative of French Divisional General referred to above.



CHAP. ' for a distance of upwards of a mile, to a galling fire  
 XI. ' of more than a hundred pieces of artillery, besides  
 ' the guns of the shipping. Remember that the force  
 ' engaging in such an attack would be without any  
 ' retreat in case of a reverse.\* The place appears to  
 ' be in such a state, and the garrison so busily, and  
 ' with so much apparent confidence, engaged in im-  
 ' proving it, that, with a fine battering-train on board  
 ' ship close at hand, we ought not for a moment to  
 ' contemplate so rash an act as that of storming at  
 ' once.† To do so would be utterly unjustifiable; ‡  
 ' would indeed be almost a crime.' §

Lord Raglan, and Lyons, and Cathcart, they have all passed away; and, except to the extent already shown, I have no acquaintance with the reasons by which any of them might have been prepared to enforce proposals for an immediate assault; but, partly by becoming acquainted with the events of the campaign which followed, and partly by help of the criticisms

\* The arguments contained in this and the preceding sentence I understand to be Sir John Burgoyne's.—'Official Journal of the English Siege Operations,' p. 17.

† Memorandum by Sir John Burgoyne, dated 20th November 1854. In this paper Sir John says: 'On arriving before Sebastopol, after the battle of the Alma and the taking possession of Balaclava, the place appeared to be in such a state, and the garrison so busily, and with so much apparent confidence, engaged in improving it, that, with a fine battering-train on board ship close at hand, no one for a moment contemplated the attempt of so rash an act as to storm it at once.'

‡ 'The place was in such a state when the army first appeared before it as rendered an attempt to storm it by a *coup de main* utterly unjustifiable.'—Memorandum by Sir John Burgoyne, dated 30th December 1854.

§ This last, I believe, was one of the forms in which General Canrobert expressed his opinion of the idea of storming without first using the siege-guns.

which later years have produced, it is practicable to discern the nature of the argument which the united counsels of the French Headquarters and of Sir John Burgoyne might well have provoked at the time :—

C H A P.  
XI.

‘ Before engaging in the main argument, it is convenient to examine some of your lesser and collateral reasons for objecting to a prompt assault. And first, you are wrong in imagining that the embarrassment created by the ravines, is one which would only be felt by the assailants. These ravines descend into Sebastopol, dividing the town from the faubourg, and again subdividing into fractions both town and faubourg. It is plain that the difficulty in the way of lateral communication created by this configuration of the ground must be so sure a source of weakness to the garrison as to be equivalent to a great deduction from their actual numbers. You will remember, Sir John Burgoyne, that you yourself perceived this clearly enough, from the indications in Colonel Jer-vis’s map ; and when you advised the flank march, you were so far from looking upon these ravines as an evil to us, that you spoke of the embarrassment they must necessarily put upon the garrison as one of the reasons for bringing us round to this South Side.\* And your reason, so far as it went, was a sound one ; for a difficulty in the way of lateral communication must of necessity be more embarrassing to the defenders than to the assailants, who can choose the ground where the real conflict shall take place. Be-

Argument  
in favour  
of assault-  
ing at  
once.

and the heads of the ravines, and there, our

is Memorandum of the 21st Sept.

CHAP. <sup>XI.</sup> ' lateral communications are free. Look at the part of  
 ' the harbour ravine which the enemy occupies. It is  
 ' of such a depth and steepness that the defences which  
 ' cover the Karabel suburb are quite sundered from  
 ' those which cover the town ; and apparently a body  
 ' of troops engaged in meeting an assault upon one of  
 ' these two districts could not be supported at need by  
 ' forces withdrawn from the other one.\*

' You speak of our want of good means of retreat in  
 ' the event of a discomfiture ; but this is a source of  
 ' danger inherent in the enterprise to which, whether  
 ' wisely or not, we are now committed. We encoun-  
 ' tered it at the landing, we encountered it in our  
 ' march from Old Fort, we encountered it on the Alma ;  
 ' but on that last day we greatly reduced its gravity  
 ' by proving our ascendant in the field ; and now that,  
 ' with our victorious armies, we approach the goal of  
 ' our enterprise, it can hardly be wise to revive the  
 ' old objection, and to refrain from attacking Sebasto-  
 ' pol on the theory that, if we were to be repulsed, we  
 ' should need to abandon the Chersonese, and yet be  
 ' unable to secure our retreat. If the attack of the  
 ' place we came out to take is, in other respects, pru-  
 ' dent, we must not forego the occasion on account  
 ' of a danger which belongs to the very nature of our  
 ' enterprise, and is not to be evaded by delay. If we  
 ' are already so circumstanced as to be unable to effect  
 ' a good retreat after undergoing discomfiture in an  
 ' assault on Sebastopol, how can we expect to be bet-  
 ' ter prepared for a like contingency when we have

\* General Todleben insists, with great force, upon this as one of the greatest of the evils with which the *besieged* had to deal.

‘ taken upon ourselves the additional task of saving  
 ‘ and re-embarking our cumbersome siege-trains ? C H A P.  
XI.

‘ You acknowledge that a main portion of the  
 ‘ force now constituting the garrison consists of sailors.  
 ‘ We do well to take it for granted that these men  
 ‘ will work the guns perfectly well, and line the en-  
 ‘ trenchments, where needed, with a diligent fire of  
 ‘ musketry ; but it is a perverse use of the imagina-  
 ‘ tion to picture these crews from the ships as battal-  
 ‘ ions of infantry coming out to manœuvre on the  
 ‘ open plateau, and driving into the sea a hitherto  
 ‘ victorious army of 50,000 prime troops.

‘ In truth, it is certain that, however efficient this  
 ‘ sailor garrison may be in defending the ramparts, it  
 ‘ cannot be capable of engaging in offensive operations  
 ‘ against us on the open ground ; and if we bear this  
 ‘ in mind, we hardly need shrink from the necessity of  
 ‘ having to operate upon an arc more extended than  
 ‘ that which the enemy holds. Besides, what is there  
 ‘ in this peril of what you call an “ extended circum-  
 ‘ ference ” which time will help to remove ?

‘ But now to come rather more close to the task  
 ‘ which lies before us. Sebastopol, on this, its land  
 ‘ side, is not a fortress.\* The enemy is in an en-  
 ‘ trenced position—a hastily entrenched position—  
 ‘ four miles in extent. To defend such ground as  
 ‘ that, the one thing needed is an army. Nothing less

\* Sir John Burgoyne says, ‘ It was, in fact, not a fortress, but an army  
 ‘ entrenched on a very strong position, along a line of moderate extent,  
 ‘ with its flanks perfectly secure’ (‘ Military Opinions,’ p. 197). In that  
 sentence Sir John well describes the position, but misdescribes its de-  
 fenders. The sailors, and the 5000 ‘ reserve,’ or ‘ militiamen,’ at that  
 time left in Sebastopol, were not ‘ an army.’

C H A P. ' than an army can be competent. Well, but the only  
XI. ' army the enemy has at his present disposal is the one  
 ' which has marched off to Baktchi Seräi, having with  
 ' it Prince Mentschikoff in person, the Commander-  
 ' in-Chief of all the Czar's forces in the Crimea, both  
 ' military and naval. We do not accurately know  
 ' the strength of the detachments which Prince Ment-  
 ' schikoff may have left in the place ; \* but whether  
 ' they be great or small, it is, of course, a huge advan-  
 ' tage to us, in assailing an entrenched position, to have  
 ' to do with some mere fractions of an army instead  
 ' of with the army itself. Prince Mentschikoff may  
 ' have been led to withdraw his army from a despair  
 ' of being able to save it alive by any less ugly ex-  
 ' pedient ; † or he may have been acting, in part, from  
 ' a cogent desire to insure the junction of expected  
 ' reinforcements ; ‡ or, again, he was perhaps impelled  
 ' by the blended force of both motives ; but every  
 ' supposition which seeks to explain his withdrawal,  
 ' invites us to be prompt and summary—invites us  
 ' to storm the defences whilst yet the field army is  
 ' absent.

' It is surmised—and this especially in the French  
 ' camp—that the Prince may have withdrawn from  
 ' Sebastopol with a determination to attack us in  
 ' flank. § Well, certainly, if we entangle ourselves in

\* We do now : five thousand militiamen, as I call them, and some companies of sappers. There was, besides, a battalion which lost its way in the course of the march towards the Belbec, and came back at night into the town.

† It was so. See *ante*, chap. x.

‡ This also was one of his motives for the step. See *ibid*.

§ Narrative by one of the French Generals of Division, given in the Appendix.

‘ a lengthened siege, there may come a time when the  
 ‘ Russian Commander will be so largely reinforced as  
 ‘ to be able to take the offensive, and assail us up  
 ‘ there on the plateau in a way to imperil our armies.  
 ‘ But, as yet, we hear nothing of any such reinforce-  
 ‘ ments; and, in the mean time, an opportunity of en-  
 ‘ countering such an attack would be the best thing  
 ‘ that could happen to us; for an army, greatly inferior  
 ‘ to us in numbers, and defeated last week in a chosen  
 ‘ and prepared position, could hardly yet come and  
 ‘ assail our forces in the open field without giving us  
 ‘ a fair occasion for inflicting upon it a great disaster—  
 ‘ a disaster of such a kind as would be likely to bring  
 ‘ about the immediate fall of the place.

‘ But then you, our French friends, say that Prince  
 ‘ Mentschikoff may attack us whilst in the act of  
 ‘ storming Sebastopol.\* Surely this apprehension is a  
 ‘ chimæra. We can choose our own moment for the  
 ‘ assault: we are not without cavalry: the Prince is  
 ‘ distant from us between twenty and thirty miles;  
 ‘ and supposing him to be marching by daylight, his  
 ‘ advance during many, many hours, would be under  
 ‘ the eyes of our people. If we wish to be superla-  
 ‘ tively wary, we may so far guard ourselves against  
 ‘ the apprehended contingency as to avoid storming  
 ‘ at the very moment of daybreak; but that surely  
 ‘ is the utmost extent to which we ought to be de-  
 ‘ flected in our counsels by the existence of a Russian  
 ‘ field army established near Baktchi Seräi.

‘ You, it seems, Sir John Burgoyne, are much  
 ‘ impressed by the energy with which the enemy is

\* Ibid.

C H A P. 'labouring at his defences ;\* and you infer, from this  
XI. 'display of zeal, a resolute determination to defend  
 'the place ; but surely this inference of yours is  
 'the very one the enemy must wish us to draw, if  
 'that which he wants is time and respite. Besides,  
 'the very haste with which we see these thousands of  
 'people now toiling at the works shows plainly enough  
 'what the garrison think of the existing state of their  
 'defences. There would not be so much doing if it  
 'were not that there is much which has hitherto been  
 'left undone. The evident anxiety of the enemy to  
 'bring his works to completion should incline us to  
 'shorten the respite of which we see him making so  
 'eager a use.

'Imperfect as are the enemy's works, they still, no  
 'doubt, will enable him to inflict cruel loss upon our  
 'assaulting columns ; but this objection, grave—or  
 'rather painful—as it is, has a general application to  
 'all attacks upon prepared positions ; and unless there  
 'be something exceptionably formidable in the works  
 'before us, and some very obvious advantage to be  
 'gained by delay, it cannot be commonly prudent for  
 'us to hold back and give time. Well, but the one  
 'great exceptional circumstance which marks the ex-  
 'isting condition of things is the evasion of Prince  
 'Mentschikoff's army ; and this is an event of such a  
 'kind as to be a cause of despair to the garrison, unless  
 'they can get some delay, and an encouragement to  
 'us, if only we act at once. For, if it be true that  
 'to defend this entrenched position of four miles,  
 'nothing less than an army is needed, and that the

\* Sir John Burgoyne insists strongly upon this in his writings.

‘ only army which could have been looked to for this  
 ‘ duty has marched out and departed, along with its  
 ‘ Commander-in-Chief, then it follows that the sailors,  
 ‘ and the rest of the people thus left to their fate who  
 ‘ may prove so brave and resolute as to be willing to  
 ‘ take upon themselves the work of a whole army, and  
 ‘ resist to extremity the attack of our victorious bat-  
 ‘ talions, will be acting in a spirit of desperation.  
 ‘ You say that, in defence, a spirit of mere desperation  
 ‘ is sometimes formidable. That may be in a street,  
 ‘ or a mountain defile; but it is hardly within the  
 ‘ competence of the spirit of desperation or any other  
 ‘ emotional impulse to hold a line of four miles against  
 ‘ the resolute assaults of an army.

‘ Nor, indeed, is it clear that the work we see going  
 ‘ on is undertaken with the single purpose of enabling  
 ‘ the garrison to give us a hot reception. The chiefs  
 ‘ at Sebastopol who are directing these labours may  
 ‘ rather be striving to prevent us from venturing the  
 ‘ assault at all until it shall be too late. Their main  
 ‘ object may be—and in that they would be wise—to  
 ‘ deter us from assaulting at once by a show of energy  
 ‘ and resolution.\* It is consistent with all we see  
 ‘ them doing, to believe that they are preparing a  
 ‘ solid defence against any attack we may make three  
 ‘ weeks hence, and are, all the while, acting with a  
 ‘ full conviction that resistance to an immediate at-  
 ‘ tack would be hopeless.†

‘ You say you will land your battering-trains. The  
 ‘ primary use of such implements is to break a way

\* This was the case. See *ante*, chap. ix.

† This was the case. See *ante*, *ibid*.



## C H A P.

## XI.

‘ through physical obstacles ; but what is it that you  
 ‘ want to knock down ? \* Engineers are accustomed  
 ‘ to say that when a place is guarded by nothing but  
 ‘ earthworks, the lines of defence are one universal  
 ‘ breach. It is not, therefore, for the purpose of breach-  
 ‘ ing any walls of defence that you are landing your  
 ‘ siege-guns. What is your object ? You answer that  
 ‘ by means of your siege-guns you can so get down  
 ‘ the enemy’s fire as to facilitate your assault. That  
 ‘ being your plan, it follows that, until you are ready  
 ‘ to make use of your siege-guns, you will delay the  
 ‘ attack. Well, but have you formed a clear concep-  
 ‘ tion of the time that will pass away before you can  
 ‘ put your siege-guns in battery ? If indeed you can  
 ‘ now at once use your siege-guns as means of getting  
 ‘ down the enemy’s fire, such a measure, it must be  
 ‘ acknowledged, will be a good preparative for the  
 ‘ assault ; but is that what you will really do ? When  
 ‘ you have landed your siege-guns, will you not want  
 ‘ to provide cover for the batteries in which you in-  
 ‘ tend to range them ? You confess that you will.  
 ‘ Your confession simplifies the question. It is now at  
 ‘ last clear that you are really entering upon the busi-  
 ‘ ness of trenches, with the prospect at least before  
 ‘ you of “approaches,” and first, second, and third  
 ‘ parallels, and all the laborious processes by which  
 ‘ men attack a great fortress. Call the task what you  
 ‘ will, you are going to undertake a siege ; and this,

\* This is not an imaginary question. In the evening of, I believe, the 28th of September, Lord Raglan rode up to the 4th Division camp and told Sir George Cathcart that it had been determined to land the siege-trains ; whereupon Cathcart said, ‘Land the siege-trains ! But, my dear Lord Raglan, what the devil is there to knock down ?’

‘ though you know that you must omit what ought to  
 ‘ be the besiegers’ first step. Without the possibility  
 ‘ of investing the place, you are going to sit down be-  
 ‘ fore the South Side of Sebastopol. It will not be in  
 ‘ less than three weeks from the day when we first  
 ‘ came down here to Balaclava that your batteries will  
 ‘ open their fire.\*

‘ Three weeks ! and from the day of the Alma a  
 ‘ month ! You are startled, as though this were  
 ‘ an extravagant estimate. Reckon then for your-  
 ‘ selves. . . . You have reckoned. Our figures  
 ‘ agree. Well, but now that you have computed the  
 ‘ length of the respite you are giving the enemy,  
 ‘ go farther, and try to make out whether all this  
 ‘ momentous delay is good for him or for you.  
 ‘ First, how will delay be likely to tell, for a time,  
 ‘ upon the relative numbers of the invaders and the  
 ‘ invaded ? By sending us upon this enterprise, far  
 ‘ away from the mainland of Europe, and in bold  
 ‘ disregard of the German Powers, our French and  
 ‘ English Governments have brought about the inser-  
 ‘ tion of a neutral army betwixt the Danube and the  
 ‘ Pruth, thus releasing the Czar from all care in the  
 ‘ direction of his Bessarabian frontier ;† and we ought  
 ‘ to assume that a large portion, if not indeed the whole  
 ‘ strength, of Prince Gortschakoff’s army is at this

\* The Allies completed their flank march on the 27th of September, and their batteries did not open until the 17th of October. The time they took was not lengthened by stress of war, or by accidents of weather or of any other kind, and therefore it is legitimate to suppose that the number of days required for the merely mechanical operations preparatory to the opening of the fire might have been computed in the last days of September with a fair approach to accuracy.

† The Austrian army was the one interposed in this way.

C H A P. ' moment rapidly marching upon Simpheropol. Any  
 { XI. ' troops which may have been previously stationed in  
 ' the more distant parts of the Crimea will probably  
 ' have been called in with all speed; and Prince  
 ' Mentschikoff's march to Baktchi Seräi seems to show  
 ' that anxiety to give the hand to his expected rein-  
 ' forcements must be one of the motives which urged  
 ' him to the singular measure of abandoning Sebas-  
 ' topol. On the other hand, we must know that, for  
 ' some time at least, we cannot hope to receive acces-  
 ' sions of strength at all proportioned to those which  
 ' the army of Bessarabia will afford to the Russian  
 ' Commander.\* Therefore, so far as concerns the rela-  
 ' tive strength of our armies in point of numbers, lapse  
 ' of time will be telling against us.

' Even more will delay tell against us in reducing  
 ' our moral ascendant. It is almost certain that an  
 ' enemy who has undergone a great defeat—a defeat  
 ' which obviously dislocated his whole scheme of de-  
 ' fence—must above all things need time and respite.  
 ' Are we to give him what most he wants? Your  
 ' victory on the Alma gave you a mighty power, but  
 ' a power which was vastly greater last week than it  
 ' is now—a power which will be less the day after  
 ' to-morrow than it is to-day—a power which will  
 ' dwindle to nothing if it is not to be exerted till the  
 ' middle of next month; for the Russians are a firm,  
 ' courageous people; and as soon as they shall have  
 ' filled up the chasms, and repaired the confusion

\* The soundness of this view was soon afterwards proved by the result; but there was nothing in the imaginary prediction which might not have been inferred from known facts so early as the closing days of September.

‘ which the defeat inflicted upon them, they will be  
‘ vastly more formidable than it is possible for them  
‘ to be at this moment. C H A P.  
XI.

‘ It is a common saying in war, that when, for the  
‘ defence of a stronghold, a pitched battle is ventured  
‘ and lost, the place falls ; but this maxim rests upon  
‘ the assumption that the victor will be prompt to  
‘ lay hold of the prize which the fortune of battle has  
‘ offered him ; and we shall be forfeiting what we  
‘ won at some cost on the heights of the Alma if we  
‘ not only allow the place three weeks of respite, but  
‘ suffer it, all this time, to be in free communication  
‘ with the roads by which troops and supplies can be  
‘ brought to its succour.

‘ But if time is thus so well fitted to enable the  
‘ enemy to recover from his weakness in point of  
‘ numbers, and from the stress of a great defeat,  
‘ much more is it favourable to him in enabling  
‘ him to strengthen his works of defence. You say  
‘ that we too can work ; but in labour of this kind  
‘ how can we compete with the enemy ? We have at  
‘ our disposal the few weary and too often sickly men  
‘ whom we can tell off for fatigue duty from the  
‘ already diminished strength of our regiments. The  
‘ enemy has thousands of strong, healthy sailors, he  
‘ has bands of dock-labourers, all well supplied with  
‘ food, clothing, and shelter. In point of tools, engines,  
‘ timber, and other materials, and even in point of  
‘ great guns, we must not compare our resources with  
‘ those of an enemy who has close under his hand all  
‘ that can be furnished by an arsenal, by a dockyard,  
‘ by a town, by a whole fleet renouncing the sea. The

CHAP. 'time we shall take to put twenty pieces in battery  
 XI. 'will enable the enemy to confront us with forty ;  
 'and with works better fitted for covering both bat-  
 'teries and infantry than any we can hope to con-  
 'struct in the same time.\*

'Yet again, think of the policy of delay as affected  
 'by the season of the year. We are nearly at the end  
 'of September. These warm, sunny days that we have  
 'had ever since the 14th, will be followed by the  
 'winds, the rains, the cold of autumn. Nay, force  
 'yourselves to think of the winter, for if once you come  
 'to the business of a siege, no man can say how long it  
 'will last. In means of providing against the rigour  
 'of the season, there is no approach to equality be-  
 'tween the enemy and ourselves. The enemy will  
 'have at his back a whole town, with hundreds of  
 'buildings of all kinds, including barracks and hospi-  
 'tals, and supplied with the stores that are needed  
 'for keeping an army in health. Our troops, on the  
 'other hand, with no other shelter than tents, will be

\* So early as the 8th of October Lord Raglan had perceived that the business of 'subduing the enemy's fire' by superior cannonading power was 'an almost hopeless task.'—Private letter (quoted more at length, *post*, p. 272) from Lord Raglan to Duke of Newcastle. In a letter addressed by Lord Raglan to General Canrobert at the close of the year, he had occasion to speak of the day when the besiegers opened fire, and he describes the cannonading power then exerted by the enemy as amounting to 'at least double that of the Allies.' It may be said that nothing but actual observation and experience sufficed to teach the Allies their inferiority in cannonading power, and that, therefore, the argument in the text could not have been used. I reply that, from the time when the Allies knew of the sinking of the ships across the mouth of the roadstead, they had before them the data from which it was competent to them to infer the great amount of power which would or might be developed by the enemy's batteries.

‘ lying on this bleak ridge at the mercy of the rain, CHAP.  
 ‘ the snow, the biting frost. If, therefore, the respite XI.  
 ‘ you are giving to the Russians should carry you into  
 ‘ a siege not destined to end in two months, your deci-  
 ‘ sion will put the winter upon the side of the enemy.

‘ You will remember, Sir John Burgoyne, that one  
 ‘ of your reasons for advising the flank march was  
 ‘ founded upon the hope that by this unexpected  
 ‘ movement to the South Side we might surprise the  
 ‘ garrison.\* Well, the hope, we now know, has been  
 ‘ realised. By our sudden march round to this side  
 ‘ of the place the garrison has been clearly surprised.  
 ‘ But how will this avail us if we leave to a garrison,  
 ‘ surprised for the moment, an immunity of two or  
 ‘ three weeks ?

‘ When you resolve to forego the present oppor-  
 ‘ tunity of carrying the place with a view to com-  
 ‘ mence a siege, you act as though you supposed that  
 ‘ you were relatively weak in the number and power  
 ‘ of your troops, and relatively strong in your means  
 ‘ of cannonading. But of these two suppositions each  
 ‘ is ill founded ; for at present you have a great supe-  
 ‘ riority over the garrison in the number† and quality  
 ‘ of your troops, and the ascendant which victory  
 ‘ gives ; whilst, on the other hand, the enemy, it can  
 ‘ hardly be doubted, has ample means of establishing

\* See the paragraph No. 2 in Sir John Burgoyne’s Memorandum of 21st September, *ante*, p. 68.

† Sir John Burgoyne thinks that, including the sailors, the forces constituting the garrison at this time might be reckoned at 25,000 (see ‘ Military Opinions ’) ; and he is not very far wrong, though Todleben cuts down to 16,000 the forces available for the defence of the South Side.

CHAP. XI. ' greater batteries than you can command. There-  
' fore, to forego the present use of your victorious bat-  
' talions, and engage in a war of trenches, is to give  
' up the ascendant you enjoy, and enter upon that  
' very kind of warfare in which the enemy, for a long  
' time to come, will be abler and stronger than you.

' Of course, it is a painful task to have to order  
' an attack upon a prepared position ; for, whatever  
' may be the expectation of final success, some por-  
' tions of the assailing troops must almost necessarily  
' be engaged in what, for them (though not for the  
' army generally, of which they form a part), is a  
' hard, unequal conflict ; but, circumstanced as we  
' are, we must not abstain from this assault on the  
' mere ground that it is a great evil to have to un-  
' dertake it. The question is, whether the evil which  
' we should bring upon ourselves by refraining from  
' an assault would not be still greater. We are under  
' the eyes of all Europe ; and unless the war comes to  
' an end, we can never go home without having exe-  
' cuted our appointed task.

' Here, on this barren shore, we stand fastened—  
' inexorably fastened—to the duty of taking Sebas-  
' topol ; and for an army in such a predicament as  
' this, the adoption of even a very hardy measure  
' may not only be free from the charge of rashness,  
' but may be commanded by the strictest prudence.

' Although the idea of this expedition to the  
' Crimea was one of exceeding boldness, it is perhaps  
' defensible (as events have hitherto tended to show),  
' upon the supposition that it was meant to be car-  
' ried through with despatch, and in a venturesome

‘ spirit corresponding with the audacity of the original C H A P.  
 ‘ conception; but it is only on that supposition that our XI.  
 ‘ invasion of this province of Russia can be justified ;  
 ‘ and we shall run into grievous danger if we become  
 ‘ too slow and too cautious in the execution of a plan  
 ‘ essentially hazardous in its nature. The very safety  
 ‘ of our forces has come to be so dependent on our  
 ‘ spirit of enterprise, that we shall be guilty of a false  
 ‘ prudence equivalent to actual rashness, if, after our  
 ‘ landing and our victory, and our daring flank march,  
 ‘ we now give the enemy respite, allowing him to  
 ‘ recover from the blow he has received, and to draw  
 ‘ to himself all the strength which the armies of the  
 ‘ Czar may be able to afford him in two or three  
 ‘ weeks from this time. To give the enemy so great  
 ‘ an advantage is surely more hazardous than to strive  
 ‘ to end the campaign at once by a timely assault.  
 ‘ His position, no doubt, is entrenched; and defended  
 ‘ by numerous seamen as well as by a detachment of  
 ‘ land-service troops; but it is a position four miles in  
 ‘ extent which has no army to hold it.’\*

These, I say, are some of the arguments which might have been adduced on one side of the question; for they are, all of them, based upon knowledge which had reached the Allies on the 29th of September; and that, it seems, is the day on which the proposal to assault Sebastopol was submitted by Lord Raglan to the French.

\* In the following November, both the French and the English engineers felt the strength of the meshes in which the Allies had entangled themselves by undertaking a siege, and came back, after all, to ‘enterprise’ and ‘audacity’ as offering the best means of extrication.—See Extracts from Memoranda of Sir John Burgoyne in the Appendix.



C H A P. General Canrobert for the second time.\* General  
 XI. Canrobert, it seems, reserved his decision until the  
 30th Sept. following day ; but ultimately the French adhered to  
 Its defini- their former opinion.† They still judged that there  
 tive rejec- ought to be no assault without first getting down  
 tion by the the fire of the place by means of their battering  
 French. guns.

Lord Raglan's negative to the proposal for having the tenor of the conferences with the French recorded in writing.

The effect of this in casting some degree of obscurity over what passed.

To prevent all constraint in the expression of men's thoughts, but also, I imagine, in furtherance of his desire to ward off the semblance of antagonism between Canrobert and himself, Lord Raglan, soon after the completion of the flank march, had negatived a proposal made to him for recording in manuscript the purport of the conferences then about to take place between the French and the English.‡ Far from wishing to record, he sought to obliterate all trace of the differences elicited by interchange of opinion. 'Evidently, this determination was a wholesome one ; but it tended, of course, after even a small lapse of time, to throw some obscurity over what passed in conference between the French and the English Headquarters ; and the information I have does not enable me to give—not to give even ever so

\* The date is fixed by the following words of a private letter, dated the 30th of September, and addressed by Lyons to Lord Raglan : ' I shall be anxious to know the effect produced upon Sir John Burgoyne's mind by his reconnaissance yesterday, and also the result of Canrobert's night reflection upon the proposition of yesterday ; and I will wait on your Lordship after breakfast.'

† ' He' (Lord Raglan) ' would have been very willing to do it by assault, but he was not supported in the proposal by the French General, nor by his own engineers.'—MS. Memorandum quoted *ante*, p. 244. I believe that Sir John Burgoyne was not present at the conference of which I am speaking.

‡ Information given me by the officer who made the proposal to him.

slightly—the tenor of the few words in which Lord Raglan elicited the opinion of his French colleague.\* CHAP.  
XI.

But the language used by General Canrobert has not been forgotten. His arguments were adduced so uninterruptedly, and were also so well put, that they not only constituted what men call a ‘speech,’ but a speech of much ability. The  
speech of  
Canrobert.

If the memory of one who was much impressed with the speech at the time can be safely trusted, it was somewhat to this effect:† First, Canrobert drew the attention of his hearers to the existence of a field army under Prince Mentschikoff which might seize any fit occasion for assailing the Allies in flank and rear; and although he acknowledged that Prince Mentschikoff’s strength could not be accurately estimated by the Allies, he insisted upon the imprudence of regarding it as otherwise than formidable. He spoke of the sacrifice of life to which the Allies must submit if they were to storm the place at once, without first breaking down the strength of its defences; and he insisted that whilst entangled in such a struggle—nay, even at a later time, whilst pushing their way in the streets of the town—the Allies would be exposed to grave danger from the enterprise of Prince Mentschikoff’s field army. He asked his hearers to imagine that army establishing itself on the plateau, and the

\* My conjecture is that, both on this occasion and on the one which offered itself two days before, Lord Raglan avoided anything like a lengthened argument, and even perhaps avoided any declaration in set terms of his own opinion, but submitted the proposal as one commended to attention by Lyons. His probable reasons for desiring that on this subject there should be no visible difference of opinion between Canrobert and himself will be seen *post*, p. 263-64.

† Information from an officer present.

CHAP. Allies beneath in a hole, so placed, so engaged, so out  
XI. of the controlling power of their commanders, as to be all but helpless.\* He showed the disasters, the ruin, which must follow upon such a condition of things. Then, and with the happy skill of an orator, he opportunely reversed the picture. The perils he had indicated need not be faced. Instead of the ruin he spoke of, there might be a glorious triumph obtained at but a small cost of life. Happily the forethought of the two Home Governments had provided the Allied armies with magnificent siege-trains. By the help of these the Allies could so break down the defences of Sebastopol that their forces would be enabled to enter the place without incurring grave loss, and without even risking that sure dominion of the plateau above, on which their existence depended. For himself, he declared that, if he were to incur the appalling risks of which he had spoken, when, as he maintained, this cruel necessity could be averted by putting in battery the magnificent siege-train which the Government had placed at his disposal, he would be condemned by the voice of his conscience, and the Emperor would never forgive him.†

In listening to his colleague at a conference of this kind, Lord Raglan would of course try to see whether Canrobert, with a mind yet open to conviction, was

\* In speaking of the Allies as 'in a hole' (*dans un trou*), he meant to indicate the low and straitened position of Sebastopol as compared with the plateau above.

† The rapidity of this transition from 'the voice of conscience' to the French Emperor will be apt to remind people of a celebrated refusal which amused wicked London and afterwards Paris some few years ago,—'Jamais ! Dieu le defend, et mon mari ne le permet pas !'

feeling his way towards a right conclusion, or whether he was adducing arguments in support of a determination already formed. In the one case, it might be Lord Raglan's duty to endeavour to persuade; in the other, to hold his peace. Evidently the tenor of Canrobert's speech was not such as to leave room for doubt. He had made up his mind.

C H A P.  
XI.

Canrobert's speech left no opening for attempts at persuasion.

Without the concurrence of Canrobert there could, of course, be no assault. He had refused to concur—had refused in such terms as to show the hopelessness of any endeavour to shake his decision. The question was ended.\*

It ended the question.

The duty of thus submitting for consideration the expediency of an assault, was one which had to be performed with exceeding care, and, if possible, in such a way as to guard against the evil that must result from an overt difference between the French and the English Commanders. Supposing, as the event happened, that the alternative of entering upon siege-work should be the one adopted, it would obviously be perilous to the good understanding, and even to the discipline of the two allied armies, if the English soldiers, when enduring the toils and the hardships of

The care required in submitting for consideration the expediency of an assault.

\* It is just that, before men cast blame upon General Canrobert personally for a want of opportune daring at this conjuncture, they should know the tenor of the very peculiar general instructions under which the French army was acting. The instructions are before me; but considering the circumstances under which they were imparted to Lord Raglan and the Queen's Government, I am not sure that it would be right for me to publish them without the assent of the French Emperor. The instructions were communicated to Lord Raglan at the Tuileries so early as the 13th of April, and almost immediately afterwards the English Government became apprised of their contents. Our statesmen were therefore forewarned.

CHAP. XI. protracted siege duties, should be able to say: 'Our Commander has brought this upon us by letting the foreigners have their way. He himself was for assailing the place; and because the Frenchmen would not agree, here we are on the clay and the snow.'

Lord Raglan's way of submitting the question.

But if this was a danger attending the crisis, no one living could be more competent to guard against it than Lord Raglan. Even in eliciting Burgoyne's opinion he did not, it seems, disclose his own;\* and although, as we have seen, he twice over submitted to Canrobert the expediency of an assault, he found means to do this without at all putting himself forward as a biassed partisan of the measure. He probably did no more than utter the few syllables which were necessary for inducing the French General to declare his opinion.† If he had found the least sign of a doubt in the mind of Canrobert, or any division of opinion in the French camp, then possibly he would have judged that the prospect of bringing round others to his own inclination was hopeful enough to warrant him in resorting to argument, and incurring the certain evil of 'discussion' for the sake of the possible good that might emerge from it. But no such occasion arose; for, Canrobert and Burgoyne being the two men whom Lord Raglan must needs have desired to see in agreement with him upon this question, it presently appeared that each of them was resting his opinion upon grounds of such a kind as to

\* See the words, 'No one,' &c., quoted *ante*, p. 244, note, from Burgoyne's Memorandum of 20th November 1854, and 'Military Opinions,' p. 199.

† See conjecture in note, *ante*, p. 261.

leave no opening for persuasion.\* Indeed it might be said that discussion was almost forbidden, when Canrobert had based one of his reasons for not assaulting upon ground appertaining to the conscience.†

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The effect of Lord Raglan's care was, that although he had caused the question to be considered, and although it had been determined in the way which he thought the wrong one, still the camp did not see in him a general overruled by his colleague; and, on the other hand, the common cause of the Allies was sheltered from the dangers to which it must have lain exposed if the soldiery could have said that it was Canrobert who prevented an assault by his resistance to English counsels. The attainment of this convenient result was perhaps, in some measure, helped by the publicity of Cathcart's proposals; ‡ for, to meet the exigency of camp gossip, in its search after those who desired to assault, there was needed at least some one man with whom to connect such a project, and the account of Sir George's advice came apt to the moment. Rumour fastened itself on his name, so content with a morsel of truth that it failed to catch what had been passing between Lord Raglan and Canrobert.

His success in warding off the appearance of differences between Canrobert and himself upon the question of assault.

When once General Canrobert had definitively de-

\* See Canrobert's speech, *ante*, p. 260. With regard to Burgoyne, it may be said, in his own words, that he looked upon an assault at the time in question as 'utterly unjustifiable.'—Memorandum by Burgoyne, 30th December 1854.

† See *ante*, p. 262.

‡ Of my own knowledge I can speak to the publicity of Cathcart's proposals; and it is certainly curious, though not the less true, that Burgoyne did not hear of them.

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The certainty that Canrobert's opinion against assaulting, when definitively declared, must prevail.

Tendency of divided counsels to end in the rejection of vigorous measures.

clared his opinion to be against assaulting, it followed that he would prevail. Many English, no doubt, at this time were entertaining a notion that, in warlike alliances no less than in common addition, one and one when united must have all the value of two ; and that, because the old rivals stood shoulder to shoulder fast linked in the bonds of a treaty, they were equal to what, in hard algebra, a man might call ' England ' plus France ;' but the world in general knew that there were fallacies in such a computation, and that one of them was the fallacy of omitting to allow for the effect of divided counsels. Independently of all the other evil they breed, divided counsels have a perilous tendency to result in the adoption of the Negative ; for when each of two men is independent of the other, any joint undertaking by the two must be founded, we know, upon concert ; whilst, in order for them both to remain in a state of inaction, or comparative inaction, no agreement at all may be needed. Therefore, when they differ, the stress of their mutual relations must tend to make them delay ; and when at last they force themselves to come to some kind of agreement, and to choose between two or more courses of action, they will incline to prefer the one which most nearly approaches to nothing. In other words, the least vigorous of any proposed plans will be the one chosen, not because it is the best, but because, as compared with the others, it has so much more of the negative character that its adoption involves a less ample surrender of opinion. Thus, supposing that Lord Raglan and Canrobert (whilst resolved, for the sake o'

abstain from all separate courses of action) were each of them to cling to his opinion with an equal tenacity, it could not but be that Lord Raglan's desire to assault must be defeated by Canrobert's desire to do no such thing. The mere words which express the tenor of such a negotiation serve to show its inevitable result. 'I propose an assault.' 'I decline the proposal.' 'I again propose an assault.' 'I definitively refuse to concur.' Plainly the question ends; and as it ends with the non-adoption of the proposal, the objector prevails. He does not prevail because he is unduly obstinate, but because he has on his side that force which in any joint counsels must always belong to the Negative.

But, independently of this consideration, it must be acknowledged that, in every proposal to assault the place at once, Lord Raglan was overborne by a great weight of what may be justly called legitimate authority. The French had always been more careful students of the arts of war than the English; and, for anything that transpired to the contrary, there was but one opinion in their camp. They condemned the idea of storming the place without first getting down its fire by means of the siege-guns; and we saw that General Canrobert, their Commander-in-Chief, placed his objection on grounds of so positive a kind as almost to forbid discussion. Besides, the question was one upon which the opinion of military engineers must needs be of great weight; and it happened, as we already know, that Sir John Burgoyne not only adhered to the same conclusion as the French, but went so far as to think that the opposite counsel

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The great weight of authority by which Lord Raglan was opposed.



CHAP. was of too wild a sort to be, even for one moment,  
 XI. tenable.\*

Upon the rejection of his proposals for the assault, Lord Raglan was frank and earnest in his adoption of the alternative measure.

His reserve on the subject of the differences between the French and himself.

Seeing that he could not hope to make his own inclination prevail against all this concurrence of opinion, Lord Raglan seems to have thought that the next best course for him was a frank and earnest adoption of the measure recommended by the French as well as by the head of his own engineers; but also he determined apparently to do all he truthfully could towards concealing the difference of opinion which had arisen between General Canrobert and himself. Not only did he avoid all recurrence to his words, but he even so comported himself as to ward off from camp the idea of his having been overruled by the French.† Nor was this all. I include the whole period from the battle of the Alma to the time now reached by my narrative, when I say that, with a refined and thoughtful loyalty, which was characteristic of his nature, Lord Raglan withheld from the Home Government all such disclosures of opinion as might show him to be more enterprising and more in favour of summary methods than the men who ruled at the French Headquarters.‡ He could not but know that,

\* See *ante*, p. 244 and the second and third notes, where the words of Burgoyne are given.

† Those who were in the English camp at the time will remember, as is observed, see *ante*, p. 265, that in current conversation the proposals for an assault used always to be attributed to Cathcart, never to Lord Raglan. Cathcart's name helped to mask the truth.

‡ The two lines written at night on the Belbec (*ante*, chap. iv.) were probably an unpremeditated and almost unintentional deviation. Notwithstanding the restraint which he thus imposed upon himself, Lord Raglan could not altogether disguise his perception of the evil which was resulting from the plan of giving the enemy a respite. Proof of this is given in the Appendix.

whatever he might write to the Secretary of State, CHAP.  
XL  
whether in the form of 'secret despatch' or private note, would necessarily, and indeed legitimately, be imparted to several others ; that the number of people thus legitimately apprised was subject to be a little augmented by the exigencies of the marriage-tie ; and that round the large group thus entrusted there always hovered the newsman, eager to hear, determined to tell, his mere presence suggesting a mart where tons of newspaper eulogy could be had for three grains of State secret. So, upon the whole, Lord Raglan could not but deem it probable that if he were to disclose to the Home Government his desire for an immediate assault, with an intimation that his wishes had been frustrated by General Canrobert and the Engineers both English and French, he would become the object of a brief popular applause in England, but applause of a kind which must be jeopardising to the Alliance and hurtful to the prospects of the war. To one constituted as Lord Raglan was, it would be quite easy and natural to apprehend all these probable consequences, and (as a mere common, evident duty) to avert them by observing silence. It is thus that I account for his reserve.

But the opinions of a commander are sometimes inferred from the conduct and language of the men who most closely surround him ; and as it happens that General Airey, in this campaign, was constant at the side of Lord Raglan, and so devoted as to be the last man who would put his mind into a state of—even argumentative—antagonism with that of his chief, it is possible that, in the absence of more direct indications, the act and the words of the subordinate

Probable clue to the opinion which Lord Raglan had formed as to the effect of the decision just taken.

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Communi-  
cation  
from  
General  
Airey at  
the time  
to the  
Com-  
mander-  
in-Chief at  
the Horse  
Guards.

will be regarded as enabling us to conjecture the opinion of Lord Raglan himself in regard to the consequences that must result from refusing at once to assault. Be that as it may, Airey ventured a step, at the time, which shows that he had caught the full import—nay, already had divined the consequences of refusing to assault Sebastopol. What he did, indeed, was only to write some two lines in a private letter; but, considering the place and the time, the purport of his communication, the personage to whom he addressed it, the events of the closing autumn, the appalling time which followed, the complaints that soon rose in Whitehall of the dearth of all warning information from the English Headquarters, and, finally, the return of the spring, bringing with it accessions of strength—his words were, at the least, a singular forecast; and to any who know how unlikely it was that he would be forming, and sending home, an opinion opposed to that of his chief, the letter will convey some idea of the light in which Lord Raglan may have regarded the decision just taken. On the third day from that when the French definitively rejected the proposal for an assault, Airey wrote to Lord Hardinge, the Commander-in-Chief at the Horse Guards. He did not presume to question the wisdom of the counsels which the Allies had been following; but he gave to the chief of the army at home what he judged to be the probable consequence of the decision just taken. ‘My own opinion,’ he wrote—‘my own opinion is that we are here for the winter, maintaining only a strong position until we can be reinforced.’\*

\* Private letter from General Airey to Lord Hardinge.

If the determination to reject all proposals for an assault was too easily formed, the causes which averted full deliberation can be well enough seen. In the first place, the insidious form under which the question presented itself gave a dangerous smoothness to the process of forming a resolve. 'We have our siege-trains, and shall we not use them to get down the enemy's fire before we deliver the assault?' This seems to have been the question which men thought they had to deal with; and, supposing it to be understood too narrowly, and without a perception of the ulterior consequences to which it might lead, the plan was dangerously easy of acceptance. All those, of course, could adopt it who approved the idea of entering upon engineer operations more or less resembling a siege; and, on the other hand, those who would have recoiled from the imprudence of wilfully conceding to the enemy a respite of twenty days, might unwittingly assent to a measure which did not, in terms, do more than add some heavy artillery to the other resources of the Allies; for at this time apparently no trustworthy estimate had been made of the number of days it would take to land the siege-trains, to get them up to the front, and to provide earthen cover for the projected batteries.\*

Another of the circumstances tending to avert dis-

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The determination to forego the plan of assaulting did not result from a careful weighing of the question. Causes which averted full deliberation.

1854. I never heard General Airey insist, or even, I think, mention, that he had been able to take this clear-sighted view at so early a day; but after the death of the late Lord Hardinge a quantity of papers which had been in his possession came into my hands, and amongst them I found the note above cited.

\* For the reasons showing that such an estimate might have been  
*note ante*, p. 253.

CHAP. XI. cussion was one which has been already referred to for another purpose; and that is, the exceeding confidence of the Engineers, whether English or French, and this, upon a subject which—partly, at least, if not altogether—lay within the range of their special science. They not only judged that the idea of an immediate assault was one of so rash a sort as to be actually unworthy of discussion,\* but were also very sure, at the time, that their plan of getting down the enemy's fire by means of their siege-guns would bring about the fall of the place.† Add to this that the opinion of the Allied Engineers was supported, as we have already seen, by the authority of General Canrobert, and apparently by the unanimous, or all but unanimous, judgment of those who had weight in the counsels of the French army.

And, again, it would seem that the judgment of the Allies was in some measure governed by a foregone conclusion. By some, unless I mistake, the expediency of making use of the siege-guns, then in process of landing, was hardly in form decided, but rather taken for granted.

\* This was Sir John Burgoyne's opinion, see *ante*, p. 244 and note. With respect to the opinion in the French camp, and the determination of General Canrobert, see the quotation from the Narrative of the French General of Division, quoted *ante*, p. 237, and given in Note to the 'Expédition de la Crimée,' p. 300.

† In a private letter addressed by Lord Raglan to the Duke of Newcastle he says: 'Since I wrote to you this morning I have had a serious conversation with Sir John Burgoyne. He was very sanguine of success at first, and considered that we had no very great obstacles to contend against, but he has gradually arrived at a different conclusion; and he now apprehends that the force we can command is wholly inadequate to the real attack of the front of the place to which we are opposed.'—8th October 1854.

The error which criticism ascribes to those who condemned all proposals for the immediate assault, is that of exchanging their power to seize the stronghold at once for an opportunity of merely besieging it, and that too with inadequate means.\* Being men, they could hardly be blamed for not seeing into the future; but the impeachment is, that they did not so read the facts lying plainly within reach of their knowledge as to be able to obtain a clear sight of the conditions in which they were placed. Thus, to take but one instance, they failed to see how they were bound by the vital condition of time.

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The error ascribed by Todleben to those of the Allies who opposed the assault.

In adopting a measure which was only the first and the easiest of a long, arduous, and bloody undertaking, the men who got the sway of the question were blind, or half-blind, it would seem, not merely to the probable effect, but to the then present import of what they were doing. They conscientiously, no doubt, resolved that, before attempting an assault, they would make a good use of their siege-guns; but then they were not really going to put all this ordnance in battery without first getting some cover for it; so that what they in truth undertook was to open some trench-work in which to plant their great guns, and with those to cannonade the fortress. In other words, they were determining—they hardly knew what they did—to enter upon the siege of Sebastopol.†

The real purport of their determination.

\* Todleben.

† In saying parenthetically that the opponents of the proposal for assaulting entered upon the siege without knowing it, I am warranted, I think, by the language of Burgoyne, and those who have followed his view. No 'approaches' were at this time meditated, and, for that

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## XI.

It was with the hope of bringing the Allies to this resolve that the defenders of Sebastopol had been toiling.

The third of the lost occasions.

It was with a hope of inducing the Allies to come to this very resolve that the defenders of Sebastopol had been toiling.

The great Engineer who directed the labours of the garrison has declared, as we saw, that the place, at this time, could not have been held against such an attack as the Allies had the power to make;\* and this is the judgment of one who, compared with all other men, had the fullest understanding and knowledge of the question on which he was writing. General de Todleben is fallible;† but unless he has underrated the defensive resources of Sebastopol, which he himself was preparing in the four last days of September, the determination of the Allies to give the garrison respite will have to be ranged as the third of the lost occasions which followed the battle of the Alma.

reason, there seemed to be a reluctance on the part of the engineers to acknowledge that the intended process was a 'siege.'

\* Todleben, 'Defense de Sebastopol.' General de Todleben's opinion applies to the state of the defences on the 29th of September, and even to their state at a much later time; but a great change had been wrought in the two days preceding the evening of the 29th (See, and compare the plans). An attempt to defend the place at the time when the Allies first appeared on the South Side would have been even more desperate than it was on the 29th.

† General de Todleben's most interesting arguments upon all these questions are in some measure vitiated by his errors in attributing to the Allies a greater numerical strength than they really had; but it will probably be considered that his conclusion upon the particular question above referred to would not be displaced by a mere correction of the numbers he gives.

## CHAPTER XII.

Of the conditions which surrounded the Allies in this their siege of Sebastopol, there were some of so general a kind, and so constant in their application to each varying stage of the conflict, that it seems right to speak of them here. And especially—for this condition held steadfast from the beginning to the end of the siege—it will be useful to convey an idea of the kind of help that was to be got from the presence of the Anglo-French fleet, and to mark out beforehand the bounds which were destined to confine its dominion.

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The extent of help that was to be got by the besiegers from the presence of the Anglo-French fleet.

It cannot be said that the conclusion of those who judged Sebastopol safe against an attack from the sea was ever upset or shaken by the subsequent course of events. It is equally certain, however, that nothing occurred which could be used as proof by experiment that the place was impregnable against an attack from the sea, for no irruption into the roadstead was ever attempted by the Allies;\* and the mere fact that an

\* Since the naval cannonade of the 17th of October was undertaken as a diversion, and not with any design of forcing the entrance of the roadstead, it forms no exception to the statement in the text.



**C H A P.** XII Anglo-French fleet lay hovering over the prey for a year and a half without breaking in to seize it, has hardly so close a bearing upon the question as it might seem to have at first sight ; for, powerful as is the separate navy both of France and of England, there are causes from which it seems to result that the united fleets of the two Powers are of less account for attack than the fleet of one acting singly. It may be that the difficulty of founding decisive action upon piebald councils of war is even more fatal to naval enterprise than to the operations of land forces. But, whatever be the cause, the lessons of history have hitherto gone to show that one of the ways in which England may carry on war without gaining naval renown is by yoking herself with France. In the days when a base Stuart king was hired to engage his people in alliance with France, the English navy was strong, and so was the navy of France ; yet the battles of Solebay and Schonveldt gave proof that, acting together, the French and the English fleets might be hardly a match for the Dutch. So, whatever may be the reasons for believing Sebastopol to be impregnable by sea, they did not receive decisive confirmation from the fact that an Anglo-French fleet was lying outside for a year and a half without making any attempt to force its way into the roadstead.

Seemingly, however, the reasonings of those who concluded that the place was impregnable by sea were as sound as reasonings of the kind could well be ; for if an artillery adept bends over a plan of the roadstead, and marks out with ruler and pencil the scope

of the fire from the forts as well as from the ships of the Russians, he finds his radii converging so thickly upon the mouth of the roadstead, and upon the waters leading on towards the Man-of-war Harbour, that even though no obstruction be supposed like that of sunken ships, he sees pointed out upon paper the assurance of ruin to a fleet which might strive to break in. Still it is of necessity that calculations of this kind should leave unreckoned the effects which may be wrought by smoke, confusion, miracle; by panic, by genius, by even that blind strength of will which in war sometimes gains over fortune; and, rightly or wrongly, the always empirical English are accustomed to think that a forecast which needs must leave out all these perturbing elements has no conclusive worth. They like that the boundary of what is possible should be sought for by actual trial—should be fixed, so to speak, by exploring, instead of by mere calculation; and it was hardly to be expected that their desire to have the experiment made would be brought to an end by their learning that the entrance to the roadstead had been closed by sunken ships; for the age was one in which physical obstacles had been much overcome by the art of the civil engineer; and many who might not underrate the power of the enemy when engaged in active defence, were still somewhat loath to believe that the heart's desire of a people who had made smooth their ways through mountains and beds of rivers, could be baffled by the inert resistance of six or seven drowned ships.

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The limits  
of the do-  
minion  
possessed  
by the  
Anglo-  
French  
fleet.

However, there stands the fact, that whatever might have been possible to a man such as Cochrane invested with the sole command, and untrammelled by the fetters of an alliance, the Commanders of the Anglo-French fleet agreed with the Russians in believing that Sebastopol was safe against an attack from the sea. Therefore, for the purpose of understanding the limit—not of what might be possible in the abstract, but—of what could be done by invaders impressed with this belief, it may be taken for granted that, although the Anglo-French fleet ruled unchecked over all the high seas, its dominion stopped short at the mouth of the Sebastopol roadstead. For securing the undisturbed maritime transport of supplies and reinforcements, whether entering Balaclava, or Kamiesch, or Kazatch, the Anglo-French shipping was all-powerful, nay, indeed, so completely unchallenged, that from the beginning to the end the waters of the Euxine were peaceful; and besides, we shall always be seeing that, so far as was consistent with the maintenance of a sure efficiency at sea, the generous zeal of the sailors, together with such of those things as could be supplied from ships' armaments or ships' stores, was from time to time brought without stint to strengthen and comfort the land forces; but it has to be said once for all, that, as means of breaking through that part of the enemy's line which consisted of seaward defences, the fleets were of no avail. In the roadstead and all its creeks the Russian was master. Nor of this was there ever much question, for in judging the limits to which the Allied fleets could push

their dominion, the invaders and the invaded were of one mind.

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Two other conclusions may be mentioned in which the contending belligerents were able to agree. From the time when the Allies were established on the south coast, they did not at all hope, and the Russians, on the other hand, did not at all fear, that the North Side of Sebastopol would ever be carried by means of a descent from the ships ; and with fully equal certainty, and on much better grounds, the belligerents knew it to be out of the question for the Allies to attempt to reverse their famous flank march, by moving back any of their forces round the head of the bay to their old bivouac on the Belbec. Our recognition of these three conclusions—not necessarily as sound in themselves, but—as conclusions in which the Allies and the Russians agreed, will help to put in full light some of the most trying of the conditions which embarrassed the siege of Sebastopol.

After the establishment of the Allies on the south coast, the North Side was regarded as secure against any descent from the ships ; and also against any attempt of the Allies to attack it by reversing their flank march. The trying conditions under which the siege would have to be carried on. The North Side remained free of access to the garrison, without at all absorbing their resources or giving them care.

For, first, it resulted that, from the time of the flank march, the North Side remained always free of access to the garrison, assuring them their free communication with the interior of Russia, and this without ever absorbing any material portion of their defensive resources. From the moment when it was known that the invading army had established itself on the south coast, the Russians, discharged of all care for the safety of the Star Fort and the whole North Side of Sebastopol, were free to bring their full strength to the scene of the actual conflict.

Next, it followed that along every yard of the line

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Along its  
whole  
front on  
the water  
side the  
place was  
secure  
without  
needing  
troops to  
defend it.

No actual  
invest-  
ment of  
the place  
was prac-  
ticable.

The op-  
portunity  
there had  
been of  
isolating

which defined both the town and its suburbs on the side of the water, the defenders were so absolutely secure as not to need there for defence the presence of a single battalion.

But, independently of that configuration of land and water immediately adjoining Sebastopol which served to aid the defence, there were features in the neighbouring country which could not but hamper an enemy who might advise himself, as the Allies were now doing, to sit down before the place on its south side. Since Sebastopol was upon the shore of the bay which bears its name, and since also the whole bay was left in the unchallenged dominion of the Russians, it followed that, in order to the investment of the place, the bay itself must be surrounded ; and it being on the west, and there only, that the Allied navy was master, the task of surrounding the bay in all other directions was one which could only be performed by land forces. Now the bay, as we saw, stretched inland for a distance of three miles and a half ; and the number of troops required for encompassing such an arm of the sea on the north, on the east, and on the south, would have ranged far beyond the resources which England and France could command. Therefore the actual investment of the place—and this, be it always remembered, is the first indispensable step in the process of a regular siege—was a thing which could not be attempted.

It may be said, and on sound authority, that a virtual investment of the place was at one time practicable ; for if, in the month of September, the Allies

had established a force on the great road which connected Sebastopol with the north, they would have done much towards putting the fortress in a state of isolation; and we have already seen ground for believing that from such a measure the immediate fall of the place would have resulted;\* but this opportunity was forfeited by adopting the plan of the flank march, and abandoning to the enemy, first the free enjoyment, and then the absolute and unchallenged dominion, of his great line of communication between Sebastopol and the interior of Russia. From the moment when the enemy—much doubting at first, and slow to believe his good fortune—was suffered to make himself master on the Mackenzie Heights, the Allies were no longer able, except by a fresh invasion, to intercept the succour which thenceforth, at the convenience of the Russians, could be freely poured into Sebastopol. Before the flank march, the enterprise against Sebastopol was a swoop at rich prey, forming part, it is true, of a mighty empire, yet seated in an outlying province, and liable to be torn off by force, if force could be used with due swiftness; but, so soon as the Allies had abandoned to their foe his great line of communication, and had also made up their minds to engage in a plan of slow warfare, then, in the full sense of the phrase (and without having means for their task), they became the invaders of Russia. Till that time, they had had to do with a provincial governor, far away from the centre of power, incredulous of the rumours which heralded their com-

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Sebastopol was forfeited by abandoning to the enemy the great road to Baktchi Serai.

The change in the character of the enterprise which was brought about by abandoning to the enemy his great line of communication, and entering upon a slow plan of warfare.


\* *Ante*, chap. iv.

C H A P. ing, surprised by their descent on his coast. Now—for  
 XII. so they had chosen—they were going to be confronted  
 by the gathering strength of a nation. Now—and  
 hardly before—they were brought face to face with  
 the Czar.

The way  
 in which  
 the flank  
 march re-  
 sulted in  
 giving  
 security  
 and free-  
 dom of  
 movement  
 to the ene-  
 my's field  
 army;

and in  
 hindering  
 the Allies  
 from un-  
 dertaking  
 aggressive  
 operations  
 in the  
 open field.

Nor were these the only embarrassments which re-  
 sulted from the flank march. When, on the 25th of  
 September, the Allies began to descend from the steep  
 sides of the Mackenzie Heights into the valley of the  
 Tchernaya, they little imagined that they were abdi-  
 cating their power to operate aggressively against all  
 Russian forces which might approach Sebastopol by  
 the great road from Baktchi Seräi. Yet so it was.  
 From the head of the roadstead to the Mackenzie  
 Heights, and thence on far to the eastward, beyond  
 the reach of forces besieging Sebastopol, the ground  
 was so strong that an army stationed or moving on  
 any part of the range could look down and defy the  
 attack of those who would assail from the south. The  
 result was that, whilst the general in command of a  
 relieving force would be in free and safe communica-  
 tion with Baktchi Seräi, Simpheropol, and the interior  
 of Russia, would be able to march to and fro at his  
 pleasure between Sebastopol and the great road to the  
 north, and would have it in his power to engage the  
 besiegers whenever he might wish to join battle, he  
 himself all the time—supposing him to keep to his  
 heights—would be quite secure from attack. If, even  
 whilst thus cooped down by the strength of the  
 ground given up to the relieving army, the besieg-  
 ers should be so reinforced as to become invested







with a numerical superiority over the enemy, they would have to bear the torment of learning that, for the purpose of operating aggressively in the open field from the base they now had on the coast, their strength could avail them nothing.\*

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We just now perceived how it happened that the Allied armies got to be pitted—no longer against the Prince-governor Mentschikoff, but—against the whole State of Russia; and we now come to see that (by reason of the impregnability of the roadstead, and of the heights ranging eastward from the mouth of the Tchernaya) the line upon which this great empire had need to prepare for conflict, was the arc of only four miles which compassed Sebastopol and its suburb on the land side. Nay, even from that narrow front a deduction would be practically warrantable, because, towards its flanks both east and west, the position of the garrison was so strong as to leave no more than a belt some 3000 yards long as the space really likely to be fought for. Of course, it is no more than the common lot of a besieger to find himself thus confined in his choice of the ground he can attack; but, in general, he compensates this evil by subjecting the garrison to the stress of an investment; and what made the plight of the Allies such a hard one was, the double impediment which hindered them from operating aggressively in the open field, and also stood in the way of an effective siege.

The small space of ground upon which the Russians were enabled to concentrate their efforts.

The double impediment which stood in the way both of field operations and of an effective siege.

\* This will be made evident enough when I come to speak of the efforts which the Allies were ready to make in the spring of the following year, with a view to recover their power of undertaking offensive operations in the field.

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The condition of things in the Crimea after the Alma was favourable to the Allies upon the supposition of their pushing their advantage swiftly; and formidable to them from the time when they made up their minds to a siege.

It will be observed, however, that great as these obstacles were, and much as they would be sure to embarrass the invader in a lengthened siege, not one of them was of a kind to hinder the Allies, whilst still on the Belbec, from attacking the north of Sebastopol, or even to deter them from assaulting the place on its south front as soon as they had made their flank march. In truth, the condition of things in the Crimea, after the battle of the Alma, was such as might well have contented the Allies if they had looked upon the expedition as one to be carried through swiftly in the first week after the victory; and yet would be likely to tell hard against them from the moment when, setting themselves against the judgment of Lord Raglan, and Lyons, and Cathcart, they reasoned away their first boldness, and wilfully suffered the enterprise to degenerate into a siege.

## CHAPTER XIII.

IN adapting the disposition of their troops to the undertaking now about to begin, the Allies had two objects before them: they had to provide for the duties of the intended siege; and also to secure all their forces, as well as they could, from interruption on the part of the enemy.

With this twofold purpose in view, General Canrobert divided his army into two bodies, each consisting of two French divisions. Of these two corps, one only—consisting of the 3d and 4th Divisions, and placed under the orders of General Forey—was charged with siege duties. It encamped with its front towards the town of Sebastopol, its left resting on the sea, by the gulf called Streleska Bay, and its right extending to the Harbour ravine. The French forces drew their supplies from the bays of Kamiesch and Kazatch.

On the other hand, Lord Raglan devoted every one of his infantry divisions to the business of the siege;\*

\* The infantry forces detached were only one battalion, the 93d, and some weakly men not in a condition for hard duty, together with one field-battery.

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Disposition of the Allied armies at the commencement of the siege.

Its twofold purpose.

The French forces charged with siege duty.

The English forces charged with siege duty.

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but his troops, as will be seen, were so posted, that whilst they had thus cast upon them the duty of pursuing the siege, they were also liable, as we shall presently see more exactly, to be summoned to the task of defending the Chersonese at its north-eastern angle. The English army had its left at the crest of the ravine which divided our lines from the French, and thence it extended eastward to ground not very far distant from the crest of the Sapounè Ridge.\* The English army drew its supplies from Balaclava, and at first by two routes; for, until the 25th of October, the Woronzoff road, as well as the way by the Col, was open to the besiegers.

The defensive arrangements of the Allies.

The extent to which these were favoured by the nature of the ground.

Works of circumvallation on the Sapounè Ridge.

In the task of securing their armies against attacks in flank and rear, the Allies were much favoured by the conformation of the ground; for the besieging forces were all upon the Chersonese, and the Chersonese was so bounded by the sea on the one hand, and the Sapounè Heights on the other, as to offer good means of defence. Except at the pass by the Col de Balaclava, and at the north-eastern angle of the Chersonese where accessible spurs are thrown out, jutting down into the Inkerman valley, the Sapounè Heights were by nature so strong as almost to form of themselves a sufficing rampart of defence; but, in order yet further to assure their hold on that part of the ridge which was committed to their charge, the French not only threw up some works to line the jaws of the pass, but also—with a care hardly needed because of the strength of the

\* Lord Raglan to Secretary of War, despatch, 3d October 1854.

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 tion.

The Allied armies were to be covered by the sea on the north-west as well as the south ; and on the more southerly portion of the Sapounè Heights, they were to be defended by Bosquet's corps ; whilst against any sortie from Sebastopol directed upon the French or English trenches, the besieging forces of course would be their own defenders.

Thus, except in one quarter, the defences of the Allies on the Chersonese were all to be soundly constituted. But against any Russian attack directed upon the north-east of the table-land, there was neither the obstacle of the sea, nor the barrier of interposed trenches, nor the defence that can be afforded by a corps of observation exclusively charged with such duty ; and in these circumstances, there was heaped upon the English siege forces the additional and separate task of providing for the security of the Allied army in what would have been otherwise an undefended part of its narrow dominions. Besides answering for the three ridges on which they meant

the extreme right, in a somewhat retired position, there was camped the 2d Division, supported by the 1st Division, or rather by five out of its six battalions (the 93d being at Balaclava) ; and on the left of the 1st Division, but divided from it by a ravine, there was the Light Division. These troops were destined to support that portion of our siege operations which was called the 'Right Attack.' The 4th and the 3d Divisions were encamped on the ground to the south-west of Cathcart's Hill, and were to support 'our Left Attack.'—'Official Journal of the 'English Siege Operations,' p. 23. Changes were afterwards made, as will be seen in future chapters.

to establish siege batteries, our people had charge of the ground which formed the north-eastern angle of the Chersonese. This ground, if so one may speak, had been half chipped off from the rest of the table-land by the deep and almost impassable ravine which descended into the Careening Bay; and it was only by an isthmus or neck of high land that the triangular quoin thus formed was joined on to the main bulk of the plateau. It would be vain to claim respect for the geographical nomenclature which prevailed before the war; for as long as there shall be any memory of the fight that was fought on that wedge of high ground, the English at least, if not others, will give it the name of 'Inkerman.'\* At first, the English cleaved somewhat jealously to this Inkerman Mount; but their eager desire to press the siege with alacrity soon caused them to grudge all the strength that was spent on collateral objects. Thenceforth, a strong picket was all they could spare for asserting the dominion of the Allies on that half-severed angle of upland where, four or five weeks afterwards, a battle was destined to rage.

The English could only spare a strong picket for the occupation of the north-eastern angle of the Chersonese.

The want of means sufficing for the occupation of this part of the ground was the more vexing, since it appeared that the formation of the spurs descending into the Inkerman valley was so favourable to de-

\* According to the geographical nomenclature prevailing before the war, and still adopted by the Russians, the 'Inkerman' Heights were on the other side of the Tchernaya, being those which descended from the region of the lighthouses and the adjoining highlands; but I have avoided in the text every such application of the word 'Inkerman,' as tending to unsettle and confuse the impressions of Englishmen.

C H A P. fence as to allow of their being held by a few against  
XIII many.

These dispositions effected a complete division of labour in the French army; but threw upon the English the two-fold duty of carrying on the siege, and also defending the plateau on its most assailable point.

Strength of the position of the Allies on the Chersonese, except at one point. There, no defence provided. Sir John Burgoyne's representations on this subject.

From these dispositions it resulted that, whilst Forey's corps had only to do with the siege, and Bosquet's had nothing to do except to defend a part of the ridge, the English were so posted as to have cast upon them the double duty of carrying on the siege and also defending the Chersonese at its most assailable point.

Upon the whole, the result was that the position of the Allies on the Chersonese was a position of exceeding strength at all points except one; and that there, though measures were taken for watching the ground, no actual defence was provided.

Sir John Burgoyne pressed earnestly for a change of these arrangements, and urged that, by placing a powerful reserve in an advanced position upon this part of the ground, and thence pushing forward strong outposts to occupy the spurs which project into the Inkerman valley and the ground at the head of the bay, the Allies should take care to enforce their dominion in the north-eastern angle of the Chersonese. This he desired, not only for the sake of securing the Allies in their position, but also because he perceived that their power of pushing the siege against the Karabel suburb would be grievously straitened by the presence of the enemy on that part of the ridge which flanked the approaches to the Malakoff. But he urged in vain. The French, it would seem, had resolved that the bulk of their corps of observation should remain concentrated along that part of the

Sapounè Ridge which lay south of the Woronzoff road ; whilst, so far as concerned the English, no force could be spared for the desired object without taking troops from the immediate business of the siege, and that was a sacrifice which Lord Raglan would not make ; for he was impressed with the importance—the growing importance—of time, and conceived that the actual attack on the place which the Allies were preparing should be made with their full might. It is obvious that a single general, having charge of the whole Allied army, would not have been at all likely to commit the error of accumulating a needless amount of force along the stiffest part of the Sapounè Ridge, and leaving without defence its more accessible slopes. Still less would he have been willing to do so, when he remembered that, except towards the north, the Sapounè Ridge was well covered by the plain of Balaclava where the English Horse camped and patrolled. The fault was one of the many which resulted from a divided command.

Such, then, were the arrangements made for the defence of the Chersonese ; but so long as the English should continue to look for supplies to the port they had hitherto used, it was necessary, of course, that Balaclava should be also secured ; and this place, though close to the south-eastern angle of the Chersonese, and lying indeed at its foot, was on the outside of the natural rampart which guarded the tableland. It therefore required a separate system of defence. For this, so far as concerned its eastern approaches, the steep lofty hills—which soon came to be

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Reasons  
why his  
suggestions were  
not complied with.

Separate  
system of  
defence  
required  
for Balaclava.

The way  
in which  
this object



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was favoured by the nature of the ground.

Works devised for strengthening the inner line of defence; and for forming the outer line of defence afterwards planned.

Lord Raglan's disposition of the scanty force which he could spare for the defence of Balaclava.

known as the 'Marine Heights'—were so well fitted as to be capable of being rendered formidable by even the slight works which could be quickly constructed for the purpose; and a redoubt, with a line of breast-work extending athwart the entrance to the gorge by the village of Kadiköi, was to complete the 'inner line' of the Balaclava defences. It was afterwards determined that an 'outer line' of defence should be constructed by throwing up a chain of small redoubts upon the low range of heights which stretches across the plain at a distance of about a mile and a half from the gorge leading into Balaclava.

With 1200 men commanded by Colonel Hurdle, and belonging to the force which gave its name to the hills, Lord Raglan found means to garrison the works on the Marine Heights, providing at the same time for the defence of the gorge of Balaclava by placing at Kadiköi the 93d Highland Regiment, with a field-battery withdrawn from the 3d Division; and he eked out the defence of the town by assigning for guard duty there some four or five score of men who were in too weakly a state to be competent to harder labours. The chain of redoubts which our engineers destined for the 'the outer line' of defence was to be constructed and manned by some bodies of Turks newly placed under Lord Raglan's orders.\*

Lord Lucan with his cavalry and horse-artillery was

\* A portion of these—two battalions—had been placed at Lord Raglan's disposal by the courtesy of General Canrobert; and the remainder, amounting to about 3500, was a force which, at the instance of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, the Sultan had consented to place under Lord Raglan's orders.

stationed in the plain to the north of Balacclava, with orders to patrol to the Tchernaya, and also in the direction of the gorges leading into the valley of Baidar.

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With the exception of this division of cavalry, the whole of the scant forces entrusted with the defence of Balacclava was placed under the orders of Sir Colin Campbell.\* The appointment elicited proof of the light in which his quality as a soldier was regarded. For several days, and not without somewhat of reason, men at Headquarters—I speak not of Lord Raglan himself—had been surmising that Balacclava was far from secure; but as soon as the Chief made it known that the place was in charge of Sir Colin, people went to an extreme of confidence, and ceased to imagine that ground where he was commanding could now be the seat of danger.† And certainly it was from no mere friendliness towards Campbell that all this confidence sprang; for his energy—a disturbing, and not always popular quality—together with the singular enmity he used to bear towards the Guards, was enough to prevent him from being liked in proportion to the trust he inspired. But that trust was deep.

Appointment of Sir Colin Campbell to the command at Balacclava.

The singular confidence in the safety of Balacclava which this appointment created.

\* The various arrangements described in this chapter were not, of course, all made at the same time, and were not permanent, for they were altered after the battles of Balacclava and Inkerman. They were carried into effect between the 27th of September and the middle of the following month. The appointment of Sir Colin Campbell to the command of Balacclava was made, I think, on the 13th or 14th of October. The 14th was probably the day; for that I see is the one assigned by Colonel Sterling.—MS. by Sir Anthony Sterling, p. 108.

† The extent to which this extreme confidence was warranted will be better judged of when we come to the battle of Balacclava. It will probably be thought that some of the arrangements for maintaining the outer line of defence were faulty or incomplete.

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The posi-  
tion of the  
French  
and the  
English  
Head-  
quarters.

The business of defending Balaclava with the slight means assigned for the purpose was no longer a problem nor a topic. Men knew the old soldier was there, and turned all their thoughts to the siege.\*

Both the French and the English Headquarters were established on the Chersonese—the English in a farmhouse a little to the north of the pass which led up from Balaclava, and the French at a spot farther west.† Lord Raglan was advantageously placed; for whilst he could communicate quickly both with his besieging forces and with Balaclava, as also with General Canrobert, he was also so near to the crest of the Sapounè Heights as to be able in a few minutes to obtain a commanding view of the plain of Balaclava, the valley of the Tchernaya, and those neighbouring heights towards the east and north-east, from which, if bent on an enterprise, a Russian field army might come.

\* A day or two after the appointment of Sir Colin Campbell to this command, a conversation with Lord Raglan turned upon the strength that everybody supposed to be given to the Balaclava defences by the presence there of one man; and it was remarked that the sense of security which the appointment created enabled a reader of the Wellington despatches and letters to feel the force of those expressions of the Duke's, in which he used to speak of himself as dependent for his repose upon the presence or absence of some one man—upon the presence, for instance, of Murray as his Quartermaster-General, or upon the absence of Maassena as his opponent. Lord Raglan seemed much gratified by hearing of the moral effect produced by the appointment, and then said that he had been greatly pleased at the way in which Campbell accepted the charge. He said that upon his asking Campbell to take charge of Balaclava, Campbell, though he supposed at the moment that he was to be subordinated to Lord Lucan, replied, without the least hesitation, 'Certainly, sir; I will place myself at once under Lord Lucan's orders.' Lord Raglan said he immediately explained to Sir Colin that his was to be an independent command.

† It was on the 5th of October that the English Headquarters were moved up from Balaclava to the heights.

## CHAPTER XIV.

Now at once—wharves had to be made for the purpose—the Allies went on in all haste with the toil of landing their siege-trains. But also there presently met them the yet harder task of bringing up from the shore to the front heavy guns, great stores of ammunition, and the loads and loads of material required for the business of siege work, besides all the usual supplies which were needed for the support of their armies.

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The landing of the siege-trains.

The process of bringing up to the front things needed for the siege.

The French had spacious landing-ground in their Bay of Kamiesch, with an easy approach to the ground where their siege-corps was camped; and it does not appear that they encountered any great difficulty in bringing to the front their stores and their battering-trains. It was otherwise with the English; for now there came to be felt the first stress of that want which was destined to be the cause of cruel sufferings to their army, and to wring the hearts of their brethren at home with a grief which soon turned into anger. Our forces, encamped on the Chersonese, were near, it is true, to their port of supply, but not in contact with it. There was a distance of six or seven miles which

The difficulty of the task so far as concerned the English.

C H A P.  
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had to be conquered. And how? The means of land transport were so slight in proportion to the enormous need, that the mere counting of the carts that they had and of the beasts fit for draught might well have induced the Allies to go back once more into council, and ask themselves yet again whether it was commonly prudent for them to forego or postpone their assault of the place for the sake of undertaking a mighty siege business without sufficing resources.

It would seem that the only means of transport available to our Engineers were some light bullock-carts of the country, amounting at first in number to forty-six, but reduced by the 12th of October to twenty-one; and that the way in which this scant command of draught-power had to be augmented was by pressing into the service every spare ammunition and baggage horse.\* Having those poor means of land transport, the English proposed to drag their stores to the front—a distance of six or seven miles—and there, sitting down as besiegers, to pit themselves against the garnered resources of Sebastopol and the vast empire lying behind it. With means of land transport not more than enough for a raid, they were invading an empire and undertaking an inland siege. It is true that by dint of toil long continued it was possible for them to drag up to the front the material for a day's cannonade; but then that consumption of time was the very sacrifice they could least afford—the very one which, in every battery and every church of Sebastopol, the devout Russian prayed they might make.

\* 'Official Journal of the Siege Operations,' p. 26.

From on board the Allied fleets large bodies of men were landed; and they were ordered—or rather permitted, for the men were burning with zeal—to take part in the active operations against Sebastopol. The brigade of English seamen thus placed at Lord Raglan's disposal was under the orders of Captain Lushington, and Captain Peel undertook a battery with a number of his men from the Diamond. Moreover, large quantities of the armament and other material resources of the fleets were freely devoted to the same purpose. Numbers of ships' guns of heavy metal were taken from the decks of the men-of-war, and afterwards dragged up to camp by the bodily power of the sailors.\*

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Aid given both in men and material resources by the Commanders of the Allied fleets.

In the eyes of those who have witnessed the contrast, as shown and developed by the business of war, it seems hardly short of a wonder that the same nation should be able to send out, to toil and fight for her cause, two bodies of men, each so devoted, each so excellent, yet parted the one from the other by a breadth so great as that which divides our soldiers from our sailors. It is true that the soldier engaged in campaigning is too often in a lower state of health than that which the sailor enjoys; but, even after recognising that physical cause as accounting for some portion of the difference between the two men, the contrast still keeps its force. For the mind of the soldier is so weighted down by the ceaseless pressure of Method, that he has little enough of resource except

Distin-  
guishing  
character-  
istics of  
the Eng-  
lish sol-  
dier and  
the Eng-  
lish sailor.

\* For details of the assistance in men and material which our Navy afforded, see Appendix.

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what he finds in his valour and discipline : he is patient, and, in some circumstances, strangely uncomplaining : he is grave, and calm : he has made himself famous in Europe for his power of confronting an enemy's column with what the French used to call his 'terrible silence.'\* On the other hand, the sailor, thrown suddenly into the midst of new conditions, is full of resource as Crusoe in his island. He does not hold himself at all bound to suffer without complaining. He freely tells his sorrows to his officers. His courage is of the kind that enables him, in the midst of slaughter, to go on cheerfully swearing, and steadily serving his gun—whilst in boarding, or any kind of assault, he finds a maddening joy ; but he would hardly enter into the spirit of an order which called upon him and his mates to stand still in straight lines under fire, keeping silence, and not rushing forward. With the performance of his duties he blends a wild mirth. As though in his infinite tenderness for all that he deems weak and helpless, he loves of all things to come ashore, with his exuberant health and strong will, to give a help to the landsmen. Sometimes in those early days of October, whilst our soldiery were lying upon the ground weary, languid and silent, there used to be heard a strange uproar of men

\* If I rightly remember, it was General Foy who, in the spring of 1814, assigned this observance of silence—'ce terrible silence'—as the cause which, in his judgment, had given the ascendant to the English infantry. He said the French could not stand it. See General Trochu's most interesting account of the demeanour of British infantry in the crisis of a fight—'L'Armée Française.'

coming nearer and nearer. Soon, the comers would prove to be Peel of the Diamond, with a number of his sailors, all busy in dragging up to the front one of the ship's heavy guns.\* C H A P.  
XIV. Peel has died—has died young—in the service of his country; but such was his zeal, such his energy, such his power of moving other men, that upon the whole his share of the gift of life was full and rich. Apart from the mere beauty of his form and features, there was a fire in his nature which gave him in that time of war an all but preternatural radiance. But whilst he was guiding the labours of his people with eye and hand and joyous words of direction or encouragement, the sailors used always to find their own way of evolving their strength. This they would do by speaking to the gun as to a sentient, responsible being, overwhelming it with terms of abuse; and, since it commonly happened that the stress of their pull at the ropes would get to be in some measure timed by the cadence of their words, it followed that at each execration the gun used to groan and move forward, as though it were a grim sullen lion obeying the voice of his keepers.

This process of landing battering-trains and bringing them up to the front was too difficult to be got through in the short space of time that was probably reckoned sufficing at the period when the Allies were resolving to enter upon a siege; and before they had yet got in readiness to open their first trench, the enemy's field army began to show signs of intending

\* Captain William Peel, a son of the late and brother of the present Sir Robert Peel. His guns were 32-pounders.



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7th Oct.  
Signs of  
change in  
the atti-  
tude of  
Prince  
Mentschi-  
koff's field  
army.

Prince  
Mentschi-  
koff re-  
sumes the  
dominion  
of the  
Mackenzie  
range of  
heights ;

to change the attitude to which its chief had condemned it since the day of the Alma. Prince Mentschikoff must have been told by his own officers, so early as the 28th or the 29th of September, that the Mackenzie Height was clear of the invaders, but his mind, it would seem, had been so put awry by disasters, as to become almost inaccessible to good tidings;\* and until several more days were past, he had confined the movements of his field army to those peaceful regions on the Belbec, in which it was impossible for his troopers to find a single battalion or squadron, either French or English. Nay, unless General de Todleben errs, Prince Mentschikoff's determination to move his army to the north of Sebastopol was actually a consequence of his learning that the Allies had marched off to the south.† But, by the 7th of October, the Russians had begun to appreciate the fact that, after all, they were once more the masters—the undisturbed masters—of the Mackenzie Range, including every road, every pathway which connected it with the valley of the Tchernaya. So now, at last, their Commander accepted the priceless dominion of territory which had been given up to him by the

\* On the 28th of September Prince Mentschikoff sent two squadrons of regular cavalry and two of Cossacks to the Mackenzie Heights.—Todleben, p. 267.

† 'The information which they [the cavalry patrols] gathered in their march proved it certain that the enemy had definitively passed to the south side. In consequence of this report, Prince Mentschikoff began to concentrate his army on the north side of Sebastopol.'—Todleben, p. 268. To understand the full force of this statement, any one not accurately carrying in his mind the features of the country should glance at the map.

Allies some ten days before, and not only resumed the full ownership of those Mackenzie Heights which secured his communications with Sebastopol and the interior of Russia, but pushed his reconnoitring forces down into the plain, and home even to the banks of the stream where the English horsemen patrolled. It was a patrol under Cornet Fisher which first felt the presence of the enemy in the country of the Tchernaya. The Cornet was surprised in the early morning by finding himself in contact with part of a powerful force which had come down into the valley;\* and three of his men were made prisoners.

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and pushes his reconnoitring parties into the plains of the Tchernaya where the English were patrolling.

At this time, moreover, it began to appear that the forces which constituted the garrison of Sebastopol were daily becoming more bold; for (supporting them in some instances by field-guns) the enemy now kept his outposts so firmly on ground far in front of his works, as to hinder the Allies in any attempt to establish batteries at a moderate distance from the place, and prevent their engineers from obtaining that minute knowledge of the ground which they wanted for the planning of their works. We shall see that the repression of this encroaching hardihood on the part of the enemy was the first in that series of measures now devised by the invaders which constituted their plan of attack.

The garrison at the same time were daily becoming more bold, and occupying ground far in advance of their defensive works.

The part of the enemy's defences which offered to his assailants the obvious 'front for attack' was that

The front for attack.

\* A whole division of cavalry, supported by several battalions of infantry and three batteries.

CHAP. slightly curved belt, which included the Flagstaff  
XIV. Bastion, the Redan, and the Malakoff Tower. This last work, or rather the ground on which it stood, had been pronounced by Sir John Burgoyne upon first surveying the ground to be the key of Sebastopol; and none indeed could well doubt that the capture of the Malakoff would carry with it the conquest of the other defences; for it took in reverse all the works on the eastern side of the Man-of-war Harbour, and its position on a high, commanding knoll seemed to offer to him who might once be there lodged good means of repelling assailants. But the Malakoff was not 'the key' in such sense as to import that it was the only key of Sebastopol; and it is the opinion of General de Todleben that—for reasons not altogether dependent upon the mere scope of fire from each site—the capture of any one of the three works—the Malakoff, the Redan, or the Flagstaff Bastion—must have carried with it the fall of the place. He likewise judged that the loss of either the 'Central' or the 'Land Quarantine' Bastion must have proved fatal; but those two last were not works which the Allies could attack with advantage.

The plan  
of attack  
adopted  
by the  
Allies.

Whatever extent of dominion the possession of the Malakoff might be capable of affording, the Allies, at this time, did not even attempt to include it in that road of havoc by which they proposed to break through the enemy's line of defences. Their reason will be apparent to those who remember that, for want of the numerical strength that would have been needed for

the purpose, the English were prevented from occupying in force the Inkerman Mount; for, without being able in that way to secure their right flank from aggression, they could not advance upon the Malakoff by the ridge which connected it with the plateau; and (except by the long-ranging fire of their Lancaster guns) all they could yet attempt against this work was to assail it with shot thrown across the intersecting ravine from the slopes of the adjoining ridge—that is, from the Woronzoff Height.\*

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Straitened thus in their choice of the ‘front for attack,’ the Allies determined that they would devote their first efforts to the object of carrying the Flagstaff Bastion and the Redan; for they saw that, if they could there break through the enemy’s line of defences, they would complete that severance of the town from the faubourg which the very form and position of the Man-of-war Harbour with the deep ravine at its head had alone gone far to effect; and they hoped that the mastery which might thus be attained would insure, with but little delay, the fall of the Malakoff itself, and all the other defences.

It was by the eventual assault of the Flagstaff Bastion and the Redan that the French and the English expected to be able to carry them; and, to prepare the way for the enterprise, they were not only intent to get down the fire of those two works, as well as of all the intermediate batteries, whether

\* Called by the English ‘Frenchman’s Hill,’ the site of ‘Gordon’s,’ or the ‘Right Attack.’

CHAP. XIV. planted on shore or ship's decks, which helped the defence of the place on its land front, but also—for the enemy's works were disposed upon the principle of what is called 'mutual support,' each one giving strength to its neighbour—it was their object to do all they could towards silencing, on the one side, the Central Bastion, on the other, the Malakoff Tower.

But since, after all, it was mainly with earthen entrenchments that the Allies had to deal, and not with those stone-work defences which oppose to the assailant in addition to other means of resistance a steep, inert, physical barrier, they did not hold it necessary to consume precious time in working on to what against masonry would be the right breaching distance by laborious, patient approaches; and their plan—the plan of both the French and the English—was to provide cover for their siege ordnance in positions near enough to the place to allow of a cannonade which should prove effective against the enemy's (chiefly earthwork) defences, and yet so distant that each position might be seized and fastened upon at once (under shelter of darkness) without the necessity of having to creep down to it gradually by dint of pickaxe and spade. After that cannonade, if it should prove as destructive as they expected, the Allies did not mean (as is done in regular siege) to dig their way on to close quarters, and there establish new batteries, but at once to undertake an assault.

The French were to establish their siege-guns :

single line or system of batteries upon the crest of the hill called Mount Rodolph; whilst the English intended to plant their 'Attacks' on two separate ridges, one upon 'Green Hill,' and the other on the 'Woronzoff Height.'\*

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The first step towards the execution of this plan was, as the Allies at the time expressed it, to 'draw the investment closer;'+ in other words, to push forward some of the infantry battalions to ground more near to the place; and this with a view to obtain for the Engineers better means of reconnoitring, and also to support the working parties in their endeavour to open trenches at a moderate distance from the enemy's works. This measure seemed to be rendered the more necessary by that increased and increasing boldness with which, as we know already, the enemy was maintaining his outposts on ground far in front of the place.

The first step towards the execution of this plan was to 'draw the investment closer.'

In order to give effect to that part of the measure which was to devolve upon the English army, Lord Raglan, on the 7th of October, assembled the Generals of his Infantry Divisions, and announced to them what he wished to have done;‡ but they, some of

7th Oct. With a view to effect this operation, Lord Raglan assembled his Infantry

\* Generally called by the English 'Frenchman's Hill.' It is in conformity with the language of the English Engineers that each system of batteries constructed by them has been called an 'Attack.' The expedient of the capital letter is resorted to as a means of indicating that the word is used in its technical, and not in its usual sense.

† Lord Raglan to Duke of Newcastle, private letter, 8th October 1854. After all that I have said as to the impossibility of investing the place, it is barely necessary to observe that the 'investment' here referred to extends only to that partial 'investment' which was effected by the position the Allies had taken up on the Chersonese.

‡ These Divisional Generals, it may be remembered, were Sir George

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Generals  
of Divi-  
sion.  
Their re-  
sistance  
to the  
proposed  
measure.

them, spoke a good deal, and they were unanimous in opinion that, without cover, they could not maintain an advanced position but at a cost beyond what it would be right to risk.\* In declaring against the idea of putting his Division in a more advanced position, Sir George Brown suffered himself to become vehement. I do not suppose—indeed I know it could not have been—that his vehemence arose from any spirit of antagonism to Lord Raglan; for he was a man of a good and warm heart much attached to his chief, and intending to walk loyally according to such lights as he had. The consulted Generals were, no doubt, aware that the desire to place our besieging forces on ground more close to Sebastopol had been submitted for adoption by Sir John Burgoyne; and it was rather, perhaps, in resistance to him, than with any notion of opposing Lord Raglan, that Sir George Brown spoke as he did. His mind was of the quality of those which are liable to be much impressed by the distinctions which separate one branch of the service from another; and I believe that he probably disliked the sensation of being directed and propelled by an officer of Engineers.

It seemed  
at the time  
that this

For appearance' sake, Lord Raglan caused the assembled Generals to express (in terms void of special

Brown, the Duke of Cambridge, Sir De Lacy Evans, Sir Richard England, and Sir George Cathcart. Taken literally, Lord Raglan's words would indicate that he had called together all his Generals of Division, but I do not imagine that he meant to include the Commander of his Cavalry Division.

\* Lord Raglan to Duke of Newcastle, private letter, marked 'Most confidential,' 8th October 1854.

significance) their willingness to aid in the siege to the best of their means ; but the practical conclusion attained by the council was the rejection of Burgoyne's proposal for a closer investment of the place.\*

After hearing the unanimous opinion which his Generals of Division opposed to the idea of pressing closer upon the enemy by moving our infantry to positions more in advance, Lord Raglan apprehended that for the time, and until the moment for assault should be ripe, our army must confine itself to such an operation as would enable the Engineers to place in battery some guns of long range.†

It seems probable, and even natural, that the course thus taken by our Infantry Generals of Division may have so contravened and so vexed Sir John Burgoyne as to make him fear, for the time, that the English must be frustrated in their desire to take a great part in the siege ; for although he had been ' very sanguine ' of success at first, yet now, on the day which followed the council, he astonished Lord Raglan by announcing that ' he saw insuperable difficulties in ' carrying on his Engineer works within breaching ' distance under the heavy fire which could be brought ' to bear upon them, and that the English must make

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resistance on the part of the English Infantry Generals of Division would oblige Lord Raglan to confine the operations of his artillery to a distant cannonade with guns of long range.

Opinion entertained by Sir John Burgoyne on the 8th Oct. after this decision of the Divisional Generals.

\* I have not forgotten the passage (vol. ii.) in which I spoke of the exceeding willingness of every one serving under Lord Raglan to give effect to his wishes ; but that passage purports only to speak of things as they were whilst the army was in Bulgaria.

† Lord Raglan seems to ascribe to the decision of his Divisional Generals the necessity of thus confining the operations of the English army ; for immediately after stating the opinion they gave him he writes, ' It was " therefore " resolved to confine ourselves, ' &c.—Private letter to Duke of Newcastle, 8th October 1854.



CHAP. 'up their minds to consider their position as princi-  
 XIV. 'pally one of bombardment, and as contributing to  
 'divert the enemy from the attack on the left'—the  
 attack where the French were to act.\*

This opin-  
 ion of Sir  
 John Bur-  
 goyne's  
 was a  
 surprise  
 upon Lord  
 Raglan ;

but he now  
 imparted  
 to General  
 Canrobert  
 the change  
 of prospect  
 occasioned  
 by Bur-  
 goyne's  
 last  
 opinion.

Two half-  
 sunken  
 long-range  
 batteries  
 commenc-  
 ed by the  
 English.

This opinion of his chief Engineer came upon Lord Raglan so suddenly that, until he had actually heard it from Burgoyne's lips in the conclusive form above stated, he had no reason for imagining that it would become his duty to prepare the French Commander for any shortcomings in the way of siege work on the part of the English ; but he now at once imparted to Canrobert the change that had just taken place in the prospects of the English, so far as concerned the use of their siege-guns. The French General did not seem to be surprised by this announcement, for he had previously learnt, it would seem, that the ground in front of the English furnished no materials for entrenching. Lord Raglan did not fail to assure General Canrobert that he should be ready to join him in any attack that might be determined upon, and to assist him in every way.

In pursuance of their plan of attempting something against the shipping and the other defences by their long-range guns, the English, in the nights of the 7th and the 8th of October, began the formation of two

\* Private letter, Lord Raglan to Duke of Newcastle, 8th October 1854. It must not be understood that the word 'bombardment,' when used by Lord Raglan and others who wrote at that time, meant only what in strictness it signified—that is, mere vertical fire. The expression was used at the time as signifying a cannonade directed against a fortress and its defences ; but an endeavour has since been made to restore to the word its original significance.

half-sunken batteries upon spots very distant from the enemy's line of works ;\* but meant to be armed with those guns of the ' Lancaster ' sort which might reach with their fire the ships at the head of the creeks, and the Malakoff, then called the White Tower. Those long-range Lancaster batteries, though intended, of course, to be auxiliary to the main purpose, stood apart in other respects from the general plan of siege labour in which the Allies were engaging.

The ground that the French had before them was favourable to the plan of ' drawing closer the investment ; ' and, in their camp, the proposal to that effect did not meet with the hindrance which it had encountered when Lord Raglan submitted the measure to his Infantry Generals of Division. The same day as that on which the English Generals of Division had delivered their opinions, but not till after sunset, nine French battalions, commanded by General Lourmel, were pushed forward and established in a sheltered position, beneath the commanding crest—the crest of Mount Rodolph—where the French meant to plant their batteries.

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The French acted upon the proposal for drawing the investment closer ;

and pushed forward nine battalions to ground lying under the crest of Mount Rodolph.

It was on the night of the 9th of October that the French were to break ground. Advancing from the ground where Lourmel had established himself, their Engineers, with a large body of men told off for the work, were to fasten at once upon the crest of Mount Rodolph ; and this they proposed to do by throwing up a gabionade a few yards in advance of the ground they had selected as the site of their intended bat-

On the night of the 9th Oct. the French broke ground.

\* About 2800 yards from the nearest of the enemy's works.

**C H A P.** teries. By this gabionade (to be thrown up as effec-  
XIV. tually as might be in one night) they intended to provide a fitting screen or cover for the subsequent operation of sinking the trenches in which their batteries were to be placed.

The night was clear, but there blew a fresh wind from the north-east, which prevented the garrison from hearing the sound of the pickaxe; and relays of working parties, numbering altogether 1600, were enabled to toil all the night without being molested, so that, when morning dawned, they had thrown up a work some 1100 yards in length, and at a distance of about 1000 yards from the Central Bastion.\* Men imagined that the spectacle of what they had been suffered to achieve without hindrance, must needs become a painful one to the enemy as soon as he should discover it. They little imagined—what yet we shall by-and-by see—they little imagined the feeling with which, on the morning of the 10th of October, the garrison would learn that their foe had indeed broken ground, and begun upon that kind of strife which is waged with pickaxe and spade.

The progress of the French works.

From this time, the French pushed on their works with great spirit; and, as marking the singular difference that there is between the ways of a French and the ways of an English commander, it seems worth while to repeat the order which was issued at this time by Forey. He gave orders for 'zeal,' and 'con-tempt of danger.' 'It is necessary,' said he, in his general order, 'that every one, by his zeal, by his

\* 1030 yards.

‘contempt of danger, should aim at attaining as promptly as possible the glorious end which we propose to ourselves.’

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And of the warlike virtues thus invoked there was no default. The enemy often busied himself with sallies at night, and the cannonades with which he assailed his besiegers and their works rarely ceased for any long time, and were sometimes of exceeding power. It is recorded that one day—the 14th of October—and in the space of a single hour, there were hurled against the works of the French no less than 800 cannon-shot; with a result which included a good deal of harm to the parapets, but killing only two men and wounding three.\* The next day, for a time, a fire of the same kind was again opened; but notwithstanding all the hindrances offered, the French works on Mount Rodolph grew fast towards completion, and were soon connected with one another, as also with the ground in their rear, by fitting lines of entrenchment.

The enemy's sallies and cannonades.

Progress of the French works.

Whilst the French, in most places, had beneath them a fair enough depth of such earth as will yield to the pickaxe and spade, the ground in front of the English was almost bare rock—rock covered but thinly, where covered at all, with soil a few inches deep. Partly from that cause, partly from the configuration of the ground, and partly from the failure of the above

The difficulties encountered by the English.

The plan with which the English were obliged to content themselves.

\* Niel, p. 53; and Todleben, p. 300, who gives the number of shots at 960. The object of these cannonades of the 14th and 15th of October was to test the working of the Russian batteries, and prepare by actual experiment for the day of conflict.—Todleben, p. 299.

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stated proposal for drawing the investment more close, our Engineers were prevented from fastening, as the French had been able to do, upon ground at all near to the fortress. The most that the English at this time could do was to endeavour to establish their siege-guns upon the Woronzoff Height and the Green Hill, at distances of from 1300 to 1400 yards from the place ; and this they proposed to do by seizing at night-time the best ground that could be chosen for the purpose on each of the two ridges, and there constructing the batteries with which they intended to prepare the way for assault.

In the nights of the 10th and 11th Oct. the English opened their trenches on Green Hill and the Woronzoff Height ; and soon it was perceived that their batteries were likely to operate more efficiently than had been at first expected.

The appearance of desolation created at this time by the necessity

Accordingly, on the nights of the 10th and the 11th of October, the English succeeded in opening the trenches which they had designed to construct on Green Hill as well as on the Woronzoff Height ; and it soon appeared that the fire they had means of preparing was likely to be much more effective than they had ventured to hope that it could be when first they prepared to break ground.

By the evening of the 16th of October the English had established their batteries, and stood ready, as did also the French, to open fire on the following morning.

The English were to be held ready to storm the Redan as soon as the French operations should be ripe for a like effort against the Flagstaff Bastion.

War by this time had set its desolating mark upon the ridges and the slopes of the Chersonese. When first the Allies seized the ground, there was to be seen here and there a farmhouse, a windmill, a cluster of cottages. But amongst the many wants of the Alli

want of timber was one; and the English more especially were put to great straits in this respect, because the platforms sent out with their siege-trains were of a new and ingenious structure, which, though promising to serve its end admirably when tried upon a perfect level at Woolwich, turned out to be altogether unfitted for the rocky, and necessarily uneven ground where our batteries had to be placed. So, all at once, it appeared that platforms of the old-fashioned sort must be framed; and, to meet the emergency, most of the few buildings which stood on the Chersonese were quickly stript of their roofs. It was only necessity which drove Lord Raglan to this measure, for he well knew of course that, in many ways, the roofed buildings found on the Chersonese could not but be of great value to his army. Another house standing within reach of a sally which the enemy undertook for the purpose, was by him set on fire, and burnt down. Marked thus, with the ruins of men's homes standing up here and there on the sky-line, the hills began to look ghastly.

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of strip-  
ping the  
buildings  
of their  
roofs.

## CHAPTER XV.

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XV.

Desire  
that the  
fleets  
should  
take part  
in the at-  
tack upon  
Sebasto-  
pol.

ALTHOUGH the Generals of the Allied armies trusted that, by the process already described, it was feasible to break into the place against even the most steady resistance, they yet were not without hope that the power of their artillery, when felt in the town of Sebastopol, and along the lines of defence, might beget such confusion and panic as would be likely to paralyse the defence, and ease the task of assaulting. Pursuing that thought, they desired that, in order still further to perturb the mind of the enemy, and distract it from quarters where the strife would be vital, the fleets should take part in the enterprise by attempting some kind of attack.

It will presently be seen that, to obtain this concurrence of the navy, a good deal of urgency was used ; and it is well to understand the grounds of that resistance—whether actual, or only anticipated—which had to be overcome by so strong an exertion of will.\*

The warlike thousands who manned the Allied

\* In a private letter to Lord Raglan, 20th October 1854, Dundas says plainly that he consented to the operation undertaken by the fleets 'with reluctance.'

fleets had long been yearning for the hour of battle with impassioned vehemence; but the mental state of such combatants as have only to fight under orders is not at all similar to that of a commander who must answer to his Government, to his country, and to himself, for the wisdom of what he undertakes; and it would seem that, at this conjuncture, the mind of an Admiral entrusted with power to grant or withhold the aid of the English navy must have laboured with thoughts of this kind: 'Any good opportunity for taking part in the attack upon Sebastopol would be singularly welcome; for the eagerness of our people on board has grown to a height almost dangerous to the maintenance of authority;\* and as the landsmen are confident in their hope of carrying the place, we have every motive for sharing in the achievement, if only we can do so with credit. Perhaps our best mode of effecting a diversion in favour of the army would have been to choose the moment appointed for the assault, and then make a feint of landing towards the north, at the same time cannonading the batteries on the north shore with the fire of twenty steamers. Such an operation would have been likely to make the enemy withdraw troops from the scene of the real conflict.† But a diversion of that kind is not, it seems, what the Generals desire. They wish that the attack by the fleets should be

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The difficulty of indicating a way in which it would be prudent for the fleets to take part in the attack.

\* This was the case.

† This was Dundas's opinion.—Letter of his to Lord Raglan, 25th  
—reader of Todleben's work will probably incline to  
be in the right direction.



CHAP. ' one more closely in unison with that to be delivered  
XV. ' by the land forces. Let us see, then, what the fleets

' can do in the way of direct attack upon Sebastopol.

' We determined, some time ago, that in the face of  
' this barrier of sunken ships, and of the forts, north  
' and south, which arm the jaws of the roadstead, we  
' would not attempt to break in. Is that decision to  
' be reconsidered?

' No? Then it follows that, in the way of direct  
' attack upon Sebastopol, we can do nothing more  
' than cannonade the sea-forts. Well, but with what  
' result can we hope to engage our wooden ships  
' against casemated forts of stone, the work of a  
' quarter of a century? Amongst those who have  
' weighed the question of what ships can do against  
' masonry, some perhaps still imagine that, with water  
' enough to admit of close quarters, a fleet having no  
' other charge than to batter down a stone fortress, or  
' else be sunk in the attempt, might possibly come off  
' victorious. But whether that be so or not we need  
' hardly consider, for the soundings do not offer us  
' any such opportunity, and from our Governments  
' we have no such mission. We have it in charge  
' to defend the existence of the land forces by main-  
' taining the dominion of the sea. With such a task  
' weighing upon him, no naval commander would be  
' warranted in crippling his fleet for the sake of at-  
' tempting mere mischief against the sea-forts at a  
' range of 800 yards.

' If only for the sake of the land forces, and the  
' whole purpose of the invasion, our squadrons must

‘ be always kept in a condition to maintain their  
 ‘ ascendant at sea. It is thought by some that this  
 ‘ ascendant has been placed beyond the reach of all  
 ‘ challenge by the sacrifice the Russians have made.  
 ‘ True, the enemy has been dealing with some parts of  
 ‘ his Sebastopol fleet in a way which seemed to show  
 ‘ that he no longer meant it for sea; and, indeed, when  
 ‘ we saw how he had sunk a number of his ships across  
 ‘ the mouth of the roadstead, we not only said, “ There  
 ‘ “ ends the naval campaign ! ” but even ventured at  
 ‘ once to give up to the land service a large proportion  
 ‘ of our strength in seamen and marines, as well as in  
 ‘ guns and materials ; yet, for all that, there is still one  
 ‘ way—a way disastrous for us—in which it would be  
 ‘ possible for our squadrons to bring about a renewal  
 ‘ —or rather, one may say, a commencement—of the  
 ‘ naval campaign. Only let us suffer our fleets to be  
 ‘ disabled by a ruinous encounter with the forts, and  
 ‘ then the Sebastopol fleet—for, after all, it is only a  
 ‘ portion of it which has been sunk—will be able at  
 ‘ last to come out and find us for once in a state ill-  
 ‘ fitted for a naval encounter.

‘ Certainly we shall not choose to prepare such a  
 ‘ disaster for our fleets. Neither we nor any successor  
 ‘ of ours will ever engage the batteries in a way that  
 ‘ might be ventured by a commander who is able to  
 ‘ risk, and risk frankly, the actual destruction of his  
 ‘ squadron in an attack upon stone forts ;\* and if we

\* Dundas soon had a successor. No living man, I imagine, could desire more passionately than Lyons did to bring the power of the Navy to bear upon the great enterprise, but from the moment when he

CHAP. XV. 'are persuaded to assail these sea-forts at all, we shall  
 'not engage in the business with that desperate pur-  
 'pose of running all hazards which alone could open  
 'out to us any even faint prospect of success. We  
 'know, in effect, beforehand, that our attack of the sea-  
 'forts would be followed by no result which could be  
 'worthily called a victory for the naval forces. We  
 'know more. We know that, after a while, mere ex-  
 'haustion of shot will bring our bombardment to a  
 'stop; and yet, if we thus desist and sheer off without  
 'having first achieved the ruin or surrender of the  
 'forts which we attack, our failure will be signal—  
 'will, in short, be a kind of defeat. Supposing that  
 'we give our aid in the attack of Sebastopol, the part  
 'we take will be this: For the purpose of effecting a  
 'diversion in favour of the land forces, we shall attack  
 'the forts in half earnest, yet at some cost of life and  
 'limb and naval strength. If that were all, we might  
 'willingly do as we are asked; but also—and there  
 'lies the precious sacrifice—we shall be wilfully en-  
 'countering a discomfiture. Can this be agreed to  
 'by one whose duty it is to maintain unimpaired the  
 'renown of the navy?'

The  
 French  
 Admiral  
 was under  
 the orders  
 of General  
 Canrobert.  
 Lord Rag-  
 lan's pro-  
 bable re-

The French Admiral was under the orders of General Canrobert; and although Lord Raglan had no actual authority over the English fleet, he could speak to its Admiral in the form of request, and that, too, with no little cogency. By character and temperament, no man then living, I think, could have been less inclined

attained the command of the fleet until the close of the war he struck a blow at Sebastopol.

than Lord Raglan to press with advice or exhortation upon a colleague of the sister service holding equal command with himself; and the terms of his intercourse with Admiral Dundas were not of such a kind as to lessen his reluctance; but he felt all the weight of that charge to capture Sebastopol, which was given, as he expressed it, by 'the united voice of the Queen, 'the Government, and the country;' and besides, he already perceived that an army nailed fast to the Chersonese by the strength of an unperformed vow, must soon be brought into trouble by time and the lapse of the seasons. Therefore it was that, with a degree of urgency to which he but seldom resorted, he resolved to press upon Admiral Dundas the importance of supporting the efforts of the land forces by the active co-operation of the fleet.

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reluctance  
to press  
advice on  
Dundas.

His sense  
of the duty  
which  
weighed  
upon him.

It would have been well if the communication needed for this purpose had been oral; and indeed it must be acknowledged that, at this conjuncture, the feelings which prevented a cordial and personal intercourse between Lord Raglan and Admiral Dundas did harm to the public service. The differences existing between them had been closed, it is true, in a measure, by the reconciliation effected in the previous month, and thenceforth the written correspondence of the two chiefs with each other was conducted in a way that is usual with men who are personally acquainted; but still Dundas never used to come to Headquarters, and Lord Raglan, as might be supposed, did not leave his duties on shore to go and meet the Admiral. This separation, so far as it went, was not

The want  
of personal  
inter-  
course  
between  
Lord Rag-  
lan and  
Dundas.

C H A P. resulted, for Lyons, as the commander of the in-shore  
 XV. squadron, was ever at hand—ever burning with zeal to bring to the aid of the land forces the resources of the fleet ; but now that the duty of landing troops and supplies, and tending the march of the armies, was to be followed by that of determining whether the fleets should take part with the land forces in one great attack upon Sebastopol, much advantage would have been likely to result from a close and free intercourse between Lord Raglan and Dundas. Indeed no one, I think, well acquainted with the qualities of the two commanders, would easily believe that, after conversing freely upon such a question, they would have been likely to come to any other than a sound conclusion.

The absence of Dundas at this time from the English Headquarters was not effectually supplied by Lyons.

Rather, it will be inferred that the counsels of Lyons were conducing to the course Lord Raglan took.

This, however, was not to be ; and I cannot think that the absence of Dundas from the English Headquarters was effectually supplied by Lyons. Nay, it rather will be inferred that the counsels of Lyons, at this time, were conducing to the course which Lord Raglan took, and to the naval operation which resulted.

The time I now speak of is the second week in the month of October. Lyons then, with the Agamemnon, was on duty at Balaclava. As might be expected, he was much with Lord Raglan, and the intercourse between the two was most cordial. By his exceeding zeal for the cause, Lyons had wrought himself into a high state of vehemence ; and he had not yet cleared his mind (as he did a day or two afterwards) by comparing his idea of what the navy could do at Sebastopol, with that entertained in

considering the cordial terms on which Lord Raglan was associated with Lyons, and the course which duty and common-sense would naturally enjoin, it may be regarded as certain that the appeal which Lord Raglan was about to address to Dundas, must have been made after free consultation with Lyons. It is not less certain that, if Lyons at this time had gained that greater clearness of view which he derived on the following Monday from his intercourse with the ships' captains, his counsels would have been of much greater worth to Lord Raglan; and in that case also, it may, I think, be inferred that Lord Raglan's appeal to Dundas would either have been withheld altogether, or else would have been made in terms less cogent, and leaving more room for the free deliberation of the naval Commander.\* Be that as it may, Lord Raglan's appeal was in writing, and the letter which conveyed it ran thus:—

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‘BEFORE SEVASTOPOL, 13th October 1854.

Lord Raglan's letter to Dundas sent 14th, dated 13th, of October.

‘MY DEAR ADMIRAL DUNDAS,—This letter will be delivered to you by Lieutenant-Colonel Steele. I have requested him to wait upon you with it, and if you will be so good as to allow him to impress upon you the great importance I attach to the active co-operation of the combined fleets, upon the day on which the French and English armies open their fire, and commence their attack upon Sevastopol.

‘That day is fast approaching, and both General Canrobert and

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\* See *post*, extract from letter of Lyons to Lord Raglan of the 16th of October. I think it plain from the tenor of that letter that, until Lyons, after being recalled to the fleet, had brought his mind into contact with those of the ships' captains, he had not perceived the most objectionable feature of the proposed naval attack. From the time when he thus corrected his view, I do not see that his opinion of the plan, in a naval point of view, differed from that of Dundas.

## C H A P.

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‘ myself feel that, if the enemy’s attention can be occupied on the sea front as well as upon that of the land, there will be a much greater chance of making a serious impression upon their works of defence, and of throwing the garrison into confusion. If the first efforts of a combined attack by sea and land should be great, the most advantageous consequences may be anticipated from it; and I know no way so likely to insure success as the combined efforts of the Allied naval and military forces. The royal navy has already done so much for the army, that the latter has no claim upon its further exertions perhaps; but then it must be recollected that the former aspires to share in the renown which those of the sister service hope to gain in bringing the present enterprise to a happy conclusion, and their presence would go far to make all feel that victory would be nearly a matter of certainty. I can hardly find terms to express my sense of the aid afforded to me by Sir Edmund Lyons since he came into Balaclava; but now that most of what we chiefly required has been landed, and active measures have been taken to put the place in a state of defence, I should do an injustice to him if I were to urge the further detention of the *Agamemnon* in the harbour, and particularly when I see that there is a chance of that noble ship distinguishing itself under his able guidance. I entertain no doubt that it is his ambition that it should be so employed. Our position here is at least an extraordinary one. We are in the middle of October. The fine weather which we have been so fortunate as to enjoy, with one single day’s exception, since we appeared on the south side of Sevastopol, can hardly be expected to last much longer, and large reinforcements are moving from the northward to the assistance of Prince Mentschikoff. Time, therefore, is most precious, and we have not much left to capture the place which we have been called upon by the united voice of the Queen, the Government, and the country, to take possession of, and which our recent success on the *Alma* will have led all to believe could and would be accomplished. Not to disappoint these universal expectations, the combined efforts of all branches of the naval and military service are necessary, and none, I am sure, will be withheld.

‘ Excuse my pressing these considerations upon your attention.

(Signed)

His Excellency Vice-Admiral DUNDAS, C.B.’

It must be acknowledged that the feeling which prevailed in the English fleet at this time was not at all such as to support Dundas in any resistance to Lord Raglan's appeal. From the very souls of those thousands of warlike men, all bent upon hopes of a fight long given and long deferred, there had been generated a force too mighty, and, if so one may say, too spiritual, in its nature, to be altogether controllable by mere authority. To resist it, a commander would need all the support that could be given him by an officer serving next under him. Lyons was the second in command. He, however, by this time, had certainly placed himself in a state of determined antagonism to his chief. Devoting his energies, with all that fiery zeal of which we have spoken, to the business of the invasion, he seems to have lost his power of appreciating the less stirring duties which devolved upon Dundas; and (apparently) by contrasting his own ceaseless activity with the seeming quietude of the Vice-Admiral, he wrought himself into a state of mind and feeling which was hardly compatible with loyalty towards his chief. Lyons himself, I think, would not have said that he was loyal to Dundas; but rather would have insisted that, because of the lukewarmness and obstructive tendency which he imputed to his chief, disloyalty had become a duty; and, indeed, at the time we speak of, this spirit of resistance to the naval Commander-in-Chief had won a **strange sanction from home.\***

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The feeling which prevailed at this time in the English fleet.

The feeling and attitude of Lyons towards Dundas.

\* The sanction here spoken of was contained in a letter from the Secretary of State (see the next note), which had been de-



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The sanction which this spirit of resistance obtained from the Secretary of State.

The letters which reached London from the fleet and from the camp, were so charged with accounts of the supposed torpor or wilful obstructiveness of Dundas, and of the devoted energy of Lyons, that they failed not to work a deep impression upon the mind of the Duke of Newcastle; and the result was that, upon his sole and undivided responsibility, he ventured to give his conditional warrant to a measure of singular boldness. Conceiving that to thwart or obstruct the zeal of Sir Edmund Lyons was to involve the expedition in imminent danger, yet fearing, apparently, that his design, if communicated to the Cabinet, would be baffled by the scruples of more timid men, the Duke went the length of intimating—and this without the knowledge of his colleagues—that he would support Lord Raglan and Sir Edmund Lyons, if Sir Edmund, in concert with Lord Raglan, should take upon himself to act independently of his chief. In other words, the Duke carried his burning eagerness for the public service to the extent of inviting Lyons to enter upon a course of mutinous resistance to the will of Dundas.\* By those means,

spatched on the 9th of October, though it had not yet reached its destination.

\* It was in a letter to Lord Raglan, of the 9th of October 1854, that the Duke gave this bold, nay, as he himself would be the first to say, this lawless undertaking. Without ever disguising for a moment the lawlessness of the proceeding, the Duke often spoke of it to me as one of the acts of his life to which he looked back with pride and satisfaction. I have not at present before me the letter of the 9th of October, for it seems to have been handed by Lord Raglan to Sir E. Lyons, and the Duke's copy of it (which Mr Gladstone, his executor, at no small cost of trouble to himself, has most kindly endeavoured to find) will not perhaps come to light in time for publication in this volume. I

such as they are, which enable me to come to a judgment, I am brought to believe that, in suffering himself to take this attitude towards his chief, Lyons was at once honest and wrong;\* but, be that as it may, he made no secret of his opinions nor yet of his feelings; and the known antagonism in which he stood towards Dundas, gave a head to the warlike impatience which stirred every ship in the squadrons.

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In this condition of things it would have been hard for the firmest of men to withstand a request such as that which had come from the English Headquarters. Dundas at once yielded; and the officer who had brought to the flag-ship Lord Raglan's

The exceeding difficulty of resisting Lord Raglan's appeal.  
Dundas's consent.

however have before me a written statement by the Duke of the purport of the letter (given in the Appendix), and also Lord Raglan's reply to it. As may well be supposed, Lord Raglan, 'educated in the strictest school of discipline,' was startled at the idea of his 'suggesting, to a second in command, to set aside the authority of his Commander-in-Chief' (see the MS. Memorandum by Mr Loch in the Appendix); and his reply to the Duke is as follows:—

'BEFORE SEBASTOPOL, October 28, 1854.

'*Confidential.*

'MY DEAR DUKE OF NEWCASTLE,—I thought it best to communicate your letter, marked *confidential*, of the 9th inst., to Sir E. Lyons, who has since had letters from Sir James Graham of a subsequent date, in which he does not refer to what you tell me, but appears to wish that, if possible, all *scandal* should be avoided.

'I am quite satisfied that this is in the highest degree desirable, and I do not think anything can occur to render it necessary to take any such extreme step as you authorise the adoption of.

'It is, however, very gratifying to me, and I make no doubt it is equally so to Sir E. Lyons, that you should place such confidence in us.'

Those who knew Lord Raglan's accustomed way of expressing himself will perhaps detect a characteristic archness in his manner of saying that Sir James Graham—the most cautious of men—had sent letters to Lyons containing no reference to the subject of the Duke's secret instruction.

\* The voluminous correspondence of both the Admirals with Lord Raglan, forms a part of the ground on which I rest my conclusion.

CHAP. appeal, carried back the consent of the Admiral.  
 XV. Dundas's short answer ran thus:—

‘BRITANNIA, OFF SEVASTOPOL, 14th October 1854.

‘MY DEAR LORD RAGLAN,—Colonel Steele has just arrived with your lordship's letter of yesterday's date, and you may depend on my using every exertion with my French colleagues to aid in your object.

‘Sir E. Lyons I have recalled from his present post, where his services have been so valuable, and I have no doubt, in his magnificent screw-ship, he will be of the greatest use here.

‘I will consult with Admiral Hamelin as to our joint operations, and will thank your lordship to let me know the time when you intend to attack.

‘I do not wish to detain Colonel Steele, and therefore leave it to him to explain what has passed between us.

‘Yours faithfully,

‘JNO. D. DUNDAS.’

15th Oct.  
 Naval conference  
 on board  
 the Mogador.

First resolution  
 of the conference.

Opinion of  
 the English ship  
 captains in regard  
 to the  
 stage of

In a conference held the next day on board the Mogador, the Allied Admirals resolved that, in order to support the attack of Sebastopol by the Allied armies, all the ships of their squadrons should execute, at the same time, a general attack upon the sea-forts of the place, and the ships lying moored in its harbour.\* The captains of the English ships judged that the co-operation of the fleets should be simultaneous—not with the preliminary bombardment, but rather—with the intended assault,† and Lyons

\* First resolution contained in the paper headed, ‘Résolutions prises par les Amiraux des trois escadres Alliées au sujet de l'attaque de ‘Sevastopol.’ This paper, dated the 15th of October, and signed by Dundas, Hamelin, Ahmet Pasha, Bruat, Lyons, Charner, and Bouet Willaumez, was received by Lord Raglan on the 16th.

† Writing from the fleet, Lyons says that this was ‘the strong and universal opinion amongst the captains here’ (private letter to Lord Raglan, 16th October 1854). I have no reason for supposing that the French or the Turkish captains differed from the English; but it is not within my knowledge that they expressed an opinion on the question

soon afterwards agreed with them, declaring that he could not see what advantage was to be 'gained by 'firing, and then retiring, without the means of 'renewing the attack from day to day;' and that such an operation could 'hardly fail to encourage 'the enemy,' because he would think—and truly, too—that the fleets of great naval States, which desisted from an attack which they had deliberately commenced, must be desisting from a want of power to go on.\* If the land forces should carry Sebastopol—and they were confident, at the time, that they would do so—it might be more or less gratifying to the lovers of the sister service to feel that the navy, though unable to do more, had, at all events, borne a part in the preparatory cannonade; but that humble share in a great triumph was not what the ship captains wanted. They desired that the part the squadrons were to take should be one of such a kind as to be powerfully conducive to the great end; and it was all but evident that, if the fire of the ships on the sea-forts was to be simultaneous with the land cannonade, it must not only lead to failure, but failure of such a kind as to wear in its public aspect the character of a naval discomfiture. But the Admirals sitting in conference judged that they might appropriately leave it to the men of the armies to say in what stage of the impending conflict they would best like to have the help which the navy could give them;† and accordingly, after intimating that their

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the conflict in which the navy should commence its attack.

Lyons concurs in their opinion, and, on the 16th, perceives the vice of the plan.

The view entertained by the English ship captains in regard to the part proposed to be taken by the navy.

The decision of the Admirals in conference. Their second resolution.

\* Ibid.

† Lyons was present at the conference; but, unfortunately, his per-

CHAP. ammunition was limited to 70 rounds for each gun,\*  
 XV. they submitted it to the Generals on shore to determine whether this, their supply of projectiles, should be all expended at the time of the land cannonade or at the time of the assault, or whether it should be divided into two, so as for one half of it to be used at the time of the land cannonade and the other half at the time of the assault.†

Decision of the Generals upon the choice offered them by the Admirals.

The Generals chose the last of the proffered alternatives. Indulging, as we saw, a fond hope that the united power of the artillery might engender confusion in the place, they judged that the hour which they had fixed for commencing the land cannonade—that is, half-past six in the morning—would be also the most fitting time for the ships to open their fire.‡

Joint letter of Canrobert and Lord Raglan to the Admirals.

In the joint letter which conveyed this decision, the Generals applauded ‘the great resolve’ to which the Admirals had come, and ventured an opinion that, by the common action of the fleets and the armies conjoined, ‘moral and material effects’ would be produced which must ‘insure the success of the attack upon ‘Sebastopol.’ They also intimated that the attack would begin at half-past six in the morning, and

The plan of the naval at-

ception of that true view of the question which the ship captains presented to his mind was subsequent to the meeting of the naval conference, in which the Admirals determined to leave the question to the decision of the Generals.

\* That is, 140 rounds for each gun meant to be used ; the intention being that each ship should deliver fire from one only of her two broadsides.

† Second resolution, *ubi ante*.

‡ Written communication from General Canrobert and Lord Raglan—date, the 16th October.

ended by announcing that an entire cessation of the fire from the trenches was to be taken as a signal that the moment for the assault had come.\*

C H A P.  
XV.

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conceived.

To the  
navy, re-  
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the plan  
promised  
nothing  
but fail-  
ure.

Regarded separately, and apart from any advantage which a naval diversion might confer upon the land forces, the Allied fleet, when thus invoked, had no clear prospect thrown open to it except a prospect of failure. Lyons came to see this, we know, before the day of the action;† and Dundas, more calm than his second in command, had perceived, from the first, that the operation was a 'false' one.‡ The chiefs thought thus ill of the plan even before those sudden changes enforced by the French of which we shall afterwards hear; and the evil was, not that the Admirals judged wrongly, but that their judgment was overborne by paramount forces. All, landsmen as well as sailors, desired that the part to be taken by the navy should be one of glory; and Lord Raglan, whose heart ever warmed with gratitude and admiration when he spoke of the seamen, was especially anxious that they should have their full share in what he believed to be the approaching triumph; but with this desire in common, there was still, as might

\* The letter, 16th October 1854, was signed by Lord Raglan as well as by Canrobert, but it was drawn up by the French; and I imagine that, if there had been time for mere literary changes, Lord Raglan would have liked to exclude the part about 'great resolve,' 'moral effects,' and certainty of success. The arrangement which the French expanded into the form of the joint letter was come to by Canrobert and Lord Raglan in the presence of General Rose and Colonel Trochu, and was recorded by a memorandum now lying before me in the handwriting of Colonel Trochu.

† See his letter of the 16th October to Lord Raglan, quoted *ante*.

‡ Letter from Dundas to Lord Raglan, 20th October 1854.

C H A P. he expected, a variety in the tendencies of the several  
 { XV. minds which were brought to bear upon the naval  
 counsels.

The longing of the seamen for a naval engagement had been so effectually baffled by obdurate stone forts and the shoal newly formed of sunken ships, that a real attack upon Sebastopol and its sheltered fleet was deemed to be out of their power; but the frustrated ardour of officers and men (growing fast, as some thought, to a grave discontent), and the probable eagerness of the people at home to see their fleets striking a blow, made it easy for the Generals to ask, and to ask with imperative cogency, that the fleets should undertake a diversion in favour of the land forces; and thus it resulted that the Admirals, though seeing aright, were moved in the wrong direction. Without being led astray by any ill-founded intelligence, without being caught by a fallacy, without being met and confounded by the darkness which shrouds the future, they still were so beset by circumstances that, knowingly and with open eyes, they prepared for themselves a discomfiture.

The Generals commanding the French and English armies found themselves invested—the one by express commission, and the other by circumstance—with an all but complete power to enforce the concurrence of the fleets in their meditated undertaking, and having that power they thought fit to use it. Lord Raglan's appeal to the navy was one of such irresistible urgency that virtually, as I think, he would have made himself answerable in an equal degree with Can

for summoning the fleets to take part in the attack, if it were not for this all-important difference—namely, C H A P.  
XV. that Canrobert, in ordering the French fleet to attack, was following apparently his own judgment, without accepting much light from the mind of the Admiral serving under him ; whilst Lord Raglan, on the other hand, when he made his appeal to Dundas, was writing, so to speak, with Rear-Admiral Lyons at his side,—was writing, in short, with all the sanction which could be given by the opinion of a naval commander deeply trusted by the Government at home.\*

It must also be remembered that if Lord Raglan thus ventured to invoke the aid of the navy, he, at all events, did nothing to render its action abortive. He took no part with General Canrobert nor with Admiral Hamelin in causing those changes which we shall by-and-by hear of as defacing the original plan.

\* Lyons, as we saw, was at Balaklava in the most friendly and constant communication with Lord Raglan.



## CHAPTER XVI.

CHAP. XVI. IN that room by the 'Number Four' Battery on the north of the roadstead where Prince Mentschikoff met his vicegerent, we heard the Prince flatly announcing that he would not engage his field army in the conflict which awaited the garrison; we also heard Korniloff answer, that without the field army Sebastopol must surely fall; and, finally, we heard the Prince say he would summon a council of war.

For some hours the fate of Sebastopol was in suspense.

The indefensible character of Prince Mentschikoff's continued endeavours to withhold from the garrison the aid of his field army.

There, the conference ended; and during the hours which followed, the fate of the 'jewel,' the 'treasure'—for so men called their loved fortress—was hanging upon the chance that a wrong-headed, obstinate man might be driven, for once, from his purpose. That purpose, however, was of a sort to be almost revolting; for what it involved was—not the surrender of a beleaguered fortress to superior forces, but—the abandonment to the enemy of many thousands of sailors and landsmen who, having stood fast to their guns when the army marched out in the night-time, were still defending the place with intent to hold out to extremity. And, koff's communications with th

being now in perfect security, the reason which had excused him when retreating out of Sebastopol could no longer hold good as a warrant for standing aloof from the conflict. CHAP.  
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Upon the theory, I suppose, that the State must ever be ready for the defence of its honour and its interests, but especially for the defence of its territory, tens of thousands of the youth of All the Russias had been every year torn from their homes at a cruel cost of life and happiness. Well, one of those very conjunctures which was to be provided for by the infliction of all these sufferings upon millions and millions of men had now at last come. A great Russian fortress more precious than many a kingdom, was assailed by the foreign invader. Brave sailors, with a handful of landsmen, were labouring to defend it; and already, as we know, to cover the town, there had been formed an entrenched position four miles in length. Without a reinforcement of several thousands of infantry to hold that entrenched position, the case of the garrison was hopeless. With it, the place might be formidably defended. That was the exigency. All ready to meet it, if only the Commander would give his assent, Prince Mentschikoff's army was lying on the north of the roadstead in actual sight of the garrison—nay, almost within hailing distance. Yet, when he came into conference, Prince Mentschikoff had still thought it possible for him to deny the garrison all aid from **his field army**; and his promise to summon a council

"title or no room for thinking that per-

The probable intention with which Mentschikoff undertook to summon a council of war.

CHAP. haps his judgment might bend. It rather tended to  
 XVI. show that he meant to have his will ratified.\*

Circum-  
 stances  
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 were mak-  
 ing it more  
 and more  
 hard for  
 him to  
 maintain  
 his re-  
 solve.

But the defeat he had sustained in battle, and also, perhaps, his long absence from the scene of the impending conflict, must have been lessening the ascendant of the Russian Commander, and making it more and more hard for him, not only to persist in maintaining what to most men must seem an outrageous resolve, but to do this in defiance of the hero who had been raised to a great height of power by the devotion of the garrison, and all the people around him.

A remon-  
 strance by  
 Korniloff  
 is put into  
 writing  
 and signed.

And Korniloff now took a step which seemed to provide that, in case of Sebastopol's falling for want of aid from the army, the truth should be visibly extant. He framed and signed a remonstrance against the plan of continuing to withhold the entire field army from the defence of Sebastopol. The paper was to be handed in to the promised council of war; but Korniloff apparently intended that, whether he were destined to survive, or to perish along with the fortress, his words should go to the Czar.†

The fact that this protest was coming may have got to the knowledge of the Russian Commander, and tended to govern his decision; but the paper itself

\* It will be remembered that a council of war was the very instrument by which Prince Mentschikoff enforced his foregone and fore-known determination to sink the ships.

† This remonstrance is signed by Korniloff, and dated 'Sebastopol, 19th September [i. e., 1st October] 1854.' It contains so authentic a statement of the straits to which the garrison was reduced in the last days of September, that I have caused it to be inserted in the Appendix.

never reached him, for whilst it still lay in the desk of the writer, Prince Mentschikoff gave way.\* Without calling a council of war, he suddenly caused it to be known that some twelve battalions should at once be detached from his field army, and suffered to take part with the garrison in the defence of the place.

The next day, to the joy of Sebastopol, these troops, with two other battalions besides, were brought over from the north of the roadstead; and from time to time afterwards, yet further bodies of infantry detached from Prince Mentschikoff's army were sent to strengthen the garrison.

Still, so late as the 5th of October, the forces defending the quarter of the Malakoff Tower were judged to be deficient in numerical strength; and as though by way of a sailor's contrivance for bringing the landsmen to his purpose, Admiral Istomin, with the full concurrence of Korniloff, imagined the idea of a 'sham fight,' which was to take place on the part of the ground thus judged to be wanting in strength. The proposed manœuvres were executed, and in a way which seemed to prove that a powerful assault on the Malakoff could not be resisted with the force then available for the purpose. Prince Mentschikoff yielded to this practical form of argument; and a yet further reinforcement, amounting to some 3000

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Without calling the council of war, Mentschikoff suddenly gave way, and announced that twelve battalions should at once be moved into Sebastopol.

Reinforcements of infantry brought in to succour the garrison.

Admiral Istomin's stratagem for wringing still further succours from Prince Mentschikoff.

Its success.

\* Korniloff's remonstrance was found among his papers after his death, with this note by Korniloff on the margin: 'This was to be submitted to the council which did not assemble. Three regiments of Kiriakoff were given without this paper—1854.' And in his journal he says,—'The Prince did not assemble a council, but gave us three regiments of the 17th Division.'

C H A P. men, was at once detached from the army, and sent  
XVI. to take part with the garrison in defending the Kara-  
 bel faubourg.\*

Strength  
 of the gar-  
 rison on  
 the 6th  
 Oct.

By the 6th of October the sailors had with them, to help the defence, more than 25,000 men belonging to the army ;† and, taken together, these soldiery and the battalions of sailors doing duty on shore amounted to near 38,000.‡

This enumeration does not include the troops, amounting to some 2600, which I have called the ‘stationed marines,’ nor yet, of course, the 12,000 dockyard and other labourers. § Those men, however, were Government servants, amenable to military discipline ; and the approaching conflict was of such a kind—a conflict much dependent upon the speedy construction and the speedy repair of earthworks and batteries—that the value of their services must have been hardly less than that of an equal number of soldiers. Upon the whole, it can scarcely be wrong to say, that the numbers now engaged in defending the land front of Sebastopol, were at least equal to any which the Allies, at this time, could have prudently brought to attack it. In the course of the ten days which followed this 6th of October, the garrison was yet further reinforced.

All this accession of strength made it practicable to

\* Viz., the Boutir regiment, four battalions, with a strength, according to the muster-roll of the 24th September (6th October), of 3430 men.

† Viz., including the men of the ‘train,’ 25,765.

‡ 37,958. See note in the Appendix.

§ Nor the gunners on duty at the sea-forts. They had nothing to do with the land defences.

give back to the sailors the system of organisation which divided them into what were called 'crews' instead of battalions;\* and at about the same time the lines of defence, extending, as we know, to a length of four miles, were divided into four sections.†

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Restoration of the seamen to their old system of organisation.

Division of the lines of defence into four sections.

Increased hopefulness of the endeavour to defend Sebastopol.

With these forces posted in an entrenched position, with, moreover, a great command of labour, and an all but unbounded command of material resources, the undertaking to defend Sebastopol was no longer one which could be justly called desperate. It is true that a careful and scientific calculation of the strength which was likely to be available for the defence of given points in the hour of the expected assault, might still have obliged the garrison to deem their prospect gloomy; for General de Todleben reckons that, after all the reinforcements which the defenders of Sebastopol had now at last wrung from Prince Mentschikoff, the Allies might have brought mighty bodies of men to two points—say, for instance, to the Flagstaff Bastion and the Redan—without encountering at either, from first to last, more than from 4000 to 5500 men;‡ but if

\* It must not be understood that the force (consisting in general of about 1000 men) which the Russians called a 'crew,' was the crew of any particular ship. The word imported only an arbitrarily divided portion of the body of seamen belonging to the fleet; but the organisation which distributed the men into 'crews' was one to which they had long been accustomed, and they were glad to return to it—glad to be once more under their accustomed 'colours.'

† Sir John Burgoyne supposed the flanks of the entrenched position to be nearly unassailable; but the distribution of the troops occupying these four sections seems to show that the chiefs in Sebastopol did not at all share his view. The two sections which comprised the 'front for attack' were occupied by only one-half of the number which guarded the flanks of the position.—Todleben, p. 272.

‡ Todleben, p. 278. The General reckons at 40,000 the force with

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this was the conclusion which a man might attain by reckoning over the combatants, and timing the march of battalions hurried up to the point of conflict from their ground on the Theatre Square, it did not embitter the sense of relief with which the garrison found itself emerging from a state of defencelessness to one of comparative strength. No longer was Korniloff forced to act the hard part of one who makes other men joyous and trustful, whilst he himself is despondent. In his secret heart now, no less than before all the world, he was able to say (after speaking of the reinforcements obtained, and the free communication there was between Sebastopol and the field army): 'Notwithstanding the number of our enemies who ' have surrounded Sebastopol on the south side of the ' bay, we have no fear of not repelling them, unless ' God forsakes us; and, in that case, His holy will ' be done! It is the duty of mortals to bend before it ' in humility, as it is always just. . . . We con- ' tinue to work at our fortifications.' \*

Close of  
the period  
during  
which the  
place had  
been lying  
at the  
mercy of  
the Allies.

Then, ended the time during which, from mere want of battalions, the garrison had been lying at the mercy of the Allies.†

which the Allies could have afforded to assault; but I may here say that his way of dealing with numbers has not led him to an accurate apprehension of the relative strength of the Allies and the Russians.

\* Private Journal, under date of 24th September, i. e., 6th October.

† The Allies reached the ground on the south of Sebastopol on the 26th and 27th of September, and the first succours which the Prince gave the garrison were the fourteen battalions which he sent into Sebastopol on the 1st of October. From that day until the 6th of October there were poured in further succours, which amounted, with the fourteen battalions, to 25,000 men.

By this time, moreover, Prince Mentschikoff's field army began to show signs of an intention to intervene once more in the campaign. Largely reinforced already, and expecting from time to time fresh accessions of strength, the Prince no longer stood aloof from the war by ensconcing his field army in the country of the Katcha and the Belbec, but undertook to set bounds to the dominion of the Allies in the valley of the Tchernaya. He occupied Tchorgoun, a village very near to the river, and sent a force on so far south, upon the extreme right of the English, as to challenge their right of forage in the grassy vale of Baidar.

But the soundest foundation of hope to the people defending Sebastopol was the likelihood of finding it happen that, instead of assaulting, the Allies might resort to siege operations; and the trust that so it might be, gathered more and more strength from the time which passed over without an attack. Other signs gave a like indication. Still, every man yearned to be blessedly certain of that which—by comparison with the alternative of an assault—he all but regarded as his deliverance; and the Lancaster batteries, which sprang up in the nights of the 7th and the 8th of October, did not help to relieve the anxiety of the garrison; for those works were so distant that, as seen from the lines at Sebastopol, they appeared to be meant for defence.

But at length came the morning of the 10th of October. If a stranger then alighting by enchantment in the Theatre Square had hastened to ask why it was that people on all sides were shaking hands

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Also Prince Mentschikoff's field army, now largely reinforced, and awaiting fresh accessions, showed signs of resuming the campaign.

But after all the main hope was, that the Allies, before they assaulted, would resort to siege operations.

Morning of 10th Oct. Discovery of the fact that the French



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had broken  
ground.

The joy  
this occasioned  
in Sebastopol.

The appearance  
on the two  
following mornings  
of the English  
works.

and embracing with raptures common to all, he would hardly have slaked his curiosity by learning that all this delight was the welcome which Sebastopol gave to a prospect of being besieged. Already we know that, on the night before, the wind blew so fresh from the town to the lines of the French as to hinder the garrison from hearing the sound of the pickaxe ; but when morning dawned it disclosed the mark of a seam, stretching on with many a bend, along the crest of Mount Rodolph. This was the work which the French had thrown up in the night. Then quickly Sebastopol learnt that the Allies had made their election, and were really undertaking a siege. It was with unspeakable joy that the garrison and the inhabitants received the glad tidings ; for the step the Allies had taken was to Sebastopol a respite from assault—a respite of at least several days ; and in the mean time, though great things had already been done in the way of preparing defences, much more might yet be achieved. ‘ If ‘ only,’ so Todleben writes—‘ if only men chance to ‘ know what siege warfare is, they can imagine the ‘ joyful impression which we must have experienced ‘ at the sight of those works. . . . Every one ‘ in Sebastopol rejoiced at this happy event. People ‘ congratulated each other upon it ; for each man saw ‘ in it a guarantee of success, and the hope that the ‘ town would be saved.’

On the two following mornings the sight of the works thrown up in the night by the English confirmed the glad inference which had been drawn from the discovery of the gabionade on Mount Ro

and proved that the whole Allied army was content to resort to siege labours. C H A P.  
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If the joy of the many was that of men all at once freed from the stress of a desperate conjuncture, the chiefs who perceived the full import of the change had a rarer and finer delight. They saw their foe clearly foregoing the kind of conflict in which, from the power of his victorious armies, he was likely to have the ascendant, and undertaking, instead, a species of strife in which they well knew they could match him. Thought is swift; and from the moment when Todleben, on the morning of the 10th of October, descried the brown line then appearing along the crest of Mount Rodolph, it cost him brief time to infer the whole plan of the enemy, and determine, too, how he would meet it. His accounts of what he designed and what he did are long, and elaborate, but I gather that the pith of his deliberations was of this kind: 'Our labours are rewarded! Our attitude of resistance has induced the Allies to break ground! This work which the French have thrown up must be meant to give cover to a system of batteries containing some forty guns. In other words, the Allies—though without being able to invest the place—are really beginning a siege. For such an undertaking they needs must have workmen and gunners, spades, pickaxes, gabions, heavy guns, gun-carriages, platforms, great store of fit ammunition. But of all such people and all such things we can command more than they—more  
more gunners, more tools, more and

Light in which the chiefs at Sebastopol regarded the determination of the Allies.

Todleben's idea of the way in which the threatened attack was to be met.

C H A P. ' heavier guns, more platforms, more powder, more—  
XVI. ' twenty times more—shot and shell. The species  
 ' of conflict in which, as it happens, we thus enjoy  
 ' an ascendant is the very one which, thanks be to  
 ' Heaven! the enemy has advised himself to try. By  
 ' dint of our greater strength in what concerns trench-  
 ' work and ordnance, we will crush and extinguish his  
 ' batteries. Mount Rodolph shall be the example.  
 ' The whole line of guns which the French mean to  
 ' plant on its crest shall be under a dominant fire.'

The meas-  
 ures he  
 adopts.

To execute this plan of aggressive defence, Todleben not only caused several portions of the existing parapets to be pierced for additional guns bearing well on the works of the French, but planted at once five new batteries, all formed with the same special aim. One of these, thrown up on a site more than two hundred yards in advance of the nearest bastion, and searching with an enfilade fire the right flank of the trench on Mount Rodolph, gave General Bizot a sample of the enterprise, the skill, and, if so one may speak, the agility with which his unknown counter-actor could wage a warfare of earthworks. At the same time, Colonel de Todleben so ranged or so altered the armaments of the Flagstaff, the Central, and the Land Quarantine, that, from every one of those bastions, the works of the French might be made to undergo heavy fire.

When the English works grew into sight on the mornings of the 11th and the 12th of October, Colonel de Todleben prepared to encounter them by increasing the power of his ordnance along the Redan and the Malakoff, as well as by prolonging a batt-

established in rear of the Flagstaff Bastion; but his measures against the English were insufficient. The positions of their Attacks did not give him the kind of opportunity which he saw on the crest of Mount Rodolph; and apparently, he underrated the harm that might be done to his defences by guns thirteen hundred yards off. At all events, he could not or did not provide means for overwhelming Burgoyne's threatened batteries by a mightier power of ordnance.

In order to secure full advantage from the aid that can be given by sharpshooters and musketry-men in a conflict of the kind now impending, care was taken to provide for them rifle-pits and other apt means of shelter.

But if, as we now must have seen, the resistance which Todleben planned was mainly of that active sort which consists in assailing the assailant, he did not at all, for that reason, neglect the use of expedients more strictly defensive in kind. Thus, as soon as he could see that the bending line of the enemy's works was threatening any of his batteries with an enfilade fire, he hastened, at great cost of labour, to give them the shelter of 'traverses.' In general, he used, at this time, to throw up only one traverse to stand between two pairs of guns.

And now there came fit occasions for striving to restore to the troops the moral strength lost on the Alma. When, either from recent defeat, or from any other more permanent cause, an army is wanting in  
 ence, and that sense of relative strength

CHAP.  
XVI.  
The long respite which the Russians had been suffered to enjoy in the ene-

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my's pre-  
sence gave  
them ex-  
cellent  
means of  
recovering  
their mo-  
rale.

which are principal sources of warlike ascendancy, it is a great advantage to be posted in close proximity to the enemy, if only it so happens that (for political or warlike reasons) his forces may be expected to abstain for a time from any decisive attack. In such circumstances, the soldiery whose self-confidence has been brought low can be encouraged to undertake petty enterprises against the enemy's outposts; and, since these attempts aim at very little, and commonly take effect by way of surprise, they often end in a way which can be represented as successful. Thus, for instance, a few men who have well formed their plan, and well watched their moment for surprising a picket at night, will be likely enough, if not to bring in a prisoner, at all events to capture some trophy—a flask, perhaps, or a haversack, a kettle, a greatcoat, or a blanket; and even if they have no such token of their prowess to show, they at least can bring in a report of what they may have been able to see within the enemy's lines. The fame of these little ventures soon spreads and expands in an army (which only, of course, hears one side of each story), and if they are followed, as they probably will be, by a few more enterprises of a like kind, but on a somewhat larger scale, a change most astonishing to those who are unacquainted with such things is speedily produced. A soldiery which but lately was cowed by disaster, and unfit for an immediate encounter in the open field, may be so easily exalted in spirit by a little of this sort of training, that after a while it will come to hold itself equal—nay, soon, perhaps,

more than equal—to the troops it has lately been dreading.\*

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This opportunity of regaining their self-confidence was one of the many advantages which delay conferred on the Russians, and they availed themselves of it with great skill and sagacity. One of the sorties they undertook was a good deal above the rank of what I called 'petty ventures;' for it seems that the enterprise which ended in the well-known result of burning down the Rodolph farmhouse, and destroying the wall of the homestead, was effected by one battalion of seamen, with some sappers, a handful of Cossacks, and a couple of guns, in the teeth of two French battalions and a squadron of horse;† but, commonly, the enterprises of the garrison were of the humbler kind already indicated. The use that could be made of these trivial acts was perceived. Admiral Istomin formally submitted to Korniloff, that it was a right policy to exaggerate the valour of these little enterprises in order to raise the confidence and en-

Sortie undertaken by the Russians for the destruction of a house which gave shelter to the French.

Petty ventures against the French and the English.

The use that could be made of these acts

\* The materials before me show at length and in much detail the whole process of this moral recovery from the disheartening effects of the blow received on the Alma.

† The distance of the farm from the Russian lines of defence was about two-thirds of a mile, and the time three o'clock in the afternoon of the 5th of October.—Niel, 'Siège de Sebastopol,' p. 50. As General Niel has not mentioned the fact, that any French troops were present when the Russians came out and burnt the house, it may be well to give the authority on which the statement rests. Korniloff records that he himself both ordered and witnessed the exploit. In his Private Journal he says, 'Our brave fellows drove away two battalions of Frenchmen and a squadron of their cavalry, destroyed the wall, and burnt the house. There could be no exaggeration as to what was done, because *the feat was achieved in our sight.*'

C H A P. thusiasm of the garrison. 'It is necessary,' he writes,  
 XVI. 'to bring the defenders of Sebastopol into a kind of  
 was well 'excited state of bravery; and this can only be done  
 under- 'by valuing their actions perhaps even higher than  
 stood. 'they deserve, and by giving them recompenses in  
 'the same measure.' \*

And upon this view Korniloff was full willing to act; for, almost on the eve of the long-expected attack, he issued a general order, in which, after telling the garrison, that from the first they 'had shown a decided readiness to die but not to surrender the town entrusted to them by their beloved Czar and all Orthodox Russia;' and after speaking to them of the fortifications which, by the unflinching energy of all, both officers and men, had been made to grow out of the earth, he went on to commemorate six trifling ventures of the kind I have described, and ended by saying, 'Such continual exploits have evidently discouraged the enemy, and probably shame alone restrains him from flight.' †

Great progress of the works.  
 The time needed for completion.

All this while, and with ceaseless energy, Todleben had been pressing on the defences; and it seems to have turned out that the respite of twenty days with which the Allies had been indulging Sebastopol,

\* Letter of Admiral Istomin to Admiral Korniloff, 3d (i.e., 15th) of October.

† General order of Korniloff, 3d (15th) October. It is curious and instructive to see that, in an appeal thus framed for the purpose of exalting the spirits of the garrison, Korniloff, who so well knew his way to the heart of the soldier and the sailor, avoided all mention of the more considerable successes achieved (such, for instance, as that at the Rodolph farmhouse), and confined himself strictly to anecdotes tending to show the boldness of individuals.

was just of the length that the garrison needed for bringing the works commenced since the 26th of September to a state of all but completion.\*

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ing them  
corre-  
sponded  
almost ex-  
actly with  
the respite  
granted by  
the Allies.

In that interval great wonders had been wrought. Besides all that had been done to develop the might of artillery, due care, as we saw, had been given to those other numberless works which were requisite for the defence of the place ; and if that be premised, it would be possible to convey some idea of the proportion in which the whole system of the defences gained strength during those twenty days by showing the increase of power which was given within that time to the armament of the Sebastopol batteries. On the 26th of September, the land defences on the south side of the place were armed with 172 pieces of ordnance, which, if each gun were once fired, could discharge missiles weighing altogether some 3000 pounds. The twenty days passed, and by the end of that time the guns in battery along the same lines of defence were in number 341, with calibres for throwing, in one salvo, about 8000 pounds' weight of shot.†

Increase of  
strength  
given to  
the land  
defences  
in the in-  
terval of  
the twenty  
days' re-  
spite.

Thus, then, it can be said that in almost all the ingredients of warlike strength the defenders of Sebastopol had gained, and gained largely, since the day when the invader surprised them by his daring flank march. They had been largely reinforced. They had recovered much of their self-confidence. They were now in free communication not only with the interior of Russia, but also with a relieving army already on the flank of the invader and preparing to

Summary  
of the se-  
veral par-  
ticulars in  
which,  
during  
the inter-  
val, the  
defenders  
of Sebas-  
topol had  
been  
gaining  
strength.

\* Todleben, p. 301.

† Ibid. p. 313 *et seq.*



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manœuvre against him. Their fortress was at length well covered by an entrenched position which, although four miles in extent, had yet been made strong at all points. Above all, they were assured that in the particular kind of strife to which they had the happiness to find themselves challenged—the strife that is waged by meeting earthworks and batteries with other earthworks and other batteries—they had, and must have for a long time to come, vastly more means of putting forth strength than those who undertook to besiege them.

Circumstances under which this aggrandisement of the resources of the garrison became possible.

If inquirers shall ask how it was that in the very presence of a victorious invader, the weakness and the all but despair of the garrison could thus be changed into strength and confidence, it will first, indeed, be acknowledged that these people were brave, patriotic, firm men, raised up to a lofty enthusiasm by the inspiring soul of Korniloff, and guided in all they did by the genius of the great ‘volunteer ;’ but still to any such question one part of the answer is this :—The Allies gave them time.\*

On the evening of the 16th Oct. the garrison knew that the bombardment was to begin on the morrow.

On the evening of the 16th of October, no spy nor deserter, it seems, had brought the news into Sebastopol ; but by surer indications the garrison knew that the time of preparation must be almost touching its end, and that a great cannonade of their works was ordained to begin on the morrow.

\* They so gave time, as we saw, against the desire of Lord Raglan, and in spite of the counsels of Lyons and Cathcart.

## CHAPTER XVII.

## I.

IF it be acknowledged that the forces now charged with the land defence of Sebastopol outnumbered the troops which besieged it;\* that, in command of labour and material resources, the garrison had an enormous ascendancy; that they were strongly entrenched; that they had in their rear a harbour and a roadstead not only made good against hostile intrusion by sea, but assuring them aid close at home from the broadsides of their own men-of-war; and, finally, if it be granted that the relieving army now gathered under Prince Mentschikoff had a greater numerical strength than the forces which covered the siege, men may ask how it came to be believed by both the French and the English, that the chances of war on the morrow would be brought to incline to their cause.

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XVII.

Considerations favourable to the prospects of the garrison.

The Allies trusted much to the power of their ordnance as well as to the quality of their troops; and,

Sources of the confidence felt

\* *I.e.*, Forey's siege corps, and the English troops camped on the Chersonese. It will be remembered that Bosquet's corps (having with it Canrobert's Turkish battalions) and also the forces engaged in defending the town and plain of Balaclava were not in the number of the troops which carried on the siege. For the strength of the contending

the Appendix.

CHAP.  
XVII.by the  
Allies.

apart from the baneful delays which their plan of attack had involved, it was not an ill-devised measure. The Allies, we saw, hoped to be able to get down the fire of the place to an extent which would enable their assaulting columns to gain the Redan and the Flagstaff Bastion, without, up to that time, undergoing an overwhelming loss from artillery ; and they trusted that, when once they had thus pierced the enemy's line, their troops would so overmaster any soldiery that could be gathered to meet them in rear of the assaulted ramparts, as to be able to cut into two the whole structure of the Russian defences. This last hope was even, perhaps, better founded than the Allies at the time understood it to be ; for we now know that, notwithstanding the large reinforcements then lately brought into Sebastopol, the extent and conformation of the ground which the garrison had to defend put it almost out of their power to be prepared at each point against the apprehended assaults with what they judged competent forces.

The batteries with which the Allies were to undertake this cannonade.

It was with batteries of 126 pieces, including 18 heavy mortars, that the Allies hoped to get down the fire of the enemy's defences ; and of these, 53 were French,\* and 73 English.† Of the English guns, 29 were manned by our seamen, the rest by our Royal Artillery.‡ The battery which the French had constructed by the sea-shore (near the site of an old Genoese fort), and also the two English

\* Niel, 'Journal des Operations du Génie,' p. 60. Auger gives the number of guns as 49, but I follow Niel.

† 'Journal of the English Engineers,' p. 31.

‡ Ibid. See details of armament in Appen





Lancaster batteries, may be regarded as standing, in some measure, apart from the general plan of attack; and all the rest of the siege ordnance with which the Allies thus proposed to conquer the enemy's fire were distributed into three systems. One of these was the system or string of batteries erected by the French on the crest of Mount Rodolph, and armed with 49 pieces. Another was the bending line of English batteries on Green Hill, with an armament of 41 pieces, which our people called the 'Left,' or 'Chapman's Attack.' The third, called the 'Right,' or 'Gordon's Attack,' was on the Woronzoff Height, and its two-faced array of batteries mounted 26 pieces.

Without counting the batteries of the Jagoudil—a ship lying moored across the head of the Man-of-war Harbour\*—or any other of the guns still on deck which could be more or less brought into use, the Russians, we saw, had in battery for the land defence of Sebastopol on its south side 341 pieces of artillery; but of these, there stood opposed to the batteries established by the Allies only 118 pieces, including five heavy mortars.† Amongst the rest of the 118 pieces there were some guns of great calibre; but, upon the whole, a salvo from the 126 battering pieces now prepared for the siege was a good deal more weighty than one from the 118 pieces with which the Russians meant to engage them.‡

The pieces which the Russians had in battery, and bearing upon the batteries of the besiegers.

It therefore appears that, as regards the weight of

\* The Jagoudil was an 84-gun ship which lay at the very head of the Man-of-war Creek with her larboard broadside towards the besiegers.

† Todleben, p. 344.

‡ 12 per cent greater, according to Todleben, *ibid.*

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Irrespec-  
tively of  
these 118  
pieces  
there were  
(without  
counting  
guns on  
board  
ship) 160  
guns  
which  
swept  
the ap-  
proaches,  
and 63  
guns be-  
sides  
which  
could take  
the be-  
siegers in  
front or in  
flank upon  
their com-  
ing to close  
quarters.

The poten-  
tial superi-  
ority of  
the Rus-  
sians in  
artillery.

ordnance brought into actual service for the artillery conflict of the 17th of October, the garrison was inferior to its assailants; but it must be understood that, irrespectively of the 118 pieces thus awaiting an encounter with the battering-guns of the besiegers, the Allies, if proceeding to assault, might have to incur whilst advancing not only the shell and the shot of ships' guns trained and pointed beforehand from the waters below, but also the fire of as many as 160 guns established in land batteries which swept the approaches of the place; and that, even after traversing the approaches thus guarded, and coming at last to close quarters, the still surviving assailants might be encountered in front or in flank by the blasts of yet 63 more pieces of cannon delivering grape-shot and canister.\*

It must also be borne in mind that potentially, the ordnance arm of the Russians had a much greater ascendant than is indicated by giving the number and calibre of their guns already in battery. To an extent which, for a long time to come, must enable them to outdo their assailants in artillery conflict, the garrison could not only command endless supplies of guns and ammunition, but (because of their strength in workmen as well as in material) could ceaselessly repair and re-arm, or shift or improve their batteries, and augment them in numbers and power.

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| * Guns opposed to the batteries of the Allies, . . . . .                               | 118 |
| Guns sweeping the approaches, . . . . .  | 160 |
| Guns for taking the besiegers when at close quar-<br>ters in front or flank, . . . . . | 63  |
| Total (being the numbers given <i>ante</i> ), . . . . .                                | 341 |

In distributing his batteries along the lines of defence, Colonel Todleben had not apportioned them ratably to the strength of the respective systems of 'Attack' which they were destined to encounter. Whilst he ventured to meet the 71 guns and mortars of the English with so few as 54 pieces of ordnance, and those too, upon the whole, of a lighter calibre, he made ready to answer the 53 guns and mortars which the French had in battery with a fire of 64 pieces.\*

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The manner in which the strength of the batteries prepared to encounter those of the besiegers was apportioned to the respective 'Attacks.'

At intervals throughout the night, the Russians, as it was their custom to do, fired some shots with the purpose of disturbing the working parties of the besiegers, but they elicited no reply.

Notwithstanding that the intervention of the Allied navy had been suddenly postponed to a later hour, the moment appointed for the opening of the land cannonade remained unaltered. At half-past six in the morning of the 17th of October, three shells were to be discharged from one of the French batteries, and then forthwith the Allies were to open fire along the whole line of their works.

The time fixed for the opening of the land cannonade.

The signal had not yet been given, when the breaking grey of the morning enabled the Russians to

The dawn of the 17th Oct.

\* The calibres of the French and Russian guns being upon an average about equal, the superiority of the Russian armament was measured by the difference in the number of the pieces, *i.e.*, by the difference between 64 and 53. Still, in the real conflict between the French and the Russians—*i.e.*, the conflict between the batteries on Mount Rodolph and their opponents—the difference in the number of pieces was only 3. It was by the position of his batteries rather than by mere weight of metal that Todleben there prepared to take the ascendant.



CHAP. see that the Allies, in the night-time, had cut their  
 XVII. embrasures, and that seams of earth hitherto blank

Opening  
 of the fire.

had all at once put on the look—significant of man and his purpose—that is given by guns seen in battery. Here and there, as this change was described, a Russian battery opened fire. More followed. Some French guns began to make answer. There was more and more light. A body of French tirailleurs with a support pushed forward towards the enemy's lines. Sebastopol beat to arms. The three appointed signal shells sprang out from the lines on Mount Rodolph. In a minute, some English guns opened ; and presently, along their whole line of batteries, and along all the enemy's works, from the Central to the Flagstaff Bastion, and thence across to the Redan, and thence on again to the Malakoff, there pealed a sustained cannonade. Then, and quickly again, and from time to time, this sustained cannonade was out-thundered by salvoes of a kind sounding strange to the land-service people. No ships were in action ; but at the first roar of the mightier outburst, the seamen who heard it grew radiant. They knew by what manner of men such a salvo as that was delivered.

Cannonading  
 in  
 salvoes.

The cause  
 of this firing  
 in  
 salvoes.  
 The seamen  
 who  
 manned  
 the guns.

Whether serving the guns of the English, or forming part of the garrison, the sailors engaged in this conflict had brought with them many of their familiar usages ; and the Russian sailors especially, who were fighting at the land defences to the number of several thousands, clung fast, it seems, to their custom. Their naval system had been in a great

copied—copied even, perhaps, with servility—from that of the English ; and thus it resulted that, in each of the main fastnesses which constituted the line of defence, there was much of the warlike practice, and even, indeed, of the lesser routine, which obtains on board English vessels. The ‘bastion’ stood for the ship. The parapets were bulwarks; the embrasures were port-holes. Every piece the men had to serve they tended and fondled and cursed in their natural, seamanlike way ; and that too with the more affection when they knew it for one of their own familiar ship’s guns. As in our naval service, so also with the Russian seamen, the drum used to beat to quarters ; but to other of their duties the men, though on shore, were still called by the boatswain’s whistle. They were piped to their meals ; they were piped to their ‘grog.’ Night, for them, was a period divided into ‘watches ;’ and far from going by clock, they measured and marked lapse of time just as though they were still on board ship ; so that when, for example, it was noon, they reported it always ‘eight ‘bells,’ and as soon as they had the due sanction, were ready to make it ‘eight.’ But, so well had these Russians been taught, that they could not be got to stop short in their old English lesson at the point their Commanders desired. To the exceeding vexation of Todleben, they could not at all be persuaded to train and point every gun with a separate attention to the object for which he designed it. Knowing well what nation it was that manned the works on Mount Rodolph, the men at the Flagstaff and the Central Bastions

CHAP. were too strongly bent on the end, aim, and purpose  
XVII. of what they had learnt from the English, to be able to forego all the rapture of 'giving the Frenchman 'a broadside.' And, that being done to begin with, their rooted faith was that, with no greater pauses of time than were of absolute need for sponging and loading and firing, one broadside should follow another.\*

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The nature of the duty in the batteries, whether Russian, or French, or English.

To be serving the guns ; to be swiftly repairing the havoc from time to time wrought in the parapets (and especially in the revetments of the embrasures) by the enemy's round-shot and shell ; to be quenching the fires which were constantly seizing upon gabions, fascines, and timber ; to be replacing guns ; to be tending or removing in litters the men newly wounded ; and to be toiling thus, hour by hour, in the midst of a dim pile of smoke, with a mind always equal to an instant encounter with death,—this was alike the duty of the French, of the English, and of the Russians, who worked the power of artillery in the conflicting batteries ; and, until there occurred that disaster to the French of which we shall presently

For some time this conflict of

\* There was a part of the height overlooking Sebastopol from the neighbourhood of the 'Maison d'eau' which served as a very good post for observation ; but the three men who witnessed from that point the opening of this great cannonade were disturbed in their appreciation of its grandeur by an incident strangely incongruous. From the direction of Sebastopol three setters came ranging up the hill-side, but making small progress, for at every salvo they dropped. At the thunder of the nations, as though it were the report of their master's 'double-barrelled' the well-bred and well-broken beasts took care to 'down-ch' never knew whence the dogs came, nor whither they went

speak, the duty was performed with unflinching persistency by besieged and besiegers alike.

The works which covered the Russian batteries had been constructed in haste, with dry, gritty earth laboriously brought to the spot ; and, no rain having come in the interval to bind the loose heaps into solid structures, they formed of course sorry ramparts. The embrasures, too, were weak. Some of them, for want of fascines and hurdles, had been revetted with bags of earth, with planks, or with clay. There were other embrasures which had not been revetted at all. Of the revetments formed with clay, some were brought down in fragments by the mere blast of the guns firing out from between them ; and those that had been made of earth-sacks and planks very often took fire, and fell. There was need of heroic stubbornness to be able to cling to the determination of sacrificing numbers of lives with the object of restoring defences so easily brought to ruin ; but the garrison had been taught that it was of great moment to them to have their embrasures in the best state that might be possible, and at whatever cost of life to those who were charged with the toil, they repaired them again and again.

But the Russians—and that every minute—had to hold themselves in readiness for a yet harder trial. Expecting an assault, they ever kept steadfastly in sight that last appeal to ‘mitrail’ which their great Engineer had designed ; and often, very often they imagined that the appointed moment had come. From the irrepressible tendency of the seamen to

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ordnance was maintained with unflinching spirit by the French, the English, and the Russians. The frail state of the Russian earth-works.

CHAP. deliver their fire in broadsides, it resulted—for no  
 XVII. breath of wind was stirring—that the men, by these rapid discharges, piled up above and around them huge, steadfast, opaque banks of smoke, which so narrowed the field of every man's sight that he hardly could see the outline of a comrade's figure at a distance of two or three paces.

The imaginary columns of attack with which the Russians were combating.

Now a dim bank of smoke, admitting distorted and deadened rays, yet confining within straitened limits the scope of a man's real vision—this, we know, is a lens which gives infinite favour to the creatures of an imagination already excited by battle. The grey, floating wreaths, though their movement can scarce be descried, are all the while slowly changing in place, as well as in form; and from that cause, or that cause in part, it seems to result that, when once the thick cloud which obscures a man's vision has been peopled and armed by his fancy, the shapes which appear before him do not long continue at rest. They grow larger; they move; and the unreal creature of the brain which at first seemed like infantry halted is presently a column advancing. With the Russians—a firm, robust people—the imagination, though straying beyond the bounds of reality, was still guided in part by sound knowledge; for the images men saw in the smoke were the images of what might well be. As in a quarter of the field at the Alma (where the onset of the English horse might fairly enough have been looked for), the mist had seemed to reveal a host of cavalry charging, so now when, as people believed, the Allies would storm the defences, men easily

fancied they saw—that they saw indeed many times over—the enemy’s columns of infantry coming on to deliver the assault. The quality of the Russian soldier being what I have said, these pictures of his imagination did not drive him at all into panic, but still they much governed his actions. Again, and again, those who manned guns so planted as to be of no service except against assailing infantry, worked as hard at their loading and firing as though the assault had begun, and many a blast of mitrail was sent tearing through phantom battalions.

So long as the conflict should be one between covered batteries on one side and covered batteries on the other, there could not well be any approach to equality in point of losses between the besiegers and the besieged; for the Russians were not only forced to keep manned the 223 guns which they had prepared against the expected assaults, but also to have close at hand near the gorges of their bastions the bodies of infantry with which they designed to meet the same contingencies; and, both the gunners and the foot soldiery being imperfectly sheltered against the batteries of the Allies, it could not but result that the troops thus kept in expectation would be, many of them, killed or wounded; whilst the besiegers, on the other hand, could keep out of fire the troops with which they meant to assault till the moment for their onset should come.

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Conditions  
under  
which the  
cannonade  
would ne-  
cessarily  
take place  
so far as  
concerned  
the respec-  
tive losses  
of the  
Allies and  
the Rus-  
sians.

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Though Prince Mentschikoff had come from the

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The forces  
defending  
Sebastopol  
were still  
under the  
command  
of Admiral  
Korniloff.

country of the Upper Belbec to the Severnaya, or North Side, and although he indeed crossed the roadstead on the morning of this cannonade, and visited a part of the lines in the Karabel faubourg, he did not long stay, as we shall see, amid the scenes of the artillery conflict which raged on the south of Sebastopol; and the virtual control of the whole force of soldiers and sailors engaged in defending the place still remained in the hands of the seaman whom the popular voice had raised up to be chief and commander of all.

Grounds  
on which  
he judged  
that his  
personal  
presence  
at the bat-  
teries  
would be  
of service.

If Korniloff had been in command of a military garrison so organised, and so highly instructed in all their duties, as to warrant him in relying upon their exact performance of orders, he would probably have thought it his duty to remain, for the most part, at the central and commanding spot which he had chosen as his dwelling: for there, he would have been most readily found; there, better than at the ramparts, he would have been able to understand the general state of the conflict; there, with the greatest despatch, he might have pushed forward his reserves to the endangered post; there, most quickly he would have been able to learn where his presence was needed. But the forces defending Sebastopol were not of such a kind as to warrant Korniloff in taking this strictly military view of the position in which events had placed him. On the contrary—and that he knew—it was the collapse of the military structure which had put upon him this great charge; and a true instinct told him, that as

hope of defending Sebastopol against a determined attack had had little to rest on at first save that spirit of enthusiastic devotion with which he had inspired his people, both seamen and soldiers, so, although the defence of the place was no longer a task of such utterly overwhelming difficulty as to need being faced in a spirit of romantic desperation, it still must depend for success upon his power of exalting and sustaining men's minds. Therefore, overruling the numberless advisers who strove to move him from his decision, he judged it his duty to be visiting the lines of defence, to be sharing in the risks of the day with the gunners who stood at the ramparts, and, in short, to cause himself to be seen at all the chief posts of danger.

Men belonging to Korniloff's Staff have commemorated the acts and the words of their hero, in this the last day of his life, with an almost pious exactness; and, although it be plain that, amongst our people at home, the uneventful ride of a Russian Admiral from bastion to bastion will never evoke that kind of interest which it wrought in the minds of his own fellow-countrymen, I yet imagine that some portion of the material derived from those loving records may help to give true impressions of the nature of the business which engaged the chiefs in Sebastopol on the day of the first cannonade, and may even, in an incidental and passing way, afford better insight into the condition of things within the fortress than could well be imparted by formal words of siege narrative

—here, and how the men were struck

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The move-  
ments of  
Korniloff.



CHAPTER. down and replaced, when and where a gun was dis-  
 XVII. mounted, or an embrasure spoilt and restored.

His pre-  
 sence at  
 the Flag-  
 staff Bas-  
 tion.

The instant he heard the opening of the cannonade, Korniloff hastened to spring into his saddle; and then—at so eager a pace that his Staff could hardly keep up with him—he galloped off to the Flagstaff Bastion. By the time that he had gained the esplanade by the left face of the bastion, the firing had grown to its full height and power. Already the smoke of the salvoes in which the sailors delighted had enwrapped the whole field of sight in a thick steadfast cloud. Seen through it, the sun in the east was a dull red and lustreless orb. Yet, by the darts of fire which, from moment to moment, were piercing the cloud, Korniloff and the officers with him could make out where the enemy's guns were in battery, or where their own were replying. In their rear, too, they saw through the smoke a third belt of fire; for behind the gorge of the bastion, the skilled contriver of the defences had planted two batteries, which threw their shells over the heads of the men engaged at the ramparts in front.

It was hot at this time in the Flagstaff Bastion; for the batteries of the French on Mount Rodolph—unstricken, as yet, with the havoc which awaited them—were exerting their full might; but also—and this was more formidable, by reason of the greater calibre of the guns—the left face of the bastion was battered, and, at the same time, its right face enfiladed, by the fire from Chapman's Attack.

Korniloff conversed with the gunners, and to some

of them he gave directions in regard to the pointing of the guns; but it does not appear that he brought himself to put a check upon his seamen by preventing them from firing in broadsides. He passed from gun to gun along the whole bastion, and then went along the winding boulevard line to that new work adjoining the Péressip, which, because of its sudden growth, men called the 'Mushroom' Battery. Whether it was that the minds of men were so kindled as to be capable of giving new colour and form to what their sight conveyed to them, or that Korniloff's look and bearing were really in some degree altered by the opening of the long-promised conflict, it is certain that the language of those who rode with him along the line of the boulevard gives a kind of support to that old superstition of the Scots which assured the believing world that approaching death was foreshown by a sign, and that when his end drew near the doomed man was clothed with a preternatural brightness. 'Calm and stern,' says one of the Staff who rode with Korniloff—'calm and stern was the expression of his face, yet a slight smile played on his lips.' His eyes—those wonderful, intelligent, and piercing eyes—shone brighter than was their wont. His cheeks were flushed. He carried his head loftily. His thin and slightly bent form had become erect. He seemed to grow in size.\*

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His ride  
along the  
boulevard  
towards  
the Péres-  
sip.

Korniloff returned the same way back to the right wing of the Flagstaff Bastion; and, after speaking

\* Admiral Likhatcheff, one of Korniloff's Staff, quoted in the 'Matières pour servir.'

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with Vice-Admiral Novolsilsky, he remounted his horse and descended into the ravine, going on through that part of the defences which connected the Flagstaff and the Central Bastions. The road lay along a steep slope, and the blaze from the French batteries was so constant, and their fire so heavy, that for a moment the affrighted chargers of Korniloff and his Staff refused to confront the storm ; but Korniloff soon conquered the will of his horse ; and when he had done so he said, with a smile, 'I cannot bear to be disobeyed.' In the valley he passed near the Taroutine battalion, and the soldiers were overheard saying, 'This is indeed a brave fellow.'

His presence at the Central Bastion.

Gaining at length the Central Bastion, Korniloff there found Admiral Nachimoff toiling hard at his duty, and seeming to be as much at home in the batteries as though he were on board his own ship. Nachimoff's appearance at this time might be regarded, perhaps, as somewhat characteristic of that tendency to self-immolation which we have attributed to him ; for, as though he would be decked out for sacrifice, he distinguished himself from others by choosing to wear his full uniform, with all the heavy splendour of an admiral's epaulets ; and already, from a slight wound then lately received, the blood was coursing down his face.

While conversing with Nachimoff, Korniloff mounted the banquette at the projecting angle of the bastion, and there for some time the two Admirals stood ; for they were trying to ascertain the effect of the Russian fire upon the enemy's batteries. Driving in from

moment to moment, the round shots so struck the parapet and its defenders as to cover the Admirals and the officers at their side with the pelting of loose, gritty earth, and even sometimes to sprinkle them with the blood of men wounded. Shells also were bursting on all sides, and slaughtering the people at the batteries.

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Seeing the danger to which Korniloff exposed himself, Captain Ilynsky approached the Admiral, and entreated him to leave the bastion. By that time Korniloff had descended from the banquette, and was looking to see how the men at the batteries were pointing their guns. Ilynsky tried to carry his purpose by saying to Korniloff that his presence at the bastion denoted want of trust in his subordinates; and added that he would so take care to fulfil his duty as to render unnecessary the presence of the Admiral. Korniloff answered, 'And if you are to do your duty, why do you wish to prevent me from doing mine? My duty is to see all.' Korniloff visited the battery

at the gorge of the Central Bastion, and then went on to the work which we call the Land Quarantine. Seeing that the men were suffering from thirst, he gave orders for hauling up casks of water to the batteries. Then, needing food, he rode home to his quarters. Before he yet broke his fast, Korniloff found time to finish a letter which he had been writing to his wife. This, along with a watch which he regarded as a kind of heirloom, Korniloff entrusted to the courier who was about to be despatched to Nicolayeff. 'Pray,' said he, 'give this watch to my wife—it must belong to my eldest son;' and then, in words

Korniloff's continued survey, and his return to his quarters.

His letter and message to his wife.

C H A P. half playful, but susceptible of an interpretation which  
 XVII. would give them a mournful significance, he went on to say, 'I am afraid that here it will get broken.'

He persists in his determination to go up to the Malakoff Hill;

but before doing so ascends the house-top in order to gather a general impression of the cannonade.

His despondency.

The state of the conflict at this time.

It was soon after this that Baron Krüdener came in with messages from Admiral Istomin, the officer in command at the Malakoff. Istomin's words purported to convey an assurance that all was going on well at the Tower; but the words were accompanied by an entreaty. The entreaty was, that Korniloff would not needlessly imperil a life so precious as his by coming up to the Malakoff Hill. He persisted in his determination to go thither; but a little delay was obtained by inducing him to ascend to the terrace on the house-top in order to form a more general and extended idea of the scope and power of the cannonade than he had yet been able to gather. It would seem that he was painfully impressed by what he saw; for, after first giving some practical directions for insuring an unfailing supply of ammunition to all the batteries, he once more disclosed in private that want of hopefulness which we have already remarked upon as forming an anomalous characteristic in one who could kindle and sustain the heroism of other men. 'I fear,' he said, 'that no means will suffice against such a cannonade.'

It may be said that, at the time, there was some ground, not, indeed, for so great a despondency as that which weighed upon Korniloff, but, at all events, for grave forebodings. The artillery conflict then raging between the French and the Russians hitherto seemed so equal as to disappoint the ing of the great Russian Engineer; f

of overwhelming the batteries on Mount Rodolph by a mightier and more embracing array of ordnance-power had been baffled, as yet, by the prowess of the French artillerymen, and also, it would seem, by the obstinacy with which the Russian seamen still clung to their favourite notion of constantly firing in broad-sides. The fronting walls of the cazern at the gorge of the Central, and the one at the gorge of the Land Quarantine Bastions, were in some places destroyed, in others, grievously injured; and the parapet of that last cazern being also destroyed, the five guns ranged behind it were soon reduced to silence. Also, the lower part of the town wall was a good deal damaged, and in some places broken through, by the French shot. Moreover, there were some of the Russian batteries opposed to the French, in which a large proportion of the gunners originally serving the guns had already been killed or wounded, and replaced by fresh combatants.

But if the strife of great guns between the French and the Russians was thus for a while almost equal, it was otherwise with the conflict of artillery-power going on in the Karabel faubourg; for there, the besiegers were obtaining the ascendant. With all his skill and all the resources at his command, Todleben, as we saw, had failed to provide sufficing means to counteract the two English Attacks. Before the first hour of the cannonade had passed, it was clear that our batteries were proving to be more powerful than those opposed to them. This was especially true of the greater calibre

CHAP. of the English guns, but in part also from the skill  
XVII. with which they had been planted on Green Hill and the Woronzoff Height. Already a good deal of havoc had been wrought in the Redan, as well as in the fronting walls of the cazern near it. Some of the guns on the summit of the Malakoff Tower had been dismounted, and the rest were now silent; for the English shot had not only ruined the parapet, but had flung its stone fragments upon the gunners with an effect so destructive as to compel an abandonment of all further attempt to work the two or three guns still remaining in battery. For the rest of the day it was no longer from the tower itself, but only from some guns covered by the glacis and its flanking entrenchments, that the famous position of the Malakoff still asserted its power.

And although at the Russian batteries the men were still firm, yet elsewhere, it would seem, there was need of that exaltation of spirit which Korniloff knew how to create by his presence among the combatants. Indeed, one of the very officers who strove to dissuade him from hazarding his life at the ramparts has acknowledged that the forces composing the garrison were in a state to require encouragement.\* Whilst the seamen, with such work in hand as was more than enough for the utmost of human energy, still persisted and stood to their guns, the bodies of

\* Captain Gendre. The Captain says: 'We all knew what influence his [Korniloff's] appearance exercised over the soldiers in these last days, and he found it indispensable to animate the men, who were not accustomed to the heavy naval shot. I did not dare to speak more.'

infantry drawn up in rear of the bastions to meet the expected assault. had been subjected to a different, nay, almost an opposite, kind of trial. They had had to remain still and passive under a fire of heavy artillery—for the most part a ricochet fire—which, for some time, had been more or less working havoc in their ranks. There were symptoms of a commencing panic. Some combatants of the inferior sort—including, it seems, a body of convicts—began to move off in disorder from the comparatively unimportant positions in which they had been placed; and although the troops posted by the gorges of the assailed bastions did not thus give way, their firmness was plainly undergoing too heavy a trial. The chief judged it necessary to reduce to a very small number the force of infantry thus detained under fire, and to endeavour to compensate for the effect of the change by providing that at several chosen points there should be posted an aide-de-camp, having orderlies and horses in readiness, who was to hurry up reinforcements of infantry to any point threatened with immediate assault.

Upon the whole, therefore, it must be acknowledged that there was some approach to a fulfilment of the hope which the Allies had suffered themselves to entertain when they looked to a panic in Sebastopol as the not unlikely result of their mere cannonade; and it would not be travelling beyond the range of things probable to imagine that, if the Allied navies at this time, and in accordance with the original plan, had been thundering at the mouth of the roadstead, the

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State and temper of the troops posted near the gorges of the bastions.

Symptoms of a commencing panic.

Measures adopted in consequence.

The effect that might possibly have been produced at this time by a naval attack.



**C H A P.** failing heart of those combatants who were less resolute  
**XVII.** than the rest might have led to confusion and flight. But whatever may be imagined in regard to the probable effect of putting that further stress upon the composure of the garrison at a time when the land cannonade was most disturbing its courage, the Russians were secured from any such superadded trial of their fortitude by Admiral Hamelin's determination to postpone the naval attack;\* and the moment was now close at hand when the evil, nay, the danger, that there is in the grievous discouragement of troops would be shifted away from Sebastopol by the turning fortune of war, and made all at once to pass over into the midst of the French batteries.

The skillfulness of Todleben's dispositions was beginning to tell;

As matched against the opposing Works, that string of French batteries on the crest of Mount Rodolph had so narrow, so protruding a front, that it has been likened to a solitary and isolated bastion dispending its strength from a centre against the concave of an arc; whilst the long, bending line of great guns with which Todleben sought to embrace it threw back a converging fire; and although the great engineer had been baffled for a time by the eagerness or the obstinacy of the sailors who manned his batteries, the higher skill of his dispositions was already beginning to give him the mastery, when the gradual and rightful solution of the problem he so longed to work out was all at once intercepted by what, in a sense,

\* See *post*, p. 387.

may be called an accident. The earth shook. A volume of flame sprang up from the ground. There was a roll of sound, not harsh nor deafening, yet such as to out-thunder great guns; and from the spot whence the flame had issued there was reared up on high a black, steadfast column of smoke. A shell from one of the Russian batteries had blown up a French magazine. The explosion, although so great a one as to be seen and heard from afar by the English as well as the French, was less widely apparent to the Russians, who were wrapped in a dense cloud of smoke. Some indeed of the garrison perceived what had happened, and they greeted the sight with exulting 'Hurrahs!' but it was only by slow and imperfect process that even the chiefs in Sebastopol attained to learn much of the truth; and down to the last, it would seem, they regarded the explosion as merely an incident of siege-warfare, when, in truth, it almost had proportions great enough to decide the campaign.

By this explosion no utterly ruinous harm was done to the works or the armament of the battery in which the disaster occurred, and the number of men whom it stretched on the ground killed or wounded is confined by French records to fifty; but for those who had to witness the scene of the havoc, whilst yet the disaster was new, it may well have been appalling to see half a hundred of human beings, who had all been alive and busy the instant before, now changed **by one blast** of fire into mere blackened corpses or **helpless sufferers**. Therefore mere horror

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when a  
great ex-  
plosion  
occurred  
in one of  
the French  
batteries.

Physical  
effects of  
the explo-  
sion.

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Its effect  
upon the  
spirit of  
the French  
troops.

may have partly conduced to what followed ; and the sensitive, anxious, humane disposition of General Canrobert laid him painfully open to the impressions which such a calamity was but too well fitted to create ; but French troops know so much about war, and are so prone to the use of the intellect as a means of divining results, that, in general, their feelings, whether of ardour or of despondency, are more or less founded upon reasoning, if not upon reason. Even if the French gunners had not discovered the error before, they would have been swift to infer the faultiness of General Bizot's dispositions when they saw that their batteries could be raked ; and upon learning from this signal misfortune that a great magazine of gunpowder had been ineffectually sheltered from the enemy's fire, they would be likely to carry yet further their distrust of the men in authority.

Second  
explosion  
in the  
French  
lines.

But whatever was the immediate cause of the feeling, it is certain that the moral prostration occasioned by the blowing up of the magazine was out of all proportion to the mere physical harm which it had wrought. The service of the battery in which the disaster had occurred was at once disorganised. Its fire ceased ; and, the Russians then bending their care to the batteries which remained unextinguished, there occurred, before long, a second explosion in the French lines. This last mishap—the explosion of an ammunition-caisson—was not in itself of much moment ; but coming soon after the great explosion, it naturally increased the discouragement prevailing in the French batteries ; and General Canrobert

tured, apparently, by grief and by doubt—left it to the officer commanding his artillery to determine and say whether the fire of the French batteries should, or not, be suspended. The decision was exactly the one which might have been expected from the tenor of such an appeal; and at half-past ten o'clock in the morning, the Attack from Mount Rodolph was silenced.\*

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Canrobert's determination.

Total cessation of fire from the French batteries on Mount Rodolph.

Communications from General Canrobert to Lord Raglan.

Not long after the silencing of the French batteries, General Rose brought a message from General Canrobert to Lord Raglan, and not only intimated that the silence of the French batteries would continue for the rest of the day, but said that the misfortune had produced great discouragement. After an interval General Rose again came to Lord Raglan with another message from Canrobert, and this his second report was even more gloomy than the first.†

\* After mentioning the last explosion, Niel, the official narrator, says:—'Ce nouvel accident determine la cessation du feu vers dix heures et demie.'—'Siège de Sebastopol,' p. 62.

† General Rose was English Commissioner accredited to the French Headquarters. It happens that Lord Strathnairn (formerly General Rose) does not remember the purport of the messages which he delivered, and I am therefore obliged to appeal—I do so very reluctantly—to my own memory. My impression, however, of what passed in my presence and hearing is this: General Rose came twice. On the first occasion he came to say that the body of combustibles which had exploded was not a French magazine, but something which the Russians had found means to hurl into the French trenches; and he added that the French were a good deal discouraged, at the same time intimating, if I rightly remember, that their fire would not be resumed that day. Upon his second visit—I am still speaking only from memory—General Rose said he had been requested by General Canrobert to apologise for having sent the first message—the fact being (as all, of course, knew) that the exploded combustibles were munitions of war contained in one of the French magazines. General Rose, it seems,

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No enter-  
prise  
against  
Mount  
Rodolph  
was at-  
tempted  
at the  
time by  
the Rus-  
sians.

After  
10.30 A.M.  
the Eng-  
lish were  
engaged  
alone  
with the  
enemy.

The nature and scope of the disaster in the French lines was not so understood at the time by any of the chiefs in Sebastopol as to lead them to follow up their advantage. If, on seeing the magnitude of the first explosion, the Russians had at once assailed the batteries on Mount Rodolph with so bold a sortie as the one they undertook some six hours later, they would have tested the power of the French infantry to hold good in a time of depression.

From half-past ten in the morning, and thenceforth to the end of the day—nay, indeed, for a yet greater time—it was only by the English batteries that the attack upon Sebastopol was maintained.

Prince  
Mentschi-  
koff.

His pre-  
sence for  
a time in  
Sebasto-  
pol.

I have spoken of Korniloff—acting always under the counsels of Colonel de Todleben—as the real commander of all the forces besieged in Sebastopol; but Prince Mentschikoff still held a supreme authority in the Crimea over army and navy alike; and during a part of the morning he was personally present in the place. After visiting the batteries in the Karabel faubourg, the Prince came back into the main town, rode up the Telegraph Hill, and stopping at Korniloff's door, requested the Admiral, then still at his house, to come

must have added that the effect of the explosion would be to prevent the French from reopening their fire even on the morrow; for I find that my note is as follows: 'General Rose rode up, and told me that the French would not be able to go on again until "the day after "to-morrow"! My impression is that after imparting the bad tidings to Lord Raglan, Rose intimated in a general way the determination of Canrobert to hold himself in readiness for assaulting. He did not, however, convey any proposal to that effect.

out and join him. The Admiral accordingly mounted his horse, and accompanied Mentschikoff as far as the Catherine landing-place, for thither the Prince was going with the intention of quitting Sebastopol, and crossing over to the north of the roadstead.

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It seems that the Prince was departing in a condition of mind far from hopeful ; \* but Korniloff, who, only some minutes before, had let fall some words indicative of his own despondency, was now, they say, able to cheer the spirit of his Commander. He made his report to the chief of the sound condition of things along that part of the line which he had already visited ; but also the Admiral was now able to impart tidings, which went to show that, for the moment at all events, the balance of the artillery conflict was inclining against the French ; for although Korniloff had not yet apparently heard of the great explosion in the French lines, he already knew something of the consequences resulting from the disaster, and was able to assure his chief that the fire from Mount Rodolph had slackened. That it had quite ceased he could not yet say ; for the time when the two chiefs thus rode to the Catherine landing-place was about ten o'clock, and a little anterior to the moment when the French gave up their attack.

His conversation with Korniloff whilst riding down to the landing-place in order to depart from Sebastopol.

I have heard no account of the reasons by which Prince Mentschikoff may have thought himself compelled to depart from the beleaguered town, and to de-

Conjectures as to Prince Mentschikoff's rea-

\* My authority (Admiral Korniloff's aide-de-camp) does not say this in direct terms, but I consider that he does so impliedly by the language in which he shows that the Prince was reassured by Korniloff.

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son for  
quitting  
the be-  
leaguered  
town.

part, too, at such a time. It is true that, in moving to the region on the north of the roadstead, Prince Mentschikoff would be rejoining his field army ; but since that was a force secure itself from attack, and not then about to be used by him as a means of striking any instant blow at the besiegers, the necessity for his personal presence in the country towards which he was going, is not at once made apparent by showing that he there had an army. It may be that, entertaining faint hopes of a successful resistance on the South Side, he judged it a duty to bend all his energies to the defence of the Severnaya ; and, indeed, if he really held fast to the theory by which his former withdrawal from Sebastopol was justified, that persuasion alone, however perverse it may seem, would still go far to account for the step which he thought fit to take.\*

Prince  
Mentschi-  
koff's de-  
parture.  
Between  
10 and  
10.30 A. M.

Be this as it may, what we know is, that the town of Sebastopol, with the Man-of-war Harbour, the fleet, and the arsenal, being now once more in a crisis of its fate, Prince Mentschikoff again withdrew from it. He got into a boat at the Catherine landing-place, and crossed over to the north of the roadstead.

Korniloff's  
move-  
ments, and  
the direc-  
tions he  
gave.

After receiving a farewell—the last farewell—from his chief, Korniloff rode along the Catherine Street to the Theatre Square, and thence, after despatching three of his Staff, with special orders for the relief of the wounded, and the supply of ammunition, he returned

\* The theory spoken of, *ante*, p. 225, which maintained that Sebastopol was of smaller account than the rest of the Crimea—that the ~~ke~~ was of less worth than the shell.

once more to the Flagstaff Bastion.\* Captain Gendre at that time was the only officer with him. At every step the Admiral was met by litters bearing away the wounded and dead, and great as was the number thus carried away, very many still lay where they fell. It was only by great and increased exertions that the Flagstaff Bastion could at length be cleared of the dead and the wounded.

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It would seem that at this time Korniloff first heard of the great explosion which had occurred in the French lines full an hour before ; but there is no indication of his having even then got to know the magnitude of the disaster, and he failed to infer the discouragement of his foe from the slackening of the fire on Mount Rodolph.

In the bastion, Korniloff and his companion were joined by the officer acting under General Möller, as Chief of the Staff ; and the three, after mounting by the barracks to the top of the hill, and inspecting the two shell-batteries, there manned by the crew of the *Jason*, descended by the alley of the upper boulevard, and returned to the Theatre Square. On the way, Korniloff indicated the arrangements which were to be made for repelling any assault against the Flagstaff Bastion ; and from the unquestioned authority with which he seems to have given his instructions to the Chief of the Staff, it is made evident that the Admiral's virtual command of the land forces in Se-

\* One of the three officers whom Korniloff despatched on these errands was his aide-de-camp, Shestakoff, who, up to that time, had not quitted his chief for a moment.



CHAP. bastopol, no less than of the seamen, was still unim-  
XVII. paired.\*

At the gates of the boulevard Captain Gendre tried to dissuade Korniloff from undertaking his intended visit to the Karabel faubourg; and he based this attempt on the ground that the Admiral was already acquainted with the condition of things in that part of the lines: but Korniloff answered, 'What will the soldiers say of me if they do not see me to-day?'

The meet-  
 ing of Kor-  
 niloff and  
 Todleben  
 at the  
 Péressip.

Korniloff now descended the road leading down to the head of the Man-of-war Harbour; and at the Péressip, he was met by Todleben then returning from the Karabel faubourg. During some minutes, and for the last time, the two great defenders of Sebastopol—I called them the soul and the mind of the undertaking—took counsel together. Todleben by this time had completed his inspection of the defences along the whole of the front assailed by the Allies; and although he had found the Redan reduced to a critical state by the fire of the English, he was able to report the success of the exertions since made to repair the harm done. His visit to the Karabel faubourg having been thus recent, it might seem that there was

\* I have thought it worth while to make this remark, lest it should be supposed that the appointment of another officer as Chief of the (army) Staff, had abridged Korniloff's power. At the time of his acquiring a kind of dictatorship by acclamation, Korniloff himself, as we saw (*ante*, chap. x. p. 192), was made Chief of the (army) Staff, in order that his authority over the land forces might be undisputed; and Mentschikoff did not disapprove the arrangement, but he afterwards varied it by appointing as Chief of the (army) Staff an officer of the land service devoted to Korniloff, and quite understanding (apparently) † virtually under the Admiral's orders.

the less reason for Korniloff's going thither ; but the Admiral had resolved, as we know, that in every part of the lines assailed the men should see their chief.

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Accordingly, he parted from Todleben, and riding on to the eastern or Karabel slope of the ravine, he ascended it, as he had often before done in these latter days of his life, by the steps cut out in the rock. He was quickly in the Redan ; and he found that the work, though undergoing a cross-fire of great weight and power from the English batteries, was now, as Todleben had intimated, in a good condition for maintaining the defence. All the guns in the works were firing ; and the number of killed and wounded was not yet very great, because the breastworks covered the men at the guns, and the infantry reserves had been so stationed as to be little exposed to fire ; but the barracks near the gorge of the work were already a mere heap of ruins, and all the space in rear of the Redan was ploughed up by English shells.

Korniloff's ascent to the lines of defence in the Karabel faubourg. His presence in the Redan.

State of things there.

Several of the chief officers in command at the Redan accompanied Korniloff in his inspection of the work. Not deeming it needful for their beloved chief to be thus surveying the lines under the heavy fire of the English batteries, they affectionately expressed the pain with which they saw him exposing his life to so great a danger ; but they could not move him from his purpose. When they learnt that he was going to the Malakoff Hill, they prayed that at least he would take the route by the hospital suburb ; for they said it was impossible for a man to pass on horseback along the line of the trenches without being struck down.

His departure for the Malakoff Hill.

C H A P. Korniloff smiled, and said, 'You can never run away  
XVII. 'from a shot.'

Accompanied by Captain Gendre, his aide-de-camp, and followed by a single Cossack, Korniloff now descended the hill along the line of the trenches, near the garden of Colonel Prokophieff. There the cover was not so high as even to shelter the horses ; but the Admiral rode quietly on under a heavy fire, and commented as he went on the plans of the Allied army. In this part of his ride, the aide-de-camp wondered to find that the round-shot, humming loud through the air, and ploughing the earth on all sides, yet always left space for three horsemen to pass on unhurt in the storm ; and he got to imagine at last that Fate and a 'happy star' had made sacred the life of his chief.

After changing the position of the 'Moscow' battalions, by moving them to a ground where they would be sheltered from the enemy's fire, Korniloff passed the dock-bridge and began to ascend the western slope of the Malakoff. When he came near the seamen on duty in that part of the field, they greeted him with loud cheers ; but Korniloff forbade them. He pointed to the crest of Mount Rodolph, where all was now hushed, and said to his people, 'When the English 'batteries are as silent as the French yonder, then, 'and not till then, we will cheer.'

His presence at  
the Mala-  
koff.

Korniloff ascended the Malakoff Hill from the side of the Karabel suburb, and gained the right flank of the entrenchment which covered the front of the tower. He quitted his saddle and began to go through the batteries on foot. The fire was very heavy. When

Korniloff reached the tower, he found that its guns had been silenced and deserted ; but Admiral Istomin still answered the English by a well-sustained fire from the earthworks which covered and flanked the stone building. It occurred to Korniloff that the ground floor of the tower would be suitable for an ambulance or field-hospital, and he gave directions accordingly. After this, he was going to mount the upper floor of the tower, but Admiral Istomin dissuaded him from doing so, saying that no one would be found on the top. Korniloff remained for some time at the foot of the tower. His aide-de-camp begged him to return home ; and in answer he pointed to the ground where the Boutir and Borodino regiments were stationed, saying, ‘ We will just go to those battalions, and after that we will go home by the hospital road.’ He still loitered for a few minutes longer, but at length—it was then half-past eleven o’clock—he said, ‘ Now let us go.’ He moved towards the spot under shelter of the breastwork where the horses were awaiting him ; but he had scarcely yet taken four steps when the uppermost part of his left thigh was shattered by a round-shot. Gendre raised the head of the wounded chief, and the other officers near coming up and lifting him in their arms, they together laid their Admiral under the shelter of the breastwork, between two of the guns. For a moment, Korniloff was able to speak, and he so used his waning power of utterance as to say, ‘ Defend Sebastopol !’ He then became senseless.

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The wound  
he there  
received.

Korniloff was carried to one of the nearest ambulan-

C H A P.  
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ces ; and having, when there, recovered full consciousness, he took the sacrament of his Church. He knew that he was to be taken to the hospital, and perceiving that men shrank from the duty of lifting him for fear of the pain they must give, he undertook the task himself, and, by a singular effort, contrived to throw his mangled body upon the litter which awaited him. He was carried to the hospital. There, at intervals, he underwent pangs so cruel as to wring from him more than once a shriek of agony ; but at a moment when he was free from sharp pain, he laid both hands upon the head of the Chief of the Staff who stood at his side, and said, 'Tell everybody how pleasant it is to 'die when the conscience is quiet.' He sent tender words to his wife and to his children ; and from time to time he prayed thus : 'O God ! bless Russia 'and the Emperor. Save Sebastopol and the fleet !' After taking an anodyne potion he was tranquil, and seemed to be dozing ; but upon an officer coming in with a story that 'the English batteries had been 'almost silenced, and that only two of their guns 'were still firing,' Korniloff seems to have become aware that the new arrival had brought with it tidings which interested the bystanders, for he roused himself to ask 'Who was there ?' and as soon as he was told of the English guns being silenced, he collected his last strength and cried out, 'Hurrah ! hurrah !' He then became insensible. After a few minutes he ceased to breathe.\*

\* Narrative by the Chief of the Staff, who was present. The narrative is given in the 'Matériaux pour servir.' The story which the officer

Thus Korniloff died. In an earlier page I have spoken of his valiant, devoted nature ; and, indeed, he had a soul of such quality that men who abhor truthless praise might yet dare to call it heroic. There, it would seem, lay the main source of his power ; for although he well proved himself to be an able administrator, very careful for the weal of his people, there is no safe ground for inferring that he had all those varied gifts which go to make a great commander ; and it must always, of course, be remembered that the wisdom and the vigour of his thousand measures for the defence of Sebastopol were owing in no small degree to the guidance of another man's mind.

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The heroic  
quality of  
his nature.

In a sense, it might be agreed that, so far as concerns the fame of the man, there was almost enough of duration in those twenty-six days of illustrious life which Heaven vouchsafed to Korniloff ; for in part, as we know, the evading army had already come back to its task ; and short as was the period of the Admiral's dictatorship, he at least had outlived that dark hour when the peril besetting Sebastopol created the need of a hero. I imagine it probable that, if the Admiral had not been slain, his authority, though wielded so nobly, would have been soon curtailed.\*

Question  
whether a  
longer  
span of  
life would  
have been  
likely to  
add to the  
brilliancy  
of his  
fame.

had brought in of the English batteries being nearly silenced was founded apparently upon the circumstance of there having occurred a short lull in the firing—a lull resulting from a momentary failure of the ammunition lying in immediate readiness.

\* Notwithstanding what I have said (*ante*, p. 378 note), I still think that the mere fact of superseding Korniloff as Chief of the military Staff denoted an intention of gradually abridging his authority.

CHAP. XVII. It could hardly have long survived the cessation of those supreme dangers to which its existence was owing.

After Korniloff's death, the control of the forces defending Sebastopol no longer remained centred in one man.

If the defence of Sebastopol was now so far provided for as to be no longer dependent upon the enthusiasm of the garrison and the romantic devotion of Korniloff, still on this day, when the assault of the place seemed impending, there was needed at least a commander whom all would obey with trustful loyalty; and after Korniloff's death, no one succeeded to the power he had been wielding. True, Prince Mentschikoff was the Commander of all the forces in the Crimea, both military and naval; but, besides that the Prince had proved himself wanting in ability for the conduct of a battle, he was absent from the beleaguered town, and not, it seems, willing for the day to come back to the scene of the conflict. Admiral Nachimoff succeeded to the naval command which Korniloff had exercised, but that control of the land forces which had been given, as it were, by universal acclamation to the Admiral now lying dead, relapsed into the hands of General Möller. The command of the forces thus became split into two; and although there was nothing in this circumstance which made it impracticable to go on with the work of the engineers and the gunners along the lines of defence, it was evidently to be apprehended that the want of a single and trusted commander might come to be grievously felt if the Allies should deliver their assault in the course of this same afternoon.

The embarrassment likely to result from divided command in the event of an assault.

An effort, it seems, was made to conceal the death

of the Admiral, and there were some at least of the garrison who did not learn what had happened till almost the close of the day. Upon coming to know the truth, the sailors, and the soldiery too, grieved bitterly for the loss of their trusted chief and dictator, who had caused men to stand to their guns when the fleet and the army alike seemed to abdicate all warlike purpose. And along with this grief for the loss of a trusted leader, there was the sorrow of the humble thousands, both seamen and soldiers, who had come to know how much of their welfare was owing to the skilful administration and the watchful care of their beloved Admiral. From time to time there had been posted up numbers of general orders, in which Korniloff gave directions tending to relieve the sufferings of the men, and in many ways add to their comfort. These announcements remained on the walls long after the death of the chief whose name stood in print at the foot of them; and, the benefits conferred by his care being still retained and enjoyed, the grateful men, as they passed, used to look up and point to the words, and bless the memory of their hero, saying often, in that gentle and poetic spirit which is characteristic of the Muscovite people, ‘Our Admiral still watches over us!’

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Endeavour  
to conceal  
for a time  
the fact of  
Korniloff's  
death.

The grief  
of the  
sailors and  
of the  
soldiery.

The feel-  
ings with  
which his  
memory  
was re-  
garded.

## II.

Meanwhile, the fleets of the Allies, though they had not yet come into action, were standing in towards the roads of Sebastopol.

The captains of the English ships were apparently



# CHAP. XVII.

If the naval attack was meant to add to the moral effect of the land cannonade, it was important that it should begin at the same time.

Accordingly, it was so determined.

Just before midnight on the 16th, the time for the attack was postponed at the instance of the French Admiral.

right when they counselled that their fire should be withheld until the moment of the intended assault, but their opinion had not been adopted by the Generals; and, it having been once determined that a naval attack should be undertaken for the avowed purpose of adding to the moral effect which the land cannonade might produce, there was reason enough for determining that it should begin at the same time—that is, at half-past six in the morning. Accordingly, it was so agreed by Lord Raglan and Canrobert.\*

Already Lyons had written to Lord Raglan, ‘We shall hear each other at half-past six in the morning, and I am not without hopes of our seeing each other in the course of the day in Sebastopol;’ and at half-past ten at night Dundas was announcing to Lord Raglan by letter that he had completed his arrangements for the morrow. But at that hour the subversive announcement, which soon afterwards reached the Britannia, had yet to come; and in a postscript to the very note which stated that his dispositions had been made, Dundas was obliged to add, ‘Since writing the above, I have had a communication from Admiral Hamelin, and find he does not intend commencing his fire before ten or eleven o’clock, as his

\* On the 16th, the eve of the engagement, Colonel Trochu’s memorandum of the agreement to which Canrobert and Lord Raglan had come upon this point is express: ‘Le feu commencera demain 17 Octobre vers 6 heures  $\frac{1}{2}$  du matin au signal donné par trois bombes parties des ouvrages Français. La marine est invitée à se conformer à cette disposition.’ Lord Raglan, in his own handwriting, has endorsed the memorandum with these words: ‘Put by. This paper was drawn up by Colonel Trochu in my room, on the 16th of October, in my presence, and that of General Rose and General Canrobert.’

‘shot would not last long, and, if expended early, the enemy might \* that he was beaten off. I mention this to explain to your Lordship why the fleets do not begin their fire early in the day.’ Dundas acceded to the reason which Hamelin adduced, and consented to the proposed change of time.†

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It had been determined apparently that the attack of the forts should be executed by ships which, keeping always in movement, would deliver their fire in succession;‡ and having given way to the French in regard to the time for beginning, Dundas perhaps suffered himself to hope that thenceforth he would be left free to execute his part of the joint naval enterprise without undergoing fresh guidance.

But at seven o'clock in the morning of the 17th, Admiral Hamelin, to the astonishment of Dundas, came on board the *Britannia*, and announced a new plan of attack. To say that he ‘proposed’ it to Dun-

7 o'clock  
A.M. 17th  
Oct., a  
new plan  
of attack  
suddenly  
insisted

\* In the original note, now lying before me, there is an omission of the word which the writer must have meant to insert after ‘might.’ The letter is printed in the *Journal of the Royal Engineers*, and the hiatus is there supplied, I see, by the word ‘think.’

† In a note written that night to Lyons, Dundas, after mentioning Hamelin’s postponement of the hour, and his reason for it, adds, ‘I think the reason a fair one, and I mean to act upon it.’ Lyons, on the contrary, says, writing to Lord Raglan, ‘I confess that I cannot understand their [the French] leaving the decision to you, and then acting at variance with that decision’ (P.S. written after midnight on the eve of the engagement).

‡ I say ‘apparently,’ because, though there are good grounds for believing the above statement to be accurate, I do not observe any mention of this superseded plan in the strictly authentic documents which are the foundation of what comes next in the text.

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upon  
by the  
French.

das for his consideration would be to mislead. By the means which will be presently shown, he forced it upon the English Admiral. It would seem, however, that Admiral Hamelin spoke in the name of his commanding officer, General Canrobert, and not as an Admiral propounding any scheme of his own ; for, personally, Admiral Hamelin is believed to have been ever loyal in his relations with Dundas ;\* and he was not a man who would willingly have outraged his English colleague by undertaking to put him under compulsion.

Nor, indeed, is it likely that Canrobert himself would have been inclined to enter upon any such line of action at a time when his judgment was holding its full sway ;† for besides that he was of a friendly, generous nature, and had learnt something by this time of the worth of the English on shore, he knew that at sea they were not without some renown ; and he hardly could have believed, in any calm moment, that it was right for him to refuse them a free voice in the counsels which were to govern the operations of the Allied navy, including, of course, their own fleet ; but he had been so constituted that, when called upon as a commander to form important resolves, his mind became the prey to a distressing kind of anxiety,

\* Dundas well knew, I believe, that Hamelin, when he had to make communications of this unwarrantable sort, was acting under the peremptory orders of his commanding officer, General Canrobert ; and I believe the English Admiral's friends will bear me out when I say that he always spoke warmly of Hamelin's loyal disposition towards him.

† The loyal and friendly way in which Canrobert (when not troubled by anxiety) could conduct his relations with the Eng think, *ante*, p. 102.

which unfitted him (as he soon came to learn) for the wielding of an army in the field ; and if now he broke loose from the plain obligations of the Alliance by peremptorily imposing upon the English navy—and that upon pain of finding all joint action suspended—the last and the feeblest of the notions which successively tormented his fancy, it is certain enough that he was far from intending discourtesy, and that he had no other object than that of pressing, with an almost hysteric force, for the adoption of a measure which his doubting and agonised mind had suddenly represented to him as the one that was the best for the common cause.

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By this new plan it was laid down, that instead of an operation effected by ships kept in motion, the two fleets, whilst engaging the forts, should be anchored in line ; that the array of the French fleet should begin at Chersonese Bay, proceeding thence in a north-north-easterly direction to a point opposite the centre of the harbour ; and that from thence, but in a line taking a north-easterly direction, the English fleet should be ranged. By examining this plan with the aid of a chart, and assuming that the French line would commence at that part of the bay which the Charlemagne actually took, it results that the French fleet was to be at distances of from 1600 to 2000 yards from the Quarantine Sea-fort (the nearest of the forts which it proposed to assail), and that the English fleet would have to engage Fort Constantine at ranges equally long.

The particulars of the new plan of attack.

Such was the plan which the last deliberations of

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The plan  
insisted  
upon by  
the French  
as an ulti-  
matum.

The dilem-  
ma in  
which  
Dundas  
was  
placed.

the French had brought them to adopt; and, scarce credible though it may seem, Admiral Hamelin caused Dundas to understand that the French were determined to have this line or none.

There was no time for an appeal to the good sense or good feeling of General Canrobert, and the dilemma in which Dundas now found himself placed was complete. Either he must come to such a breach with his tormentors as might endanger the delicate structure of the Alliance, and at all events prevent the united action of the two fleets, or else he must consent to draw up his ships at preposterous ranges, and engage alongside of the French in what (if it should not involve a painful and useless sacrifice) must be almost a mock battle. It was an addition to his troubles that he could not much speak the language of the nation which thus put him under compulsion. And this was the 'command in the 'Mediterranean,' that pleasant marine retirement which a good, faithful Whig had been earning by toil at the Board in Whitehall, by toil in the lobbies of the House of Commons, by long and enduring patience on the cushions of the Treasury Bench! The times were no more when he could have what men call 'quiet life;' and of the only two paths which lay open to him, each was so beset with evil that, upon the whole, as it seemed to him, the least pernicious thing he could do was to consent to range with the French in their planned line of battle, and deliver a vain cannonade. True, he was so bitterly reluctant to adopt a measure which he saw must

mortifying and hurtful to the self-respect of our navy, that he withheld his assent till Hamelin—in the very act, it seems, of leaving the ship—had declared outright that, since he could not have the English fleet with him, he must act alone;\* but when that last pang of the torture had been inflicted, Dundas yielded. He did not deceive himself. Though his volition was pliant under any hard stress of this sort, his judgment, it would seem, remained always unwarped; and he had not the solace of imagining that perhaps, after all, the measures forced upon him might turn out to be good ones. He has caused it to be formally and officially recorded that he gave his consent to the new plan because he saw that the French were determined to have this line or none.†

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Dundas's  
reluctant  
acceptance  
of the new  
plan.

His de-  
clared rea-  
son for ac-  
cepting it.

It was thus that, by means of a sudden and peremptory change adopted and enforced as an ultimatum on the very morning of an intended attack, the lever of the precious Alliance could be used and applied without mercy to an admiral commanding our fleet.

The effect  
of the  
course  
thus taken  
by Can-  
robert.

---

\* I have some reason for believing that Admiral Bonet de Willaumez, who was present, would corroborate this last statement.

† '6.45 A.M.—The siege-batteries and Russian forts opened fire.

'7       ,,     Admiral Hamelin came on board, and proposed a new 'line of attack—viz., the French N.N.E. from Cherson-ese Bay to the centre of the harbour, and the English 'from thence N.E. This was agreed to, *as the French 'seemed determined to have that line or none.*'

—Admiral's Journal, entry under date of 17th October 1854. When Dundas uses the words 'or none,' I understand him to mean *none in concert with him*. What Hamelin, I believe, threatened was—not to abstain from all naval action, but—to act independently.

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9 A.M.  
17th Oct.  
Dundas's  
conference  
with his  
ships' cap-  
tains.

By them  
the French  
plan was  
unani-  
mously  
condemn-  
ed, but re-  
luctantly  
assented  
to.

The readi-  
ness with  
which the  
English  
yielded  
to con-  
straints  
of this  
kind put  
upon them  
by their  
Allies.

The midnight and the new morning changes thus forced upon Dundas obliged him, of course, to confer anew with Lyons, as well as with the captains of his ships; and he summoned them on board the *Britannia*. There, at nine o'clock, they assembled. Dundas explained what had been required of him. I gather that with one mind, if not with one voice, the assembled captains condemned the new plan; and one of them put a question to the Admiral which tended to lay bare its weakness. Thereupon, Dundas rang a bell, and sent for the chart; but the captains did not come to precise conclusions as to the ranges at which the ships taking part in the array would have to act.\* They apparently judged that the service would be one of greater danger to the ships than it proved to be; but, in regard to the hopelessness of the intended attack, they did not deceive themselves. However, they deferred to authority.

It must be acknowledged that the English were good, easy allies. As on the morning of the landing they had made haste to accept the change, and to mend the confusion which the French had created by altering the place of the buoy,† so now our ships' captains gave proof that even under such a trial as this—and it was nothing less than that of having to play out before Europe a play which each saw to be a sorry one—they could keep themselves

\* They had not, of course, before them all the requisite data for coming to such conclusions, unless they knew the exact *part* of Chersonese Bay at which the French line of battle was to commence, and upon that, apparently, they were imperfectly informed.

† See vol. II. chap. xi.

free from the guilt of that which the churches call 'schism.'

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The English Admiral had to form, with the French, a line of ships riding at anchor, which was to stretch in unbroken array across the approaches of the roadstead ; and although it is true that to a portion of Admiral Hamelin's fleet this design seemed to offer a fair opportunity of ruining the work which we call the Quarantine Sea-fort, yet so far as concerned the rest of the French, and the whole of the English Navy, the proposed operation was calculated, as it seemed, to be in some degree hazardous, and at the same time thoroughly impotent. Under such conditions, the task imposed on our seamen was sacrificial rather than war-like ; and apparently it was in the spirit of devotion to a forlorn duty that Dundas chose the place in which to put his own flag-ship ; for when, in the course of this conference, an officer, whose opinion was weighty, pointed out that the ship which should be on the extreme right of the English line must of necessity be sunk in one hour, Dundas quietly answered that that post was the one he had reserved for the *Britannia*.<sup>\*</sup> That portion of the English fleet which was to anchor

The nature of the service which Dundas imposed upon himself when he submitted to the change of plan which had been forced upon him.

The place he chose for the *Britannia*.

The main division.

\* General Brereton, p. 26. Upon the supposition that the French line would commence at the eastern part of the Chersonese Bay, the centre of the whole array would be brought very near to the mouth of the roadstead ; and in that case, there was good reason for believing that, if the fleets should be ranged at any moderate distance from Sebastopol, the enemy's batteries would cross their fire with destructive effect upon any ship occupying the central post reserved for the *Britannia*. With regard to General Brereton, it may be right to say that he was the guest of Admiral Dundas on board the *Britannia*, was in the entire confidence of the Vice-Admiral, and with him in fact all day.



C H A P. strong limestone called the 'stone of the steppes.'\*  
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The average height above the level of the sea of the guns ranged in all these great sea-forts was, for the casemated tiers, about 26 feet, and for the open-air batteries on the top, from 30 to 40 feet.† The fronting stone walls of these two forts were from  $5\frac{1}{2}$  to 6 feet thick; and the vault-roofs which protected the storeys below from the effects of vertical fire had a thickness, including all their fillings and the layer of earth on the top, of from 6 to 12 feet.‡

Fort Con-  
stantine.

Fort Constantine had an armament of 97 pieces, disposed in the manner which will be indicated in a later page.

Fort Alex-  
ander.

Fort Alexander mounted, in all, 56 guns, of which 27 were in casemates.§ Of these 56 guns there were 51 which, in the course of the engagement (though only at long range) could be brought to bear upon the French or the English ships.||

The one  
definite  
purpose  
involved  
in the  
French  
plan.

The third and last of the three great works which were so placed as to be liable to become engaged with the fleets was the Quarantine Sea-fort. Amidst all the haze that there was in the mind which planned for the navy this attack of the 17th of October, there stood out one lesser object which was aimed at with a clearly defined intent. That object was the destruction of the Quarantine Sea-fort. The work stood detached at some distance west of Sebastopol. It had been constructed so early as the year 1818. Whilst the great casemate fastnesses of Constantine

The Qua-  
rantine  
Sea-fort.

\* Todleben, p. 93.

† Ibid. p.

§ Ibid. p. 96.

The main objects of these works were,—to prevent an enemy's ships from entering the roadstead; to destroy them very speedily if they should ever succeed in doing so; and, failing even that, to sink them in any endeavour to approach or to penetrate the Man-of-war Harbour. So large a proportion of the defensive works had been designed for these purposes, that (not counting those two small works, the Wasp Tower and the Telegraph Battery, of which we shall hear by-and-by) three only of all the water-side forts were so placed as to be able to take part in an engagement with ships keeping clear of the entrance. These three forts were Fort Constantine, Fort Alexander, and the Quarantine Sea-fort.

Fort Constantine on the north, and Fort Alexander on the south, of the entrance, were, both of them, works of prime importance, not only from their size, strength, and power, but also because it was evident, from the position of these two great fastnesses, that the capture or destruction of either would be an event that might govern the fate of Sebastopol.

Forts Constantine and Alexander.

Like the rest of the great stone forts which defended the coast and harbour, Fort Constantine and the casemated portion of Fort Alexander were built of a very

Whilst he lay in the roadstead, at some little distance from the inner or Man-of-war Harbour, the number of guns bearing on the Retribution was no less than 350. I imagine that any one acquainted (from Russian sources) with the sea-forts of Sebastopol, and examining Captain Drummond's report, as well as the plan which accompanies it, would be struck with the exceeding accuracy of the survey which the Retribution effected.

**C H A P.** strong limestone called the 'stone of the steppes.'\*  
**XVII.** The average height above the level of the sea of the guns ranged in all these great sea-forts was, for the casemated tiers, about 26 feet, and for the open-air batteries on the top, from 30 to 40 feet.† The fronting stone walls of these two forts were from 5½ to 6 feet thick; and the vault-roofs which protected the storeys below from the effects of vertical fire had a thickness, including all their fillings and the layer of earth on the top, of from 6 to 12 feet.‡

**Fort Constantine.** Fort Constantine had an armament of 97 pieces, disposed in the manner which will be indicated in a later page.

**Fort Alexander.** Fort Alexander mounted, in all, 56 guns, of which 27 were in casemates. § Of these 56 guns there were 51 which, in the course of the engagement (though only at long range) could be brought to bear upon the French or the English ships. ||

**The one definite purpose involved in the French plan.** The third and last of the three great works which were so placed as to be liable to become engaged with the fleets was the Quarantine Sea-fort. Amidst all the haze that there was in the mind which planned for the navy this attack of the 17th of October, there stood out one lesser object which was aimed at with a clearly defined intent. That object was the destruction of the Quarantine Sea-fort. The work stood detached at some distance west of Sebastopol. It had been constructed so early as the year 1818. Whilst the great casemate fastnesses of Constantine

\* Todleben, p. 93.

† Ibid. p. 334.

‡ Ibid. p. 93.

§ Ibid. p. 96.

|| Ibid. p. 333.

**The Quarantine Sea-fort.**

and Alexander were the chief of the forts, north and south, which lay couched to expect an intruder and forbid his approach to the roadstead, the batteries of the Quarantine Sea-fort were so placed as to be competent to help with great means towards the same end; but, standing on a double-tongued promontory, with a command over the water in many directions, the fort also secured to its holders their control of the Quarantine Bay—a dominion of high importance to the land defence of Sebastopol.

The fort was at the water's edge, and so formed that it threw out a salient upon each of the two tongues of land which it occupied; and, the two salients being connected by a curtain fronting towards the sea, and having retours towards the gorge, a newly constructed redan, which now closed the whole work on the side of the country, gave it the character of a completed redoubt of small profile.\* Unlike the great castles at the mouth of the roadstead, this Quarantine Sea-fort had no casemated tier; so that the 58 guns with which it stood armed were all in open-air batteries, and fired from over the parapet.† There were 48 of its pieces that could be brought to bear on the Allied fleets, and of those, as many as 33 could be used against the French.‡

It is true that the conquest of the fort would not, like the conquest of Fort Constantine or Fort Alexan-

\* Todleben, p. 95.

† Ibid. p. 334.

‡ Ibid. p. 332, 333. The Quarantine Sea-fort is the one which the Russians call 'Number Ten.' The details of the armament of the three forts spoken of in this section will be found in the Appendix.

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Determin-  
ation of  
the French  
to attack  
it.

der, be an event carrying bodily with it the fate of Sebastopol ; but, in the event of the place holding out for a time, the dominion of the Quarantine Bay could not but be of great value to the Allies. Above all, the undertaking seemed to be not merely feasible, but easy ; for with a replying power of only 33 pieces, the 58 guns of the Russians—all standing in open-air batteries—were to be under the starboard broadsides of the whole of the French line of battle, and the depth of the water was such that the ships, if so men should choose, could be brought to close quarters with the Fort.

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In an earlier page we saw that a main ground for pressing the Admirals to undertake an attack with their ships was the hope of its increasing the confusion and terror that might be inflicted upon the garrison by the opening of the fire from the trenches ; and that, accordingly, the onslaught of the fleets had been ordained to begin simultaneously with the land cannonade, at half-past six in the morning ; but we afterwards had to be told that the hour of the naval attack was postponed, at the instance of Admiral Hamelin. We have since been learning that at half-past ten the land batteries of the French were silenced. After that, there was no room for hoping that the garrison just relieved from the pressure of the batteries on Mount Rodolph would be thrown into a state of dismay by a distant cannonade from the ships. But the arrangements for the naval attack had been made.

They were not countermanded ; and the result was a coincidence both perverse and exact. At half-past ten in the morning, the project of a naval attack ceased to offer its promised advantage. At half-past ten in the morning, the movement of the squadrons began.

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Perverse  
coincidence at  
10.30 A.M.

The bulk of the Allied fleet had been lying in the roads off the Katcha, and in the column of ships thence advancing the French had the foremost place, being followed by Admiral Dundas with that part of the English fleet which we call the 'main division.'\* Some of the ships had on board them their own steam-power.† The rest were moved by steam-vessels—not towing in the ordinary way, but—lashed alongside them ; for the intention was, that upon coming within range, each sailing-ship should, on one side, protect with her bulk the steam-vessel lashed alongside her, and, on the other, should present an

The order  
of advance  
from the  
roads off  
the Kat-  
cha.

The steam-  
power of  
the Allies.

Mode of  
applying it  
to the sail-  
ing-ships.

\* This order in the advance seems to have resulted from the arrangement which placed the French on the right hand—i.e., on the southern side—of the intended array at the time of the landing. The French fleet off the Katcha being already to the southward of the English, and having to move in a southerly direction, was naturally in advance from the first.

† Amongst the French ships destined to exert the strength of their fire, there were three—the Napoleon, the Jean Bart, and the Charlemagne—which had, each of them, her own steam-power on board her. The English had no such ships in their 'main division ;' for their Agamemnon (as also their Sanspareil) formed part of the 'in-shore squadron ;' and although, as we saw, they had besides, 4 steam-frigates, a steam-sloop, and a steam-gunboat, those six vessels were not destined to anchor and form part of the Allied line designed by the French.

CHAP. armed broadside to some of the enemy's batteries.  
XVII. With the exception of the London, the ships having  
 steamers attached to them were to fight with their  
 starboard broadsides.

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Fire open-  
 ed by the  
 Russian  
 forts.


At one o'clock in the afternoon, Admiral Hamelin's fleet was closing upon its destined anchorage off the mouth of the Sebastopol roadstead ; and when, somewhat later, he was in process of forming line, the Russian forts opened fire upon such of his ships as already had come under range. Then instantly Dundas gave the signal to his in-shore squadron of which we shall afterwards hear. Pending the completion of their array, the French ships vouchsafed no reply to the Forts ; and their silence during those teeming moments was more expressive of power than the roar of six hundred great guns when firing at too long a range.

The calm  
 silence of  
 the French  
 ships.

The array  
 and posi-  
 tion of the  
 French  
 fleet.

Consisting (along with two Turkish vessels of war) of not less than thirteen fighting ships, with the steam-power needed for moving it, this French fleet at length came to anchor, and then lay ranged in a line, which began with the Charlemagne, near the mouth of the Chersonese Bay, and extended thence more than a mile ;\* but the part of the bay where this line commenced was so far towards the west that the Admiral's flag-ship (which took her place near the centre) was some 1600 yards distant from the Quarantine Sea-fort, whilst the ship at each extremity of the

\* For the names of the ships, see the plan.





1. The first part of the document is a list of names and titles, including "The Hon. Mr. Justice" and "The Hon. Mr. Justice".

array was 1800 yards or more from the nearest of the enemy's works.\*

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Knowing the high quality of the French navy, I am led to imagine that the signal which preceded the engagement must have been chosen in expectation of a really great battle, or else had been fashioned beforehand, and enforced upon the reluctant Admiral by some paramount authority. If conjecture in regard to the authorship could be safely indulged, it would point to the ruler of France. But whether Admiral Hamelin was acting of his own free will or by compulsion, his words, it must be owned, had such pith and such import as to be capable of becoming invested with historic grandeur, if followed by a corresponding achievement. He ran up for his signal,—‘*La France vous regarde !*’

High tone and quality of officers and men in the French navy.

Their presumed dislike of false heroics.

Surmise as to the cause which may have led to the adoption of Admiral Hamelin's signal to his fleet.

The words of the signal.

Opening of fire by the French fleet with more than 600 guns.

The range of their fire.

It was about half-past one when the French fleet opened fire from more than 600 guns.† The fire was directed (at ranges of from 1800 to 3700 yards) against Fort Alexander, against the town, and also against the ships in the roadstead; but the main object of the attack—at ranges already shown—was the Quarantine Sea-fort.

\* See the accompanying plan. The exact direction of the French line was, as we saw, to be N.N.E.

† Number of guns on board the fighting ships of the

|   |       |      |
|---|-------|------|
| Franco-Turkish line, not including the Shérif,    | . . . | 1412 |
| Deduct one-half, i.e., the guns on the port side, | . . . | 706  |

|  |       |     |
|--|-------|-----|
| Guns on the starboard, or fighting broadsides, | . . . | 706 |
|--|-------|-----|

I, however, speak of ‘six hundred’ as approximately representing the number of guns, because I have an impression that there were two 80-gun ships and one 90-gun ship which were not called upon to deliver fire.

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Dundas orders three of the steam-frigates kept under way to engage the enemy. The number of guns with which the Russian forts were able to answer the French fleet.

Engagement of the French fleet with the Quarantine Sea-fort.

Suspense in Sebastopol as to the fate of the Quarantine Fort.

As soon as the French opened fire, Dundas ordered the *Terrible*, the *Tribune*, and the *Sampson* to engage the enemy.\*

The Quarantine Sea-fort was able to answer Admiral Hamelin with a fire of 33 guns, whilst his ships were also under a fire of 17 pieces, discharged from Fort Alexander at a range of some 2000 yards, and of 23 pieces, in the rounded part of Fort Constantine which could be worked against a part of his fleet, though at a range of more than 3000 yards. Altogether, there were 73 guns in the forts which replied to the 600 guns discharged from the starboard broadsides of the French fleet.†

During several hours, the cannonade directed against the Quarantine Sea-fort was continued by Admiral Hamelin; and, the work not being casemated, there seemed to be fair ground for trusting that its batteries must be overwhelmed and brought to ruin by the vast weight of metal with which the French fleet was assailing them. It happened that an immensely large proportion of the missiles thus hurled by the French fleet shot a little to the east of the work for which they were destined, and swept the empty space between the fort and the town in so thick and so ceaseless a storm that, until towards the close of the day, the Russians judged it hardly possible for a man to pass unscathed; and, all communication being thus cut off for a period of several hours, there was anxiety in Sebastopol for the fate of the Quarantine Sea-fort. This anxiety increased, nay,

\* The order was by signal.—Log of the *Britannia*.

† Todleben, p. 332.

almost changed into grief, when it was observed that the work had all at once ceased firing; but at length a volunteer, Lieutenant Troitsky, undertook to endeavour to make his way to the fort. He succeeded, and was soon able to come back and astonish his hearers by informing them, to their great joy, not only that the fort was safe, but that it had suffered no material loss or injury, and had only ceased firing because the French ships were judged to lie at too great a distance to allow of their guns being answered by any effective fire.

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The result  
of the  
attack.

Of the 58 guns arming the fort, three only were dismounted, and seven had their carriages injured. Of the garrison—both infantry and artillerymen—which defended it, 8 were killed, 22 wounded, and 5 bruised.

We saw that the other work upon which, though at a yet greater range, the French fleet directed a portion of its fire was Fort Alexander. It is hardly imaginable that, in any way, however remote, the distant broadsides expended in such a direction could have been deemed conducive to the fall of Sebastopol; but they were a reply to the 17 guns brought to bear from that quarter; and, great as the range was, it admitted of some shots taking effect in the upper or open-air batteries of the fort. In this fort (Fort Alexander) 3 guns were dismounted, 3 gun-carriages injured, 3 men killed, 17 wounded, and 5 bruised.\*

Attack by  
the French  
fleet on  
Fort Alex-  
ander, and  
its result.  
General  
result of  
that part  
of the ac-  
tion which  
was un-  
dertaken  
by the  
French  
fleet.

These results the French fleet achieved; but whilst sustaining, as it did, heavy damage, and losing in

\* Todleben, p. 334.

**C H A P.** killed and wounded 200 men, it had an opportunity  
XVII. of proving the skill, the coolness, the resource with which conflagrations and havoc of all kinds can be dealt with in battle by seamen. It displayed too that exalted kind of courage which, without being heated by the rapture of strife at close quarters, can yet make men steadfast in fight whilst their comrades from time to time are falling, some mangled, some slain, by an enemy ensconced behind ramparts.\*

The long range at which the French attempted to act was apparently the cause of their failure.

If the French seamen were exposed, and fruitlessly exposed, to a trial of this kind, it was apparently because they endeavoured to operate against land fortifications at a range which, for such a purpose, was fatally long. It would seem that they must have been acting under some misconception of the distance at which a fleet undertaking to assail land defences can most advantageously operate; for, so far as concerns depth of water, there was nothing to hinder the ships from coming to close quarters with the fort.

The works which were to be assailed by the in-shore squadron.

The works which the in-shore squadron undertook to engage were three :—

The Wasp.

At a bend of the coast north-east of Cape Constan-tine, there stood that small fastness which the English surnamed the ‘Wasp.’ Overhanging the shore, at an elevation of 130 feet above the level of the sea, the work was so well covered round by its glacis, that, much as it made itself felt, the Allies, at the beginning

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\* The loss of the French fleet alone (without including the Turks acting with them) seems to have been 203.

of the war, hardly knew the form of its structure. They have since learnt that it was a small square tower 27 feet high, with a diameter of 50 feet, and surrounded by a ditch. Besides a piece placed for the defence of its drawbridge, it mounted on its summit 8 guns, being one at the centre of each of the four sides, and one at each of the four angles.\* Of those 8 guns there were 5 that could be brought to bear upon shipping in the waters beneath.†

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The Telegraph Battery was an earthwork on the cliff, which gave it an elevation of 100 feet above the level of the water. It was armed with 5 guns, all having command towards the sea.‡

The Tele-  
graph  
Battery.

The great casemated fastness called Fort Constantine stood at the water's edge, and along with Fort Alexander and the Quarantine Sea-fort contributed largely to the cross fire which defended the entrance of the roadstead and its approaches. As we have already seen, it was a work built of stone, with a front wall of from five and a half to six feet thick, and vaulted roofing from six to twelve feet thick. The work had the form of a horse-shoe, so placed upon a narrow spit of land that its right face was towards the sea, whilst its left looked up to the east, along the Sebastopol roadstead; and the rounded part of the work,

Fort Con-  
stantine.

\* Todleben, p. 118. The 'Wasp' was called by the Russians the Volokhoff Tower. There was no sufficient room on the tower to work so many guns; and according to some Russian statements, it was mainly with one gun that the tower from the beginning to the end of the war kept alive the attention of our seamen.

† Ibid. p. 333.

‡ Ibid. p. 117. This was the work which the Russians called the Kartacheffsky Battery.

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which joined the right face to the left, defended the entrance of the roadstead and its approaches. The fort contained two storeys of casemates, and had besides, on its summit, a tier of open-air batteries. At its gorge, the work was closed by a strong cazern with a crenelled wall for muskets, and casemates on the storey above for 11 guns. Altogether, the fort mounted 97 guns, of which more than 60 were in casemates, and 27 in the open-air batteries at the top of the fort. Of these 97 guns there were 43, according to General de Todleben, that could be brought to bear upon some portion or other of the Allied fleet—that is to say, 23 (at a very long range) upon the French fleet, 18 upon the main division of the English fleet, and 2 only in the direction of a vessel approaching from the north along the five-fathom edge of the shoal.\*

The weak  
angle of  
the fort.

The shoal  
which pro-  
tected  
Fort Con-  
stantine.

But nature had done a good deal to defend Fort Constantine from the guns of an enemy's shipping, for the spit on which the work stood was prolonged towards the sea by a shoal of such form and size, that it forced line-of-battle ships attempting an attack from the west to stand off to a distance of eleven or twelve hundred yards. Towards the north-west, however, there was a bend in the form of the shoal of which we shall presently speak.

The Allies had discovered the weak point which

\* According to Todleben, those two guns were in the open-air batteries at the top of the fort. It must be stated, however, that the actual experience of our in-shore squadron does not perfectly accord with Todleben's impressions. For the exact armament of Fort Constantine, see Appendix.

tended to mar the defensive powers of Fort Constantine; and with a view, if possible, to take advantage of the defect, it became important to know the boundary of the shoal with a greater exactness than that attained by the Admiralty charts. The exigency was no sooner felt than men came forward to meet it. On the night before the action, Mr Mainprise the master of the *Britannia*, Mr Noddall the master of the *London*, and Mr Forbes the master of the *Sampson*, volunteered to go in under cover of darkness and endeavour to take soundings. And this they did. Approaching the shore in boats with muffled oars, they boldly penetrated within the line of the enemy's look-out boats; and although they were repeatedly hailed by the enemy, they yet, by their skill and coolness, succeeded in achieving their purpose.

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Soundings  
taken the  
night be-  
fore the  
action.

The result of this night's survey proved to be one of high interest to those who desired an attack on Fort Constantine. It turned out that, from a point opposite the Wasp Tower, and distant from it some six hundred yards, the five-fathom line ran parallel with the coast till it came to a spot within eight hundred yards of Fort Constantine;\* but then, with a sudden bend, this five-fathom line passed trending away to the west and south-west, running parallel in that last direction with the seaward batteries of the fort, and at a distance from them of eleven or twelve hundred yards. From this configuration of

The form  
of the  
shoal  
north-  
west of  
Fort Con-  
stantine.

\* The five-fathom line sufficiently represents the boundary which kept off line-of-battle ships; and there was no question of attacking with gunboats or other small vessels.



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Point at  
which a  
ship of the  
line could  
approach  
to within  
800 yards  
of the fort.

the shoal it resulted that, although a line-of-battle ship attempting to attack from the west could not come at all near to Fort Constantine, she still would find water enough at that sudden bend just now mentioned, where the edge of the shoal was within eight hundred yards of the fort. What made this formation of the shoal the more interesting was, the now apparent fact that the point where a great ship could float within eight hundred yards of the fort, was on that very line of impunity, or comparative impunity, where a vessel might act against the fort—nay, might rake it obliquely from its gorge to its eastern face—without incurring a fire from any great number of guns.

Dundas's  
determina-  
tion to  
detach  
some ships  
to the  
edge of  
the shoal  
off Fort  
Constantine.

Before parting with Lyons on the morning of the action, Dundas (who had hitherto limited his designs to a mere prolongation of the French line) was moved to take advantage of the opportunity thus offered ;\* and having, as we saw, two powerful ships which were propelled by their own steam-power, and could therefore be wielded with an ease and exactness unattainable by any towed vessel, he at once perceived these to be the two ships which could best be charged with the duty of feeling their way to the edge of the shoal, and thence engaging Fort Constantine. Accordingly, he resolved to despatch Sir Edmund Lyons upon this service with the Agamemnon and the Sans-

\* He was so moved, as I understand, by Lyons. I imagine that the merit of discovering the weak or 'dead angle' of the fort belonged in great part to the French, and that Lyons, in inviting attention to this subject, was in some degree conveying their suggestion.

pareil.\* The Agamemnon, as before, carried the flag of Lyons, and Dacres commanded the Sanspareil. Subsequently the London, commanded by Captain Eden, was added to the force thus placed under Lyons.† At a later hour, the Albion and the Arethusa were detached from the main division, with orders to attack the Wasp, and the Telegraph Battery; and although these two ships at first had not been placed under Lyons, yet, as they acted in proximity to the ships which he commanded, and indeed were sent off from the main division before it got into action, they came to be included with the Agamemnon, the Sanspareil, and the London, as a part of the force which we have called the in-shore squadron.‡

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The five ships composing the in-shore squadron.

\* Agamemnon, 91 guns; Sanspareil, 67. The current belief at the time was, that Lyons's attack on Fort Constantine was an act of his own free will, not deriving at all from the authority of his chief; but that was an error. Lyons, I believe, conveyed to his chief the suggestion spoken of in the last note; but Dundas having seen the merit of it, and having also now learnt the exact form of the shoal, was able to define the places which the Agamemnon and Sanspareil were to take, and this he says that he did at the morning's conference. In a private note to Sir James Graham, Dundas, after adverting to a statement which seemed to give sanction to the current belief above-mentioned, says: 'The position taken by every ship during the action was as defined 'by me in my conference with the captains previously; but during the 'action I was desirous of strengthening the position of the Agamemnon, 'Sanspareil, and London, and I sent,' &c.—27th November 1854.

† London, 90 guns. It was at the earnest instance of Captain Eden himself that Lyons sought and obtained from Dundas permission to take the London.

‡ Albion, 90 guns; Arethusa, 50. In the authentic record of the fleet called the Admiral's 'Journal,' these ships are treated as being formally as well as substantially under the orders of Lyons; but since it happened that they moved at first with the bulk of the fleet, and had their towing steamers on the port side, it was very generally believed that they formed part of the main division.

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Essential  
difference  
between  
the lot  
assigned  
to the  
main divi-  
sion and  
the lot  
assigned  
to the  
in-shore  
squadron.

In the nature of the lot which was assigned to the main division, and of that which fell to the share of the detached or in-shore squadron, there was this all-governing difference: The main division had a place assigned to it beforehand by the force of the lever which subjected our Admiral to the direction of the French; whilst, so far as concerns the ships in the in-shore squadron, Dundas was left free to place them in those positions which he judged to be the best for the purposes of attack.

Advance  
of the  
in-shore  
squadron.

At half-past twelve, the Agamemnon, the Sanspareil, and the London, moved slowly on towards the south; but if Lyons and Dacres and Eden were now at last standing in for the long-studied forts of Sebastopol, they needed some patience, or else some half-mutinous resolve, to sustain them under the weight of the distressing instructions which Dundas, on the eve of the action, had issued to some of his captains.\* Until the very words shall come to light, it may be surmised that Dundas was misconstrued; but by this paper the English Admiral was really understood to ordain that each captain to whom he addressed it must keep his ship out of danger. Yet the men to whom Dundas addressed these instructions were told by him that the object of the attack was 'the destruction of the enemy's batteries.' They were to seek a great victory, but only by a path of safety. So far as concerned

The paper  
of instruc-  
tions issued  
by  
Dundas  
on the eve  
of the  
action.

\* It was understood to have been a circular addressed to all the captains; but I have reason to doubt whether all received copies, for there are some who have no recollection of the circumstance. I have not myself seen a copy. One captain assures me that, purposely and in anger, he destroyed his copy before the action.

the captains of ships in the main division of the fleet, the cramping force of this paper might not be intolerable; for their duty was to be one of a fixed kind, leaving only slight room for the exercise of discretion; but to men commanding ships in the in-shore squadron these orders might be much more embarrassing. I do not understand that at the conference any remonstrance was made by the captains who had received this paper; but some of them determined from the first to treat the instructions as null. C H A P.  
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Supposing that the instructions had really the import ascribed to them, it would be quite just to say, in condemnation of Dundas, that either he should have refused to attack at all, or else should have given due power to his captains; but we have seen how far out of his reach the first alternative was; and in regard to the second, it may be well to remember that few people having authority are so constituted as to be able to carry out with great vigour the measures which they wholly condemn. In general, when men are forced to do what they disapprove, they render a sort of homage to the opinion they have been forced to desert, by doing as little as may be in the opposite direction. As our statesmen at home had sought rest for the soles of their feet in that shadowy land which they thought must lie somewhere between peace and war,\* so apparently, Dundas in his pain had tried to find some middle term between doing and not doing—between the evil of undertaking a determined yet hopeless attack, and

\* After the disaster of Sinope. See vol. I. chap. xix.

CHAP. XVII. the all but impossible alternative of not attacking at all. Disapproving altogether the idea of assailing the forts with ships, he seems to have inferred that in proportion as he could attenuate the attack by confining it within cautious limits, he would be lessening its evil effect.

Signal  
from the  
Britannia.

But whatever was the origin of the instructions, they were scattered to the winds when the naval engagement began. The men of the in-shore squadron had just been aroused by the opening of the fire against the French fleet,\* when there flew out a signal from the Britannia.† As they gazed at the fast-shifting flags, Lyons, Dacres, and Eden may have, all of them, expected with pain more warning, more caution, more hampering orders from the Commander-in-Chief; but perhaps Dundas now remembered his chilling instructions, and perceived that they were unfit for the guidance of a squadron standing in for the forts, or again it may be that his Scots blood at last had got heated, as the Scots blood commonly does when the din of fighting begins. At all events, his signal bore no such import as to make it unwelcome to even the most ardent of captains. The signal was this:—‘Proceed and attack batteries.’

Accelerated  
advance of  
the Agamemnon.

Already the Agamemnon had cleared, or was clearing, for action; and upon the appearance of the signal her speed was increased.‡ Presently, that she might

\* At 1.5, according to the log of the Agamemnon.

† This was at 1.7, according to the log of the Agamemnon.

‡ To 40 revolutions.

take her place in the van, the Agamemnon had to pass the Sanspareil. There was friendship between Lyons and Dacres, and the people of the Agamemnon, too, were united to those of the Sanspareil by the bonds of a long-standing affection. Therefore, whilst the two ships were abreast, the crew of each welcomed the other, and welcomed, with the same roar of cheers, the long-desired fight then beginning.

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Her inter-  
change of  
cheers  
with the  
Sanspar-  
eil.

When the ships passed under the guns of the cliff batteries, some shots were exchanged, but at first with little effect. The main purpose of the fire from the ships whilst thus moving along the coast was to raise up around them a shroud of smoke, which might more or less baffle the gunners at the Wasp and the Telegraph Battery.

Fire de-  
livered  
and re-  
ceived by  
the ships  
in passing  
under the  
guns of  
the cliff  
batteries.

A bold offer had just now been made, which was destined to exert a great influence upon the tenor of the approaching combat. Mr Edward Charles Ball, acting master, who had the command of a little steam-tender called the Circassia, proposed to be allowed to move on with his small craft ahead of the Agamemnon, in order to feel the way for the great ship by taking soundings for her, and leading her on as close to the shoal as prudence would allow. Lyons felt the value of such an offer, but thought it fair to warn Mr Ball that his vessel would probably be sunk, telling him, however, at the same time, that, to meet that contingency, and to pick up the commander and his crew, the Agamemnon's boats should be kept ready and manned. Mr Ball did not hesitate an instant. Upon the suggestion of Lyons, he placed his little

The ser-  
vice which  
Mr Ball  
rendered  
by going  
ahead  
and taking  
soundings  
for the  
guidance  
of the  
Agamem-  
non.

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vessel upon the off-shore side of the *Agamemnon*, and, as soon as the preconcerted signal was given, moved forward ahead of the great ship, and proceeded to find a path for her. In his first attempt to sound, the lead-line was struck out of the leadsman's hands by a shot; but this only caused Ball to search for another sounding-line; and although his small craft received nine shot in her hull, and his leadsman got wounded, he did not remit his task till he had guided the *Agamemnon* to the very verge of the point to which she could move without grounding.\*

The *Agamemnon* comes under fire from several quarters;

Whilst the *Agamemnon* was slowly creeping on to the spot thus found for her, she received her first shot; and a few moments afterwards she was hulled, and much harmed in her rigging, by shot coming from several quarters. At five minutes before two she let go her stream anchor by the stern in five fathoms and a half of water, and presently she dropped her small bower-anchor under foot in five fathoms. Then, by so moving the ship as to bring the stream-cable to her starboard quarter, her port broadside was laid on Fort Constantine with all the advantage that the position allowed. She opened her fire. The centre of the fort then bore nearly south-east of the ship, and at a distance from her of 800 yards.†


and, anchoring at 800 yards from the gorge of Fort Constantine, opens fire.

Advantage of Lyons's position.

In such a position as this, after all his impatience for action, Lyons well might see room for contentment. He was so placed as to be assailing Fort Constantine almost in reverse, with power to rake its top

\* Lyons to Dundas, despatch, 18th October 1854.

† The exact bearing of the fort was S.E.  $\frac{1}{2}$  S.







batteries at a range of but 800 yards ; and, although he was within 750 yards of the Telegraph Battery, within 1200 yards of the Wasp, and also under the fire of some thirteen guns which (at very long range) could be brought to bear upon him from the opposite side of the roadstead, yet, as concerns Fort Constantine itself, he had so happily struck upon its weak point as to be secure from most of its batteries. General de Todleben, indeed, has erred in supposing that there were only two guns, and those on the top platform of the fort, which could be brought to bear upon the Agamemnon ; for it is certain that she received shot and shell from some few, at least, if not more, of the guns in the casemated tiers ; but it is not the less true that the ship took Fort Constantine at a great advantage, and that, so far as concerned the fire from that work, she enjoyed a comparative impunity.

Dacres, in the Sanspareil, came up close astern of the Agamemnon ; and laying his port broadside towards the shore, opened fire on Fort Constantine at a range of 900 yards. For the purpose of the attack, the position of the Sanspareil (if only she should be able to hold it) was regarded as admirable ; but the ship was much more exposed than the Agamemnon to the fire of guns on the cliff, more especially those of the Telegraph Battery.

Eden, in the London, came up in the wake of the Sanspareil. Anchoring close astern of her, he laid his port broadside towards the shore, and opened fire on Fort Constantine at a range of 1500 yards. So large

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Position  
taken up  
by the  
Sanspar-  
eil.

By the  
London.

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Causes  
which  
narrowed  
the region  
of the  
compara-  
tive im-  
punity  
enjoyed  
by the  
Agamem-  
non.

Position  
of the  
steam-  
ships kept  
under  
way.

Explosion  
on Fort  
Constan-  
tine.

a proportion of his crew was engaged in the land operations that, with only the numbers remaining on board his own ship, he could hardly have brought into play more than one-third part of her batteries; but having reinforced himself by taking a body of men from the Niger (his towing steam-ship) to work his upper-deck guns, he was able to put forth the whole strength of his port broadside. He was, however, exposed to a destructive fire from the guns on the cliff; for he lay right under the Telegraph Battery, at a distance from it of less than seven hundred yards. The simple truth is that, by the destructive power of the cliff batteries on the one hand, and the form of the shoal on the other, the region of comparative impunity was so narrowed as to offer no more than one berth to a great ship of war, and that berth was the one which the fortunate Agamemnon had taken.

At this time, the steam-ships kept under way were all, it seems, hovering upon the off-shore side of the detached squadron. Some of them tried their range at Fort Constantine; and, almost at the time when the Agamemnon opened her fire, a shell which was believed to have been thrown from Carnegie's steam-frigate, the Tribune, caused a great explosion of ammunition amongst the batteries at the top of the Fort.\* This disaster alone must have done much to breed confusion; but it was mainly by the fire of the

\* Brereton, p. 33, confirmed by inquiry from Admiral Carnegie. The shell from his ship, the Tribune, was thrown at a range of 1600 yards. The Lynx, also, at this time was firing on Fort Constantine.—Admiral's Journal. As to the effect of the explosion, see Todleben, p. 336.

three great ships—the Agamemnon, the Sanspareil, and the London—that the result was obtained. The upper-tier batteries of Fort Constantine were brought to ruin. Of the 27 guns there planted, 22 were speedily silenced; and the gunners found themselves so overwhelmed with shot and splinters of stone that, chiefly it seems by that last stress, they were driven to go down and take refuge in the casemates below.\* Though no statement to such an effect has been made in Russian narratives, there is some ground for inferring that the gunners thus driven from the top of the Work must have carried down with them to the lower batteries a consternation approaching to panic; for during a space of ten minutes the whole fort was silent.†

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Havoc wrought amongst the batteries at the top of Fort Constantine.

They are abandoned by the Russians.

The whole fort for a short time is silenced.

But with that extermination of the top batteries, and with that ten minutes of silence, the power of the ships over the fort may be said to have ended; for in the lower or casemated tiers, though ten of the embrasures were more or less damaged at the cheeks, and though four out of five of the shot-heating furnaces were destroyed, the stone wall of the fort held good, and the guns all remained untouched.‡ So decisive was the line which defined the power of the assailing ships over Fort Constantine, that what they could inflict upon the open-air batteries proved to be sheer ruin, and what they could do against the casemates turned out to be almost nothing.

The limit of the power which the assailing ships had over Fort Constantine.

At about half-past two, the Arethusa towed by the Triton, and the Albion towed by the Firebrand, came

The Arethusa and Albion,

\* Todleben, p. 336.

† Brereton, p. 33.

\* Todleben, *ubi ante*.

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coming  
into line  
with the  
rest of the  
detached  
squadron,  
assail the  
cliff bat-  
teries.

The line  
now form-  
ed by the  
ships of  
the in-  
shore  
squadron.

in from the south-west. They soon afterwards took up positions astern of the London, and opened upon the cliff defences, the Arethusa being then about 700 yards from the Telegraph Battery, and the Albion, as her Commander reckoned it, within 600 yards of the Wasp.

When this had been done, the whole number of those ships which I have spoken of as composing the in-shore squadron, were ranging in a single line which ran nearly parallel with the shore, and at distances from it of from 600 to 800 yards.

The main  
division.

Meanwhile the main division had been coming into line; and indeed the Queen, which was the leading ship, had moved on, and had even anchored so far towards the south as to be in the array of the French fleet;\* but the Britannia was in her designed position at the extreme right of the English line; and although, at a quarter before three o'clock, there were still some of the vessels following her which had not yet come to an anchor, they were, all of them, very near to their assigned places; and it may be said that about this time the array of the main division had attained so much of perfection as it was destined to achieve.

The ships  
which  
composed  
it.

Besides the Britannia, 120, the flag-ship (which was towed by the Furious), there were appropriated to this dismal service the Queen, 116 (towed by the Vesuvius), the Trafalgar, 120 (towed by the Retribu-

\* She had the Henri IV. on her bow.—Log of the Queen.

tion), the Vengeance, 84 (towed by the Highflyer), the Bellerophon, 78 (towed by the Cyclops), and the Rodney, 90 (towed by the Spiteful). These ships, all destined to be anchored in a continuous file, and in prolongation of the French line of battle, formed the right of the English fleet, and main division. The several steamers which propelled them were lashed to each sailing-ship on her port side, it being intended that the ships in this main division of the fleet should pour their fire from the starboard broadsides. During the progress of the main division from the roads off the Katcha, the propelling steamers (being already lashed on in the way described) were, by consequence, on the landward side of the vessels propelled; but, before taking up her assigned position in front of the entrance to the Sebastopol roadstead, each ship was to make a sweep round, and present towards the forts her starboard, or fighting broadside. Even in the dead calm that there was on that day, the moving of great ships by means of steamers lashed to their sides turned out to be a slow process;\* and it was not until half-past two o'clock that the Britannia and the vessels which followed her began to range in line of battle, and successively to open their fire.† At this time, then, the French

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The way  
in which  
the main  
division  
was  
brought  
into line.

\* There was great difficulty in steering ships propelled in this manner; and even the single process of getting the ship's head into the right direction after weighing anchor proved to be a tedious one.

† It was at half-past two o'clock that the Britannia herself cast anchor (log of Britannia); but the Queen was in advance, and had anchored, some minutes before, amongst the French ships. The Trafalgar, the Vengeance, the Bellerophon, and the Rodney were close following, and preparing to range in prolongation of the line.

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The combined array formed by the French fleet and the main division of the English.

Position of the in-shore squadron in reference to that of the main division. Of the steamships kept under way.

fleet and Dundas's main division were for the most part in their places, and if they had ranged in perfectly straight lines they would have formed an obtuse angle, at the point where the French left was touched by the English right.\* There being, however, a slight bend in both the French and the English lines, the two formed together a great arc or crescent, which enclosed the approach to Sebastopol, with a span nearly two miles in length; but at a distance of more than 2000 yards from the entrance of the roadstead, and at a distance, also, of from 1600 to 1800 yards from the nearest of the enemy's forts. On the left front of this array, and placed, as it were, in echelon to it, at distances of only from 600 to 800 yards from the nearest of the batteries which they assailed, there were the ships which constituted the in-shore squadron of the English fleet. The four frigates, the sloop, and the gunboat which remained under way moved, hovering, as we have already seen, near the ships of the in-shore squadron, and either supported by their fire the attack on Fort Constantine and the cliff defences, or else from time to time rendered such services as their facility of movement enabled them to afford.†

Great as was the amount of naval strength thus spread out to sight by the Allied fleets, it can hardly,

\* The French line being N.N.E., and the English N.E.

† The Tribune, the Terrible, and the Sampson were the three steam-frigates which had specially been ordered to engage by signal from the Britannia.—Log of Britannia. But I do not except the Sphinx from the statement in the text; for it seems that, though ordered to keep out of range, she occasionally fired.—Admiral's Journal.

I think, be acknowledged that their battle array wore an aspect portentous of conquest. Whilst their power was a power impending, and not least during that mid-day time when, in the majesty of their unexerted might, they were gliding down, ship after ship, to take their assigned positions, both the imagination of the unskilled people of Sebastopol, and the fairly-drawn inferences of minds informed on such things, were conducing to a rational dread of what might be achieved against a port, town, and arsenal by forces which ruled the high seas; for none, at that time, knew where they could point to a limit which bounded the power of great navies over places in range of their guns. 'There was something solemn,' says Todleben, 'in those minutes of expectation; all bending their anxious attention to the manœuvres of the enemy's fleet, but at the same time full of firmness, prepared to undergo a maritime bombardment terrible, unknown till then in the annals of war.'\* But no sooner had the fleets taken up their array than the spell seemed to break. The practised seaman, who saw, through the barrier of smoke, how the line of fire from the French ships began at more than a mile from the nearest of the enemy's works, and then went away N.N.E. as though avoiding Sebastopol, would soon be able to say: 'This is not so much as a threat, still less an attack in great earnest.'

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The aspect  
of the  
Allied line  
of battle.

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\* Todleben, p. 326.



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Place of  
the Bri-  
tannia in  
the Allied  
line of  
battle.

Part taken  
by the  
main  
division.

The English Admiral did not forget the place which he had chosen to reserve for his flag-ship when told that any vessel must needs be sunk in one hour if she should be posted in the centre of the Allied line of battle. It was exactly there that, in fulfilment of his words, Dundas now placed the *Britannia*.

It will presently be seen that of the vessels which followed the *Britannia* when she was thus brought into line by the English Admiral, three were afterwards moved farther in, to take part in the closer engagement which Lyons had begun with Fort Constantine; but such of the ships as continued to act with the main division delivered, and continued to deliver, their fire all the rest of the day at ranges of from 1600 to some 1800 yards from the nearest forts. With what effect can scarcely be known; for Fort Constantine, the work they chiefly attacked, was engaged at the time with other English ships at comparatively short ranges; and it would be hard to say that there was any part of the havoc and loss sustained by the fort which may not have come from its closer assailants.

These ships, it appears, were answered by 18 guns in Fort Constantine, and were also under a fire at long range from 36 pieces in Fort Alexander and the Quarantine Sea-fort.\*

In a contest between ships and forts, long range gives immunity to the forts, but not to the ships. The *Britannia* was set on fire by a red-hot shot, which buried itself in some of the hammocks. She

\* Todleben.

received 42 shots in her hull ; and she suffered great damage in her masts, yards, shrouds, and rigging. C H A P.  
XVII. Lieutenant Vaughan and eight of the *Britannia's* men, besides six of the men of the *Furious*, her towing steam-ship, were wounded. The main-mast of the *Retribution*, the steamship which towed the *Trafalgar*, was struck by a shot, and went by the board. Thereupon, the *Trafalgar* was ordered to haul out.

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We have before seen that not only the French fleet, but also those English steam-ships which were kept under way, and likewise the in-shore squadron acting with Lyons, had successively begun to take part ; so that now, when, for the most part, Dundas's main division had also come into line, it might be said that nearly the whole of the Allied fleet was at length engaged with the forts ; and although each ship was firing from one only of its broadsides, it is declared that the cannonade which now pealed from the whole Allied line was the heaviest that had ever been delivered from shipboard.\*

The fire was delivered from more than 1100 pieces of heavy artillery,† whilst, to meet this great

2-45. Almost the whole of the Allied fleet was now engaged.

The great cannonade now delivered by the Allied line of battle.

\* 'From the experience of fifty years, I can assert that so powerful a cannonade as that of the 17th inst. has never taken place on the 'ocean.'—Admiral Dundas to Lord Raglan, private letter, 17th October 1854.

† 1119 guns, as I make it (621 of the French fleet and 498 of the English), fired from the line of battle, without counting the guns of the steam-ships kept under way. Todleben gives a greater number, but he includes the guns of some French ships which were not in action.

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The fire  
that could  
be oppos-  
ed to it.

Counter-  
balancing  
effect of  
hard ma-  
sonry.

Compara-  
tive harm-  
lessness  
of the can-  
nonade  
delivered  
by the  
ships.

No farther  
results ob-  
tained

from the  
continu-  
ance of the  
fire from  
the fleets.

Dundas,  
having  
once yield-  
ed to  
Canrobert  
and  
Hamelin,  
could not  
now do  
otherwise  
than make  
his fleet  
conform  
to the  
position  
taken up  
by the  
French.

cannonade, the Russians could only bring to bear on the fleets 152 guns ; and of those there were as many as 105 that were in open-air batteries firing over the parapet, so that there were only 47 casemated guns to meet all the broadsides of the Allied fleets.\*

But with all these elements of superiority on one side, the strength of hard masonry on the other did more than redress the balance ; and if this was the heaviest sea cannonade that, up to that time, had been known, it was also, in proportion to its greatness, the most harmless one ever delivered.

The continuance of the fire from these 1100 guns added nothing to the advantages already obtained by the Allied fleets.†

Such a result could not but be mortifying ; and some may judge that, in yielding to the dictation which caused this impuissant display, Dundas was so abandoning his freedom of action as to be guilty of making an extravagant sacrifice to the exigencies of the French alliance ; but, at all events, it is only by argument in that direction that the fitness of the position taken up by the English Admiral and the ships which followed him can be rightfully challenged ; for when once Dundas had submitted to act upon the plan which the French forced upon him that morning, he had nothing to do but to place one of his ships near the Jupiter or the Napoleon, and thence prolong the array in a north-easterly direction.

\* Todleben, p. 334, 335.

† For the results which had been obtained by the French fleet and the English fleet respectively, see *ante*, p. 403, and p. 417.



EMENT

54.

E BASTOPOL

ries at  
ck P.M.



And, after all, it was only in part that the strength of the main division ran to waste in this impuissant array ; for out of the six fighting ships which constituted that part of our fleet at the opening of its fire, no less than three, as we shall by-and-by find, were sooner or later sent off to reinforce the detached squadron ; and a fourth—the Trafalgar—as we saw, was ordered to haul off ; so that only two English ships (with their propelling steamers) remained ultimately employed in the task of prolonging the French line of battle.

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And, after all, a part only of the main division was long kept in the more distant line of battle.

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When we left the in-shore squadron, it had just been reinforced by the *Arethusa* and the *Albion*. These ships had stood in with orders to attack the cliff batteries ; and, accordingly, they advanced to the very edge of the shoal which ran parallel with the beach, overlooked by the *Wasp* and the *Telegraph*, the *Albion*, as we saw, casting anchor at a distance of only 600 yards from the *Wasp*. They were aided in their attack by a fire (at much longer ranges) from the *Sampson*, the *Tribune*, and the *Terrible* ; nor, indeed, can it be said that there were any of the ships near the coast on the north of *Sebastopol* which were strangers to this conflict with the cliff batteries ; for although the *London*, as we saw, had come on in the wake of the *Sanspareil*, and opened fire on *Fort Constantine*, she suffered much more from the little *Telegraph Battery* than from all the power of the great casemate castle. Indeed the

Continuation of the engagement undertaken by the in-shore squadron.

English ships engaged with the *Telegraph Battery* and the *Wasp Tower*.

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same, or almost the same, might be said of the *Sanspareil*, and even of the *Agamemnon*. More or less grievously the whole of the in-shore squadron was suffering under the fire of only a few pieces of artillery well placed on the cliff; and, indeed, it might be said—for, compared with its next neighbour battery, the *Wasp* did but little harm—that the five guns of the *Telegraph* earthwork sufficed to produce this result.

The power of the cliff guns against the English ships became apparent at once.

The contest of the *Arethusa* with the cliff guns.

It soon proved that this contest between cliff batteries and ships was one of a kind altogether unequal. Without the means of repressing her assailants by any effective fire, the *Arethusa*, a fifty-gun frigate, was rudely struck. Four shells took effect on board her; and she was set fire to both on her main and her lower decks. Seven of her planks started. She was in danger of sinking; and there needed the coolness and the skill of the successive commanding officers and the crew of the *Triton*,\* as well as of Captain Symonds and the crew of the *Arethusa* herself, to get the ship out of action. According to the official list, she lost 4 men killed and 14 wounded; but there was one whose name did not appear in the return because he concealed his wound. This was Lieutenant Bowden.†

\* The *Triton* was under the command of Lieutenant Lloyd. 'When he was severely wounded, Mr George Arguimban, second master in charge of the *Triton*, took command, and did his duty admirably. Both these officers displayed the utmost coolness and intrepidity.'—Captain Symonds (who commanded the *Arethusa*) to Admiral Dundas, despatch, 18th October 1854.

† 'His zeal keeping him to his work and hiding his hurt. I cannot speak too much in his praise. His exertions all day, and cool courage,

With the Albion, a 90-gun ship, it fared yet worse. She had been ordered to engage the Wasp, and, accordingly, she was placed within 600 yards of the work; but not being molested by it, and finding herself hotly attacked by the Telegraph Battery, she engaged her assailant. Her fire was altogether in vain. Without being able to harm the battery, she was soon struck by numbers of shells. Of these, some struck the ship near her water-line, and some of them, bursting on the orlop deck, set fire to the ship in several places.

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Of the  
Albion.

In her masts, in her rigging, and in the part of her hull near the water-line, the ship suffered havoc, and the fires which had laid hold upon her having rendered it necessary to close the magazine, her broadside was by consequence silenced. Altogether, she was in such a plight as to make it the duty of Commander Rogers, who was in charge of her,\* to haul out; and accordingly she slipped her cable; but the missiles hurled from the cliff had shot away the lashings which joined the Firebrand to her side, and, for a time, the two ships became unmanageable.† Whilst the Firebrand laboured and laboured to move out the Albion, the two ships were not only under the ceaseless fire of the cliff batteries, but at one time were raked by them; and as they could not enshroud

‘call for my warmest praise.’—Captain Symonds to Admiral Dundas, private letter, 21st October 1854.

\* Rogers commanded in the ship, in the absence of Captain Lushington, who commanded the naval brigade acting ashore.

† The Firebrand, the Albion's towing steam-ship, was commanded by Captain Stewart.



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XVII. themselves in smoke, they stood out a fair target for the enemy's gunners. Moreover, they were so close upon the edge of the shoal, that any effort of the steam-ship which might cause the Albion to turn or to move, even slightly, in the wrong direction would suffice to ground her. All this while, nearly half of the Albion's crew were mustered at 'fire quarters,' to get down the three conflagrations which threatened the powder-magazine. The men worked as steadily as at an inspection. More for pride's sake than with any notion of effective reply to the cliff batteries, one gun was from time to time fired.\*

The signal which was flying from the masthead of the Albion imported that she was in danger; and the practised eyes of seamen who gazed from the neighbouring ships conveyed to them an exact perception of her predicament. They understood the problem; and watching to see how Stewart would solve it, they soon became willing admirers of the skill with which he applied the power of the Firebrand to the object of getting out the disabled ship. The success with which Commander Rogers and Captain Stewart and the crews of both the Albion and the Firebrand encountered these dangers and troubles was not, of course, likely to be greeted with that kind of welcome at home which is given to tidings of victory; but, perhaps, as a sound proof of firmness and seamanlike skill, it was of a fully equal value.

When this hard-smitten ship Albion, with signal

\* Commander Rogers to Admiral Dundas, 17th October 1854.

flying that she was on fire, was at length moved away out of range, she had lost 10 killed and 71 wounded. Lieutenant Chase was one of the killed ;\* and amongst the wounded there were the master, the surgeon, and the paymaster. On board the Fire-brand, too, there were five men wounded ; and amongst these was Captain Stewart himself.

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Both the *Arethusa* and the *Albion* had to be sent to Constantinople to refit ; and indeed they were in such plight, that the chance of their proving able to reach the Bosphorus was judged to be dependent upon weather.†

Disabled  
state of  
the *Are-  
thusa*  
and the  
*Albion*.

And those few guns on the cliff which thus beat off and disabled the *Arethusa* and the *Albion* were, all this while, inflicting great havoc upon the *London*. From the moment when the *London* cast anchor, she was under a telling fire from the Telegraph Battery, but at first, though many shots struck, there were also some which missed. After a while, men gazing at the battery from the deck of the *London* saw an officer, quadrant in hand, exerting himself to obtain with mathematic exactness the proper angle of fire. After that, there was no imperfection in the aim of the Russian gunners ; and as soon as the *Arethusa* and *Albion* had been disabled and beaten off, the fire from the cliff, which before had been divided in its objects, became concentrated with powerful effect upon the three remaining ships. Of

Havoc  
inflicted  
upon the  
*London*  
by the  
cliff guns.

\* Described by Commander Rogers (*ubi supra*) as a 'very valuable and intelligent officer.'

† Dundas to Lord Raglan, private letter, 18th October 1854.

C H A P. these the London was the one which lay closest under  
 XVII. the guns of the Telegraph Battery.

Engage-  
 ment of  
 the Lon-  
 don with  
 the Tele-  
 graph Bat-  
 tery.

Its result.

So, against that battery as his real antagonist Captain Eden exerted the whole power of his port broadside ; but after a while he was able to assure himself of that which we now know with certainty—namely, that his ship, whilst sustaining a good deal of havoc, and losing men killed and wounded, was absolutely powerless against the battery.\* As soon as he had assured himself of this, he determined to shift the position of his ship, and with that intention sheered out.† Afterwards he again stood in, and, from a new position, assailed Fort Constantine as well as his old foe at the Telegraph ; but it resulted from his movement that, during the interval which elapsed before he stood in for the second time, the number of ships which still occupied the line taken up by the in-shore squadron was reduced to two.

Losses  
 sustained  
 by the  
 London.

The London lost 4 men killed and 18 wounded. Amongst those last was Lieutenant Stephens. Having received an ugly wound in the head, he quickly got it bandaged, and went on with his duty as though nothing had happened to him. When recommended by Captain Eden to go below, he excused himself by setting up a theory that because his wound was quite warm it needed for the time no attention. Afterwards, he got wounded in the knee ;

\* As to the absolute immunity enjoyed by this battery, see *post*, p. 443.

† The soundness of Captain Eden's conclusion is now proved by General Todleben, who states, as will be presently seen, that the Telegraph Battery suffered nothing at all from the ships.

but by the help of that same theory of his, and also another bandage, he so dealt with the second casualty as to be able to go on with his duty. C H A P.  
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The Sanspareil was the northernmost of the only two ships under Lyons now remaining in line ; and the fire from the cliff, which had been doing great harm from the first, was now very heavy upon her. Galled, just as Eden had been, by the sense of not being able to do anything against the Telegraph Battery, Captain Dacres determined to shift the position of his ship. He got up his anchor, and tried so to place his ship as to be able to lay a broad-side upon the cliff batteries in a way more effective than before.\* Still remaining near the Agamemnon, the Sanspareil, for an hour and a half, was kept in her place by steam-power;† but at the end of that time there sprang up a light breath of wind, which caused her to forge ahead ; and, the bow of the ship coming into such a position that her foremost guns failed to bear clear of the Agamemnon, Dacres wore his ship round. Receiving at nearly this time an order from Lyons ‘to close in ‘and support,’ he returned to his old station under the stern of the Agamemnon, and again let go his stream anchor. The Sans-  
pareil.

\* It was imagined—see the log of the Agamemnon—that during the period of probably some ten minutes which it took to effect this movement, the Sanspareil lost a number of men ; but it seems that this idea was a mistaken one. Only one shot struck the ship at the time, and that was the one which, striking a table and driving it with violence against Captain Dacres, knocked him down and stunned him.

† One hour and thirty-five minutes, according to the log of the Sanspareil.

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The position of the Sanspareil, from the first, had been such as to subject her to heavy loss, and mainly, it would seem, from those small cliff batteries which had operated so destructively against the Arethusa, the Albion, and the London. As on board the other ships, so now on board the Sanspareil there sprang up the question whether the works which inflicted this havoc were suffering at all from the ships' guns. The captains of the guns declared to Captain Dacres that their fire was taking no effect against the coast batteries; and the accuracy of their observation was definitively confirmed by Hastings Anderson, the gunnery lieutenant, who went up the mizzen rigging of the ship and saw that her fire was in vain.

But although it soon became plain that the Sanspareil could add nothing to what had been achieved in the first few minutes of the conflict, and that she was powerless against her assailants, Dacres seems to have considered that as the fire his ship was sustaining must be visible to those who were on board the Agamemnon, he ought not to sheer off until his ship should be either disabled or ordered to move out of range by a signal from Lyons; but, whatever might have been the principle on which he acted, it was not without grievous sacrifice that the ship kept the place she did during a period of three hours.

Her losses. She lost 11 men killed—of whom one was Mr Madden, midshipman—and 59 wounded, including Lieutenant W. H. Anderson, Lieutenant James Bull, and Mr Parkinson, second master.

For a while, the Rear-Admiral's flag-ship had been

enjoying a comparative impunity; for after the ruin of the batteries on the top of Fort Constantine, the guns in the casemates, though not so absolutely powerless against the Agamemnon as General de Todleben believed, were still of but moderate efficiency, and the much more formidable power of the little cliff batteries was in a great measure absorbed for a time by the other vessels of the in-shore squadron. But in proportion as the rest of the squadron got to be discomfited, the Agamemnon suffered more and more; and when the Arethusa, when the Albion, when the London had all of them hauled out, one after the other, and when also the Sanspareil had moved away from her original position, the Agamemnon began to undergo a heavier cannonade than before. She was set on fire by a shell.

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Comparative impunity enjoyed for a time by the Agamemnon.

Change in this respect which subsequently occurred.

Whether it was that Lyons still entertained a hope of reducing Fort Constantine, or that he was governed by the instinctive reluctance of a brave man to abandon a strife once begun, he could not yet bring himself to haul off; but he became somewhat anxious.\* He sought to obtain reinforcement. He signalled to the London to take station astern of him, and to the Bellerophon (which did not form part of his squadron) he made an appeal for support. Knowing that his signal might be interrupted by smoke, he despatched his flag-lieutenant in one of the Agamem-

Persistence of Lyons.

His measures for obtaining reinforcements.

\* See the passage of Lyons's despatch, quoted in the text, 'I have seldom'

ed. ' &c., post, p. 434.

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non's boats, with directions to board the *Bellerophon*, and personally convey the appeal to Lord George Paulet, her captain. Lord George was asked to close in and support the *Agamemnon*. Lieutenant Coles, the flag-lieutenant thus despatched, was to board the *Sanspareil*, and deliver to Dacres an order to the same purport.\* At the same time, Lyons sent up for general signal that favourite 'Number thirteen,' which says to the captains who see it, 'Close the enemy, and engage for mutual support!'

The effect  
of his  
measures.

These appeals were all abundantly answered. The London stood in, and again engaged her old foe on the Telegraph Height. The *Sanspareil* resumed her place astern of the *Agamemnon*. Lord George Paulet, upon receiving the message, stood in at once with the *Bellerophon*. 'I have seldom,' wrote Lyons—'I have seldom had my mind more relieved than when I saw the *Bellerophon* coming down to our succour, and my gallant flag-lieutenant and his boat's crew emerging from the smoke on their return.' From ships not specially invoked there also came help. The Queen stood in to support the *Agamemnon*; and Dundas having already despatched the *Rodney* upon the same errand, she came down at full speed. The steamers kept under way still hovered as before, at some distance, upon the starboard quarter of the *Agamemnon*.

Reinforce-  
ments  
from quar-  
ters not  
specially  
appealed  
to by  
Lyons.

Thus, then, with the exception of the two dis-

\* This is the order to that effect before mentioned received on board the *Sanspareil*.

ships, and the three \*—the Britannia, the Trafalgar, and the Vengeance—which still aligned with the French, the whole English fleet was crowding in to support the Agamemnon. True, the form of the shoal, as we already know, was not such as to afford an anchoring-ground from which numbers of ships could effectively engage Fort Constantine; and, against the cliff batteries, it had only been too well proved that ships were powerless; but the signals and the messages of Lyons, and the position of the Agamemnon, admired from afar, had engendered with some a belief that great results might yet be achieved by supporting her attack on Fort Constantine;† whilst others were led to apprehend that the ship was in danger, and needed to be helped.

It was under the impulse of that last idea that Lord George Paulet, coming down in the Bellerophon, seemed to take up the fight. For the purpose of relieving the Agamemnon, he opened a violent cannonade against the Telegraph Battery. He soon brought down havoc upon his own ship. Her wheel was destroyed; and she was set on fire by a shell, but Lord George continued to stand in, and at length moored his ship on the starboard quarter of the Agamemnon. As the Bellerophon swung to her anchor she offered an occasion to the enemy; and, the enemy promptly seizing it, she was swept by a raking fire. Her launch was struck by a shot and

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The Belle-  
rophon.  
Lord  
George  
Paulet.

\* Reduced, as we saw, to two, when the Trafalgar was disabled.

† See note, *post*, p. 436, mentioning Captain Jones's counsel.



**C H A P.** sunk ; she again took fire ; she was in a condition to  
**XVII.** be in need of help. Help was brought by the Spit-  
 fire ; and at last, with a signal flying which told that  
 she was on fire, the ship was towed out of action.  
 She lost 4 men killed and 15 wounded ; amongst the  
 last was Mr M. Foster, a midshipman, whose skull  
 was fractured.

**The  
Queen.**

The Queen, as we saw (Captain Mitchell), was  
 hastening to take her part in the fighting of the  
 detached squadron ; and Lyons, when he saw her  
 stand in, and begin to engage, made her welcome,  
 by signal, with the greeting of ' Well done, Queen !'  
 but already the new-comer had come under the power  
 of the Wasp, or the Telegraph Battery ; and signal-  
 ling for answer, the ' Queen is on fire !' she passed  
 away towards the north.

**The  
Rodney.**

Before this time, and whilst preparing to take  
 her place in the line of the main division, the Rod-  
 ney had been boarded by Captain Jones, the Com-  
 mander of the Sampson, who, passing from ship to  
 ship in his gig, brought an order from Dundas—an  
 order suggested to the Admiral by Captain Jones  
 himself—which directed the Rodney to go in and  
 support the Agamemnon and the Sanspareil.\* Cap-  
 tain Graham, who commanded the Rodney, made  
 haste to obey the command, and his ship was at

\* In the despatch highly laudatory of Captain Jones, which reports  
 his passage in his boat from ship to ship under fire, the Captain is  
 stated to have suggested to Dundas, that ' If a line-of-battle ship were  
 ' sent to a position near the Agamemnon, great execution might be  
 ' done.'—Admiral Stopford (Captain of the Fleet) to Dundas, 19th Octo-  
 ber 1854.

once moved forward in the direction of Lyons's flag-ship with all the speed that could be given her by her satellite steamer the Spiteful. In about fifteen minutes from the time when Graham received the order, his ship was already close in near the Agamemnon and the Sanspareil. She fired from time to time, when her guns bore clear of her neighbours, and — moving stern foremost — proceeded to back on towards the southward in search of a good fighting berth.

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The only part of the position which appeared to be at all advantageous for the attack of Fort Constantine was so narrowed by the form of the shoal, that the places already occupied by the Agamemnon and the Sanspareil left hardly the room that was needed for another line-of-battle-ship.\*

As the Rodney, stern foremost, moved slowly to the southward in search of a berth, the lead was kept constantly going, and the water was found to be shoaling. Mr Craigie, the master, could not believe it safe to be going on towards the edge of the shoal in less than seven fathoms.† His belief was that, both for the object of fighting the ship and that of keeping her clear of the shoal, the space between the Sanspareil and the Agamemnon was the only one which offered a good berth.

Captain Graham, however, rejected the plan of trying to thrust in between two other ships at the risk of fouling them ; and presently, overruling the master,

\* See the plan.

† The ship, I think, drew  $24\frac{1}{2}$  feet—i.e., four fathoms and half a foot.

C H A P. he resolved to go to the southward of the Agamemnon.  
XVII. In that direction, accordingly, his ship continued to move; and whilst she was passing the Agamemnon, Lyons signalled, 'Well done, Rodney!'

It was not till her starboard bow had just passed the starboard bow of the Agamemnon that the Rodney let go an anchor. She then came to, with her starboard bow anchor in six fathoms and a half. The bows of the two ships were then abreast, but divided the one from the other by a distance of some thirty or forty yards. To bring the jib-boom of the Rodney out of reach of the Agamemnon's jib-boom, the Rodney, by a back-turn of her steamer's engine, was so made to veer that—still moving, of course, stern foremost—she glided on to the southward, where the edge of the shoal was awaiting her.

All this while, the soundings were being taken incessantly, not only from the Rodney herself, but also from the stern of the Spiteful; and, by the orders of Kynaston (the officer in command of the Spiteful), the result of each cast of the lead that he caused to be made from his vessel was so chalked up on a board as to be easily visible from the deck of the Rodney. This board, when the anchor went down, gave 'six fathoms and a half;' but whilst the ship was yet veering, the board showed 'four and a half;' and in the next instant the heel of the Rodney was cast upon the shoal with a force which threw over the four men at the wheel.

The  
 Rodney  
 aground.

With her heel—and only her heel—hanging thus on the shoal, the Rodney, although held fast, was

held fast, as it were, to a pivot—to a pivot on which she could swing. Her bow swung to starboard; and, the distance to which she had veered not sufficing to keep the ships clear, her jib-boom fouled the jib-boom of the Agamemnon, and so caused the bow of the flag-ship to move some few feet towards the shore. The people of the Agamemnon had sought to avoid this contact by hauling astern on their stream cable; but when the movement of each ship had ceased, the jib-guys of the two were still touching.

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Notwithstanding her mishap, the Rodney now lay bravely placed for the task of engaging Fort Constantine; and to that her men bent their exertions; for all that they did at this time, as a consequence of their being aground, was to heave taut the cable by which they had anchored.

The position of the Rodney. Her engagement with Fort Constantine.

During the progress of the movement which had brought the one ship past the other, each starboard gun of the Rodney, as it came to bear clear of the Agamemnon, had, at once, opened fire on the fort; and now that the batteries of the Rodney were no longer, in any part, masked, she poured upon Fort Constantine the fire of her whole starboard broadside at a range of 800 yards, whilst she answered the more distant batteries on the south of the roadstead with the four guns she had at her stern on the main and the lower deck.\*

\* Two of these were 68-pounders; and, notwithstanding the length of range, it is probable that their fire may have told somewhat upon the open-air batteries of Fort Alexander.

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Whilst thus engaging Fort Constantine the Rodney found no such 'dead angle' as to be in the enjoyment of any perfect immunity from the power of its case-mated batteries; but it is certain that—from causes still somewhat obscure—the fire which the fort directed against this ship was not only ill directed — being always a good deal too high — but also intermittent, and in short, one may say, somewhat languid. The Rodney was also exposed to a raking though distant fire from Fort Alexander and other batteries on the south of the roadstead. The fire from these was not ill directed; but, considering the numbers of shot hurled into the ship from that quarter, the harm they did was strangely small. Like all the other ships which took part with Lyons, the Rodney was more or less under the fire of those cliff batteries which had done so much service to the Russians; but she did not receive from them a harm bearing near proportion to that which they had inflicted upon other ships. Indeed it may be said generally of every ship constituting the in-shore squadron or acting in company with it, that the nearer she lay to Fort Constantine, the greater was the impunity she enjoyed.

So large a part of the Rodney's crew were on shore taking part in the land cannonade, that Captain Graham did not engage with his upper-deck guns; but the ship had a very good crew, and the fire which she long maintained from her main and lower decks was carefully directed. Her firing was not in broadsides.

It seems that the ship's company were not in the

least discomposed by the circumstance of being aground under the guns of Sebastopol.

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But whilst the Rodney, hard at work with her star-board batteries, was thus lying fast on the shoal in a berth which contented her crew, Lyons at length determined to haul off. The Agamemnon ceased firing.\* Slipping her port, or small bower cable, and cutting away her stream cable, she backed astern till she got to be clear of the shoal, and afterwards moved ahead, delivering a farewell fire as she passed at the cliff batteries, and then going out of range.†

Lyons in  
the Aga-  
memnon  
now  
hailed off.

\* At 5.10, according to the log of the Agamemnon.

† An officer, whom I judge to be highly competent to speak of the probable motive which brought the late Lord Lyons to take these steps, gives the following explanation of the reason for the Agamemnon's hauling off when she did, and slipping her cable: 'The Agamemnon did not go out from under Fort Constantine until she had been there four hours [three hours, according to the Agamemnon's log]; it was then getting late, and became evident we could do nothing more [that is, the in-shore ships] whilst unsupported by the rest of the Allied fleets, who were too far off to make any impression on the forts. [In contradiction of that last statement see *ante*, p. 435.]

'The reason we slipped was, that the Rodney had anchored over our anchor, and we could not pick it up whilst she was there; and as we were in her way of coming out, it was advisable for us to move first. The Rodney took up her position well; and Captain Graham's conduct was much appreciated by Lord Lyons.'

The officer who thus accounts for the loss of *one* of the anchors does not speak (in terms) of the reason for *sec* stream anchor. For the determination of the *ques* Rodney anchored over the anchor of the Agamemnon materials are probably sufficient. 1st, the Agamemnon port bow anchor—was dropped in 5 fathoms; 2dly cable at its first shackle, i.e., 12½ fathoms.—See how he remembered that after the Rodney had veered,

CHAP. She had lost 4 killed and 25 wounded. Amongst  
 XVII. the wounded were Lieutenant S. Gaussen and Duke  
 Her losses. D. Yonge, naval cadet.

The Sans- The Sanspareil followed the Agamemnon, and the  
 pareil and London, too, went out of action.  
 also hauled  
 off.

Summary of what had been effected by Lyons with his in-shore squadron. These, then, were the operations which Lyons conducted. With the aid of the shell from Carnegie's steam-frigate the Tribune, his squadron had effected, within the first few minutes of its anchoring, all the good that it was destined to achieve; for by that time the batteries on the top of Fort Constantine had been ruined; and during the period of nearly three hours which followed, the efforts of the ships were of no avail, except to afford one more proof of the reluctance of our seamen to accept discomfiture. At any range allowed to large ships by the extent of the shoal, the casemates of Fort Constantine were found to be an armour of proof against the guns of those days.

Resistless power of the cliff batteries as against ships. If the casemated batteries at the water's edge proved all but safe against shot, they did not, on the other hand, exert much power; and unless a third species of force had been ready to take part in the combat, neither the ships nor the sea-forts would have been very much altered in their relative strength by the effect of a three hours' fight. But the interposition of the two little works on the cliff, or perhaps indeed one may say of the Telegraph Battery alone, wrought so great a havoc in the ships which came under their guns, as to give to the coast de-

touching the jib-guys of the Agamemnon; and from that part the distance between the bows of the two ships may be computed.

fences a decisive ascendant over their naval assailants; and this result the cliff batteries were enabled to achieve without being subjected in return to any grave loss or injury. In the Wasp 22 men were wounded and a gun-carriage overturned, but that Telegraph Battery which wrought so great a havoc in our ships sustained no harm at all in either men or material.

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It could hardly have been intended that the Sanspareil, the London, the Arethusa, and the Albion should remain under a fire like that to which they were exposed, without being able to answer it effectively; and perhaps the comparative impunity conferred upon Lyons's flag-ship by the splendid position she occupied, was in part the cause of this mischief; for an Admiral directing his squadron from on board the Agamemnon, would not know the extent of the havoc going on in the rest of his ships, and might easily fail to perceive that they were powerless against the cliff batteries.

The Rodney (with her satellite steamer the Spiteful) was now the only ship remaining in action; and the men who stood working the guns on her main and lower decks were not slow to learn that the Agamemnon, with the rest of the force under Lyons, had sheered off; but although they, it seems, grew a little in their half surly, half humorous way when they found themselves left on the coast by the retreating squadron, their anger, it seems, did not amount

The Rodney left alone on the shoal. The temper and spirit of her men.



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was rather of a kind to increase than to impair their efficiency. They steadily maintained their fire ; and at the time I speak of, this duty was not interrupted by any endeavour to get the ship off.

Concen-  
tration of  
fire upon  
the Rod-  
ney.

All the power that Fort Constantine as well as the cliff batteries had been hitherto exerting against numbers of vessels could now be concentrated upon the Rodney, with her satellite steamer the Spiteful ; and besides, for some time, the grounded ship sustained a raking though distant fire from the batteries on the south of the roadstead ; but, after a while, the chief of those last forts ceased firing, and the midshipmen of the ship indulged their minds with a theory that the guns at the stern of the Rodney, and especially the 68-pounders, had humbled and silenced Fort Alexander.

Its effect.

The ship herself suffered a good deal, especially in her rigging, and she was set fire to both in her orlop deck and in her foremast under the foreyard ; but her crew enjoyed a singular impunity. One cause of this was that scantiness of the numbers remaining on board, which determined Captain Graham to abstain from fighting his upper deck ; but it is also certain that the fire from Fort Constantine was slack and ill directed. As we saw, the open-air batteries of the fort had been long before silenced ; and in regard to the guns in the casemates, it is imagined that the smoke may have been so blinding as to hinder the gunners from giving due effect to their ordnance. At all events, they fired ill, and with little constancy. Oftentimes the men of the Rodney

were heard to declare—and in gruff tones which sounded like anger—that the Russians in Fort Constantine were not standing to their guns.\* Though the Rodney was comparatively distant from the cliff batteries, it is believed that she suffered more from their fire than she did from the guns of Fort Constantine.

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Indeed, one of the theories which seeks to account for the impunity of the Rodney, is based upon the supposition that some of those who were directing the fire of Fort Constantine perceived the ship to be aground, and regarded her almost as their own. This idea receives some support from the fact, that the moment the Spiteful moved ahead, so as to disclose herself to the gunners in Fort Constantine, she experienced full proof that they did not intend to grant her the least measure of that indulgence which they gave to the 90-gun ship.

For some time, the French ships had been hauling off, when Dundas at length sent up his signal to cease firing and come out of range.† Except the Rodney still fighting on the shoal, with her satellite steamer at her side, the whole Allied fleet hauled off.

The French, and afterwards the English, fleet hauled off.

Though in order to get off the Rodney there was wanted some more steam-power, Captain Graham so hated the idea of asking even that kind of aid, that

The Rodney still aground on the shoal.

\* General de Todleben having stated, as we saw, that the Agamemnon was so placed at the dead angle of Fort Constantine as not to be liable to be touched by any of the guns in the casemates, gives no other explanation of the causes which rendered the fort so harmless.

† At 5.30.—Log of Britannia. According to the same record, the French ships began to haul off at 5.10.

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Measures  
taken for  
getting  
the Rod-  
ney off.

he refused to make the appeal ; and it was only after breaking a cable, and failing to move his ship by the sole power of the *Spiteful*, that he at length brought himself to run up a signal for help. At once the appeal was answered ; for Lieutenant Luce, in command of the gunboat *Lynx*, quickly came in to give help. It was determined to endeavour to get the ship off by the united power of the two steamers, both acting from ahead of the *Rodney*. The *Spiteful* was to tow with the stream cable, and the *Lynx* with the towing hawser.

It may be that the *Spiteful* moved somewhat too fast before she got a strain on the cable, for the result was that the stream cable snapped.

The fire with which the Russian batteries had been assailing the *Spiteful* then increased in power, cutting her masts and rigging, and hulling her several times.

Captain Graham now resorted to another plan. The *Spiteful* was lashed alongside, and the anchor hove up to the bow ; whilst the *Lynx* exerted her power by steaming ahead ; and, some of the *Rodney*'s guns having been run forward in order to lighten her abaft, she at length was dragged off the shoal.

The Rod-  
ney was at  
length got  
off.

In the course of the endeavours thus crowned at length with success, a heavy fire had been directed, though directed in vain, upon those of the *Rodney*'s boats which were employed in the task of getting cables on board the towing steamers.\*

\* In these operations, good service was rendered by Mr Craigie the master, and Mr Hancorne the assistant-master. Mr (now Captain)

The Russians, still intent on harming the Spiteful, sent against her a shower of rockets, which wounded Commander Kynaston, and Baillie, one of his midshipmen.\*

The deliberation with which the people of the Rodney encountered their predicament was maintained to the last. They did not slip their cable, but righteously got up their anchor. Almost at the same minute they ceased firing, closed their ports, and extinguished all lights. Then, at half-past six in the evening, the Rodney hauled off.

She had lain aground under the guns of Fort Constantine during a period of more than two hours and a quarter;† and although, as we have seen, it did not so happen that her men were exposed to the trial which is put upon seamen when their decks become scenes of carnage, there was enough in her predicament to put to a proof the warlike composure and firmness still upholding the name of the Rodney. Nor less will it be gathered from what I have recounted, that, along with the captain, officers, and men of the Rodney, those also of the Spiteful and the Lynx were deserving of the praise they received.‡

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Fire directed against the Spiteful.

The deliberation with which the crew of the Rodney acted.

She at length hauled off.

The steadiness of her crew from first to last.

Craigie, a most able and thoroughly trustworthy officer, was warmly thanked by Captain Graham.

\* I hear that Commander Kynaston's death, though it occurred long after the engagement, was caused by the wound then received.

† According to her log, she dropped her anchor at 4.8, and weighed at 6.30.

‡ The court of inquiry which investigated the circumstances under which the Rodney ran ashore, found that the mishap resulted unavoidably from Captain Graham's gallant determination to take up the position he did in support of the Agamemnon; and that the greatest

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Havoc  
done on  
board the  
Rodney  
and the  
Spiteful.  
Losses.

Both the Rodney and the Spiteful sustained a good deal of damage from shot and shell; but strange as it may seem, the Rodney had no men killed, and only two or three wounded.\* With her satellite steamer it did not fare so well. Out of the small crew which serves to man a six-gun steam-sloop the Spiteful lost two killed and nine wounded.

The failure of this naval attack on Sebastopol.  
The attempt sprang from no sound warlike purpose.

Thus ended—thus vainly ended—the naval attack on Sebastopol. Except as regards that part of it which unsuccessfully aimed at subduing the Quarantine Sea-fort, the attempt did not spring from any more direct warlike purpose than that of effecting a diversion in favour of the land forces.† Of course,

credit was due to Captain Graham and the officers and ship's company of the Rodney, as also to Commander Kynaston and Lieutenant Luce, and the officers and men of the Spiteful and the Lynx, for their gallant and indefatigable exertions in towing the Rodney off whilst exposed to heavy fire from the enemy. This finding was approved by the Admiralty, and the approval was communicated by Sir E. Lyons, then in command, in a notification dated the 23d of February 1855. A day or two after the action, Sir Edmund Lyons addressed to Captain Graham a letter of thanks for the support the Rodney had brought him, and he added, I believe, some words tending to explain why he had left the Rodney when he did. All hands were called aft to hear the praises of the Rear-Admiral, and a part of the letter was read on the quarterdeck. I have no copy of the letter before me, but if memory could be trusted, it would appear that Sir Edmund did not take the same ground as the officer cited in the note to p. 441.

\* The official list gives only two wounded; but it seems that there were one or two wounded men whose names did not get into the return.

† Dundas wrote to Lord Raglan: 'All this'—a plan for a diversion on the side of the Belbec, which the Admiral had been speaking of—'would be to act in a true position. The action of the 17th was a false one, and which I decline to repeat. It is one that I accepted with

this could not be said if the design of attacking Fort Constantine had been based upon grounds which were—even apparently—good. But it was not so: it was not the belief of those days that good walls of stone, with a thickness of five or six feet, would give way under broadsides from ships at a range of 800 yards; or that the number of shots which skill or chance might send through the embrasures could be looked to as means of reducing a great casemate fort long prepared for the day of attack, and defended by brave, steadfast men. People rather founded their dream upon the hope of there occurring in the fort some mighty explosion; and, indeed, it was natural enough that the English should have remained more impressed by the event which once gave them the fortress of Acre, than by that faithful voice which (entreating men not to take guidance from what was a sheer gift of fortune) strove to make them beware of sending ships to capture stone forts.\* And, again, there were people so constituted as to be able to believe that walls built by Russian contractors, though faced with a semblance of stone, would turn out to be formed, in the main, of some rotten and costless material, very soft to the touch. Any attempt which should seek to open a way for the fulfilment of

‘reluctance, and with which, as a naval commander, I am dissatisfied.’  
—Private letter, 20th October 1854.

\* It was in 1840 that our ships attacked the fortress of Acre; and, there occurring an explosion which sent to destruction great numbers of men, the Egyptians abandoned the place. In his place in the House of Lords the Duke of Wellington spoke with warm praise of what the navy had achieved upon the coast of Syria, but with a great earnestness he added the warning above referred to.

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hopes like these would, of course, be empirical, but would not, for that reason only, be necessarily unwise. On the contrary, the genius and the enterprise of the seamen, whether English or French, gave a naval commander some right to trust that, although he might enter upon an attack without being able at first to pursue a well-defined purpose, he yet, having freedom of action, might so use the chances of combat as to be borne onwards to victory by the inspirations that come in great moments.

Cause  
 which  
 brought  
 the Allies  
 to engage  
 in the un-  
 dertaking.

But, unhappily for the Allies, their vast naval strength was so used that, instead of being free to seize upon occasion, and to act in that spirit of enterprise which might compensate for the want of fixed purpose, the ships of the whole French fleet and of our Admiral's 'main division' had to ride at anchor in a formal line of battle, at once so grand and so impotent that there needed the fighting there was by the ships in the English left wing to save the whole business of the engagement from being deemed solemnly frivolous. If the zeal of the united navies was perforce to be used against Sebastopol in such a way as to go to the verge of what might be possible, the best direction to give to that sort of hardy empiricism would have been, perhaps, an attempt to break a way into the roadstead. At the worst, a venture of that kind, if made at a well-concerted moment, would have been an effective diversion in favour of the land forces. And, again, it is imaginable that the original plan of attack adopted by the council of admirals might have won for them some semblance of successes

more or less specious, or might even have enabled them — for their ships would have been moving incessantly — to feel and make good their way to some more or less signal achievement. Their original plan would at least have secured for them the advantage of a less solemn failure than the one which they actually incurred. As it was, the ships spent their strength upon forts of stone and coast batteries, not only without reducing any one of them, but even without dismounting a single gun, except amongst those which were in open-air batteries and fired from over the parapet.\*

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Failure of the attack as an attempt to reduce any of the forts, or to effect a diversion.

History is crowded with instances in which the forces of two allied states are reduced to impuissance by the sheer perverseness of one, or the clashing pretensions of both; but even amongst such examples this naval attack seems egregious; for, so far as concerns the main division of our fleet, the English were coerced into a plan of attack which no one of their captains approved, and found themselves disposed, with the French, in such a meek order of battle that, as long as the great array lasted, they were offering themselves to the striker, without being able to strike.

Perverseness of the coercion applied by the French to Admiral Dundas.

But, independently of the general idea which fashioned this order of battle, there resulted from the punctilio and the stiffness attendant upon the Alliance so strange a waste of opportunity that it deserves to be marked and remembered. Whatever doubts the sanguine English might entertain of the power of

Perverseness of the arrangement which excluded the English ships from the south or deep-water side.

\* Todleben, p. 336.



CHAP. XVII. stone forts to resist the broadsides of their ships, they, at all events, were sure that to act with effect in such strife they must come to close quarters.\* The French, on the other hand, believed that a long range—a range of from 1600 to 1800 yards—was the one at which their fleet could best act.† Well, corresponding, as it were, with this difference of opinion, there was a difference between the shoals on the north and the shoals on the south of the harbour; for whilst on the north, there was a shoal which kept off line-of-battle ships to distances of from 800 to 1200 yards from Fort Constantine, the forts on the south, and especially the Quarantine Sea-fort, could be attacked by ships at close range.‡ Therefore, nature herself had ordained the respective positions of the French and the English fleet, so that those who desired close quarters might go where close quarters could be had—that is, to the south; and those who preferred to act at a range of 1600 yards would be content with the north of the roadstead, where the approaches, though shut against close fighters by the extent of the shoal, were everywhere open to those who liked ranges of 1600 yards or upwards. The reverse of this, as we know, is what happened. For no other reason, it seems, than that they were

\* The English gave good proof of this by the way in which they pressed and crowded to the very edge of the shoal in order to get as near as was possible.

† The French gave conclusive proof of this by attacking forts at ranges of 1600 yards and upwards, when, if they had liked, they might have chosen ranges of from 150 to 400 yards.

‡ See the plans.

already on the right, that is, on the south of our fleet, the French took a place where, with the opportunity of closing the forts to within extremely short ranges, they chose to stand off at a distance of nearly a mile, thus excluding their allies from the deep water most nearly approaching the forts without making use of it themselves; and meanwhile, the English, who entertained the belief that ships should engage forts at close quarters if they engaged them at all, had to crowd round a shoal which barely suffered more than one of their ships to come within 800 yards of the principal fort they attacked, condemning all the rest to longer ranges upon pain of running aground.

Regarded as an attempt to effect a diversion in favour of the land forces, the naval attack, as we saw, lost all the little worth it had had when Admiral Hamelin thought fit to change the time for beginning it. The gunners on duty at the sea-forts were a distinct force long ago organised for that special service;\* and I know of no ground for supposing that any one man engaged at the land defences was either withdrawn from his post or otherwise disturbed in his task by the stress of the sea cannonade.

In proportion to the immense artillery-power which the two fleets exerted, the loss they inflicted upon the enemy was small. Under the fire of 1100 ships' guns, and these so diligently served that from two ships alone, there were hurled between 6000 and 7000 shot,

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Small  
compara-  
tive loss  
inflicted  
upon the  
Russians.

\* *Ante*, p. 126.

C H A P. no more than 138 of the Russians were either killed,  
 XVII. wounded, or bruised.\*

Damage  
to ships,  
and loss of  
men sus-  
tained by  
the Allies.

The Allies suffered more. Besides the two English ships which were so crippled that they had to be sent back to Constantinople to be refitted, there were many that sustained great damage. The *Ville de Paris*, the French Admiral's flag-ship, received fifty shots in her hull; and a shell bursting under the poop made such havoc in that part of the ship that nine of the officers of Hamelin's Staff there standing near their chief were either killed or wounded. Indeed, the Admiral himself, and Rear-Admiral Bouet-Willamez, the Chief of his Staff, were the only two of the group who remained unstricken.† In killed and wounded (without including the Turks, whose losses remained unrecorded) the Allies lost 520 men; 203 French, and 317 English.

Loss of  
the moral  
strength  
which the  
Allies had  
derived  
from the  
undefined  
ascend-  
ancy till  
then en-  
joyed by  
their  
fleets.

But it was not only in men and material that the Allied fleets were losers; they lost some part of that incorporeal strength which, conferred though it be by mere human opinion, may yet be to fleets and armies a main source of warlike ascendancy. Before the 17th of October, that haughty dominion of the seas which the Allies had been able to assert contrasted so painfully in the minds of the Russians with the posture of their own Black Sea squadrons, all sunk as they were or imprisoned, that it oppressed them with a sense of vast power—with a sense of

\* Todleben, p. 336.

† Relation du Contre-Amiral Bouet-Willamez, inserted in Bazancourt, p. 332.

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vast power, which, though it might not be immeasurable, had, down to that time, been unmeasured ; and there were signs of a spirit in Prince Mentschikoff's troops, which made it seem probable that in moments of discouragement the acknowledged ascendant of the Allies at sea might be used as a pretext and excuse for shortcomings and dereliction of duty on the part of the Russian land forces. But by that which they did, and by that which they refrained from doing, on the 17th of October, the Admirals who were wielding this hitherto undefined and therefore most dreaded power, gave a public acknowledgment of the limits which bound them in approaching the forts of Sebastopol. From that day, their supposed pretension to be, some day or other, the assailants of the place was visibly a pretension withdrawn ; and the seaward approaches of the roadstead became added to the range of unchallenged dominion thenceforth enjoyed by the fortress.

The pretension of the Allied fleets to assail Sebastopol thenceforth came to be regarded as withdrawn.

The boundary of the dominion exerted by the forts on the side of the sea became extended.

This security of the fortress from any fresh naval attack was indeed so firmly established by the engagement of the 17th of October, that it afterwards received a practical recognition from the one man of all the world whose mind would most violently struggle against any such conclusion. Until he was recalled from Balaclava to the fleet a few days before the action, Lyons—evidently differing from Dundas—had believed that the navy might take a great part in the reduction of Sebastopol ; but even before the action, his views, as we saw, were much cleared by hearing what was said to him by the English captains of

After the action, the security of Sebastopol from naval attack was so well established, that although Lyons succeeded to Dundas, and long retained the command of the fleet, he did not again attack the place.

CHAP. ships; and after the 17th of October, his opinion  
XVII. upon the question of attacking Sebastopol became  
 apparently the same as that of Dundas; for although  
 it was his fate to become before long the successor of  
 the Vice-Admiral, and to hold the command of the  
 fleet until the close of the siege, yet, during the whole  
 of that time, he acted exactly as Dundas had desired  
 to act from the first, and abstained from attacking  
 Sebastopol.

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Admiral  
 Hamelin,  
 being under  
 the orders of  
 General  
 Caurobert,  
 was not  
 respon-  
 sible.

Whence came all the errors which brought about  
 this ostentatious misuse of naval power we have well  
 enough seen. So far as I have learnt, there is no  
 reason for believing that the judgment of Admiral  
 Hamelin was ever astray, or that (except under the  
 stringent orders of the General who was his com-  
 manding officer) he would ever have outraged the  
 English by depriving them of a voice in the control  
 of their own fleet. Indeed the contrary is almost  
 manifest, for Dundas ever spoke with warmth of the  
 loyalty which marked the character of the French  
 Admiral; and this, of course, he could not and would  
 not have done if he had looked upon Hamelin as a  
 free agent.

Degree in  
 which  
 blame  
 could just-  
 ly attach  
 upon  
 Admiral  
 Dundas.

Dundas had the merit of disapproving, one after  
 another, the false steps proposed to the navy; but  
 then, unhappily, there remains the fact that he took  
 those steps nevertheless. He must have deemed that  
 the soundness of his judgment upon these questions  
 was in a great measure proved when he saw his  
 example close followed by a successor who had been

the foremost of his naval critics ; and, in that respect, his vindication has since been completed by the Russian accounts of the war ; but the misfortune was that, not having the natural ascendant, nor yet that authority resulting from former exploits which might otherwise have hindered the insistants from approaching him with their urgency, he also wanted the stubbornness that was needed for withstanding the stress when it came. True, he was Scotsman enough to be tenacious of his mere opinions—those, indeed, he seemed never to change—but his will, over-tempered perhaps by the action of politics upon the mind of a subordinated member of the Government, was too pliant to enable him to maintain himself steadfast against the violent and sudden assaults that were made upon his freedom of action.

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Under the first of the two hard trials to which his firmness was subjected, he found himself compelled to leave undischarged one of the gravest of the duties which attach upon a commander in war-time. The duty I speak of as thus attaching upon a commander is that of protecting the force he commands from the impatience of the Government at home, from the impatience of the people, from the pressure of colleagues and allies, but, above all, from its own healthy eagerness for action, and continuing so to protect it until his own judgment tells him that the moment for striking has come. It is for this amongst other reasons that a commander with a warlike reputation already established is of so much more worth than another of equal ability who is wanting in

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XVII. that condition. The adviser who comes forward in difficult conjunctures to lay it down that 'something ' must be done' is as dangerous in the business of war as in any other public concerns. Nor let it be thought that this extension of Lord Melbourne's precept to warlike counsels would tend to exclude bold resolves. History is replete with proof that the boldest captains have ever been those who, far from striking at random, and with half-formed notions of what they might do, have always had clear conceptions of their objects, and of the way in which they meant to succeed. No sane commander could well be more venturesome than Cochrane, but he was a man who could forecast his way to the havoc he was preparing with a clearness of mental vision which might almost be called Satanic.

The pressure to which the English Admiral was subjected might have been resisted by a man who had gained a great naval victory. It could not be resisted by one who had acceded to command by paths of peace and pleasantness; and Dundas had so much modesty and clearness of perception that he never confounded his nominal with his real authority. On public grounds, and apart from selfish desires, he used to lament that he was without the kind of ascendant which is earned by warlike achievements. Those who were the most anxious to support their chief in the maintenance of his own opinion were obliged to acknowledge, when they knew how the stress was applied, that no freedom of choice remained to him. One of our ship's captains,\* perceiv-

\* Captain (now Admiral) Carnegie, the commander of the Tribune.

ing, as he thought, that his chief was wrongfully obstructed in following the guidance of his own judgment, took upon himself in the intimacy of private friendship to deprecate undue concession in naval affairs to the opinions of other men. Thereupon Dundas laid his hand on the shoulder of the officer who so counselled, took him aside, placed a paper in his hand, and, requesting him first to read it and afterwards give his opinion, renewed the occupation in which he had been before engaged. The letter was that appeal which had been made to Dundas on the 14th of October.\* When the officer had read through the paper, he returned it to his chief, and at once decisively said, 'Sir, this leaves you no option.'

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Where freedom of choice was thus wanting, blame could not be justly imputed.

But as regards the dilemma in which Dundas was placed by Hamelin's visit on the morning of the engagement, a different opinion must be formed. It was, no doubt, plain that a want of concerted action on the part of the two allied fleets might have an ill aspect politically, and, in that way, become pernicious; but Dundas seems to have thought that, because the avoidance of such a result was indeed a great object, he therefore must act as though it were of all things the greatest. There, he erred. Other than any blessing of such proportions as that, there was one which had descended to the England of that day from the England of greater times. The renown of our navy was a treasure unspeak-

\* See *ante*, p. 321.



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ably precious. By our whole people, and, above all, by an English admiral, it deserved to be guarded with jealous care; for, if it be certain that the very life of England depends upon the strength of her navy, it is also true that the strength of her navy is in some sort dependent upon its sense of power; and again, that that sense of power must always depend in part upon the sacred tradition which hands down a vague estimate of the things our navy has done and the things it has failed to do. At the time I am speaking of, it was less than ever right that, for mere policy's sake, the warlike renown of our navy should be made to suffer. France watched, with the knowledge that, in matter of naval ascendant, our loss must needs be her gain. But also there were reasons of another kind for taking full care that the momentous duty of upholding our naval renown should not be made second to any ephemeral policy.

The expedient of eliciting all sorts of labour ashore from the generous devotion of the sailor had been carried, if not to the verge of what is tolerable, at least to the limit of what prudence could sanction; for, after all, the main covenant of the man-of-war's man is a covenant to fight, not a pledge to attend fighting men: and, it being of especially high moment that the labours thus obtained from our seamen should not be followed by measures calculated to injure the warlike renown of the service, it was unfortunate that the Admiral should have to set his fleet to the business of effecting a mere diversion for the land forces, when he knew all the time that, however

advantageous his intervention might prove to the besieging armies, yet, so far as concerned our navy, the end to which he found himself driving was a sure and foreseen discomfiture—nay, a discomfiture foreseen with such clearness that the approach of night was deliberately looked to beforehand as a plausible pretext for hauling off.\* Up to the point of determining that, in some form or other, a naval attack was to be made, Dundas, as we saw, acted almost under compulsion, and was therefore deserving of pardon; but to carry yet further the sacrifice of our naval renown, to let our fleet fall under the control of an anxious French landsman, who insisted upon condemning it to take part in an exhibition which our captains all saw to be vain and humiliating, and to make such concession with no other object than that of guarding against the misfortune of there appearing to be a divergence between the resolves of the French and the English Admirals—this, surely, in a choice of two evils, was a palpable choice of the greater one. It is true that the French had exerted their pressure by coming at the last moment, and causing Dundas to understand that they would have their own line, or none; but the very circumstance of being subjected to such a process as that might well have inclined our Admiral to disclose his honest anger, and exert that austere kind of firmness which is commonly thought to be of great efficacy as a

\* That, as we saw, was Admiral Hamelin's suggestion. See the postscript to Dundas's midnight letter, *ante*, p. 386-7; and acceded to by Dundas, second footnote, *ante*, p. 387.

CHAP. means of resistance to threats. So, at least, it would  
XVII. seem, Lord Raglan had hitherto thought; for, flexible as he had been in from time to time yielding to the proposals of the French, he had not yet suffered them to gain their way by threatening to resort to sole action; and upon the only two occasions where they ventured on any such method, he had brought them back to propriety by a wholesome and effective severity, which was better fitted to preserve real harmony in the Allied camp than a series of extorted concessions.\*

And, after all, though (as viewed by men at that time) the political consequences of a schism between the Admirals might have worn a somewhat grave aspect, there, at least, is sure ground for saying that no naval inconvenience could have resulted to the English from the execution of the French threat. Supposing the French fleet to have acted alone and apart, or not to have acted at all, the English fleet would have been set free, with full power to engage in any enterprise which its commander, with the advice of his captains, might think fit to devise; and whatever that enterprise might have been, it could scarcely have failed to acquire the merit of being less impotent than the formal, remote line of battle which Admiral Hamelin proposed.

But although Dundas erred when he so far submitted to dictation as to engage to anchor his ships and prolong the French line of battle in the way

\* For the two instances of well-timed severity referred to in the text, see vol. II. chaps. i. and ix.

prescribed to him by Hamelin, it must yet be remembered that the English Admiral did not employ his whole fleet in this distressing and frivolous duty. On the contrary, he not only devoted a choice portion of his force to the attack on Fort Constantine and the neighbouring coast defences, but supported the squadron thus detached by the fire of nearly all the steam-ships which he kept under way, and soon reinforced it so powerfully from out of his main division that, besides the *Britannia*, which carried his flag, he at last had but two fighting ships—to exhibit, as though for form's sake—in dreary line with the French.\* Indeed, the array in which Dundas consented to align with the French approached so near, after all, to a mere solemnity, that, happily, scarce one seaman's life was made forfeit to this painful exigency;† and whilst the ships composing the in-shore squadron, or engaging in support of it, lost nearly 300 in killed and wounded, the sacrifices incurred by those of our ships which remained in the Anglo-French line were only 21 men wounded.

I have not concealed my impression that the untoward measure of involving the navy in a combat

\* After 4 o'clock, he had actually only one ship besides the *Britannia* thus employed in prolonging the French line of battle, for by that time the *Trafalgar* (for the reason stated *ante*, p. 423) had hauled off.

† It is probable that the fact would warrant me in saying '*not one*,' instead of '*scarce one*;' but I have qualified the phrase, because I do not know as a certainty that the *Queen* or the *Bellerophon* may not have had a seaman killed before moving off to the support of the detached squadron.

CHAP. against the stone forts of Sebastopol was in part  
 XVII. brought about by the exceeding zeal of Lyons, by  
 Sir his tardiness in attaining to an accurate view of the  
 Edmund question, and especially by the attitude of antagonism  
 Lyons. in which he stood towards his chief;\* but if Lyons  
 in this respect erred, it was given him at least to  
 have a foremost place in the action. The position in  
 which he placed his superb Agamemnon verged so  
 close upon the utmost limit of what was possible,  
 that she only had under her keel two feet and a half  
 of water;† and his place at but 800 yards from the  
 gorge and right flank of Fort Constantine won for  
 him, at the time, the enthusiastic admiration of the  
 French, and the approval of the English, navy.‡  
 ‘General Canrobert and the officers of the French  
 ‘army’—it was so that Lord Raglan wrote—‘were  
 ‘loud and unanimous in their expression of admira-  
 ‘tion at the position in which Sir Edmund Lyons  
 ‘placed the Agamemnon and the ships that were

The  
 praises  
 showered  
 upon him  
 at the  
 time.

\* With regard to that, and also with regard to the time when Lyons first perceived the objectionable features of the measure, see *ante*, chap. xv., and especially his letter of the 16th of October there quoted.

† And her jib-guys were in contact with those of a ship (the Rodney) which was actually aground.

‡ I speak of the approval of the English navy without qualifying the words; because, though Dundas (who was much dissatisfied with the naval engagement, and angered perhaps against those who had forced it on) may have been dry and even silent on the subject, I have no reason for thinking that he failed to appreciate the position which Lyons took up; but it may be right for me to say that Lyons writes thus: ‘Nor can anything be more gratifying than the congratulations I receive from all the captains, and indeed from the whole fleet, with one exception.’—Private letter to Lord Raglan, 19th (wrongly dated 20th) October 1854.

‘with him;’\* but the opinion of the French navy upon such a question had, of course, a yet higher value. ‘The position of the Agamemnon,’ they said, ‘was superb, and that of the Sanspareil not less admirable. Both ships were capitally placed. It was ‘really magnificent.’† That last epithet, large as it was, Lord Raglan made bold to adopt; for he expressly applied it to the mode in which the Agamemnon was laid ‘alongside of Fort Constantine;’‡ and he ventured to declare it ‘probable that if the ‘whole of our fleet had got as close in, the fort would ‘have been destroyed.§

I conceived it fitting that these opinions should be quoted; and especially I desired to record the generous enthusiasm with which the French generally, and, above all, their naval men, were able to speak of an action performed by their ancient rivals; but because I repeat this language of praise I am not therefore venturing to submit it for unqualified adoption by others. The dearth that there was of great naval exploits on that 17th of October made it certain that the merit of the operation undertaken by the Agamem-

\* The Sanspareil and the London.—Lord Raglan to Dundas, private letter, 19th October 1854.

† ‘Hamelin and Bruat said to Greville yesterday: “La position “de l’Agamemnon était superbe, et celle du Sanspareil [Captain “Dacres] pas moins admirable. Tous les deux étaient supérieurement “bien placés; c’était superbe.”’—Sir E. Lyons to Lord Raglan, private letter, 19th (misdated 20th) October 18.

‡ Private letter from Lord Raglan to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, 21st October 1854.

§ The extent to which the casemates had held good against the fire was not known at the time to the Allies.

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And even now, without unduly lowering the standard of naval excellence, it can be said that the position in which Lyons placed the Agamemnon was one boldly and happily chosen.

non and the ships which followed her flag would be brought into strong light by contrast; and although I imagine that our seamen will be unwilling to lower their standard of naval excellence, by accepting the highest of praises for anything less than great deeds, yet, when it is seen that by venturing his Agamemnon upon the very edge of the shoal, Lyons fetched such a place off the gorge of Fort Constantine as enabled him to rake and crush its top batteries from end to end, there need be no scruple in saying that the berth he found for his ship was one boldly and happily chosen.

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The light which the naval attack of the 17th of October tended to throw upon the mechanics of war.

It could not but be that the attack of great coast defences by two mighty fleets would tend to throw light upon that branch of science which, relating as it does to the efficacy of the implements and appliances made use of in fighting, may be called ‘mechanics of war;’\* and although I myself need not venture to draw conclusions, yet, in order that others may the more incline to do so, it seems well to state over again, and in categorical form, five results evolved by the conflict:—

1. At ranges of from 1600 to 1800 yards, a whole

\* Plagiarised from the title of a book on a very different subject, namely, that of legislation—the book by which Mr Arthur Symonds delivered his patient country from the oppression of the wordy, diffuse, obscure Acts of Parliament which loaded the statute-book in the times before his attack. Treating language as the machinery by which the Legislature seeks to enforce its will, he called his book the ‘Mechanics of Law-making.’

French fleet failed to make any useful impression upon a fort at the water's edge, though its guns were all ranged in open-air batteries and firing from over the parapet.

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The five results which, in that point of view, seem worthy of mark.

2. An earthen battery mounting only five guns, but placed on the cliff at an elevation of 100 feet, inflicted greivous losses and injury on four powerful English ships of war, and actually disabled two of them, without itself having a gun dismounted, and without losing even one man.

3. At ranges of from 800 to 1200 yards, and with the aid of steam-frigates throwing shells at a range of 1600 yards, three English ships in ten minutes brought to ruin and cleared of their gunners the whole of the open-air batteries (containing 27 guns) which were on the top of a great stone fort at the water's edge.

4. The whole Allied fleet, operating in one part of it at a range of from 1600 to 1800 yards, and in another part of it at ranges of from 800 to 1200 yards, failed to make any useful impression upon casemated batteries protected by a good stone wall from five to six feet thick.

5. Under the guns of a great fort by the water's edge, which, although it had lost the use of its top-most pieces of artillery, still had all its casemates entire, and the batteries within them uninjured, a great English ship, at a distance of only 800 yards, lay at anchor and fighting for hours without sustaining any ruinous harm.\*

\* Of course, the value of the experience thus acquired by the Agamemnon must depend upon a question still somewhat obscure, i.e., the



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## III.

Continu-  
ance of  
the bom-  
bardment  
carried on  
by the  
English  
batteries.  
Its effect.

Whilst the fleets plied their thunder in vain, and the still silent guns on Mount Rodolph confessed the ill plight of the French, there yet was one part of the field where the cause of the Allies seemed to prosper. This was in the English batteries. There, from break of day to that critical afternoon-time which we are now approaching, our cannoneers—sailors and landmen—had been well fulfilling their part. Not only had they sustained with advantage their now single-handed conflict with the Flagstaff Bastion and the ‘Garden Batteries’—works which for the first three or four hours of the bombardment had been under fire from Mount Rodolph as well as from Chapman’s Attack—but they were fast achieving almost all that could have been hoped from their efforts against that part of the enemy’s lines—his lines in the Karabel faubourg—which they more especially undertook to assail. The batteries in both Gordon’s and Chapman’s Attacks were so placed, and were armed with guns of a calibre which compensated so aptly for the length of the range, that, after some nine hours of firing, they had established a clear ascendant over the enemy’s ordnance. Indeed, the ascendant obtained was decisive enough to give ground for believing that Todleben, in his exceed-


number of guns in the casemates of Fort Constantine which could really be brought to bear upon her. The impunity of the Rodney would be even more instructive than the experience of the Agamemnon, if it were not for the surmise referred to, *ante*, p. 445.

ing eagerness to overwhelm the French works on Mount Rodolph, had devoted too little of his care to those blank-looking mounds on Green Hill and the Woronzoff Heights, which, at distances of 1300 or 1400 yards, marked the seat of the English Attacks. CHAP.  
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But after the opening of the fire, the great Engineer had been quick to learn that the English batteries were operating with destructive power against a vital part of the Russian defences; and he seems to have felt to the quick (though seeing it all the time with a genuine, scientific approval) the telling effect of Attacks so disposed that, both as respected the Flagstaff Bastion and the Redan, the same guns which battered in front the left face of the work could also enfilade the right face.\*

Though with somewhat less advantage, in that respect, than the French, the English were still upon heights which commanded the Russian defences, and

\* This diagram—it is only a diagram and not a plan—may help to elucidate the text:—



**C H A P.** looked over into their rear. From this cause, as well  
XVII. as from the effect, in some places, of shot bounding in by ricochet, our siege-guns, from the first, had begun to work a great havoc in those parts of the Russian batteries which lay towards the gorges of their bastions, as well as amongst the bodies of troops which were posted hard by to await the expected assault. But this was not all; for, little by little, the whole front of the assailed defences in the Karabel faubourg began to give way under the power of the English artillery. Even from the Allied lines it was easy to see that, independently of the effect produced by explosions, the shell or the round-shot alighting upon a parapet which was no more, after all, than a heap of loose particles without coherence, wrought changes in its bulk and its form, whirling up into the air at every blow a dark column of dust and small earth. Before the day was half spent, the frail ramparts most battered by our artillery had degenerated into shapeless mounds; and after the first nine hours of the cannonade, there was more than one spot where they seemed to be nearly effaced.

Its effect  
upon the  
Malakoff.

In the midst of the earthworks thus almost dissolving into dust under blows of round-shot and shell, the stone-built tower of the Malakoff remained yet upstanding; but the work had undergone a fire so powerful that it no longer carried an effective armament. Of its few guns—all ranged, as we know, in open-air battery, at the top of the work—some had been, not merely dismounted, but even hurled over the parapet; and there was one—the English remem-

ber it—which had been so tilted round by the blow of a shot as to be made to stand up on end, a staring sample of havoc which people could see from afar. But also the stone parapet of the tower was so shattered, and its splinters flew so destructively, that, without incurring an unwarrantable sacrifice, the men at the top of the work could no longer be kept to their guns. They were withdrawn. There still poured a well-sustained fire from the guns on the glacis of the work, but the tower itself was now silent.

It was at the Redan, however, as we have seen, that the English siege-guns were to drive a pathway for our columns of assault by first getting down the power of the Russian artillery. To assail the defences at this chosen part of them, a large proportion of the guns which armed Gordon's works had been made to cross their fire with that issuing from some of the batteries in Chapman's Attack; and thus it resulted that each face of the Redan was both battered in front and enfiladed.\* Meanwhile, also, 'other projectiles of great weight discharged from the English batteries, and taking effect by ricochet, so swept the space between the Marine Hospital and the Dockyard ravine as to make all going and coming in that direction a service of exceeding danger.

Its effect upon the Redan and the defences in its rear.

We saw that so early as that hour of the forenoon when Todleben surveyed the Redan, its defences had fallen into a critical state. Even then several pieces had been dismounted, and numbers of the embrasures blocked up with ruins. True, we also learnt that the

\* See again the diagram appended to the foregoing note.

CHAP. XVII. zeal of the Russian engineers and seamen was supporting them in their ceaseless effort to encounter the work of destruction with the work of repair, and giving them heart to toil thus under a fire of great power. But hours and hours elapsed. The cannonade did not relent; and, despite all that man could do, the power of the English ordnance so continued to tell upon the Redan as to be gradually annulling its batteries. By about three o'clock in the afternoon, one-third of the pieces which armed the work had been dismounted; and even where guns were yet in battery, the cheeks of the embrasures lay in ruins. The loss in men had been heavy. Twice over, the gunners of several pieces had had to be replaced by fresh hands. Of 75 men sent to the Redan from on board one of the ships, so many as 50 were killed or wounded. And against the artillery which was inflicting these losses upon them the Russians could do but little; for their batteries were here over-matched by the more commanding position and the greater weight and numbers of the guns which assailed them from the Green Hill and the Woronzoff Height. Yet under stress of the decisive and increasing ascendant thus established against them by the English, the gunners in the Redan stood firm. They had been exalted, it seems, into so high a state of devotion by the example of their chiefs, Captain Ergominischeff, Captain Leslie, and Captain Katchinsky, that, however appalling the slaughter, the men yet remaining alive and unstricken worked on and worked on at the defence with a courage which did

not droop. They strove hard to do what was needed for maintaining a fire in spite of all the havoc that had been wrought in the batteries; and, to that end, they kept on banking up the embrasures which were continually falling to pieces. The officers did not hesitate to give the example of this kind of devotion. They mounted the parapets, and toiled at the repairs of the embrasures with their own hands.

But even by all these efforts the English artillery was not to be prevented from overmastering the Redan;\* and soon after three o'clock in the afternoon there occurred a disaster which completed the ruin of the work. A shell blew up the powder-magazine established in the salient. When the smoke lifted, it disclosed a dire spectacle of ruin. What a man could see of the world where transformed by the explosion, bore scarce any likeness to what he had been looking upon the minute before. At the fore part of the work the parapet had been heaved over into the ditch, and so filled it in. The ground was laden with fragments of platforms, with guns dismounted, with gun-carriages overthrown and shattered. On all sides there were the blackened bodies of men scathed by fire, and it was afterwards known that more than 100 men had been thus killed. There were many of the dead—and among them the brave Captain Leslie—whose bodies could never be recognised. The calmest of the survivors who gazed on this scene of

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Great  
explosion  
in the  
Redan.  
Its effect.

\* 'These efforts were impotent to prevent the English artillery from 'getting the dominion of ours.'—Totleben.

C H A P. XVII. havoc might well enough judge that the last hour of their cherished Sebastopol must indeed be come ; for not only could they see that the ruthless energy of their own war-munitions had laid open the road for a conqueror, but also, through the roar of the artillery, they heard the ' hurrah ' of the English ; and the cheering was taken for proof that the besiegers had comprehended the gift which the fortune of war had brought them, and were coming to lay hands on their prize.

The cheering died out ; but narrators have said that, notwithstanding the thunder of the artillery war still waging elsewhere between Sebastopol and its assailants both by sea and by land, the failure of sound issuing from the Redan added strangely to the sense of desolation which the sight of its ruins occasioned. From a work where, for hours, great batteries had been pealing, where words of command and the shouts of men toiling under fire had been all day resounding, there was nothing now to be heard except the discharge, at long intervals, of a single cannon, and the groans and entreaties of wounded men, who lay praying, and praying for water.

There were Russians so steadfast in their obedience to sense of warlike duty that, in the face of the ruin which surrounded them, they made an attempt to get some guns in a condition for service ; but what resulted was, that out of the 22 pieces which had armed the work, 2 only remained in battery, and these were manned by but 5 gunners.\*

\* Todleben.

Nor was it only by the number of men killed or disabled, and the all but total ruin of both the work and its batteries, that the Redan was brought into danger. A significant indication of despair yet remains to be given. The troops which had been kept near the gorge of the Redan in order to meet an assault, now all at once fell back for shelter towards the Marine Hospital, and dropped down behind the scarp of the rock overhanging the Man-of-war Harbour. 'Thenceforth,' says Todleben—and the time he speaks of is that which close followed the great explosion—'thenceforth there disappeared all possibility of replying to the English artillery. The defence in that part of the lines was completely paralysed; and in the Karabelnaya men expected to see the enemy avail himself of the advantage he had gained, and at once advance to the assault.'\*

And, indeed, it might well be imagined that the time was at hand when (after one final salvo which would build up a wall of dim smoke to cover the front of the assailants) the gunners in the English batteries might now at last take their rest, and deliver over the site of what had been the Redan to assaulting columns of infantry. From first to last I have been careful to keep under a full light the tissue of evil consequences that resulted from neglecting the element of time, and consenting to give the enemy his respite of twenty days; but although Sir John Burgoyne gave counsel which tended to this capital error, the soundness of his conclusions in other

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Retreat of the Russian infantry posted near the Redan.

Defenceless condition of the Redan.

Expectation by the Russians of an immediate assault.

The opportunity that there was for assaulting at the Redan.

\* Todleben, p. 329.



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The state  
of the Re-  
dan was  
a fulfil-  
ment of  
Sir John  
Bur-  
goyne's  
design.

respects may fairly, perhaps, be subjected to a separate criticism ; and when once the field of scrutiny is thus narrowed, it becomes right to say that, so far as concerned the English part of the siege, the state to which the Redan had been brought on the afternoon of this 17th of October was a singularly exact fulfilment of Burgoyne's design. For, although, as auxiliary and collateral measures, our chief engineer had undertaken the battering of the Flagstaff Bastion, and the battering of the Malakoff as well as of other defences, yet the main purpose of what Burgoyne had planned to achieve by force of siege-guns was to drive such a chasm of havoc into the enemy's line of defence on the ridge where stood the Redan as would open, through ruins of earthworks and silenced batteries, a not impracticable roadway for the English columns of assault. This being what Burgoyne had undertaken to do, it resulted that—with some aid from that gift of fortune which wrought the explosion of the Russian magazine—he was able to fulfil his engagement. At a few minutes after three o'clock in the afternoon, the Redan lay before him in that very state to which he had sought to reduce it.

Causes  
which  
prevented  
the Allies  
from seiz-  
ing the op-  
portunity.

But we have to remember that the plan which aimed at breaking in by the Karabel faubourg was a part only of the whole design, and that whenever the English should be assaulting the Redan, the French were to be assaulting the Flagstaff Bastion. According to the understanding between the French and the English Headquarters, the one assault was not to be going on without the other ; and it seems to have

been—not so much stated in terms, but—rather taken for granted that the silencing, for the day, of the batteries on Mount Rodolph carried with it a corresponding postponement of any attempt by the French to assault the Flagstaff Bastion. Indeed it was evident that, independently of the physical obstacle still interposed by the unsilenced batteries of the Flagstaff Bastion, the moral discouragement which had been inflicted upon the French by the disastrous explosion of their magazine could not but be an ill preparative for the task of storming Sebastopol.

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In this way, once more, the tender exigencies of the bond which united two mighty States forbade them the full use of their strength. A tacit compact required that their armies should act together in any great operation ; and it chancing at this time, from the mere fortune of war, that the English were in a condition to assault and the French not, it resulted, as a natural consequence, that the temporary impotence of the one Power carried with it the abstention of both. What benumbed the Allies was the Alliance.

It must not be supposed that the disappointment of Lord Raglan's hopes came upon him at this late hour. The silence of the French batteries on Mount Rodolph prepared him of course for ill tidings ; and the first message which had been delivered to him from General Canrobert disclosed no small part of the unwelcome truth.\* As soon as General Rose had spoken, the horizon of the besiegers was all at once overcast ; and, indeed, his words on that day may be

The effect  
of General  
Rose's dis-  
closure  
upon the

\* For the purport of General Rose's communications, see *ante*, p. 373.

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prospects  
of the  
Allies as  
contem-  
plated by  
Lord  
Raglan.

regarded as marking the time when that which had seemed at the English Headquarters to be a near prospect of the storming and capture of Sebastopol, dissolved into hopes faint and vague. Certainly in the mind of Lord Raglan this quick change was wrought. Before the explosion in the French lines, he had been apparently confident that Sebastopol would be carried;\* and his anticipation was that, in the course of the evening, he and Canrobert would be able to make their arrangements for the assault.† After hearing General Rose's account of the discouragement suffered by the French, and of the time that would be needed for the resumption of their cannonade, he at once perceived that the siege was likely to become a protracted undertaking.‡

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\* I found this statement partly though not entirely upon the tenor of Lord Raglan's communications to the naval authorities.

† Speaking to me during the progress of the cannonade, and I think at about one o'clock P.M., Lord Raglan said that, but for the disasters which had befallen the French, he believed 'he should have been 'able to come to an arrangement with Canrobert that evening;' and (by the way in which those words bore upon the immediately preceding part of the conversation) I knew that the 'arrangement' to which Lord Raglan had looked forward was an arrangement for the assault of Sebastopol. I do not, however, undertake to say whether he meant an arrangement for an assault that evening, or an arrangement that evening for an assault on the morrow. Originally, no doubt, the first day of the cannonade was looked to as the day for assaulting; and the detailed instructions issued to the troops were so framed as to be in accordance with that supposition; but some of those instructions were cancelled on the eve of the 17th; and the change was such as to displace the inference which might have been drawn from the paper in its original state.

‡ Lord Raglan, at the time, spoke to me in a way which disclosed his clear perception of the unfavourable change which had come over the prospects of the Allies. Lest it should be thought that a mere

The Russians were strangely slow in their endeavours to draw a conclusion from the silence of the French batteries; but in the course of the afternoon they began to surmise that the assailants thus paralysed might have altogether abandoned their trenches; and in order to learn the truth, a small reconnoitring force, consisting of sailors under Lieutenant Hiliban, was despatched at about four o'clock to the crest of Mount Rodolph. The force pushed boldly forward to within a hundred yards of the trenches, and was then driven back. From the insight obtained by this reconnoitring force, Sebastopol learnt that the batteries on Mount Rodolph, though silenced, were still amply guarded.

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Recon-  
naissance  
sent by  
the Rus-  
sians to  
Mount  
Rodolph.

On the part of the English, the firing was continued till the evening without adding signal results to those already obtained. At dusk, the cannonade ceased.

Conclu-  
sion of the  
cannonade  
for the  
day.

In this the first day's conflict of the land batteries, more than 1100 of the Russians were killed or wounded,\* whilst the loss of the Allies was comparatively small.† The disparity was occasioned in

Its result,  
so far as  
concerns  
losses of  
men and  
harm done  
to works  
and bat-  
teries.

traveller was guilty of intrusion in remaining with Lord Raglan at a time and place when any needless addition to the group might tend to draw fire upon the Headquarters Staff, I may be suffered to mention that I had chosen for myself another post of observation. Lord Raglan, however, finding where I was, kindly sent to request that I would come to the spot at which he had stationed himself. From him at the time a request was of course a command.

\* 1112.—Totleben, p. 345.

† Including the 50 men struck down by the first explosion on Mount Rodolph, the loss of the French in killed and wounded seems to have been only 96.—Niel, p. 62. Exclusive of the casualties among our

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Quantity  
of projec-  
tiles ex-  
pended.

part by the exceedingly advantageous positions in which Burgoyne had established his Attacks, as well as by the greater calibre of the English guns;\* but a main cause of loss to the Russians was the necessity of preparing for the expected assault, by keeping large forces on ground where they could not be sheltered from fire.† The works and the armaments of the Allies sustained, upon the whole, little harm.‡

It has been reckoned that the projectiles thrown on this day from the land batteries of the besiegers and the besieged were, by the French, about 4000; by the English, 4700; and by the Russians, so many as 20,000.§ This large expenditure of ammunition on the part of the Russians is ascribed in some measure to their sailors, who could not, we saw, be dissuaded from indulging their love of the broadside.|| But it also appears that no small portion of the Russian fire was elicited by those imagined columns of assault which so often in the course of the day seemed to come marching down through the smoke.¶

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sailors acting on shore, the losses of the English in killed and wounded were, it seems, 144.

\* Todleben, p. 344.

† Ibid. p. 345. The forces thus exposed were not only battalions of infantry, but also the grape-shot batteries to which Todleben looked for his favourite 'mitrail.'

‡ The details of the damage will be found in Niel, p. 62, and the English Official Siege Journal, p. 34. In the Appendix to that work there is an interesting paper by Sir John Burgoyne, showing that the comparative immunity of the English was owing in great measure to the efficient way in which our Engineers performed their many and difficult tasks. Their parapets proved solid, and their magazines, though often struck by shot and shell, held good in every instance.

§ Todleben, p. 345.

|| Ibid.

¶ Ibid.

When the Allies suffered night to come and to pass without having stormed the defences, it followed, in truth—though they did not yet thoroughly know the vanity of what they had done—that the cannonade, prepared at great cost of warlike resources, and, yet worse, at a ruinous cost of time, had brought them no nearer to their object than they were before opening fire. Not being followed up by an assault, the one opportunity which all their siege labour had earned for them became an opportunity lost.

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The opportunity of assaulting not having been seized, it resulted that the day's cannonade had brought the Allies no nearer to their object.

The rigidity which necessarily characterised the mixed counsels of the Allies.

That the deliberations of independent commanders tend to the rejection of vigorous resolves, we have been seeing again and again; but another of the characteristics which mark such counsels is their rigidity. Decisions formed in that way are really in the nature of diplomatic engagements, and it is only by a renewal of the diplomatic labour that they can be varied and adapted to the changeful circumstances of the hour. The swift exigencies of battle can ill be met by conferences and negotiations.

Apart from the diversity both of nation and of race which made it hard to restore the temper and spirit of one army by reporting to it the success of the other, there was a physical severance of the French and the English siege forces which tended to increase the evil; for whilst the two camps, and especially the Headquarters camps, were divided from one another by a comparatively small space of ground very easily traversed, the advanced positions which had to be occupied by the besiegers whilst actively engaged in their task were divided by ravines

**C H A P.** of such depth as to be equivalent to long distances.  
**XVII.** Another of the ills resulting from this riven configuration of the ground was its tendency to aggravate the embarrassments created by a divided command. At moments which might require that unforeseen occasions should be instantly seized, and that the old plan of action should be rapidly accommodated to new conditions, it could not but be material that, if possible, the two Commanders should be near to one another; but they had both thought it right to establish themselves at posts announced beforehand to their respective armies, and it is plain that the interposed ravine did much to keep them asunder. The use of the electric telegraph had been learnt in those days by merchants, nay even, in some measure, by Governments, and the value of moments in war had long been known to mankind; but the old and the new discovery had not yet been so blended in the human mind as to result in a wire from the batteries to the two Commanders, or across the Harbour ravine.

I do not, however, represent that if the two Commanders had been communicating with one another at the critical moment, they would have changed their design. During the whole of the day, and notwithstanding that their cannonade had succeeded at one point whilst failing at the other, they, each of them, apparently continued to treat it as settled that, by way of preliminary to the operation of assaulting, the fire of both the Works which were to be stormed must first be got down.

: If the whole Allied army had been one people obey-

ing one chief, the Commander, when surveying the state to which the conflict had been brought after four o'clock by the destruction of the Redan, might not have been so ill content with the general result of the cannonade as to reject a large gift which the fortune of war had just brought him, for no better reason than that the gift was but a half of the entire result which he had sought to attain by artillery. Judging that the failure of the cannonade on his left was, upon the whole, well compensated by the success attained on his right, a general so circumstanced might have proceeded at once to assault.

But with the Allies, that force on the left which had sustained the check was an independent army, was the offspring of an independent nation, was commanded by an independent general; and there needed an almost romantic affection for the common cause to make the French act in the way that would have been only natural to them if the force on the right which then chanced to be smiled on by fortune had been part of the army to which they belonged. In such a case, the confidence and the warlike impulse engendered by disabling the Redan would have been carried by swift contagion to the men on the crest of Mount Rodolph; and the discouragement there occasioned by the explosion of the magazine would perhaps have been followed by a bold and determined resolve. As it was, the duality of the besieging force proved so perverse in its effects that, although both the armies were hampered by the misluck which happened to one

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Embar-  
rassment  
resulting  
from the  
duality  
of the  
Allied  
armies.



CHAP. of them, there was no happy converse to set against  
XVII. that ill result, and the hopefulness of the army which had chanced to succeed in its task could not be at all imparted to that one which happened to fail. Experience gave little warrant to the fancy of those who had imagined that the concord of England and France would enable them to act in the field with the power of two mighty nations and the decisiveness of one. In that sense, the Alliance scarce ever joined together the two armies: it coupled, but did not unite them.

The  
 course to  
 which  
 Canrobert  
 resorted.

To a man of an anxious temperament there is sore temptation in the ever-ready, the ever-alluring, yet often pernicious, expedient of resorting to delay. General Canrobert apparently judged that he must wait until his troops, with spirits restored, and with batteries strengthened and multiplied, should be able to bring the Flagstaff Bastion to a state like that of the Redan; and to that course of action on the part of the French Lord Raglan simply assented, but he was not the less determined to persist in his own cannonade.

It must not be supposed that General Canrobert receded in the least from any engagement he had made. The checkered and twofold event of success at the Redan and failure at the Flagstaff Bastion had not been apparently contemplated in the anterior deliberations of the Allies; and it was in perfect accordance with the understanding between the two Generals that the French, when they found themselves baffled for the moment in their artillery con-

flict, determined to postpone their attack. The whole theory of the cannonade which the Allies had been preparing for the last twenty days was based upon the supposed importance of getting down the fire of a work before any attempt to assault it; and, the exceeding worth of the opportunity which had occurred being ill understood at the time, it was consistent and only natural on the part of the French Commander to put off his further attack.

The question whether Sebastopol would have been probably carried by a resolute assault on this 17th of October has been determined in the affirmative by our English Engineers;\* and their judgment has been ratified by the weighty authority of General de Todleben. It must be observed, however, that General de Todleben's argument omits the consideration of what might be effected against the assailants by the fire from the Russian ships.

Plainly also, that imaginary road to the conquest of Sebastopol which the great Engineer of the Russians can now so surely point out to his former opponents might not have been easily found by the assaulting columns; and, in the absence of a panic involving the collapse of all steadfast resistance, it seems

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Decision of the question whether Sebastopol could have been advantageously assaulted at the Redan; by the English Engineers; by General de Todleben.

\* The Official Journal of the English Engineers—a work strongly bearing the impress of Sir John Burgoyne's mind—contains this passage: 'Could an assault have been attempted this evening, it is believed that it would have been successful. But as the French expected to re-establish their batteries by the following morning, it was decided to delay the assault on the British side until the French were ready to undertake the operation against the works of the Flag-staff Bastion.'—P. 34. As to the numerical strength of the opposing forces, see paper in the Appendix.


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At all  
events,  
the omis-  
sion of the  
Allies to  
push home  
their ad-  
vantage  
was a lost  
occasion.

likely that the besiegers in storming the place would have had to undergo heavy slaughter. Therefore the opportunity which presented itself to the Allies on this day was not one so unspeakably precious as those which, thrice over, occurred in the last ten days of September. Still, the predicament into which the invaders had thrust themselves was of such a kind that they would have been blessed indeed if they could now have found means to capture Sebastopol even at the cost of cruel losses; and since it happened that they had opened a chasm in the enemy's line of defence, their omission to push home the advantage must here take its place, and be numbered. It constitutes the fourth of the lost occasions which these volumes have to record.

In succumbing for a time to the defenders of Sebastopol, and resolving to postpone his next attack to some future day, General Canrobert, it is plain, acted loyally, and without an idea of the extent to which he was sacrificing the common cause. By the conjuncture which had suddenly placed the resources of a whole fleet and arsenal at the disposal of transcendent genius there had been generated so vast a power of rapidly constructing, restoring, and re-arming defensive works, that the like of it had never before been known in the world; and it is scarcely wonderful that, even with all the quickness and sagacity of his nation, a French commander should have been slow to perceive the whole truth. He apparently formed no conception of the huge quantity of new work, and restoration, and re-arma-

ment that might be effected by the garrison and people of Sebastopol in the course of an autumn night, and suffered himself to imagine that the besieger's work of destruction might recommence on the morrow at the point where it was to leave off that same evening. If he had not indulged this illusion, General Canrobert would have seen that, to give further respite to Sebastopol when the favouring chances of war had torn open its line of defence, was to spurn a gift of rare worth, such as Fortune—too often rebuffed—might hardly again deign to proffer.



## APPENDIX.

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### No. I.

*Extract from a Memorandum of a Conversation held with Sir Edmund Lyons, which was made by Mr George Loch, February 10, 1856, and approved as accurate on the same day by Sir Edmund.*

‘ SEBASTOPOL undoubtedly might have been taken within five  
‘ days after we landed in the Crimea. He had earnestly pressed  
‘ that an immediate attempt should be made on it: Lord Rag-  
‘ lan had the same feeling. After the battle of the Alma, the  
‘ same day, he received a note from Lord Raglan requesting  
‘ that he would call on him by eight o’clock the following morn-  
‘ ing. He prepared to go; but meanwhile he received a letter  
‘ from Admiral Dundas, saying that information had been sent  
‘ him by the Turkish Admiral, that seven Russian line-of-bat-  
‘ tle ships had left the harbour, making apparently for Odessa,  
‘ and ordering him (Sir Edmund) to get ready to follow them  
‘ with the steam squadron. Sir Edmund answered that he  
‘ could not understand this; that he, Admiral Dundas, ought  
‘ to have better information on the subject than the Turkish  
‘ Admiral; that he, Admiral Dundas, was himself lying with-  
‘ in twelve miles of the harbour; that doubtless he had been  
‘ watching it narrowly by means of the numerous steamers at  
‘ his command, and therefore that it was not likely that such a  
‘ squadron could have put to sea without his knowledge; that  
‘ even if they had, it was extremely unlikely they would go to

‘Odessa, which was a *cul de sac*.’ (He found afterwards that the Admiral had kept no watch whatever on the harbour.)

‘Before, however, this matter was cleared up, the time for going to Lord Raglan had passed, and it was between twelve and one before he got to Headquarters. On going in, after explaining the cause of his being late, Lord Raglan showed him a memorandum made by Sir John Burgoyne, in which he suggested the movement round the head of the harbour to the Sebastopol side. He, Sir Edmund, at once urged strong reasons against this. He said that the character of the whole expedition was that of a surprise; that it was undertaken without accurate knowledge of the strength of the enemy, or their resources, and that in great measure they still remained ignorant on these points; that all they knew positively was that the victory at Alma had been a heavy blow to them, and that the best chance of continued success was to follow it up rapidly, and to try and take the northern forts by a *coup de main*. Lord Raglan said that he concurred in these views; that he had already made representations to St Arnaud on the subject; that he proposed to him at once to advance on the Belbec, cross that river, and then assault the forts, but that St Arnaud had told him his troops were tired, and that it could not be done; that he, Lord Raglan, was disappointed by this answer, and could not understand it, for he knew the troops could not be tired, and that there must be some other reason.’ (The truth was, as afterwards known, that St Arnaud was here stricken down by his mortal malady.)

‘Sir Edmund again saw Lord Raglan the following day, and found him in low spirits. On asking him the cause he said he had been again urging on the French General to advance across the Belbec, but that he had replied that he had ascertained that the Russians had thrown up strong earthworks on the banks of the river; and though he did not doubt that the Allies could force them as they had the works on the Alma, they could not afford the loss that would be entailed. On this, Sir Edmund went on board a small steamer, ran close in, reconnoitred the works, found them to be as represented, but that they were without guns. He reported this, but the

' French General replied that he had already given his officers ' *orders* to commence the march round the harbour, in order ' to reach the south side; that during this march, as is well ' known, they fell in with the rear-guard of Mentschikoff's ' army abandoning Sebastopol; and it is now known that the ' Russians had not left 2000 men in the place, believing it to ' be untenable.

' Immediately on their arrival at Balaclava, he, Sir Edmund, ' had urged again on Lord Raglan an immediate assault; but ' Sir John Burgoyne represented strongly against it, and urged ' that regular approaches be made. He said it would cost them ' a loss of 500 men (!! ) There was then little appearance of ' defences on the town side. It was stated that the Russian ' fleet would cause loss of the assaulting troops; on which he, ' Sir Edmund, pointed to the Malakoff Hill, then unoccupied, ' and advised the immediate construction of a battery there, ' which would make it necessary for the fleet to take care of ' themselves. That a day or two after this he again urged an ' assault on Lord Raglan. By this time the Russians were at ' work throwing up batteries, and consequently the loss to be ' caused by an assault would be greater than if done in the first ' instance. Lord Raglan was willing, and asked him how he ' would proceed. He, Sir Edmund, said, in answer, that it was ' now clear that the Russians saw they (the Allies) were about ' to lay regular siege to the place. Let them be encouraged in ' this belief; send lots of men to the front with pickaxes, or, ' if they have them not, with something to resemble pickaxes, ' and commence turning up the ground, and when they least ' expect it, rush in upon them. He urged that if this were not ' done the place would not be taken except after grievous loss; ' that the men who now composed the army would never live ' to do it. Lord Raglan frequently adverted to this afterwards. ' He would have been very willing to do it by assault, but he ' was not supported in the proposal by the French General, nor ' by his own Engineers.

' Canrobert was a fine, honourable, chivalrous fellow, but a ' miserable commander-in-chief — brave as steel personally, ' but he dare not take responsibility. He had, on *four* separate



'occasions, made arrangements with Lord Raglan for assaulting the place, and each time made excuses when the moment arrived for getting off; he has been heard since to confess that he durst not have attempted it.

'Sir Edmund's opinion of Admiral Dundas as a commander-in-chief is not favourable. I mentioned that it was my impression, from reading the accounts that came home, that he (Sir Edmund) must have determined to take upon himself to act independently, and as circumstances might demand of him.

'He said it was quite true—that he was reduced to this necessity—that it was a great responsibility, but that there was no help for it; that indeed in this he acted by the advice of Lord Raglan, and at his request; that he (Lord Raglan) told him the expedition must be given up unless he consented to take active charge of it. While saying this, Lord Raglan alluded to the singular position in which he felt himself—viz., that having been educated in the strictest school of discipline, he should yet be suggesting\* to a second in command to set aside the authority of his Commander-in-Chief.'

HATCHFORD, *February 11.*

I last night showed this memorandum to Sir Edmund Lyons, saying that I had no business to make notes of what he had said without his knowledge. He returned it after reading it, confirming its correctness.

(Signed) GEORGE LOCH.

(*Private.*)

CLUMBER, *January 10, 1863.*

MY DEAR MR LOCH,—I am much obliged to you for allowing me to read your interesting memorandum of a conversation with Lord Lyons.

\* Lord Raglan could not have used exactly the words 'should yet be suggesting.' See his reply to the Duke of Newcastle's letter, given in a note, *ante*, p. 325. What Lord Raglan probably spoke of as so strange was the circumstance of his having been *asked* to make the suggestion by the Secretary of State.

I was so often on board his flag-ship off Sebastopol, that you will easily suppose that there is little in it which is new to me; indeed I can corroborate from other sources of information a great deal of it.

What is related in page 20 struck me with *personal* interest. It was done under secret instructions from me, sent (most irregularly, of course, but, as I thought, justifiably on account of the imminent danger) without the knowledge of my colleagues.

This must be known to Kinglake, as he no doubt has my letter.—I am, yours sincerely,

(Signed) NEWCASTLE

## No. II.

### *Argument for avoiding the Attack of the North Side.\**

' THE north front was exceedingly strong by nature, and extended across a ridge of bold and rocky heights, intersected by steep ravines. A permanent fort, conspicuously situated in a commanding position, occupied its centre, and was supported on either side by earthen entrenchments and batteries. The entire front was exposed to enfilade from the right of the position, where heavy guns could readily and securely be placed; and all the approaches were commanded by the men-of-war and steamers in the harbour. This position was, moreover, defended by an army, which, although recently defeated, had retreated to its supports, and was still very powerful, as subsequent events clearly proved.

' To assail such a position by a *coup de main* with an army little superior to the defenders, with nothing but field-

\* It might be assumed that this argument (extracted from the Official Journal of our Siege Operations) is substantially Sir John Burgoyne's; but those who prefer looking to his publicly avowed words will find the same argument in p. 238 *et seq.* of his 'Military Opinions'

‘pieces at its command, and with its flanks and retreat quite insecure, would have been a most desperate undertaking, with every probability of a failure or repulse, the consequences of which would have been most disastrous.

‘A regular siege, on the contrary, required heavy guns and stores of all kinds, and therefore a harbour. Now the only place to the north of Sebastopol where the disembarkation of stores could be effected was the narrow, shallow beach at the mouth of the Katcha, open to every gust of wind, difficult to defend, and which, from its distance in the rear, would have been much exposed, while its communications could have been intercepted at any moment by an enemy capable of such enterprises as he afterwards attempted at Balaklava and Inkerman.’

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No. III.

*Statement (dated 24 Nov. 1867) by Sir Edward Wetherall  
respecting the Flank March.*

I WAS directed to lead the Cavalry, who were at the head of the column of the army; I do not consider that Lord Lucan's command was a reconnoitring column in the ordinary acceptance of the term. My orders were positive to follow the main road which led down to and crossed the Causeway at the head of the harbour as far as I could, and then to take a direction S.S.E. I think (and not W., as the latter direction would have led towards Severnaya), and I was given the Light-house at the head of the Inkerman valley as a general direction. On arriving at the edge of the plateau where the road dipped, I perceived a road to my left, the existence of which I was unaware of. Harding (who was with me) and I galloped up the road some distance, but finding its direction was N.E., we agreed it was better to abandon that line and adhere to the direction given. The Horse-Artillery (Maude's troop), I believe, never left this road, for I recollect, after we had marched

some distance on, hearing the sound of waggons to our left. I went, with Lord Lucan's permission, to see what they were, and found Maude's troop in the road with Lord Raglan, who asked me where the Cavalry were. I replied, About a quarter of a mile to the right. He then directed me to bring them up as quick as possible, as a Russian column had crossed our front.

On returning to the Cavalry, I found them forming up on the open ground near Mackenzie's Farm, and the Greys, who were at the head of the column, were advancing in pursuit of the enemy.

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## No. IV.

*The Flank March. The Order given to Lord Lucan.*

## Memorandum.

THE Cavalry Division supported by the second battalion Rifle Brigade will proceed on reconnaissance in a direction S.S.E., towards a spot marked on the map 'Mackenzie's Farm,' on the great road leading to Sebastopol. This road will be watched both ways, and reported on. The Cavalry will not descend into the road. There is a deep ravine or gully running about N.E., commencing at ruins of Inkerman, which it will be desirable to report upon as to practicability. An officer will be sent back as soon as possible with Earl Lucan's report.

(Signed) RICHARD AIREY,  
*Quartermaster-General.*

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## No. V.

*Letter printed in 'L'Expedition de Crimée' of a French Divisional General whose name is not given by M. de Bazancourt.*

LES bâtiments qui portaient le matériel de siège arrivaient en même temps à Balaclava ; mais on était si loin de s'attendre aux difficultés que l'on allait rencontrer, qu'il fut questions de ne pas débarquer ce matériel, et qu'on parut disposé à tenter une attaque de vive force contre Sébastopol. C'est injustement, selon nous, que l'on a conclu du parti pris par les Généraux Alliés, qu'ils avaient manqué de résolution en cette circonstance. Si les Russes, réfugiés après la bataille de l'Alma sur les hauteurs d'Inkermann, y eussent attendu nos armées, un combat heureux eût peut-être ouvert les portes de Sébastopol aux Alliés. Mais l'armée ennemie, ayant par une marche semblable à celle que venait de faire l'armée Anglo-Française, conservé ses communications avec l'intérieur, et s'étant établie sur le flanc et les derrières des Alliés, une attaque de vive force contre Sébastopol, dans ces conditions, devenait une opération des plus hasardeuses, qui n'entraînait pas dans le caractère méthodique et peu entreprenant du général Anglais [!!!—See *ante*, vol. II. chap. xvi. sec. 25], et que ne pouvait guère risquer le nouveau général, qui, investi depuis quelques jours seulement du commandement, voyait peser sur lui une immense responsabilité. Malakoff (car c'eût été alors, comme toujours, le point d'attaque) n'était pas fortifié comme il l'a été depuis ; mais la position en elle-même déjà très forte pouvait en vingt-quatre heures, et avec l'habileté des Russes à remuer la terre, se couvrir d'ouvrages de campagne, armés d'une puissante artillerie. L'armée Alliée, menacée sur ses derrières par l'armée de secours, ayant à combattre une garnison de 25 à 30,000 hommes, sous le feu de la flotte et des forts du nord, qui ont pris, ainsi qu'on l'a vu depuis, une si grande part à la défense de cette position, courait le danger, en cas d'un succès, d'être jétée à la mer. Le siège régulier fut donc résolu.

## No. VI.

*Extracts from Letters of Lord Raglan tending to show his opinion as to the policy of storming the place at first.*

ALTHOUGH it is true that in his despatches and private letters he omitted—nay, studiously omitted—to disclose his opinion, he nevertheless often wrote in language which could hardly have come from him unless he had been one of those few who perceived the peril of delay, and lamented the irresistible concurrence of opinion which was inducing the Allies to forego the prompt seizure of their prize. Thus on the first day after the completion of the flank march he showed how clearly he perceived the advantage which the Allies gained by surprising the enemy on the South Side, for he wrote: ‘We have taken the enemy quite aback by a manœuvre for which they were not by any means prepared.’\* And five days later he showed himself keenly alive to the advantage which the enemy was gaining from delay, for he wrote: ‘The garrison is actively and incessantly employed in adding to the defences, and forming a continuous line of works along the South front which had previously, to all appearance, been much less protected, and they have likewise been busily occupied in bringing in large stores of supplies of different kinds.’† Again, five days later, he wrote: ‘The enemy however is in great force within the place, and have been busily engaged since they discovered the design of making the South Side the object of attack in strengthening the whole front, and arming the works which they have established with the heaviest artillery.’‡ And yet again, on the same day: ‘The enemy have taken advantage of the time that has elapsed since they discovered our intention of attacking the South Side of Sebas-

\* Private letter from Lord Raglan to the Duke of Newcastle, Sept. 28, 1854.

† Despatch addressed by Lord Raglan to the Secretary of War, Oct. 3, 1854.

‡ The same to the same, Oct. 8, 1854.

‘topol to strengthen the whole front;’ and then, after describing the nature of the defences which the enemy had thus been preparing under the eyes of their invaders, he goes on to say: ‘These formidable preparations make the approach to the place extremely difficult, and without cover an advance upon it is next to impossible.’\* And in yet another letter on the same day, he spoke of the undertaking to subdue the enemy’s fire as ‘an almost hopeless task, considering the number, weight, and metal of the guns they have in position, and the cover they have been able to give them since they saw the necessity of strengthening the South Side of Sebastopol.’†

Now a mere disputer, no doubt, may well enough fence and say that these despatches and letters yield no actual proof of the opinion Lord Raglan had formed upon the question of giving the enemy time instead of assaulting at once; but those who have an eye for the truth will incline, perhaps, to believe that he who could thus be insisting, and insisting again on the strength which the enemy had gained from the respite accorded him, must needs have been one who, having perceived the peril of delay whilst yet there was time to avoid it, had formed, from the first, an opinion that the place should be promptly assaulted. And this, as has been seen in the text, is the opinion ascribed to Lord Raglan by the two men who enjoyed his most intimate confidence—that is, by Sir Edmund Lyons and General Airey.

\* Private letter from Lord Raglan to the Duke of Newcastle, Oct. 8, 1854.

† The same to the same of the same date, but written later, and headed ‘most confidential.’

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## No. VII.

*Extracts showing that in November 1854, both the French and English Engineers came back, after all, to 'enterprise' as offering the best means of extrication.*

In a memorandum before me in the handwriting of Sir John Burgoyne he says: 'In the present state of affairs of the Allied armies before Sebastopol some decided measure of progress must be immediately adopted, either by a vigorous assault of the place, or an attack on the enemy's army in our rear as a preliminary to it, both of them arduous undertakings, and under arrangements that will require energy and audacity on the part of the forces fronting in every direction.' The memorandum is not dated, but it is marked by Lord Raglan in pencil with these words: 'This has no date, but it was previous to the battle of the 5th.' And in his memorandum of the 28th of November on General Bizot's project of attack Sir John Burgoyne writes: 'This, as seems to be confessed by General Bizot, would not be the most methodical and safe course to pursue under ordinary circumstances of adequate means and a favourable season of the year; but under the pressure of our present situation it would seem imperative to adopt a more short and enterprising process to accelerate our proceedings. . . . The circumstances under which the Allies are now placed before Sebastopol may in some degree be compared to those under which the Duke of Wellington considered it necessary at sieges in the Peninsula to adopt irregular and somewhat hazardous modes of attack for want of means and time for the more systematic course.'

Is it possible to be reasoned into the belief that 'audacity' and an 'enterprising process' would have been more opportune in the closing days of November than in the first or second of the weeks after the battle of the Alma?



## No. VIII.

*Extract of Return to the Admiralty showing the number of men and the quantity of material landed from the English fleet to aid the land forces in the siege of Sebastopol down to 28th of October.*

Officers and seamen, 1786.

Officers and marines (besides 400 more landed at Eupatoria), 1530.

6 68-pounders, with 400 rounds for each gun.

50 32-pounders, with 150 rounds of shot and 30 of shell for each gun.

9 24-pound howitzers, } with 70 rounds of ammunition.  
9 12-pound howitzers, }

1300 8-inch shells.

3000 8-inch cartridges.

680 24-pounder rockets.

770 8-inch cargasses.

Timbers and planks collected from different points for platforms.

## No. IX.

*General de Todleben's Explanations of Prince Mentschikoff's Reasons for his Flank March.*

VOYONS par quelles raisons le Prince Menchikow avait été déterminé à entreprendre une marche de flanc sur Bakhtchisarai.

Après l'occupation du Belbeck par les Alliés et leur campement en vue des fortifications du côté Nord, la situation du Prince Menchikow était devenue fort critique. Les ouvrages du côté Nord se trouvaient—dans le cas d'une attaque dirigée contre eux par les Alliés—réduits à leurs propres forces, et ces forces, en comparaison de celles des Alliés, étaient parfaitement insignifiantes; l'armée Russe, séparée d'elles par une large baie, ne pouvait leur prêter aucun secours.

On devait, en outre, dans la supposition d'une attaque des fortifications du Nord, l'attendre à ce qu'une partie des troupes de l'assaillant s'étendirent vers la gauche et occuperait une forte position sur les rochers encarpés de la ferme Mackenzie et des hauteurs d'Inkermann.

La Tschernaïa est bordée de rochers sur presque toute la longueur de son cours, qui ne peuvent être franchis qu'en quatre endroits très rapprochés les uns des autres. Ces passages présentent tous les inconvénients des passages de montagne, et peuvent être, sans beaucoup d'efforts, rendus tout à fait inaccessibles au moyen d'un petit corps d'infanterie appuyé par quelques bouches à feu. Si les Alliés eussent occupé cette position, notre armée aurait été forcée de rester à Sébastopol et d'attendre l'ennemi sur le mont Sapouné qui, présentant une position assez forte, avait pourtant le désavantage d'une trop grande étendue—environ douze verstes. Par suite de la position prise par l'ennemi sur les hauteurs d'Inkermann, le Prince Menchikow aurait en ses communications coupées avec l'intérieur de la Russie, et alors la situation de l'armée Russe, privée de ses approvisionnements et de l'espoir de recevoir des renforts, aurait été fort pénible.

Il est vrai que dans ce cas, la garnison de Sébastopol aurait pu être notablement renforcée par l'armée ; mais si l'on considère l'étendue en longueur du terrain qu'occupaient nos troupes, les forces supérieures de l'ennemi et l'issue de la bataille de l'Alma, on voit que nous ne pouvions avoir la certitude de vaincre l'ennemi dans le cas où il aurait attaqué la ville. Tous les avantages étaient évidemment de son côté, et s'il eût obtenu un succès, non seulement nous perdions la ville et la flotte, mais notre armée elle-même était aussi perdue.

Ayant bien pesé toutes ces circonstances, le Prince Menchikow, convaincu que son armée n'était pas en état de sauver Sébastopol si l'ennemi dirigeait une attaque contre cette ville, jugea qu'il valait mieux prendre les mesures les plus efficaces et employer les efforts les plus énergiques pour la défense de la presqu'île de Crimée. Néanmoins, il gardait encore l'espoir que, si l'irrésolution des Alliés et le courage désespéré de nos

## No. XV.

*Armament of those Russian Batteries which were opposed to the Batteries of the Besiegers on the 17th of October.*

| BUTS PRINCIPAUX.                                   | Canons à bombe<br>de 8 pouds. | Canons. |        |        |        | Canons Caron-<br>ades. |        |        | Licornes * |            | Mortiers.  |            | Total. |
|--|-------------------------------|---------|--------|--------|--------|------------------------|--------|--------|------------|------------|------------|------------|--------|
|  |                               |         |        |        |        |                        |        |        |            |            |            |            |        |
|  |                               | de 68.  | de 36. | de 24. | de 12. | de 56.                 | de 24. | de 12. | de 1 poud. | de 4 poud. | de 5 poud. | de 2 poud. |        |
| Batteries Françaises sur<br>la Chersonese, . . .   | ..                            | 1       | ..     | 5      | ..     | ..                     | ..     | ..     | 3          | 4          | ..         | ..         | 13     |
| Batteries Françaises du<br>Mont Rodolphe, . . .    | 5                             | ..      | 13     | 6      | 6      | ..                     | 10     | ..     | 7          | ..         | 1          | 3          | 51     |
| Batteries Anglaises de la<br>Montagne Verte, . . . | ..                            | 2       | 2      | 5      | ..     | ..                     | 11     | 4      | ..         | ..         | 1          | ..         | 25     |
| Batteries Anglaises du<br>Mont Worontzow, . . .    | ..                            | 2       | 4      | 13     | ..     | ..                     | ..     | ..     | 5          | ..         | ..         | ..         | 24     |
| Batteries Anglaises de<br>Lancaster, . . . . .     | ..                            | ..      | 2      | ..     | ..     | 3                      | ..     | ..     | ..         | ..         | ..         | ..         | 5      |
| Total, . . . . .                                   | 5                             | 5       | 21     | 29     | 6      | 3                      | 21     | 4      | 15         | 4          | 2          | 3          | 118    |

\* The Licorne is a Russian variety of the Howitzer.

## No. XVI.

*Strength and Armament of the three Russian Sea-fort Batteries which were engaged by the Allied Fleets.*

| BATTERIES.             | MEN. | Cannon.                 |              |              |              | Licornes.         |                   | Mortars of 5 pounds. | Total pieces of ordnance. | Total of pieces so placed as to be able to answer the fire from the ships. |
|------------------------|------|-------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|---------------------------|--|
|                        |      | Shell guns of 3 pounds. | 36-pounders. | 24-pounders. | 18-pounders. | Long, of 1 pound. | Long, of 4 pound. |                      |                           |  |
|                        |      |                         |              |              |              |                   |                   |                      |                           |  |
| Quarantine Sea-Fort, . | 277  | 2                       | 29           | ...          | ...          | 12                | 9                 | 6                    | 58                        | 33   |
| Fort Alexander, . .    | 272  | 2                       | 11           | 16           | 4            | 19                | ...               | 4                    | 56                        | 17   |
| Fort Constantine, . .  | 470  | ...                     | ...          | 50           | ...          | 34                | 4                 | 6                    | 94                        | 23   |
|                        | 1019 |                         |              |              |              |                   |                   |                      |                           |  |
|                        |      | 4                       | 40           | 66           | 4            | 65                | 13                | 16                   | 208                       | 73   |

marins permettaient de contenir pour quelque temps l'ennemi devant Sébastopol, l'armée pourrait, après avoir reçu des renforts, arrêter les succès ultérieurs des Alliés.

Guidé par ces puissantes considérations, le Prince Menchikow prit la résolution de quitter la ville et de se diriger vers Bakhtchisarai, afin de pouvoir renouer ses communications avec la Russie et menacer le flanc et les derrières de l'ennemi sans se préoccuper de l'impression défavorable que son éloignement devait produire sur la garnison de Sébastopol.

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No. X.

*Protest of Vice-Admiral Korniloff against Prince Mentschikoff's plan of still keeping the army aloof from Sebastopol.*

It appears that the importance of preventing the enemy from penetrating into Sebastopol, is beyond all discussion. This is evident from the very efforts of our enemies to get possession of the town, together with the mass of Government establishments and ships that are in it. The loss of either would be irretrievable for Russia; even the subsequent destruction of the whole army of the enemy on the ruins of Sebastopol would not compensate the Emperor for the demolition of that important port, and for the loss of the whole Black Sea fleet, not only with its ships, but with all the officers and sailors who had been trained by such constant and unremitting exertions. To defend Sebastopol with the forces at our command is impossible. The line of defence extends over seven versts, intersected by deep ravines with many approaches, which can only be defended by our artillery and by the simple temporary earthworks. Three columns, each consisting of 15,000 men, might easily, by three different ways, descend the heights occupied by the enemy's camp, and, with no great sacrifice, crush their respective adversaries, however desperate their resistance might be; the seamen and reserve soldiers now

forming the garrison scarcely amount to 15,000. I therefore consider it indispensable for the security of the town to double this number of the garrison—i.e., to increase it by a division. Only then, when we shall have the seamen in reserve and be able to employ them for sapping works, and for keeping up the fortifications as well as strengthening the defences, for which sailors are so eminently suited—then, and only then, can we hope to resist an assault and to save the town. The movement of the army, though useful in diverting the attention of the enemy, may meet with a reverse, and thus open a passage to the enemy for the object of all his efforts; and besides, considering the small number of our troops, this movement would be anything but formidable. The enemy, having spies, will soon discover the weakness of the garrison, and of the army itself, and, benefiting by the opportune moment, will seize both town and fleet in the very teeth of our army. In conclusion, to secure the defence of Sebastopol, and to employ the remainder of our troops to watch the North Side, whither the reinforcements coming from Russia should be directed, is our only practical mode of defence, and I consider it not only possible, but even certain.

SEBASTOPOL, 19th September (1st October) 1854.

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## No. XI.

### *Grounds of Statement as to Strength of the Garrison.*

It is right to say that General de Todleben (p. 277) cuts down this strength to the round numbers of 28,000; and therefore it may be well for me to give the authority on which I rely. I adopt the figures which are given in full official detail by Gendre, the author of '*Les troupes de la ville de Sebastopol pour servir*;' and the following is the note which authenticates his statements: 'The number of troops is taken from the following report of the Vice-Commodore of the fleet, dated 1st October 1854.'

‘Admiral Novosilsky on the 16th (28th) September; report of Captain Sokovnin (who brought the recruit marching battalions) of the 23d September (5th October), and lists of the troops under the command of Captains Bartenaff and Varnitzky on the 13th (25th) September. The number of infantry is taken from the muster-rolls of General Möller of the 23d September (5th October), and of the Commander of the Boutir Regiment of the 24th September (6th October).’

General Todleben speaks of the battalions as being only forty-two in number, whereas Gendre’s list (and he describes by name each battalion) amounts to forty-five.

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## No. XII.

### NOTE RESPECTING THE STRENGTH OF THE BESIEGERS AND THE GARRISON IN OCTOBER 1854.

#### *Strength of the French.*

L’ARRIVÉE de ces renforts [the remainder of General Levaillant’s division] porte l’armée Française en Crimée à 46,000 hommes, et 5500 chevaux.\*

#### *Strength of the English Infantry.*

‘I enclose . . . and, 3dly, a statement of the effectives of the infantry, by which you will see that the rank and file little exceed 16,000; and when these have furnished the guards and working parties for the trenches, there remain in camp available for the support of those in advance in case of a sortie, and for the maintenance of our position, which is assailable on our extreme right, and right rear, something under 8000 men.’†

\* Niel, p. 65. The day with which he connects his statement is the 18th of October.

† Lord Raglan to Duke of Newcastle, 23d October 1854.

*Strength of the Turkish Troops.*

Under the command of General Canrobert, 8 battalions, probably about 5000 men.

Under the command of Lord Raglan, about 4400 men.

*Strength of the Garrison.*

See chap. xvi., showing the strength on the 6th of October, and add to the figures there given 3112 infantry, being the strength of the 'Minsk' regiment, which was sent in as a reinforcement on the 9th.\*

## No. XIII.

*The French Siege Batteries, 17th of October.*

|                      |  |                  |
|----------------------|--|------------------|
| No.                  |  |                  |
| 1. (de la marine)    | 7 canons de 30, 2 obusiers de 22°, . . .             | Total, 9 pieces. |
| 2. „                 | 8 „ 4 „ . . .  | „ 12 „           |
| 3. (de l'artillerie) | 6 mortiers de 27°, 2 mortiers de 22°, . . .          | „ 8 „            |
| 4. „                 | 6 canons de 24, 2 mortiers de 22°, . . .             | „ 8 „            |
| 5. {                 | 1 <sup>re</sup> face, 4 obusiers de 22°,             | } „ 12 „         |
| „                    | 2 <sup>e</sup> face, 4 canons de 24,                 |                  |
| „                    | 3 <sup>e</sup> face, 2 canons de 24, 2 canons de 16, |                  |
| 6. (de la marine)    | 4 obusiers de 22°, seuls en état de faire feu        |                  |
|                      | de lendemain, . . . . .                              | „ 4 „            |
|                      |  | Total, 53 „      |

\* Todleben, p. 285.

**END OF VOL. III.**

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